


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THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF ANARCHISM

Edited by Carl Levy and Matthew S. Adams



The Palgrave Handbook of Anarchism

Carl Levy • Matthew S. Adams
Editors

The Palgrave Handbook of Anarchism

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Editors

Carl Levy
Department of Politics
and International Relations
Goldsmiths, University of London
London, UK

Matthew S. Adams
Department of Politics, History
and International Relations
Loughborough University
Loughborough, UK

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IN MEMORIAM

James Joll: 1918–1994
Murray Bookchin: 1921–2006
Paul Avrich: 1931–2006
Colin Ward: 1924–2010
Nunzio Pernicone: 1940–2013
Ursula LeGuin: 1929–2018

PRAISE PAGE

“Adams and Levy’s modest aim is to provide a comprehensive account of anarchist history and ideas. The Handbook of Anarchism achieves this aim and does far more. This excellent collection of essays shows how anarchist critique has given rise to a living, dynamic tradition and why that critique remains vital. The whole is far greater than the sum of its parts. It explores the tensions and commonalities in anarchist politics and the endurance and adaptiveness of anarchists who continue to contest systemic injustice and oppression.”

—Ruth Kinna, *Professor of Political Theory, Loughborough University, UK*

“At a time when anarchist politics is on the rise and has visibly increased its appeal and influence in contemporary political and social action, this welcome collection provides a comprehensive and exceptionally insightful journey in anarchist thinking, traditions, history, tactics and impact on our culture and society. Carl Levy and Matthew Adams have gathered the best and most insightful scholars on anarchism and put together an indispensable and thought-provoking guide to understanding anarchism’s global dimension and connections, its ideological distinctiveness and diverse historical manifestations from the French revolution to Occupy and the Arab Spring. This book will be essential reading to anyone interested in making sense of both our past and of the politics of 21st century.”

—Ilaria Favretto, *Professor of Contemporary European History, Kingston University, London, UK*

“The Palgrave Handbook of Anarchism is a wonderful resource for anyone interested in the past, present, and future of anarchism. The editors have assembled many of the leading scholars of the subject to reflect on a vast array of topics, from seminal historical episodes to broad traditions of thought. Straddling anarchist theory and practice, this is an illuminating, comprehensive, and thought-provoking volume.”

—Duncan Bell, *Reader in Political Thought and International Relations, Christ’s College, University of Cambridge, UK*

“This is an indispensable reference work for anyone interested in the history and theory of anarchism, providing an impressive range of coverage and expert scholarly discussion of the issues, people, events and developments of the tradition. It should become a standard guide for anyone studying or teaching the subject.”

—Gregory Claeys, *Professor of the History of Political Thought,
Royal Holloway, University of London, UK*

“Will certainly become the key text on anarchism: theoretically aware with a global perspective, historically well-informed with a proper focus on key events and people from 1848 and Proudhon down to the Occupy and Indignados movements. No anarchist stone is left unturned or thrown.”

—Donald Sassoon, *Emeritus Professor of Comparative European History,
Queen Mary, University of London, UK*

“A real intellectual achievement. More than a handbook, Levy and Adams have assembled a state-of-the-art conceptual guide to anarchist history, theory and practice. The collective range and individual depth of the volume’s essays is impressive. Much more than a resource, this collection redefines the field and sets an intellectual agenda.”

—Raymond Craib, *Associate Professor of History, Cornell University, USA*

PREFACE

Anarchism is one of the oldest political philosophies in the world. Before authority and government existed, it was simply how humans organised their affairs. In our individualistic contemporary culture, the fourth-century *Tao Te Ching* is celebrated as a guide to spiritual self-awareness. But in fact Lao Tzu's ancient text should be read as an eloquent articulation of the full meaning of anarchism, political as well as spiritual. For the more I understand anarchism, the more I realise that anarchism digs deep into us. It is about much more than how to 'run' society—an inherently hierarchical formulation; it is about how to *live*, above all with one another. To eschew all power relationships is not merely to reject government, it is to re-engineer every human relationship into one of equality, respect and cooperation. It is to change oneself as much as it is to change society.

This book is an extraordinarily rich source of anarchist thought and history. There is much to explore and much to learn. Each of us comes to anarchism our own way. Almost no anarchist inherited this philosophy unquestioned from their parents and forbears. Every anarchist, I suspect, starts out as something else and is only changed by the jolt of experience, the eruption of a problem and the urgent quest for an answer. Anarchists are made, not born. Indeed, they make themselves.

My own journey began in painful disillusionment. I had been a career diplomat for the British government, a profession I thought I would enjoy my whole life, culminating perhaps in an ambassadorship in one of Her Majesty's embassies. But I witnessed first-hand how my government, and colleagues, lied about the Iraq war. I knew the facts—and thus the lies—because I worked on Iraq, in fact directly on the issue of so-called weapons of mass destruction. Eventually, I resigned from the diplomatic service after giving then-secret testimony to an official inquiry into the war.

My disillusionment however ran deeper than the war, terrible though it was. In early twenty-first-century New York, where I then lived, fashionably dressed

diners enjoyed fresh sushi in downtown restaurants while, a few miles away, children went hungry. Worldwide, the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere was rising inexorably. The attacks of September 11, 2001, had ushered in what already seemed like permanent war. Politicians shamelessly took money from tycoons and corporations yet everyone still pretended we enjoyed ‘democracy’. These problems were all too obvious and still no one seemed alarmed. Governments, like the one I worked for, had no credible answers and yet no one demanded better. I am a deeply political beast. I could *feel* that things were not right. The system was not working, but what would? And thus began my exploration.

In a library at Washington Square, I read and read. From Ludwig Wittgenstein, I learned that the things that matter most to humans—solidarity, meaning, love—have no terms. And therefore that these things have no accounting in the allegedly ‘logical’ neo-classical economic theory that dominated contemporary thinking. But how could these most fundamental human needs be elevated? From Marcuse and Benjamin, I learned how to deconstruct the economics and politics that I had learned in university and reveal the deeper power relations hidden within. I began to realise that what matters in any analysis of society is not what theory tells us, but what *is*: put simply, the facts. Who wins and who loses? Who rules, and who suffers? Suddenly, the haze of confusion dissipates and the facts are simple and stark and the solutions clear. If people are to be treated equally, they must have an equal say in their affairs. The only way to guarantee this inclusion is for people to govern themselves: any hierarchy is intrinsically corruptible. And hierarchy, with its humiliation of both the managed and the manager, is inherently dehumanising. By random chance, I came upon complexity theory which showed me not only a model of the complex system that is the world today, but explained how individuals and small groups can trigger dramatic change across the whole system. The revolution I wanted was suddenly more plausible.

And as I read, I realised that others of course had walked this path before me—Kropotkin, Bakunin, Fanelli, Stirner, Godwin and New York City’s own Emma Goldman in whose very footsteps I trod around the Lower East Side where I lived. I had loved Orwell’s *Homage to Catalonia* since childhood, but only now did I begin to understand the anarchist revolution he was describing. I learned from Colin Ward, Murray Bookchin and many of the writers included in this volume who shone their bright lights on the current era, such as Marina Sitrin’s from-the-ground insights into the factory occupations in contemporary Argentina—this was anarchism in action today.

The financial crisis of 2007 was another explosive signal that the orthodoxy was in deep trouble. The grotesque and uncontrolled profiteering of a few had endangered the welfare of the many. The lie that democratic government could modulate the excesses of capitalism was laid bare for all to see. Government was in fact insuring those excesses, literally. Though few of the occupants of Zuccotti Park would have called themselves anarchists, Occupy Wall Street began to manifest the most important attributes of an anarchist approach,

above all that everyone had an equal right to speak. After they departed the park, some Occupiers implemented these ideas. When a hurricane struck New York City, it was Occupy activists who mobilised most quickly and effectively to organise help for city residents who had lost electricity and lacked food or water: not charity but *mutual aid*, another core anarchist precept. These ideas were not mere theories, they were animating people and change right here, right now.

Anarchist ideas have flourished in the most unlikely places. In a corner of war-torn Syria, in a region known by the Kurds as Rojava, a new kind of society has come into being, governed by the people themselves without the state. ‘Democratic confederalism’ they call it, where decisions are taken by those most affected by them at the level of the commune. To deal with wrongdoing, the community seeks not punishment but reconciliation between victim and perpetrator, between their families and within the community as a whole. The goal is not punishment but ‘social peace’. In the forums of self-government, non-Kurdish groups—Arabs, Assyrians—are given the floor before others in order to ensure that minorities have a fair say. Women co-chair all meetings and fight alongside men in their epic battle against ‘Daesh’ as they call the extremists sometimes known as the Islamic State. Rojava is a modern echo of the anarchist society that came to life in Republican Spain in the 1930s. It is a fragile dispensation, surviving in the furnace of war and great power rivalries, but Rojava represents a living repudiation of the lazy claim that anarchism doesn’t work in practice, or at scale.

Today, humanity faces very serious dangers. Climate change now risks entering a vicious cycle of unstoppable warming, whose only culmination is planetary catastrophe. The contemporary economic system—some call it capitalism, I think there are better words—is now a grotesque spectacle where algorithmic traders amass unprecedented fortunes for zero social benefit while the wealth of the large majority has stagnated or declined. As the rich evade taxes and hide their wealth overseas, governments enforce ‘austerity’ on everyone else. As a result, faith in institutions and government has declined to abysmal lows. So far, it is the far right which has profited most from this debacle. Demagogues and proto-fascists are on the rise in America and across the world, from Poland to the Philippines. But rather than blame the system that has so evidently brought the world to this disastrous pass, they sow hatred against the ‘other’—the immigrant, the foreigner, or simply the political enemy ... anyone!

There has never been a more urgent time to reconsider and learn about anarchism, an undertaking which this book admirably facilitates. I once believed that wise people in accountable governments could govern the world for everyone’s ultimate benefit. It is not that I think that people in government are evil. It is systems, not inherent nature, that allows people to do bad things, I believe. But my experience of government above all showed me that it is incompetent to manage the extraordinary complexity of our current condition. Top-down authority is incapable of understanding such a vast, massively connected and dynamic system as the world today. Government should be in the hands of

those who know their own circumstances best, the people themselves. Not only is self-government more effective, it also permits a kind of human flourishing that is unfamiliar in today's pervasive culture of cynicism, vapidness and consumption. I believe the very opposite of Hobbes. When people are given responsibility for their own affairs, they tend to behave responsibly. When given the opportunity, and not told what to do, people tend to choose cooperation over competition. And at the deepest level, I passionately believe that only in authentic and honest human relationships can we be truly ourselves and enjoy the full self-expression that should be everyone's right. And such relationships are only possible when there is no power, when people are equal. This is anarchism.

As for anyone, my journey is never complete. I do not expect to arrive. And indeed one of the great beauties of anarchism is that it does not offer an *end*: a utopia or a blueprint for the perfect society (indeed such blueprints are inherently fascistic). Anarchism is about *means*—how we should live our lives today. Anarchists accept that humans are imperfect; we are always a work in progress. Anarchism is, amongst other things, a philosophy of time. Unlike socialists or capitalists, anarchists do not pretend that things will be better for everyone in the future, and thereby justify present injustice and sacrifice. But if we live by certain principles now, a better kind of society will emerge. Those principles are elaborated by the thinkers in this book. The most cardinal, that no one should wield power over anyone else. Put that idea into practice and things will change, without fail. The means are the ends.

London, UK
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Carne Ross

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Matthew S. Adams Lecturer in Politics, History and Communication, Department of Politics, History and International Relations, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK

Lara Apps Tutor in History and Humanities, Athabasca University, Athabasca, Edmonton, AB, Canada

Constance Bantman Senior Lecturer in French, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK

David Berry Senior Lecturer in French and European Studies, Department of Politics, History and International Relations, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK

Alexandre Christoyannopoulos Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Department of Politics, History and International Relations, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK

Michael Coates Principal Lecturer, Faculty of Arts & Humanities, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK

Sky Croeser Lecturer in Internet Studies, MCASI, Curtin University, Perth, WA, Australia

Erika Cudworth Professor of Feminist Animal Studies, University of East London, London, UK

Anthony D'Agostino Professor of History, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, Oakland, CA, USA

Laurence Davis College Lecturer in Government and Politics, University College Cork, Cork, Republic of Ireland

Francis Dupuis-Déri Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada

Kathy E. Ferguson Professor of Political Science and Women's Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Hawai'i Mānoa, Honolulu, HI, USA

Rhiannon Firth Senior Research Officer in Sociology, University of Essex, Essex, UK

Benjamin Franks Lecturer in Social and Political Philosophy, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

Laura Galián, Ph.D. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

James Gifford Professor of English, Fairleigh Dickinson University, Vancouver, BC, Canada

Robert Graham Independent Scholar, Vancouver, BC, Canada

Kahala Johnson, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of Hawai'i Mānoa, Honolulu, HI, USA

Nathan J. Jun Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of English, Humanities, and Philosophy, Midwestern State University, Wichita Falls, TX, USA

Donna M. Kowal Professor of Communication, The College at Brockport, State University of New York, New York, NY, USA

Ole Birk Laursen Research Associate, Open University, Milton Keynes, UK

Carl Levy Professor of Politics, Department of Politics and International Relations, Goldsmiths, University of London, London, UK

Mark Mattern Professor of Political Science, Department of Politics and Global Citizenship, Baldwin Wallace University, Berea, OH, USA

C. Alexander McKinley Professor of History, Department of History, St. Ambrose University, Davenport, IA, USA

John Merriman Charles Seymour Professor of History, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA

Elliot Murphy, Ph.D. Candidate in Neurolinguistics, University College London, London, UK

Saul Newman Professor of Political Theory, Department of Politics and International Relations, Goldsmiths, University of London, London, UK

Lucy Nicholas Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn, VIC, Australia

Andy Price Principal Lecturer in Politics, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK

Alex Prichard Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK

Maia Ramnath Writer, Organiser and Adjunct Professor of History, Fordham University, New York, USA

Carne Ross New York, NY, USA

Peter Ryley Formerly Academic Co-Ordinator for Lifelong Learning, University of Hull, Hull, UK

Deric Shannon Associate Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology, Oxford College, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

Marina Sitrin Assistant Professor of Sociology, State University of New York, Binghamton, Binghamton, NY, USA

Judith Suissa Professor of Philosophy of Education, University College London, London, UK

Davide Turcato Applied Scientist and Historian, Dublin, Republic of Ireland

Lucien van der Walt Professor of Economic and Industrial Sociology, Sociology Department, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

Dana M. Williams Associate Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology, California State University, Chico, CA, USA

Shawn P. Wilbur Independent Scholar, Gresham, OR, USA

James Michael Yeoman Teaching Associate in Modern European History, Department of History, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK

Kenyon Zimmer Associate Professor of History, University of Texas, Arlington, Arlington, TX, USA



Introduction

Carl Levy and Matthew S. Adams

THE REVIVAL OF ANARCHISM AS POLITICS, METHODOLOGY, AND ITS PRESENCE IN ACADEMIA

Anarchism is a political concept and social movement associated with future or here and now politico-social projects without the state. It is informed by a commitment to the autonomy of the individual and the quest for voluntary consensus. In historical overviews of anarchism, it is often presented as possessing family resemblances to political, intellectual, and cultural innovations in classical Greece, ancient China, medieval Basra and medieval Europe, Civil War England, and Revolutionary Paris. Equally, anthropologists will point to ‘stateless peoples’ throughout the world and throughout all of human history as evidence of the deep pedigree that informs anarchist rejections of the state as an organising principle, and, indeed for most of humankind’s existence, the state did not exist. As a self-conscious ideology—as an ‘ism’—anarchism may owe its existence to the political formulations and intellectual currents that shaped Europe in the wake of the dual revolution, but it is also, crucially, a global and not merely European tradition. Anarchism’s history—its tenets, concepts, approaches, arguments, and style—was thus nurtured by global currents that spread people and ideas around the world, and its local manifestation was often shaped by domestic cultural and intellectual traditions that make anarchism an elusively protean ideology.¹

C. Levy (✉)

Department of Politics and International Relations, Goldsmiths,
University of London, London, UK
e-mail: c.levy@gold.ac.uk

M. S. Adams

Department of Politics, History and International Relations, Loughborough
University, Leicestershire, UK

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The sub-schools that are a feature of anarchism—its admixtures of ‘individualism’, ‘collectivism’, ‘communism’, and ‘syndicalism’, which are cross-cut by differing attitudes towards the economy and organisation—add a layer of complexity to fathoming the nature of this ideology. And more recently, as we shall see, new takes on anarchism have become significant presences: anarcha-feminism, Green anarchism, and postmodern or postanarchism, draw on or refine ideas and practices which had always been present in the anarchist canon.

Since the Second World War, three waves of anarchist revival have occurred in the wake of the collapse of the Spanish Republic and the march of Franco’s troops into the anarchist stronghold of Barcelona in early 1939. Although certain formations of syndicalist action, particularly in the Global South from the 1940s, may be said to carry forward much of the spirit of pre-Second World War anarchism. But these movements, at least until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition of the People’s Republic of China from a Leninist to a capitalist state, tended to be overshadowed by national liberation movements drawing their inspiration from the so-called socialist world.²

The first wave of the anarchist revival of the 1940s and ‘50s was primarily composed of coterie of intellectuals, artists, students, and bohemians, and included, in the Anglophone world, people such as Paul Goodman, Colin Ward, Ursula Le Guin, Herbert Read, Alex Comfort, Judith Malina, and Murray Bookchin. Much of their intellectual and imaginative labours were not, at first, joined to mass movements, even if they may have been inspired by their histories, or drawn energy from observing the various political and social movements that began to move to the centre of radical political life. Similarly, despite their occasional dismissal by rival anarchists for their bookish elitism, neither did they exert much influence in mainstream academia, or even mainstream political and civil society more broadly. But their anarchist methodologies, anarchist provocations, and anarchist imaginations, did stimulate new pathways in a host of academic disciplines including sociology, pedagogy, psychology, geography, urban planning, literature and historical studies, and they occasionally found coverage in various media outlets as ‘public intellectuals’, chiefly commenting on the cultural issues on which their modest fame tended to rest.³ C. Wright Mills, a figure moving in these circles, is a case in point.⁴ Famous for his role in defining this ‘new’ left in opposition to the ‘old’ which was seemingly discrediting itself in various totalitarian experiments, he articulated an anti-Cold War sociology that attempted to break out of the straitjacket of ‘Bomb Culture’⁵ functionalist sociology. More than an academic distraction, he wanted to warn the peoples and elites of the East and West of an impending nuclear catastrophe, seeing in the Cold War antagonists self-reinforcing, mirror-image, military-industrial complexes in operation. Wright Mills’ work, urgent in the context of mutually assured destruction, drew its power from an older tradition of thinking and activism: the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), through his signal intellectual influence Thorstein Veblen, an admirer of the IWW in its 1910s pomp, and the nineteenth-century anarchist tradition of social enquiry that had, amongst other things, launched a powerful moral critique of capitalism and the state.

Voices like Wright Mills' were muffled but slowly gained traction with the dual crises of Suez and Budapest, and the emergence of the African American Freedom Movement.⁶ Nevertheless, when the first edition of George Woodcock's seminal general history of anarchism appeared in 1962, the author saw fit to issue a sombre obituary for anarchist politics. This book, Woodcock told his readers, analysed a movement which was dead.⁷ In the wake of the unexpected events of 1968, and the broader period of social change and turmoil that stretched from the middle of the 1950s to the 1970s, Woodcock, in a second edition, conceded his death notice may have been premature.⁸ His shift from pessimism to optimism was partly a product of the fact that he drifted out of anarchism's orbit when he left austerity Britain for a new life on the west coast of Canada in 1949, but it was also a reflection of the changed circumstances for a movement that had seemingly drifted into redundancy after the tragedy of Spain.⁹ Black flags were spotted anew from Paris to Berkeley, with the events in Paris in the spring of 1968 suggesting that, apparently, spontaneous events founded on direct action and grassroots occupations could paralyse an advanced capitalist democracy within a matter of days.¹⁰

During the 1970s and 1980s, the spin-offs from the 1960s and '1968' were embodied in a variety of new social movements highlighting new, second-wave, anarchist-inflected groupuscules, activists, and thinkers. These included second-wave feminism, the Greens, the anti-nuke movements, and Gay Rights, all of which practised forms of small 'A' anarchism that invoked participatory democracy, affinity groups, the personal as political, consensual forms of democratic governance, prefiguration, and direct action.¹¹ Despite the clear resurgence of interest in anarchist ideas that these groups represented, it is important not to replace Woodcock's 1962 obituary with eulogy. These waves of 'New Anarchism', or new politics with an anarchist flavour, style, theory, and methodology, were still overshadowed by social democratic, socialist, Eurocommunist, and Global South radical populist and Leninist-Nationalist competitors. Moreover, the intellectual and organisational bases of these movements could be varied, drawing strength and inspiration from a potpourri of historical and contemporary actors.¹² But something had, nevertheless, changed.

The greatest impulse for a more publicly noticeable revival of anarchism as action, theory, and methodology emerged from a complex of historical ruptures. The penetration of varieties of neo-liberalism in the West and the Global South; the downfall of the Soviet Union and the Marxist-Leninist model in its former bloc, and in its iteration as the 'heroic guerrilla' or radical post-colonial governments in the Global South; and the astounding rise of the Chinese model of Leninist Capitalism in place of Maoism, all informed an unstable political universe in which anarchism was rediscovered.¹³ Besides the rise of political Islamism, the greatest challenge to the New World Order were forms of anarchism or anarchist-type movement that point to a third wave of anarcho-activism. This new radicalism was embodied in the rising in the Lacandon jungles of Mexico's Chiapas in 1994, under the banner of the post-Leninist Zapatistas and cognate movements in urban and rural areas of Latin America.

This sparked a series of mobilisations that culminated, via the War on Terror/Iraq War, with the crisis of 2007/2008, the Occupy/Square movements, and associated social aftershocks from 2010 to 2014, which have unsettled mainstream politics in a similar manner to 1968, globally reshuffling the deck in unanticipated and unpredictable ways. This 20-year wave of social movements is a complex story of several strands. The Global Justice Movement, the networking of social forums, the War on Terror after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the end of the so-called Great Moderation or Great Speculation, the crash in 2008, and the Euro Crisis and the Age of Austerity led to the rise of Square movements from Tahrir to Zuccotti Square, grassroots radicalisms and left-wing populism in Latin America, and then in Europe and North America (and of course to a counter-blast of right-wing populisms).¹⁴

These strands of dissent became a motor in Latin America, North America, Europe, and elsewhere, inspiring academics and public intellectuals, and spurring in turn the unprecedented growth of ‘Anarchist Studies’ in the universities, and amongst a broader interested public.¹⁵ But the intellectual field had been fertilised by several generations of radical academics, and by curious and sympathetic investigators and practitioners in the social sciences, the humanities and the arts, stretching from the 1940s to the present.¹⁶ One did not need to be an anarchist to see that the questions posed by anarchism demanded addressing; as did, for example, in its classical period, the theoretician of the bourgeois state, capitalism, and bureaucracy, Max Weber, who sharpened his own research agenda and political ethos by engaging in close discussions and friendly debates with anarchists and syndicalists.¹⁷ Similarly, in our own era, anarchism has served as a muse, sparring partner, or method, without those engaged in their respective fields necessarily declaring themselves ‘card-carrying’ anarchists, or producing works aimed at a self-identified anarchist mass movement. For the anthropologist David Graeber, for example, who was closely associated with the direct-actionist Global Justice Movement and later ‘present at the creation’ of Occupy Wall Street, anarchism was a form of consensual grassroots democracy without the state, and much of his academic work seeks to understand how people can negotiate their lives without the state.¹⁸ Similarly, for another anthropologist, James Scott, an anarchist ‘squint’, assisted the investigator in perceiving the hidden transcripts of peasants’ lives in the Global South (e.g. in Brazil, Southeast Asia, and Egypt), who sought, and still seek, to escape the legibility of the prowling machines of the state.¹⁹

The burst of interest in anarchism in all its manifestations has been fuelled by a feedback loop nourished by several generations of post-1945 anarchist thinkers, sympathetic academics, and scholars who, like latter-day Max Webers, see the merit in the questions anarchists pose, the examples they set, and the methodologies they pursue. For example, historians of the transnational, diasporic, and cosmopolitan movements of anarchism and syndicalism between the 1870s and 1920s have been inspired by the examples of the Global Justice Movement and Occupy occurring outside their seminar rooms.²⁰ Conversely, the political theorists and public intellectuals of the Square have

cited the transnationalism of early-twentieth-century anarchism and syndicalism as precursors of the networked, rhizomic, digitalised, waves of dissent today. In terms of publications, the burst of monographs, anthologies, and edited works on all aspects of anarchism (classical, new, and ‘post’),²¹ makes apparent that the present situation is different than the 1950s, the wave of interest in the 1960s and 1970s,²² and the focus on anarchism that emerged from Punk and the new social movements of the 1980s.²³ In each of these cases, one can note a spike of publishing activity, but until the end of the Cold War and even perhaps to the dawn of this century, Marxist, postmodernist, and post-colonial forms of radical thought overshadowed the brief appearances of anarchism in the print and digital word. That, as this book testifies, is not necessarily the case any longer.

OVERVIEW OF THIS HANDBOOK

The *Palgrave Handbook of Anarchism* addresses, engages with, and challenges the anarchist tradition in ways that reflect the resurgence of interest in anarchist politics and its diverse manifestations. We do not give the reader biographical summaries of the so-called sages of anarchism.²⁴ In the standard histories of anarchism that have dominated the scholarship since the 1960s, a line of descent is usually traced between key intellectuals apparently engaged in a mutual conversation, as if aiming to stake out the boundaries of a distinct ideology. William Godwin, Max Stirner, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Errico Malatesta, and Emma Goldman, all usually feature, while innovators aim to bring others into the ‘canon’, Alexander Berkman perhaps, or Gustav Landauer, or Leo Tolstoy. So too these histories often progress from disquisitions on key personalities to a movement-based approach, frequently presenting a pre-history starting sometime before the nineteenth century and the emergence of self-conscious and self-defined anarchism, and then tailing off with the anarchist and syndicalist defeat in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). More recent attempts have endeavoured to correct the obvious faults in these narratives: disrupting Eurocentric accounts, presenting less masculinist and hetero-normative interpretations, and taking the post-1945 era more seriously. We have not chosen sides in battles such as these, but we have tried to draw from and refine the models of twenty or so years of anthologies and edited volumes, to produce a rich *tour d’horizon* guided by an indisciplinaryity that gives the reader a historical and conceptual overview of the field.

Given the decline of Marxism as the hegemonic force on the left, there has been a renewed interest in the ideas, the history, and the potentialities of anarchist politics. Reflecting this renewed interest, the *Handbook of Anarchism* unites leading scholars from around the world in exploring anarchism as an ideology, offering an examination of its core principles, an analysis of its history, and an assessment of its contribution to the struggles confronting humanity today. In this regard, the approach taken by the *Handbook* is an amalgam of

the previous waves of anthologies and edited volumes, but it is the most comprehensive attempt so far. Grounded in a conceptual and historical approach, each entry charts the distinctively anarchist take on a particular intellectual, political, cultural, and social phenomenon. At its heart, therefore, is a sustained process of conceptual definition, demonstrating how anarchism emerged as an independent ideology in the nineteenth century, how it has grown into a diverse tradition across the twentieth century, and how it continues to help shape, often in unexpected ways, contemporary political and social action.

This volume therefore bridges the gap between historical approaches to anarchism and the vibrant and ever-expanding discussion of new forms of anarchism that are taking shape in the twenty-first century. The chapters that comprise the book point, as Carne Ross suggests in his preface to this volume, to the urgency of taking seriously the questions that anarchism has posed throughout its history. Ross, a former UK diplomat who became disenchanted with his role after the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003, has himself been informed by these ideas in both an intellectual sense and by witnessing the diverse manifestations of these values in practical social struggles. Finding inspiration in the Occupy Movement, the mutual aid of Occupy Sandy, and the experimental communalism in Rojava, anarchism for Ross has become a method, a process, and a means to a fairer society, not an end result in itself.²⁵ The dynamics of this position are examined across the four sections of this book. These sections are:

Part I ‘Core Principles and *Problématiques*’ is designed to stake out the core concepts that shaped the emergence of anarchism as an ideology and to give an idea of the ways different thinkers have grappled distinctively with key intellectual, political, and practical social problems.

Chapters in Part I include ‘The State’, in which Nathan Jun draws upon Michael Freeden’s morphological theory of ideology to examine diverse conceptions of the state within the anarchist tradition. In the ‘Individual and Community’, Laurence Davis argues that anarchism demonstrates its coherence as an ideology partly through the pluralist coexistence of individualism and collectivism at its heart. In his chapter on ‘Freedom’, Alex Prichard suggests, building on evidence from five different historical contexts, that competing conceptions of freedom can be reconciled through anarchist constitutionalism, and by conceiving of anarchism within the republican tradition of non-domination in which decision-making, rules, and regulations can be aligned to conceptions of the good.²⁶

Deric Shannon’s chapter in Part I throws further light on the conceptual issues that have characterised anarchism’s distinctiveness. In ‘Anti-Capitalism and Libertarian Political Economy’, he argues that despite the claims of certain anarcho-capitalists, libertarian approaches to political economy have always been rooted in anti-capitalism. The author defines the anarchist contributions to political economy by examining historical and contemporary anarchist takes on wage labour/exploitation, private property, markets, class society, and

states. He then dissects how capitalist values are naturalised, examining the assertion that human beings are natural utility maximisers and that capitalism is a ‘natural’ result of the desire in human nature for human beings to dominate one another. Moving to anarchist approaches to political and social change, in his chapter ‘Tactics: Conceptions of Social Change, Revolution and Anarchist Organisation’, Dana Williams explicates key components of the anarchist toolkit, particularly ‘direct action’ and ‘prefiguration’, which promote the goals of horizontalism, liberation, and egalitarianism. These tactics are not exclusive to the anarchists, and have been developed in cooperation with other movements, namely, other non-state and non-elite actors in a wide variety of community, education, and alternative-building efforts.

Carl Levy’s chapter in Part I on ‘Anarchism and Cosmopolitanism’ discusses the two faces of cosmopolitanism: ‘Stoical imperialism’ and ‘Cynical Anarcho-Cosmopolitanism’. It traces elements from the latter tradition into the Radical Enlightenment and extra-European thought and practice in the Global South and later in the sinews of transnational anarchism and syndicalism, and today in the practices and theorisations of the Global Justice, Occupy, and Square movements in contradistinction to the International Relations concept of international society and ‘anarchy’. Ole Birk Laursen takes a related theme in his chapter, ‘Anarchism and Anti-Imperialism’, providing an overview of anarchist approaches to anti-imperialism, offering examples of collaborations, solidarities, antagonisms, and syntheses between anarchists and anti-colonialists from across the British, Spanish, French, and Portuguese colonial worlds in the period 1870–1960.

Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and Lara Apps’ chapter, ‘Anarchism and Religion’, reviews the many different types of interactions between religion and anarchism including religious scholars articulating a theology which engages with anarchism, and how anarchists interpret religious scriptures to point to anarchist politics. But the main aim of this chapter is to map out the intersections of religion and anarchism by examining four themes: anarchist quarrels with religion and its institutions; anarchist interpretation of founding scriptures and figures; anarchist theology; and historical studies of specific religious thinkers, communities, and movements. Shifting from religion to science, the final chapter in Part I, by Elliot Murphy, explores ‘Anarchism and Science’, revisiting classical anarchism’s close relationship to the sciences, particularly Peter Kropotkin’s assertion that anarchism was akin to the experimental method of the natural sciences.²⁷ Building on Kropotkin’s prediction that science would confirm the veracity of much of the anarchist project, Murphy suggests that the psychological and behavioural sciences are now closer than ever to discovering the origin and structure of humanity’s moral faculties, an idea central to the altruism which underwrote Kropotkin’s concept of mutual aid.²⁸ In what is a bold counter-thrust to the growing post-anarchist narrative, Murphy also argues that political critique can and indeed should be based on naturalism and not the first premises of Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, Judith Butler, and other thinkers associated with postmodernism.

Part II ‘Core Traditions’ gives an overview of the ways in which—under the broad category of anarchism—different thinkers and activists have tried to carve out particular political positions stressing specific aspects of the anarchist intellectual identity as fundamental. Contributors to Part II convey the key claims of these ‘schools’, considering their defining internal debates, and exploring the ways particular thinkers and activists have tried to distinguish their ideas from other schools of anarchist thought.

Chapters in Part II include ‘Mutualism’, where Shawn Wilbur delineates a strand of anarchism founded on the proposition of non-governmental society and non-capitalist commerce through bilateral agreements and mutual guarantees between free individuals and groupings. This chapter summarises the work of the first self-declared anarchist, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. It then precedes to differentiate schools of mutualism associated with Proudhonian anarchist collectivism and anarchist communism, tracing continuities, especially in the American context, with the individualism of Benjamin Tucker and the more recent but related varieties of ‘market anarchism’ now advanced by Kevin Carson’s ‘free-market anti-capitalism’.²⁹ In his chapter, ‘Individualism and Anarchism’, Peter Ryley emphasises that individualist anarchism does not abide by one tradition. Most importantly, although some collectivists have denied its anarchist authenticity, Ryley mounts a strong defence of its legitimacy. This individualist anarchism is founded, Ryley argues, on the autonomous moral individual and an economics based on direct ownership.

Davide Turcato discusses ‘Anarchist Communism’ in his chapter, the hegemonic ideology of anarchists during the era of ‘classical anarchism’. Although the idea that products should be distributed according to the needs of the individual was a constant throughout the history of anarchism, Turcato notes that anarchist communism was never a single coherent current. He identifies three main trends: anti-organisationalist anarchist communists in dispute with organisationalists; socially oriented anarchist communists positing their doctrine in contradistinction to individualists; and finally, after the Bolshevik Revolution, libertarian communists contrasting their doctrine to the authoritarian communism of the Marxist-Leninists who seemed to monopolise the term ‘communism’.

Syndicalism was the doctrine and method which allowed anarchists to become noticeably influential during the era of classical anarchism, and in his chapter Lucien van der Walt defines it as a radically democratic unionism which, through solidarity, self-activity, and direct action (from self-education to the general strike), aims to construct a free socialist order based on self-management grounded in interlinked assemblies and councils. Van der Walt disputes the pessimistic predictions of Robert Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchy’³⁰ which he feels syndicalist trade unions could, and can, avoid. This chapter supplies the reader with a synoptic history of the origins, growth, and global dissemination of syndicalism from the 1870s to the 1940s. But he insists that syndicalism should not be consigned to the museum of historical curiosities. Noted perhaps for its

destructive purism and sectarianism, it also displays an unquenchable vitality and creativity over its 150-year history.

The last chapters in Part II point to currents that have played increasingly important roles in shaping anarchism since 1945: ‘Anarcha-Feminism’, ‘Green Anarchism’, and ‘Postanarchism’. In her chapter Donna Kowal traces the origins of anarcha-feminism to the contribution of key thinkers from the nineteenth century, such as Voltairine de Cleyre, Emma Goldman, Lucy Parsons, and Lucia Sánchez Saornil, pinpointing agreements and disagreements between them. Since these pioneers, anarcha-feminism has developed as a distinct school of thought and praxis that has mounted a critique of authority through the experiences of women, particularly the constraints posed by sexual double standards and the gendered division of labour. In his chapter on ‘Green Anarchism’, Andy Price traces its take-off from the resurgence of the anarchist tradition and the emergence of a Green movement in the late 1960s. Through a review of the three main and differing contributors to Green Anarchism—from Murray Bookchin, Arne Naess, and John Zerzan—Price concludes that all genuine Green thinking is by definition anarchistic. But this chapter also demonstrates that there are many varying shades of Green Anarchism.

Finally, the emergence of a genuinely new and at times controversial synthesis known as postanarchism is discussed in lucid and engaging tones by one of its proponents, Saul Newman. Postanarchism, Newman argues, is a synthesis of anarchist philosophy and poststructuralist theory (Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Derrida and Lacan) and has been employed to understand and define the contemporary autonomous movements and decentralised networks discussed earlier in this introduction. Controversially, Newman contends that postanarchism differentiates itself from nineteenth-century anarchism through its disavowal of universal metanarratives and ontological certainties. Human nature is not assumed to be benign, nor is there a latent rational social order under the constraints of the oppressive state which an anarchist revolution will reveal. Like the poststructuralists, the postanarchists believe that the human subject is discursively constructed and that social relations are characterised by their contingent nature. Anarchy is not an end-state awaiting to be revealed once the constraints of statist society are smashed in revolutionary action. Instead, Newman proposes an ontologically anarchic politics grounded on this form of ‘post-foundational’ anarchism. But Newman is not naïve and points to the amorphous, indistinct, and shape-shifting nature of contemporary forms of power. If there are no clear normative guidelines in this post-foundational anarchism, how are social actors, who may be enchained by voluntary servitude, to act?

Part III ‘Key Events/Histories’ examines the responses of anarchists to particular events, their involvement in episodes of historical importance, and the significance of their interpretations of these events to the development of anarchist theory.

Part III begins with C. Alexander McKinley’s ‘The French Revolution and 1848’ in which the author details the ways in which the Enlightenment, the

French Revolution, and the Revolution(s) of 1848 shaped anarchism in its early but crucial phases. He contends that although they were not anarchists, and future anarchists may have been hostile to much of their thought, key components of anarchism can be found in aspects of the writings of Enlightenment thinkers including Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, and others. McKinley notes that key components of anarchist practice (particularly the direct democracy of the sections of the Commune of Paris) made their appearance during the French Revolution, as did the word ‘anarchist’, a term of disparagement against the radicals of the French Revolution. The next chapter discusses the anarchism of the First International (formally known as the International Workingmen’s Association).³¹ Lasting from 1864 to around 1880, Robert Graham highlights its role as a watershed in the history of anarchist movements and ideas. It is within the debates carried out in the First International that modern anarchism was first clearly articulated. It was here also that anarchists advanced their revolutionary alternatives to both parliamentary socialism and the advocates of revolutionary dictatorship in a Marxist mould.

In his chapter, ‘The Spectre of the Commune and French Anarchists in the 1890s’, John Merriman analyses the event which made anarchism flesh for many of its supporters and detractors from 1871 to the outbreak of war in 1914. But although Merriman notes the importance of the example of the Paris Commune of 1871 on anarchist political theory, his chapter focusses on its influence on the reality of anarchist organisation in France, and above all, in Paris. The crushing of the Paris Commune in a sea of blood remained crucial in the collective memory of Parisians and in the global anarchist movements as a prime example of state terrorism, and indeed motivated the actions of anarchist terrorist, Émile Henry, whose Communard father had been condemned to death in absentia. The Communard ‘martyrs’ were joined by other martyrs after Haymarket in Chicago in 1886, discussed by Kenyon Zimmer in the next chapter, ‘Haymarket and the Rise of Syndicalism’. Zimmer’s chapter is a global survey of how anarchists’ views of the workers’ movement and trade unions evolved, and their participation in these movements. This chapter is a companion piece to van der Walt’s, but from the specific angle of how the American strike movement of 1886 influenced the development of syndicalist ideas in Europe, and the subsequent global dissemination and intermixture with local traditions of labour radicalism.

Themes broached in Merriman’s chapter are given a global account in Constance Bantman’s contribution, ‘The Era of Propaganda by the Deed’. In a richly analytical contribution, the author traces the ideological genesis of the notion of propaganda by the deed, reviewing the terrorist wave which it partly inspired from the 1880s to the 1920s. Bantman stresses that the link between the notion of propaganda by the deed and this wave, or waves, of anarchist terrorism is complex and that anarchism was not solely a movement of terrorism. Thus she outlines the divisions amongst the anarchists regarding the use of political violence, and examines the frequent difficulties of identifying acts that were examples of anarchist terrorism, as they were frequently clouded by lone

wolf acts, police provocations, and opaque boundaries with mere criminality. The author remarks on the fascinating academic and media debate which has been spurred by possible parallels between anarchist terrorism and post-9/11 Islamist-inspired attacks.

If the First International and its schisms, and the contemporaneous Paris Commune of 1871, were watersheds in the emergence of classical anarchism, surely the outbreak of war in 1914 was equally important for its long-term decline. In his chapter on ‘Anarchism and the First World War’, Matthew Adams discusses how the war heightened governmental suspicion and coercion of anarchists, and disrupted networks of international cooperation between anarchist individuals and organisations. But the First World War also posited an existential crisis of belief for the anarchist movement, magnified by the public debate between two of its greatest antebellum personalities and thinkers, Peter Kropotkin and Errico Malatesta, in which the Russian anarchist embraced the cause of the Entente, and the Italian anarchist denounced him as an apostate and believed that the war’s instability would give rise to revolutionary opportunities for anarchists. Using this set-piece debate to explore anarchist responses to the outbreak of the war in Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Russia, the clash over intervention in the war posed the issue of the distinctive political identity of the anarchists, generated fresh tactical perspectives on anti-militarism and anti-colonialism, and demonstrated the theoretical and tactical plurality of anarchism, a red thread through this volume.

The Russian Revolution was precisely the type of opportunity Malatesta believed the war would produce.³² In his chapter, ‘Anarchism and Marxism in the Russian Revolution’, Anthony D’Agostino approaches the events of 1917–1921 by employing the longer view, and emphasising that the dramatic events of the Revolution and Civil War were foreshadowed by the decades-long conflict between Bakunin, Kropotkin, and other anarchists on one side and Marx and the Marxists on the other. The author contends that these Russian anarchists had constructed a sophisticated theory of the state which was suited for an age of revolution, stretching from the Italian Risorgimento to the Mexican Revolution. The Russian anarchists, D’Agostino suggests, understood the unique Russian case which placed it outside the evolutionary pathways increasingly embraced by the Marxists of Western and Central Europe. In an interlude before his discussion of the events of 1917–1921, D’Agostino weighs the influence of Jan Waclaw Machajski, on the radical realism of Lenin and the anarchists, because, of course, like the Polish theorist, Bakunin had predicted that the victory of the Marxist dictatorship would not result in the triumph of the proletariat but the rise of a New Class of savants and ex-worker party bureaucrats.³³ D’Agostino thus argues that Machajski’s reconciliation with Bolshevism mirrored the reaction of many anarchist militants in Russia to the victory of the Bolsheviks in 1917. For these anarchists, the Bolsheviks were the vanguard in the revolt against imperialist war, the reaction, for instance, of anti-war Malatesta, discussed previously in Adams’ chapter. D’Agostino retains a radical realism in his conclusion: would any state power have allowed Kronstadt

or Makhno to persist after the alliance of convenience ended? And would an agrarian Russian federative polity without state compulsion survived in a world of states?

This takes us on to the other case study, James Yeoman's 'The Spanish Civil War', which poses the same dilemmas and reveals similar ironies. Yeoman's valuable review of the most recent studies of the anarchists in the Spanish Civil War begins with a discussion of the development of the Spanish anarchist movement from its origins to the eve of the events of the summer of 1936. From July 1936 to early 1937, Yeoman details how anarchist ideas were implemented in an unparalleled fashion in factories and agricultural production under workers and peasants' committees and then reversed in the wake of the May Days in Barcelona in 1937, with the anarcho-syndicalist *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT) being removed from dominance in the north-east of Spain. But Yeoman also emphasises two important but until recently overlooked aspects of the Civil War period: that despite this major set-back for the anarchist movement, it still played a significant role in the republican war effort until Franco's victory in April 1939, and that the anarchists' role in the Spanish Civil War outside the north-east of Spain needs greater investigation.

The re-emergence of the anarchists in the streets after 1945 is the theme of the chapters by David Berry, 'Anarchism and 1968' and Francis Dupuis-Déri, 'From the Zapatistas to Seattle: The 'New Anarchists''. The events of 1968 seemed to herald the emergence of a new type of anarchism after the deep freeze following the collapse of Spanish anarchism in 1939. Whereas 1968 happened when Marxism was still a vigorous and attractive competitor for the anarchists and the anarchist tradition, the era of the 'new anarchists' discussed by Dupuis-Déri occurred after the fall of the Soviet Union and the decline of Marxism as a political project. In both cases, however, the mainstream media were startled by the reappearance of black flags in the streets of Paris in 1968 and Seattle in 1999. As Berry argues, it is assumed that the events of 1968 were a type of anarchist or anarchistic revolution, yet the scholarly work on the role of the anarchists and anarchist ideas on the events in France in May–June 1968 has been surprisingly limited. Drawing on a wide variety of periodicals, pamphlets, police files, and the personal archives of militants, this chapter is a comprehensive account of the role of the anarchists in the events and ponders the extent to which the spirit of '68 can be said to be libertarian or anarchistic. Berry concludes that whereas 1968 was seen as endorsement of anarchist ideas of spontaneous popular revolt, the anarchist movement itself was in disarray. Small 'A' anarchism thus makes its debut in this post-1945 setting, and re-emerges in the startling events of Seattle, 1999, where Dupuis-Déri argues that the anarchists stole the show in the so-called Battle of Seattle, where a broad-based alliance shut down the World Trade Organization (WTO) Summit. The goal of this chapter is to identify these new anarchists and their new anarchism. How did these new activists translate their collective organisation, decision-making processes, and collective action into anarchism? Returning to May '68, he proceeds to discuss the Zapatistas' uprising in 1994 and goes into great

detail about the events which occurred on 30 November 1999. The final section is devoted to how these new anarchists were interpreted theoretically by Barbara Epstein, David Graeber, and Richard Day, and in contrast why other radical political theorists and philosophers such as Nancy Fraser and Chantal Mouffe argue that the new anarchists should engage with Podemos, the US Democrats, and SYRIZA and disavow their anarchism.

Part IV ‘Anarchist Applications’ focusses on the contemporary relevance of anarchist ideas and the contributions anarchist activists and thinkers have made to movements, theoretical conflicts, and particular social struggles. Although the focus in this section is on the role that anarchists have played—and the distinctive contributions that anarchist ideas have made—to a particular problem or theme, authors also reflect on the deeper history of attempts by anarchists to grapple with particular issues.

Part IV begins with a chapter on ‘Utopian and Intentional Communities’ by Rhiannon Firth, where she notes the complex, yet mutually reinforcing, relationship between utopian and intentional communities and anarchism. Utopianism is not an uncontested term in the anarchist tradition, where it can be dismissed as a blueprint authoritarianism. Instead Firth posits a ‘critical utopianism’ using the work of Lucy Sargisson and Tom Moylan, which is suitable for the anarchists because it is critical of the status quo, is self-critical, and explores forms of domination and exclusion that may arise within utopian experiments and intentional communities. Judith Suissa’s chapter ‘Anarchist Education’ deals with one of the chief cultural manifestations of anarchism over the past two centuries: education. Suissa argues that central anarchist values such as mutual aid, autonomy, and cooperation yield an anarchist alternative to mainstream forms of educational provision. She provides the reader with a historical account of anarchist educational experiments and goes on to discuss formal and informal education, as well as issues within educational philosophy and theory. While the anarchist tradition of educational thought and practice overlaps to some degree with non-anarchist forms of libertarian, progressive, and democratic education, anarchist education and theory and practice offers a unique perspective, while also proffering valuable resources to mount criticisms of contemporary mainstream educational policy and practice.

In ‘The City, Urban Planning & Architecture’, Michael Coates addresses how anarchists do architecture, which of course was of keen interest to the first wave of post-1945 anarchist thinkers, including Colin Ward and Paul and Percival Goodman. How can a grassroots anarchist approach to architecture be possible if, over the past 200 years, it has become professionalised and the practice of building buildings industrialised? Coates focusses on case studies in the 1970s and the operation of the SOLON housing and architectural works cooperative, the cooperative housing groups created to resist demolition in Liverpool, and the Architects’ Revolutionary Council which mounted a rebellion of professionals against the profession. In contrast, Benjamin Franks’ chapter on ‘Anarchism and Ethics’ does not describe how to do practical things in

an anarchist manner, but how morality and ethics informed by anarchism can guide our practical activities. Reviewing the main meta-ethical and normative positions associated with different constellations of anarchism and post-anarchism, Franks argues for an anti-hierarchical virtue approach which, the author concludes, is the most productive and consistent for social anarchism, and he illustrates his point through the debates of contemporary anarchist activists and anarchist practices that are rich in virtues.

James Gifford's chapter on 'Literature and Anarchism' has linkages with the previously discussed chapters on utopianism and on education.³⁴ As a work of the imagination, and as form of pedagogy, literature is crucial to the culture and presence of anarchism. Also as Gifford argues, anarchism has extensively contributed conceptual, thematic, and topical contents to literary work, while authors have made major contributions to anarchism as a political philosophy and practice. Gifford's ambitious chapter, which includes poetry and prose, surveys Romantic through Modernist and Contemporary literature in relation to anarchism, with an emphasis on English language literary traditions in Europe and North America since the 1790s. This chapter also covers authors whose depictions of, or topical engagements with, anarchism helped shape popular consciousness or mainstream conceptions of anarchism, primarily Joseph Conrad in *The Secret Agent* and G. K. Chesterton in *The Man Who Was Thursday*. On the other hand, Gifford also serves up a fascinating discussion of popular literature and genre writing engaged with anarchism, including works by Ursula Le Guinn, Michael Moorcock, Starhawk, and Allan Moore.

In a similar vein Mark Mattern's chapter, 'Anarchism and Art', argues that the arts have been integral to anarchism since its inception, with foundational thinkers like Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Peter Kropotkin, and Emma Goldman all writing persuasively and eloquently about the power of art as a potential tool of social criticism and revolutionary vision and as an essential component of a life free of domination.³⁵ Contemporary artists engage with these themes and open up new approaches, but anarchist themes have also informed artists' quests for a life free from alienation over the last 150 years, and art continues to play a role in opening cracks in dominant structures of everyday life where anarchist values and practices can take root. Mattern's chapter summarises the arguments of the foundational and contemporary anarchists and then illustrates several popular art forms in terms of core anarchist values of autonomy, equality, power, and direct action. Lucy Nicholas' chapter, 'Gender and Sexuality', returns us to themes pursued in the chapter on 'Anarcha-Feminism', analysing anarchist approaches to the dominative aspects of gender and sexualities. These historical, and more recent, approaches have offered unique ways of understanding the underlying mechanisms that explain why these axes of oppression have been so difficult to challenge, as well as offering anarchist ways of understanding the more interpersonal and social workings of power. Although this causes Nicholas to return to the era of Emma Goldman and her comrades, this chapter focusses on more contemporary anarchist approaches to feminism and critiques of gendered hierarchy. Advancing arguments which

have reached mainstream discourse and public/social policy, some approaches call for more anarchistic gender relations rather than the existing binary genders and challenging gender roles more broadly. A second, more contemporary and queer theory-informed analysis points to the coercive nature of the gender binary and envisions its eradication. This chapter thus demonstrates how anarchism can be applied to critique compulsory heterosexuality or heteronormativity, as well as monogamy and traditional sexual ethics.

We had cause to note new inflections, or new formations, in anarchism as theory and practice since 1945, including innovations such as Green Anarchism, and new takes on sexuality and gender. Sky Croeser's chapter, 'Post-Industrial and Digital Society', investigates the new material and technological realities of twenty-first-century anarchism. Her chapter explores some of the diverse changes to production and consumption facilitated by the Internet, particularly those that embody a shift towards non-hierarchical and participatory practices. These practices are explicitly informed by anarchist praxis and history, and the development of independent, non-commercial, communications infrastructures online has frequently been driven by a concern with evading state censorship and surveillance. These communications infrastructures are often produced by collectives drawing on anarchist principles, but other emerging practices are heavily influenced by US capitalist-libertarian subcultures. Anarchists have expressed extreme wariness at claims trumpeting the radical potential of these practices. But this chapter investigates other potentialities beyond the gaze of hacktivists, Bitcoin fanatics, and venture capitalists in libertarian garb. Anarchist praxis is frequently at its most disruptive in the networks of solidarity and mutual aid facilitated by the Internet.³⁶ Although by no means all anarchists, these networks of people are nevertheless challenging capitalist and statist constructions of labour and consumption, and this chapter describes how these new gift economies are developing radical, anti-capitalist, and anti-hierarchical discourses around labour and consumption.

Since the era of classical anarchism, concerns around human relations with non-human animals, and with the raising of animals for food, have played an important role in the history of anarchist thought and practical political engagement. Élisée Reclus' argument in *On Vegetarianism*,³⁷ for example, emphasised our emotional connections to other creatures and the dominating power and violence implied in the production and consumption of meat. In her chapter, 'Farming and Food', Erika Cudworth considers that the openness of anarchism to multiple forms of domination makes it particularly well-suited to develop powerful critiques of human domination of other animals. As Cudworth notes, Kropotkin and Bookchin both saw humanity as co-constituted in 'federations' of life with non-humans, and this chapter examines anarchist foregrounding the intersectionalised oppression of humans and other animals in the food and farming industries. The chapter evaluates the role of anarchism in human-animal studies and argues that anarchism has a significant impact on the sub-field of Critical Animal Studies. But Cudworth also notes tensions within both human-animal studies and anarchism. Some see animal liberation as a

tertiary concern for anarchism, but others see it as on the cutting edge of contemporary political action. Some anarchists call for the end to industrial animal food production but not the end of eating meat, and some call for a post-industrial society based on hunting for food, while others call for a vegan future. Cudworth recommends an anarchist food politics which endorses more compassionate ways of being in the world and resistance to the violence implicated in the global networks of making other animals into food.

Marina Sitrin returns to a theme examined by Dupuis-Déri, taking a closer look at new horizontal forms of social action spanning the globe in her chapter ‘Anarchism and the Newest Social Movements’. She discusses the functioning of such movements as Occupy Wall Street in the United States; the autonomous movements in Greece, from Solidarity Health Clinics to recuperated workplaces; movements in defence of the land in Argentina, Bolivia, the United States, and Canada; *Nuit Debout* in France; and resistance to housing evictions and occupations, from the *Plataforma* (PAH) in Spain to Occupy Homes in the United States. This chapter delves into the specifics of the newer anti-capitalist movements and also refers back to the Zapatistas in the Chiapas, the Global Justice Movement, and the Argentine assembly movements after 2001. Sitrin interrogates the extent to which there are similarities with anarchist approaches and visions, and examines the composition of these new social movements.

In a related chapter which hearkens back to earlier accounts of anti-imperialism and syndicalism as a global phenomenon, Maia Ramnath’s ‘Non-Western Anarchisms’ offers a broad overview of non-Western anarchisms, touching upon the historical and contemporary manifestations of anti-authoritarian movements and tendencies in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. In parallel but differently from earlier discussions of self-identified anarchists and anarchists’ movements, and the larger social movements which interacted with them but also manifest autonomous forms of small ‘A’ anarchism, Ramnath divides her field of enquiry into people and groups who self-identify as part of the modern genealogy of modern anarchist traditions, from syndicalist to insurrectionary. She consequently challenges Western ownership of that tradition, widening its field of view, including people and groups who use different vocabularies which are rooted in a variety of philosophical traditions but demonstrate an affinity with anarchism. Ramnath maps the power relations and relevant forms of oppression, exploitation, and hierarchy as they manifest in each specific context, and their corresponding histories of resistance and the making of alternative politics, which draw on available cultural repertoires. Her purview is ambitious including manifestations from Mexico to Kurdistan, and Egypt to the Philippines, amongst many others. All of these examples have specific conditions and histories, but all non-Western anarchisms share a history of colonisation and foreign occupation or intervention. Ramnath therefore unpicks the additional layer of complexity in the story of power and resistance to power, requiring a systemic awareness of where a given society is located in relation to global structures of capital and empire as these intersect or collude with locally rooted forms of domination.

This highlights the complex shadings of issues of indigeneity, religion, modernity, industrialisation, and nationalism and communism in resistance struggles, and the next chapter by Kathy Ferguson and Kahala Johnson, 'Anarchism & Indigeneity', continues to focus on the intersection of self-identified anarchists and other movements and individuals who share affinities and similar aims and goals. Ferguson and Johnson note that anarchists and indigenous activists have historically made alliances to fight colonialism, as was notable in early-twentieth-century struggles in Mexico and India. They often ally today in struggles against environmental degradation and settler colonialism, and in the context of other shared concerns, but Ferguson and Johnson also note that encounters of anarchism and indigenous thinking can generate conflict. This chapter explores these attractions and repulsions, but the authors, nevertheless, locate a vibrant, shared epicentre of resurgent activity generated by the land itself/zherself. How, the authors ask, do relations with the land prefigure anarchy-indigenous interdependences and non-human kinships beyond the varieties of violence of sovereignty, property, territory, and law?

In the final chapter of this volume, Laura Galián continues with the theme of the Global South and anarchism and the new anarchism of the Square and Occupy movements which is a shared praxis of North and South. In the case of Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and other Southern Mediterranean countries, anarchist groups and forms of politics re-emerged in recent years with the Revolutions of 2011. Tahrir, and other squares in Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria, constituted spaces of convergence, of encounter, and of 'anarchist experiences' in themselves. These experiences culminated in the establishment of self-declared anarchist groups and of different autonomous spaces and collectives that, by reclaiming their right to the city and radicalising public space, were organised in horizontal, decentralised, and anti-hierarchical ways. Their goal was to keep alive the demands of the 2011 Revolutions. Galián incorporates recent theories of social movements and revisits concepts such as 'civic humanity' in order to incorporate autonomous spaces and collectives in to the culture of contemporary anarchism in Southern Mediterranean contexts.

CONCLUSION

The reader will undoubtedly pick those chapters and themes which best suit her tastes, but one of the strengths of this volume is the way it highlights the threads connecting what, at first, may seem to be disparate subjects. One can follow the theme of the Global South and anarchism, for example, through separate chapters on anti-imperialism, syndicalism, anarchism and social movements, non-Western anarchisms, anarchism and indigeneity, and anarchism and the Arab Spring. The same applies to a plethora of other themes: anarchism and feminism, for instance, or anarchism and social movements after 1945, or anarchism and culture, run in multifarious ways across all four sections of this book.

As this introduction, or even a cursory glance at the contents page makes clear, this is a book composed of multiple threads. But these strands—approaching anarchism as a political and philosophical theory, as a historical force, and as a lived reality for activists and dissidents—mesh in a detailed assessment of anarchism’s past, its present, and perhaps also its future. As much as the contents of this book reflect the intellectual sophistication characteristic of the anarchist tradition, there is also something fitting about the variety captured in these pages. After all, for anarchists, plurality, diversity, and inclusion are supreme values, ones they see imperilled by the homogenising force of the state and capitalism, and ones that alternative forms of anarchist-inspired living must allow to flourish to be counted as improvements upon the present. This openness and flexibility can make anarchism, to the chagrin of political theorists, difficult to pin down, to define, and to catalogue. As Alfredo Bonanno writes, ‘anarchist’:

Is not a definition that can be made once and for all, put in a safe and considered a patrimony to be tapped little by little. Being an anarchist does not mean one has reached a certainty, or said once and for all, “There, from now on I hold the truth and as such, at least from the point of view of the idea, I am a privileged person” [...] Anarchism is not a concept that can be locked up in a word like a gravestone.³⁸

In their various ways the authors in this book have grappled with this Bonannian challenge. And while conclusive, fixed definitions would be an affront to the anarchist project, what is apparent in these pages is the depth and sophistication that has characterised this much-maligned, and constantly evolving, political tradition.

One of the ‘new anarchists’ we met at the outset of this chapter, Herbert Read, once drew a distinction between ‘change’ and ‘adventure’. Change, he judged, was the basis of life, captured in the constantly unfolding and regenerating processes of the natural world, where life grew from the decay that was an inevitable consequence of life. Adventure, he reflected, was the manifestation of change as the ‘essence of civilisation’, a commitment to innovation, to experimentation, to pushing the boundaries of knowledge, art, and science. But he also thought that this distinction between change and adventure was essentially illusory. ‘Change or adventure’, he concluded, ‘—it is one and the same philosophy which we seek to express [...] and we believe valid, equally in science, art and religion’.³⁹ This was also an expression of his anarchism, a political vision he believed must enshrine flexibility and change in its intellectual adventures as it grappled with the existential problems of today, and mirror the organic, mutating, processes of nature in its practical organisational forms. This was a philosophy too alive to ever be locked up in a gravestone.

NOTES

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PART I

Core Problems/*Problématiques*



The State

Nathan J. Jun

The State, therefore, is the most flagrant, the most cynical, and the most complete negation of humanity. It shatters the universal solidarity of all men on the earth, and brings some of them into association only for the purpose of destroying, conquering, and enslaving all the rest.

—Mikhail Bakunin¹

INTRODUCTION

Although it had existed as a distinctive political movement since at least the mid-1870s, anarchism did not achieve widespread public attention until the last decade of the nineteenth century following a series of high-profile bombings, assassinations, and other terroristic attacks that were attributed to individuals who identified themselves, or were identified by others, as ‘anarchists’. As a result, the anarchist movement of the fin de siècle was initially seen by its contemporaries as an altogether new phenomenon with sinister if not altogether inscrutable motives.² This perceived inscrutability was intensified by sensationalistic portrayals of anarchists as mindless fanatics and sadistic villains in the popular press that made anarchism appear all the more dangerous and threatening.

Early studies of anarchism seldom questioned the accuracy of such portrayal. Insofar as many, if not most, simply took for granted that anarchism constituted a genuine existential threat to the established order, their overarching aim was not so much to understand anarchism on its own terms as it was to gain useful information for combating and ultimately eradicating it.³ Although Paul Eltzbacher’s *Der Anarchismus* (1900) was motivated by a similar desire to ‘penetrate the essence of a movement’ which, at the time, was growing in force

N. J. Jun (✉)
Department of English, Humanities, and Philosophy,
Midwestern State University, Wichita Falls, TX, USA
e-mail: nathan.jun@mwsu.edu

and influence before the author's very eyes, it stands apart from related volumes in its self-conscious desire to treat its subject matter fairly and objectively.⁴ As the translator of the English edition noted, Eltzbacher approached his task as an impartial 'investigator trying to determine the definition of a term he finds confusedly conceived' rather than as a military strategist seeking to understand and outmaneuver an enemy.⁵ Even if it is an exaggeration to claim that Eltzbacher attained the goal of 'impartiality ... as perfectly as can be expected of any man'—so much so as to leave his readers unsure 'whether [he] is himself an Anarchist or not'—there is no doubt that his aspiration to 'know Anarchism scientifically' was sincere.⁶

Eltzbacher's study begins by lamenting the 'lack of clear ideas about Anarchism ... not only among the masses but [also] among scholars and statesmen'.⁷ To some, he explains, anarchism has 'only a negative aim' that 'culminates in the negation of every programme'.⁸ To others, this 'negative and destroying side is balanced by a side that is affirmative and creative', the latter constituting anarchism's 'real, true essence...'.⁹ In order to determine what anarchism is really all about, Eltzbacher undertakes a thorough study of 'the most important Anarchistic writings'—that is, writings 'of certain particular men' (to wit, Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, and Tolstoy) that are recognised as 'particularly prominent' by 'the greater part of those who at present are scientifically concerned with Anarchism'.¹⁰ His goal in so doing is to ascertain the common element within these otherwise diverse writings, which he ultimately identifies as 'the negation of the State for our future'.¹¹

Whether owing to its perceived objectivity or something else entirely, *Der Anarchismus* has had a profound influence on popular understandings of anarchism, both at the time of its publication and subsequently.¹² Indeed, Eltzbacher's central conclusion—that anti-statism is the defining element of anarchist thought—has 'become such a commonplace that [it has been] incorporated into almost every study of the subject up to the present day'.¹³ That said, the fact that 'anti-statism' has become the single-most ubiquitous element within conventional definitions of anarchism scarcely implies that said definitions share a uniform understanding of this element. Although some follow Eltzbacher in identifying 'anti-statism' with a principled call to oppose and ultimately abolish the state, others construe it as a kind of abstract moral judgment (e.g., 'the rejection and criticism of all state authority and of the power and coercion that combine to make up the machinery of government'¹⁴) or, more generally, as a species of 'belief' (e.g., that 'society should do without government'¹⁵ or that 'society without the state, or government, is both possible and desirable'¹⁶). Many such definitions treat 'anti-statism' as a generic descriptor for any kind of principled skepticism of, or disapproval for, the state whether or not this 'entails a moral obligation or duty to oppose and ... eliminate [it]'.¹⁷

From a purely historical vantage, there is no question that anti-statism—in the sense of actively endorsing, encouraging, and seeking to bring about the

abolition of the state, rather than merely condemning or disapproving it—has been and continues to be a central element of anarchism. To this extent, at least, Eltzbacher's definition is a vast improvement over those which seek to reduce the anarchism to mere disapproval or the state or, worse, to abstract judgments or beliefs concerning its moral legitimacy or lack thereof. As countless scholars have noted, however, even this understanding of anarchism is grossly inadequate—not just because it is ahistorical, but because it 'fails some of the most basic requirements of a definition', such as the ability to 'effectively highlight[t] the distinguishing features of a given category ... in a coherent fashion ... [and] to differentiate that category from others, thereby organising knowledge as well as enabling effective analysis and research'.¹⁸ In the first place, Eltzbacher's approach involves an egregious fallacy of composition insofar as it defines anarchism as such in terms of a particular (if particularly significant) element of anarchism. Because anti-statism in this sense is by no means unique to anarchism, moreover, defining anarchism in terms of it renders the latter indistinguishable from all other ideologies that happen to share this element.

All of this being said, it is equally mistaken to define anarchism in terms of some other elemental concept or set of concepts. As Michael Freeden argues, ideologies are not distinguished by the particular concepts they contain so much as the particular ways they *decontest* these concepts, where this, in turn, is a function of how concepts are organised and arranged within their overall ideational structure.¹⁹ What differentiates anarchism from other ideologies, accordingly, is not the concept of anti-statism (or any other concept) per se but the particular meanings and degrees of relative significance it assigns to concepts in relation to other concepts.²⁰ This process of decontestation gives rise to a distinctive understanding of the nature and function of the state which foregrounds distinctive normative critiques of the state as well as strategies for the dismantlement of the same.

Regrettably, far more attention has been given to establishing that anarchism is 'more than anti-statism'²¹ than to clarifying in what sense, and to what extent, anarchism *is* anti-statist. As a result, there is a great deal of confusion regarding how the concept of 'the state' has been understood within the broad anarchist tradition, how this understanding has informed anarchist critiques of the state, and how these critiques have informed anarchist strategies for resisting, opposing, and, ultimately, abolishing the state.²² Insofar as it is impossible to address satisfactorily all three of these issues in a single chapter, the discussion to follow will focus primarily on the first. Its principal aim in so doing is to provide a general overview of prevailing anarchist conceptions of the state that may serve as a foundation for subsequent explorations of the normative and strategic dimensions of anarchist anti-statism and, by extension, of the extent to which the latter distinguish anarchism from competing ideologies—especially those, like Marxism, to which it is especially close.

GOVERNMENT AND AUTHORITY

Anarchism regards the state as a paradigmatic instance of *government* (or *political authority*), the basic nature and function of which it invariably identifies with the morally illegitimate exercise of power over human beings. At the highest level of generality, the term ‘power’ refers to a hypothetical or actual capacity to act in some particular way (‘power to’).²³ To say that Jones has the power to learn the violin, for example, means that Jones has the hypothetical capacity to perform a particular kind of action under certain conditions—or, what comes to the same, that it is possible for Jones to acquire a particular kind of ability that will enable her to perform a particular kind of action. To say that Jones has the power to play violin, in contrast, means that Jones has the actual ability to perform a particular kind of action right now, under existing conditions. (For our purposes, let us refer to the former sort of ‘power to’ as *potential power to* and the latter sort as *de facto power to*.) Now, when Jones has the *de facto* power to compel Smith to act (or refrain from acting) in some particular way, we say that Jones has ‘power over’ Smith.²⁴ In many cases, this involves the ability to compel Smith to obey a directive regardless of whether she herself wishes to do so or not. In other cases, it entails nothing more than the ability to ensure Smith’s voluntary compliance with said directive. Either way, Jones’ ‘power over’ Smith involves an actionable capacity to direct (or ‘govern’) Smith’s behaviour in various ways regardless of whether it is morally justifiable for her to do so.

Now, the mere fact that Jones has *de facto* power over Smith scarcely implies that this power is ‘binding’—that is, that Jones has (or claims to have) ‘a special right to command’ Smith or that Smith is (or takes herself to be) ‘obliged or duty-bound’ to comply with Jones’ commandments.²⁵ Nor does it entail that such commandments are ‘content-independent’—that is, that Smith has a reason to obey them independently of their being issued by Jones. On the contrary, ‘all that [Jones] demands from [Smith] is that [her] command is taken for what it is and obeyed’.²⁶ This is in marked contrast with the concept of *de jure* authority, according to which Jones not only has the *de facto* power but the presumed right to compel Smith to act (or refrain from acting) in some particular way, where this, in turn, implies that Smith has a duty or obligation to do (or refrain from doing) whatever Jones tells her to do (or not do).²⁷ In other words, it is not the content of Jones’ commandments that makes them authoritative but rather her presumed right to issue such commandments in the first place.²⁸

De jure authority of this sort, which Richard Sylvan has described as ‘opaque’ or ‘closed’ authority, ‘simply stand[s] on [its] position or station ... [or] appeal[s] to a conventional rule or procedure (“that is how things are done” or “have always been done”) without being able to step beyond some rule book ... which has been enacted (for reasons not open to, or bearing, examination) by a further substantially opaque authority’.²⁹ Authority of this sort involves a presumed right to issue binding, content-independent directives and, as such,

does not *depend* on the voluntary compliance over those over whom it is exercised. On the contrary, the presumed right to exercise de facto power over others presupposes the right to coerce them into obeying against their own will. What Sylvan refers to as ‘transparent’ or ‘open’ authority, by contrast, is capable of justifying its claims or directives ‘by appeal to a further range of assessable evidence...’³⁰—that is, by demonstrating that there are content-dependent reasons to assent to these claims or directives. Assuming such reasons exist, this at most implies that the authority in question is worthy of voluntary deference. It does not imply that otherwise reasonable people are categorically obliged to assent to open authorities or that the latter have a right to compel their assent. If an otherwise reasonable person fails to recognise that she has content-dependent reasons to defer to such an authority—whether or not this is primarily the authority’s fault—she is at worst guilty of a transgression against reason. The same is true if she fails to defer to an authority which she herself recognises as (*ceteris paribus*) worthy of deference.

For any particular organisation defined by particular ends, the government of that organisation is just the particular group of individuals that is responsible for ensuring these ends are met, where this, in turn, involves directing the behaviour of other individuals within said organisation.³¹ For example, the government (or ‘administration’) of a university refers to the particular group of individuals (chancellors, provosts, deans, and so forth) that is responsible for ensuring that the university in question meets its particular institutional objectives. In practice, this involves directing the behaviour of other individuals within the university (the faculty, staff, and students) through the enactment and enforcement of rules, policies, and procedures.

Although governments of all sorts typically function as closed or opaque authorities that exercise varying degrees of de facto power over those who are subject to them and claim to do so by right, they are importantly distinct from the explicitly political entities known as *polities*. Like ‘universities, trade unions, and churches, *inter alia*’, a polity is a ‘corporation [or organization] in the sense that it possesses a legal *persona* of its own, which means that it has rights and duties and may engage in various activities *as if* it were a real, flesh-and-blood, living individual’.³² A polity is distinguished from other corporations by the fact that it ‘authorizes them all but is itself authorized (recognized) solely by others of its own kind ... that certain functions (known collectively as the attributes of sovereignty) are reserved for it alone ... [and] that it exercises those functions over a certain territory inside which its jurisdiction is both exclusive and all-embracing’.³³

Polities as such are defined by the exercise of de facto power over particular populations within particular bounded geographic areas, regardless of the particular systems of government—that is, the particular individual or group of individuals (kings, presidents, prime ministers lawmakers, judges, police, etc.), institutions (legislative assemblies, courts, armies, etc.), and procedures (making and enforcing laws, levying taxes, imprisoning criminals, etc.)—through which they do so. As explicitly *political* entities, moreover, they are directed toward a

broad range of exceedingly general ends, all or most of which reflect fundamental aspects of human social organisation (e.g., the satisfaction of basic needs, the protection of life and property, the distribution of valuable resources, etc.).

THE ILLEGITIMACY OF AUTHORITY

As noted previously, anarchists invariably understand government in terms of *domination*,³⁴ which Iris Marion Young defines as ‘institutional conditions which inhibit or prevent people from participating in determining their actions or the conditions of their actions’.³⁵ As Proudhon famously writes, for example:

To be governed is to be watched over, inspected, spied on, directed, legislated at, regulated, docketed, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, assessed, weighed, censored, ordered about, by men who have neither the right, nor the knowledge, nor the virtue... To be governed is to be at every operation, at every transaction, noted, registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished. It is, under the pretext of public utility, and in the name of the general interest, to be placed under contribution, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolized, extorted, squeezed, mystified, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the first word of complaint, to be repressed, fined, despised, harassed, tracked, abused, clubbed, disarmed, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and, to crown all, mocked, ridiculed, outraged, dishonoured. That is government; that is its justice; that is its morality.³⁶

Although the notion that government is ultimately a matter of forcing people to submit to the commands of others is a fundamental and recurrent anarchist theme, it is scarcely unique to anarchism. Indeed, the entire liberal tradition is founded on the assumption that exercising power over others in this way is at odds with individual freedom, which means that in the absence of *de jure* authority government is nothing more than tyranny. All liberal political theories, accordingly, attempt to establish the conditions for possessing and exercising such authority—that is, the conditions for political legitimacy—so as to demonstrate that government is (or at least can be) legitimate and, by extension, compatible with human freedom and other substantive moral ends.³⁷

Because political legitimacy is a function of *de jure* authority, and because *de jure* authority is a function of exercising *de facto* power by right, there is nothing to prevent an otherwise ‘open’ or ‘transparent’ government or political authority from resorting to coercion when its legitimacy goes unrecognised, regardless of who or what is responsible for this lack of recognition. (Indeed, the same is true even if its legitimacy *is* recognised.) This invites the problematic notion that governments are or can be legitimate even when they are not recognised as such, and even if they themselves are responsible for this lack of recognition. Worse, it implies that governments are no less legitimate for compelling obedience through force or fraud rather than open and transparent

attempts to justify their power—in which case the concept of legitimacy is no more than a disguise, a ‘garment’ with which governments ‘cove[r] themselves’ in order to conceal their true nature and purpose.³⁸

In response, one might argue that a government’s de facto power over its subjects is only legitimate if the latter (a) have content-dependent reasons to comply with the government’s directives; (b) freely recognise that they have such reasons because the government has openly and transparently demonstrated them; and (c) voluntarily choose to comply with the government’s directives pursuant to this recognition. This is tantamount to claiming that a government is only legitimate if its authority is open or transparent. As we have already seen, however, such authority ‘has no force to back it’ and so can neither ‘compel [their] acceptance’ nor ‘prevent [their] rejection of it’.³⁹ Although an open authority is worthy of deference, this scarcely implies that it has a *right* to exercise power over its subjects—assuming that it has the ability to do so in the first place—let alone that these subjects have a special duty or obligation to assent to its claims or directives.

Anarchists are certainly not opposed to ‘authority’ of this sort. As Bakunin writes, for example:

In the matter of boots, I refer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals, or railroads, I consult that of the architect or the engineer. For such or such special knowledge I apply to such or such a savant. But I allow neither the bootmaker nor the architect nor the savant to impose his authority upon me. I listen to them freely and with all the respect merited by their intelligence, their character, their knowledge, reserving always my incontestable right of criticism and censure. I do not content myself with consulting a single authority in any special branch; I consult several; I compare their opinions, and choose that which seems to me the soundest.⁴⁰

For anarchists like Bakunin, deferring to an open authority is a matter of freely choosing to accept its judgments or comply with its directives precisely *because* one recognises that there are good reasons to do so. Again, the fact that such reasons exist entails nothing more than that the authority in question is worthy of deference, and reasonable people are obliged to exhibit such deference only insofar as they are obliged to act in accordance with reason more generally. As Bakunin says:

If I bow before the authority of the specialists and avow my readiness to follow, to a certain extent and as long as may seem to me necessary, their indications and even their directions, it is because their authority is imposed on me by no one, neither by men nor by God... I bow before the authority of special men because it is imposed on me by my own reason. I am conscious of my own inability to grasp, in all its detail, and positive development, any very large portion of human knowledge. The greatest intelligence would not be equal to a comprehension of the whole. Thence results, for science as well as for industry, the necessity of the division and association of labour. I receive and I give—such is human life. Each directs and is directed in his turn.

The notion that otherwise reasonable people are categorically obliged to obey authorities or that authorities have a right to compel their obedience assumes that the authorities in question are ‘infallible ... fixed and constant’.⁴¹ This assumption is not only false, Bakunin writes, but also ‘fatal to my reason, to my liberty, and even to the success of my undertakings ... transform[ing] me into a stupid slave, an instrument of the will and interests of others’.⁴²

To reject this assumption, as anarchists do, is perforce to reject ‘all legislation, all authority, and all privileged, licensed, official, and legal influence, even if it arises from universal suffrage’.⁴³ This, in turn, implies that there is no such thing as a ‘good, just, or virtuous’—in a word, *legitimate*—government.⁴⁴ On the contrary, ‘all [governments] are bad’ because ‘by their nature, by all their conditions, and by the supreme aim and end of their existence they are completely the opposite of liberty, morality, and human justice.’⁴⁵ Indeed, the very concept of government denotes nothing more than arbitrary ‘violence, oppression, exploitation, and injustice, raised into a system’.⁴⁶

Even if there were such a thing as de jure authority, the fact that a particular government is taken to have such authority irrespective of the underlying motives of those actually doing the governing remains deeply problematic. If government in general is legitimate insofar as it protects the natural rights of the governed, for example, then any particular government is legitimate only to the extent that it achieves this end in practice; it is no less legitimate if it turns out that every single government agent is motivated by narrow self-interest, say, rather than concern for other peoples’ natural rights. But since there is no such thing as a ‘government’ apart from the actual people who do the governing, it is reasonable to assume that the operation of the former will inevitably be effected by the motives of the latter. If these motives are fundamentally at odds with the ‘legitimate’ ends of government, moreover, this suggests that the actual process of governing will inevitably run afoul those ends, thereby rendering the government illegitimate in practice. In other words, the de facto legitimacy of any particular government would seem to require that those who govern are motivated primarily by a desire to achieve whatever substantive moral ends are taken to constitute that legitimacy in the first place.

Although it is difficult if not impossible to determine the precise motivations of those who govern (or seek to govern) others, almost every government contains at least some individuals who are primarily driven by narrow self-interest or, worse, by the ‘carnivorous, altogether bestial and savage instinct’⁴⁷ to exercise power over others for its own sake. The problem, according to anarchists, is that such an instinct brings with it an insatiable desire for ever *more* power and, to this extent, is ultimately ‘animated by the wish to be the only power, because in the nature of its being [power] deems itself absolute and consequently opposes any bar which reminds it of the limits of its influence’.⁴⁸ In other words, the desire for power inevitably generates a corresponding will to destroy, or at least neutralise, anything and anyone that stands in the way of increasing power—in which case even a small handful of government officials who are motivated by such a desire will naturally tend to drive out their

more high-minded colleagues. Indeed, just *having* power tends to have a ‘corrupting effect on those in whose hands it is placed’,⁴⁹ which means that even those who are motivated to seek power from ostensibly altruistic motives run a considerable risk of being corrupted when and if they actually wield it. Every concept of political legitimacy presupposes a distinction between just government and tyranny; but if tyranny denotes exploitation and oppression, and if the very possession of de facto power transforms people ‘by the force of an immutable social law’ into ‘exploiter[s] and oppressor[s] of society’,⁵⁰ it is unclear how any government can be (or at least remain) legitimate in practice.

Hence anarchists’ insistence that ‘all governments resemble one another and are worth the same’,⁵¹ that their ‘essential function ... in all times and in all places’ has unfailingly been ‘that of oppressing and exploiting the masses’ for the sake of ‘defending the oppressors and exploiters’.⁵² Regardless of their particular ‘form, character, or color’—whether ‘absolute or constitutional, monarchy or republic, fascist, Nazi, or Bolshevik’⁵³—all governments are in practice ‘ranged on the side of the most enlightened and richest class against the poorest and most numerous’⁵⁴ and are ‘capable only of protecting old privileges and creating new ones’.⁵⁵ This explains why

the political world has always been and continues to be the stage for high knavery and unsurpassed brigandage ... why all the history of ancient and modern states is nothing more than series of revolting crimes; why present and past kings and ministers of all times and countries—statesmen, diplomats, bureaucrats, and warriors—if judged from the point of view of simple morality and human justice, deserve a thousand times the gallows or penal servitude.⁵⁶

THE NATION-STATE

Further along in the same passage, Bakunin claims that ‘there is no terror, cruelty, sacrilege, perjury, imposture, infamous transaction, cynical theft, brazen robbery, or foul treason which has not been and is still not being committed daily by representatives of the State’.⁵⁷ Here, as in the previous quotation, the term ‘state’ is a proxy for ‘polity’ or, more generally, for any and all organised systems of government. Although this convention is common in anarchist writings, anarchists, like others, also use the term ‘state’ in reference to a particular *kind* of polity (the modern ‘nation-state’) that first emerged in Europe in the seventeenth century and is generally distinguished from city-states, empires, feudal kingdoms, and other early political systems by four general characteristics:

1. *The Conflation of Political Identity with National Identity.* The modern nation-state combines the concept of political identity and the concept of national identity into a single entity. Whereas the concept of ‘polity’ is purely political in nature, the concept of ‘nationhood’ is primarily sociological insofar as it refers to a community of people who share, or take

themselves to share, a common culture or lineage. Historically, identification with a nation was altogether separate from identification with a polity. In Ancient Greece, for example, the term *Hellas* referred to the collection of individuals who spoke Greek, shared a common Greek culture, and saw themselves as descended from a (real or imagined) common ancestral line. Membership in the Greek ‘nation’, accordingly, had nothing to do with being a citizen of a particular polity. (A similar situation prevailed in the Roman Empire, many of whose citizens were themselves non-Roman.) The citizens or subjects of a given nation-state, in contrast, are taken to share a common national identity that is rooted in the particular territory (or territories) they inhabit. This national identity, moreover, is co-extensive with their political status within said nation-state and plays a prominent role in legitimating the latter’s system of government.

2. *Sovereignty*. Strictly speaking, a polity endures so long as it maintains de facto power over their subjects and the territories they inhabit. Although this is much easier to accomplish when the polity’s government is recognised as legitimate by (most of) the people it governs, no less than by other polities, its status *as* a polity does not depend on such recognition. By contrast, a polity is not generally regarded as a nation-state unless other nation-states recognise its ‘sovereignty’—that is, the de jure authority of its government to exercise a monopoly of force over the populations and territories it claims.
3. *The Centralisation and Expansion of Political Power*. In exercising this monopoly, nation-states tend to consolidate the various operations of government within centralised bureaucratic apparatuses; more than this, they radically expand the scope of political power by exercising control over aspects of life that had previously been regarded as ‘private’.
4. *The Hypostasisation of Political Power*. The ideology of the nation-state reifies or ‘hypostasises’ political power by drawing a real (and not merely conceptual) distinction between ‘the government’ and ‘the State’, where the latter refers to an abstract corporate person—a ‘body politic’ or ‘commonwealth’—that encompasses the entire citizenry (i.e., ‘the people’) as well as entire apparatus of government but exists separately from, and independently of, all particular individuals and institutions.

Although anarchism rejects the nation-state for the same general reasons it rejects all states, it also recognises it as importantly distinct. Anarchist critiques of the nation-state, accordingly, are focused primarily on the foregoing characteristics, especially the third and the fourth.

At the heart of such critiques is the notion that ‘the State’—understood as an ‘abstract entity’ that embodies the general or collective will of ‘the people’ but is ‘not identical with either the rulers or the ruled’⁵⁸—is a ‘lie, an illusion, a Utopia, never realized and never realizable’,⁵⁹ a fiction that ‘has no more

existence than gods and devils have' and which is 'equally the reflex and creation of man [sic]'.⁶⁰ In reality, the State is merely a 'condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of human behaviour' that ultimately reflects human 'ignorance and fear'.⁶¹ The nature of this condition or relationship is reflected most clearly in the centralised and bureaucratised apparatus of the modern nation-state—an unthinking, unfeeling machine that 'interferes with all the activities of men [sic]'⁶² and 'forc[es] every manifestation of life into the straitjacket of its laws'.⁶³ As Kropotkin writes:

Today, the State has succeeded in meddling in every aspect of our lives. From the cradle to the tomb, it strangles us in its arms... It regulates our actions. It accumulates mountains of laws and ordinances in which the shrewdest lawyer is lost... It creates an army of employees, spiders with hooked fingers, who know the universe only through the dirty windows of their offices, or by their obscure, absurd, illegible old papers.⁶⁴

Domination of this sort presupposes that the dominated are not (or, at least, should not be treated as) *autonomous*—that is, competent to deal with the management of their own affairs⁶⁵—which means that the State opposes both collective aspirations toward self-determination as well as individual persons' ability to think and act for themselves. In practice, this means turning everything into a 'means of exploitation' or a 'police measure ... to hold people in check', either by 'brute force, that is, physical violence ... by depriving [people] of the means of subsistence and thus reducing them to helplessness'⁶⁶ or by shackling the human mind with 'dead dogma' that destroys its ability to think on its own.⁶⁷

Because the State is both antagonistic toward individual and collective autonomy as well as fundamentally 'conservative, static, intolerant of change and opposed to it',⁶⁸ its foremost aim is to relegate the many to the one, the different to the same, the specific to the general, the particular to the universal, and the concrete to the abstract. In pursuing this aim, the 'mechanical order of the State 'sets its stamp' on every individual it encounters by 'render[ing] them stupid and brutal', divesting them of 'all human feeling', and, ultimately, transforming them into machines themselves.⁶⁹ In this sense, it represents 'the triumph of the machine over the spirit, the rationalization of all thought, action, and feeling according to the fixed norms of authority, and consequently the end of all intellectual culture'.⁷⁰ Along the same lines, the notion that individual nation-states are only legitimate insofar as they are 'sovereign'—that is, recognised by other nation-states—has facilitated the emergence of a global political framework within which all polities are, or aspire to be, nation-states. As a result, the concept of ethno-cultural identity or 'peoplehood'—which Kropotkin describes as 'the union between the people and the territory it occupies, from which territory it receives its national character and on which it impresses its own stamp, so as to make an indivisible whole of both men and territory'⁷¹—has been universally subsumed under the concept of 'nationality', a form of collective identity that is primarily defined by affiliation with a nation-state.⁷² In practice, this has led nation-states consistently to oppose ethnic,

racial, cultural, and religious diversity in favor of homogeneous conceptions of national identity and to reject the right of minority ethnic and religious groups both at home and abroad ‘to develop along the lines [they] wished’ independently of the global nation-state system.⁷³

ANARCHIST VS. MARXIST VIEWS OF THE STATE

Anarchists have frequently recognised a distinction, if only implicitly, between *domination* and *oppression*, the latter referring to a ‘systematic’ iteration of the former. Like domination more generally, oppression involves exercising power over people in a way that ‘limits [their] freedoms, choices, and abilities’.⁷⁴ The difference is that oppression entails *asymmetrical* power—that is, power that is exercised by one group over another group in a way that harms the latter to the benefit of the former. Whether the harm in question is ‘direct physical harm, as when the oppressor group uses violent coercion or force against the oppressed group, or indirect harm, as when the oppressor group exploits, marginalizes, or disempowers the oppressed group, or when the oppressed group is denied significant political, social, or economic advantages’,⁷⁵ the fact that it benefits the oppressor group and is perpetrated chiefly if not solely for this reason is the distinctive hallmark of oppression. At the level of social, political, and economic organisation, oppression invariably operates by means of the creation and maintenance of *hierarchies*—that is, structured relationships in which political, social, economic, and so on, power is distributed unequally among those who are party to said relationships in a way that benefits some of them at the expense of others.

Anarchists recognise that political, social, and economic oppression exists in myriad forms ranging from ‘the economic idea of capitalism’ to ‘the politics of government or of authority’ to ‘the theological idea of the Church’.⁷⁶ We have already seen that anarchists regard the state in general and the nation-state in particular as paradigmatically oppressive institutions—‘permanent conspiracy[ies] on the part of the minority against the majority’ which, even when they are ‘dresse[d] up in the most liberal and democratic form[s]’ are ‘essentially based on domination, and upon violence, that is upon despotism—a concealed but no less dangerous despotism...’.⁷⁷ As a centralised, hierarchical institution that actively concentrates power in the hands of the few, the State ‘by its nature places itself outside and over the people and inevitably subordinates them to an organization and to aims which are foreign to and opposed to the real needs and aspirations of the people’.⁷⁸ Were the people themselves to ‘stand at the head of the government’, Bakunin writes, there would be ‘no government, no state’. Indeed, the very existence of the State implies that ‘there will be those who are ruled and those that are slaves’.⁷⁹

Anarchists have also insisted that otherwise distinct forms of oppression are ‘linked in various ways’,⁸⁰ ‘bound together ... by the bond of cause and effect, effect and cause’.⁸¹ This is most vividly illustrated in the ‘inseparable’ relationship between the State and capitalism. As Bakunin writes:

Political power and wealth are inseparable. Those who have power have the means to gain wealth and must center all their efforts upon acquiring it, for without it they will not be able to retain their power. Those who are wealthy must become strong, for, lacking power, they run the risk of being deprived of their wealth. The toiling masses have always been powerless because they were poverty-stricken, and they were poverty-stricken because they lacked organized power.⁸²

Bakunin's point here is that the ability of one class to exploit another class—and thus to acquire and maintain economic power at its expense—requires political power. As Lucien van der Walt notes, 'Private ownership of the means of production can only be used for exploitation if buttressed by relations of domination, whereas monopoly of the means of coercion and administration requires the financing provided by economic exploitation'.⁸³ This implies that the interests of economic elites are inextricably bound up with the interests of the government, and vice versa, which explains why 'every government' is committed to 'preserving and strengthening ... the systematic and legalized dominance of the ruling class over the exploited people'.⁸⁴

The notion that economic interests naturally converge with political interests is, of course, a basic presupposition of classical Marxist theories of the State as well. A crucial difference, however, is that Marxism regards the State as nothing more than 'a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie'⁸⁵ or as 'an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another [...] which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between classes'.⁸⁶ This implies that all 'relations of domination' are consequences of 'relations of production' or, what comes to the same, that all oppression is ultimately reducible to economic exploitation.⁸⁷ Anarchists, in contrast, contend that there are multiple and mutually irreducible forms of oppression with distinct qualities, interests, and dynamics that can and do exist 'apart from and independent of ... economic conditions'⁸⁸ (or, in Marx's parlance, 'economic requisites'⁸⁹). The State, accordingly, doesn't exist simply for the sake of promoting 'the general interests of the ruling classes'; the State has its own interests—chief among them, 'the preservation of its exclusive governmental advantages and its personnel'—which it pursues independently of its collusion with economic elites.⁹⁰ As Lucien van der Walt notes:

For [anarchists], the class system was not defined simply in economic terms—that is, in terms of *relations of production*—but also had to be understood in terms of *relations of domination*; not just in terms of inequitable ownership of the *means of production*, but also in terms of ownership of the *means of coercion* (the capacity to physically enforce decisions) and of *administration* (the instruments that govern society). It is only possible to understand the anarchist claim that a state must (with "iron logic") generate a new ruling class, and that state managers are themselves part of a ruling class and not mere servants of a ruling class *external* to the state, by recognizing that class is envisaged here in relation to ownership or control of one or more of the aforementioned core resources. A ruling class is not just an economically dominant class; indeed, members have no direct relation at all to the means of production.⁹¹

In other words, the mere fact that ‘capitalists, whether state or private, are part of the ruling class’ does not necessarily imply that they are ‘always the *dominant* part’. Although ‘economic power allows individuals access to state power ... state power allows individuals access to economic power as well.... [S]ince the political and economic elites wield different resources, their interests are convergent and mutually reinforcing but not identical’.

Unlike Marxism, which self-consciously aims to provide a purely ‘scientific’ theory of the State in the broader context of historical materialism, anarchist accounts of the nature and operation of the State are closely related to, if not altogether inseparable from, anarchist critiques of the State. As we noted at the outset, it is precisely this critique—no less than the engaged opposition it provokes—that truly distinguishes anarchism from other anti-statist ideologies. The foregoing has made clear that a central element of this critique is the rejection of *de jure* authority and, by extension, legitimacy. This is not the whole story, however, since the mere absence of *de jure* authority scarcely implies that the State is evil in itself, let alone that it should be abolished. Our goal in the next section, accordingly, is to provide a fuller understanding of anarchist’s rejection of the State as well as their active attempts to eradicate it.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, conventional theories of *de jure* authority are intended to demonstrate that a government has a right to exercise *de facto* power over its subjects and that these subjects have a corresponding obligation to comply with that government’s commands. If the subjects in question are autonomous, however, then it is not clear how any such obligation could possibly exist apart from the consent of those subjects themselves—in other words, how a government could possibly have *de jure* authority over its subjects if they themselves fail to recognise voluntarily that authority. Social contract theory and other liberal accounts of *de jure* authority have attempted to sidestep this issue by introducing various concepts of ‘implicit’ or ‘tacit’ consent according to which anyone who chooses to live in a particular political community incurs an implicit obligation to comply with the government of that community—in other words, that the government has *de jure* authority over anyone who refrains from explicitly rejecting that authority. Other accounts contend that a government has *de jure* authority over its subjects just in case the things it commands them to do (or not do) are things that they have good reasons to do (or not do) independently of their being commanded.

Anarchists obviously find these and all other attempts to justify *de jure* political authority wanting. As far as they are concerned, the very notion that there is or could be a right to ‘compe[1] obedience to, or recognition of, authority through the direct or indirect perpetration of harm or the threat of harm constitutes a fundamental denial of ... autonomy’⁹² that is irreconcilably opposed to the ‘self-respect and independence’ of the individual.⁹³ That said, the fact that *de jure* authority cannot be justified on voluntarist grounds and

so is arguably at odds with autonomy scarcely entails that the exercise of de facto power over others is categorically unjustifiable—let alone unqualifiedly *wrong*—nor that the institutions that exercise such power ought to be abolished. After all, perhaps exercising such power is necessary for (or, at the very least, conducive to) the achievement of higher moral ends, in which case denying the autonomy of others is morally justifiable (if not altogether right) in certain instances even if it is prima facie morally wrong to do so in general.

Anarchists do not claim that states are ‘unjustifiable’ because they believe the existence of states as such is contrary to any and all moral ends. On the contrary, anarchists recognise that there are different kinds of states, at least some of which have ostensibly beneficial consequences for the individuals and societies they govern.⁹⁴ As Paul McLaughlin notes, however, ‘Anarchists do not simply disapprove of the state; they disapprove of it as a particular (if particularly important) and unjustifiable instance of a more widespread social phenomenon’⁹⁵—namely, authority. For anarchists, this ‘unjustifiable instance’ of authority—the opaque political authority that is necessarily exercised by all systems of government and, by extension, by all polities, including nation-states—is unjustifiable precisely because it is an instance of domination and oppression. In other words, the fact that the state is necessarily co-extensive with opaque authority and that opaque authority is necessarily co-extensive with domination and oppression implies that the state dominates and oppresses *by definition*. If, as anarchists contend, domination and oppression are wrong in and of themselves, then the same must necessarily be true of the state in general, which trivially implies that all particular states are incapable of being reformed.

Anarchism is ‘more than anti-statism’ precisely because its particular brand of anti-statism rests on the more fundamental conviction that domination and oppression are not only unjustifiable but inherently and irredeemably wrong. This means, in turn, that understanding *why* anarchists oppose whatever they oppose (including, but not limited to, the state) requires a more basic understanding of *how* anarchists conceptualise domination and oppression and, by extension, *why* they reject them. If nothing else, my hope is that the foregoing chapter has provided a foundation for the future pursuit of such understanding.

NOTES

1. Mikhail Bakunin, ‘Federalism, Socialism, Anti-Theologism’ [1867], in S. Dolgoff (Ed), *Bakunin on Anarchy: Selected Works by the Activist-Founder of World Anarchism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 133.
2. Marie Fleming, *The Anarchist Way to Socialism: Elisée Reclus and Nineteenth-Century European Anarchism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 16.
3. See, for example, Francesco Crispi, ‘The Antidote for Anarchy’, *The Daily Mail* 807 (1898), 4. Adolf Lenz, *Der Anarchismus und des Strafrecht*, in *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft* 16:1 (1896), 1–47; Cesar Lombroso, *Gli Anarchici*, 2nd ed. (Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1895); Naum Reichesberg, *Sozialismus und Anarchismus* (Berlin: Seibert Verlag, 1895); Ettore Sernicoli,

- L'Anarchia e gli Anarchici* (Milano: Fratelli Treves, 1894); and Van Hamel, 'L'Anarchisme et le Combat contre l'anarchisme au point de vue de l'anthropologie criminelle', in *Congrès international d'anthropologie criminelle, compte rendu des travaux de la quatrième session, tenue à Genève du 24 au 28 août 1896* (Genève, 1897), 254–257. For a detailed overview of early studies of anarchism, see Matthew S. Adams, 'The Possibilities of Anarchist History: Rethinking the Canon and Writing History', *Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies* 1 (2013), 33–63.
4. Paul Eltzbacher, *Anarchism*, trans. Steven T. Byington (New York: B.R. Tucker, 1908), 3. The original German text (*Der Anarchismus*) was published by J. Guttentag Verlagsbuchhandlung of Berlin in 1900.
 5. *Ibid.*, vii.
 6. *Ibid.*, viii, 3.
 7. *Ibid.*, 3.
 8. *Ibid.*
 9. *Ibid.*
 10. *Ibid.*, 4, 12.
 11. *Ibid.*, 292.
 12. Kropotkin lavishly praised the book in his famous article on anarchism for the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (*Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th edition [New York: The Encyclopedia Britannica Co., 1910], 914) and Benjamin Tucker regarded it as 'the best book on anarchism ever written by an outsider' (James Martin, *Men Against the State* [Colorado Springs, CO: Ralph Myles, 1972], 271). For more on Eltzbacher's influence, see Andrew Carlson, *Anarchism in Germany* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1972), 1–4; Marie Fleming, *The Geography of Freedom* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1988), chapter 1; Michael Schmidt and Lucien van der Walt, *Black Flame: The Revolutionary Class Politics of Anarchism and Syndicalism* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2009), chapter 1.
 13. Fleming, *The Anarchist Way to Socialism*, 16.
 14. Jeremy Jennings, 'Anarchism', in R. Eatwell and A. Wright (Eds.), *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, 2nd ed. (New York: Continuum, 1999), 132.
 15. J. Narveson, *You and the State: A Short Introduction to Political Philosophy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 183.
 16. G. Crowder, 'Anarchism', in E. Craig (Ed), *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 1998), 244.
 17. A. J. Simmons, 'Philosophical Anarchism', in J. Sanders and J. Narveson (Eds.), *For and Against the State* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 22. The literature on 'philosophical anarchism' of this sort is extensive. For a general overview, see Benjamin Franks, 'Anarchism and Analytic Philosophy', in Ruth Kinna (Ed), *The Continuum Companion to Anarchism* (London: Continuum, 2012), 50–71; and Nathan Jun, 'On Philosophical Anarchism', *Radical Philosophy Review* 19:3 (2016), 551–567.
 18. Schmidt and van der Walt, *Black Flame*, 43. See also S. Clark, *Living Without Domination: The Possibility of an Anarchist Utopia* (London: Routledge, 2016), 9–10; Paul McLaughlin, *Anarchism and Authority: A Philosophical Introduction to Classical Anarchism* (London: Routledge, 2016), 27–28; David Weick, 'The Negativity of Anarchism', in Howard Ehrlich et al. (Eds), *Reinventing Anarchy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 139.

19. Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 77, 88; Michael Freeden, *Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 54, 59, 76–77.
20. Michael Freeden, ‘The Morphological Analysis of Ideology’, in Michael Freeden et al. (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 124–125.
21. Wieck, ‘The Negativity of Anarchism’, 139.
22. All of these questions involve certain fundamental concepts, the precise meanings of which is a matter of considerable dispute. This chapter makes no pretense toward settling such disputes, and any definitions it assigns to these concepts are merely stipulated for the sake of facilitating the investigation to follow.
23. Dennis Hume Wong, *Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Use* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1980), 1.
24. *Ibid.*, 2–5.
25. McLaughlin, *Anarchism and Authority*, 56.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.* Cf. Richard De George, *The Nature and Limits of Authority* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 19–20; A. John Simmons, *Boundaries of Authority* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 16.
28. McLaughlin, *Anarchism and Authority*, 56.
29. *Ibid.*
30. Richard Sylvan, ‘Anarchism’, in Robert Goodin and Philip Petit (Eds), *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), 221.
31. Crispin Sartwell, *Against the State: An Introduction to Anarchist Political Theory* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008), 25–28.
32. Martin van Crevald, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1.
33. *Ibid.*
34. See, for example, Mikhail Bakunin, ‘The Bear of Berne and the Bear of St. Petersburg’ [1870] in Sam Dolgoff (Ed), *Bakunin on Anarchism* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2002), 221; Mikhail Bakunin, *Marx, Freedom, and the State*, ed. and trans. K. J. Kenafick (London: Freedom Press, 1950), 33; Alexander Berkman, *What is Anarchism?* [1928] (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2003), 205; Alexander Berkman, *The Life of an Anarchist: The Alexander Berkman Reader*, ed. Gene Fellner (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), 273, 300; Peter Kropotkin, ‘The State: Its Historic Role’, in George Woodcock (Ed), *Fugitive Writings* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1993), 200–201; Errico Malatesta, *Life and Ideas*, ed. and trans. Vernon Richards (London: Freedom Press, 1965), 47, 135, 186.
35. Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 38.
36. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century* [1851], trans. J. B. Robinson (London: Freedom Press, 1923), 294.
37. McLaughlin, *Anarchism and Authority*, 36–37.
38. Peter Kropotkin, ‘Anarchist Morality’ [1892], in Roger Baldwin (Ed), *Kropotkin’s Revolutionary Pamphlets* (New York: Dover, 1970), 98.

39. Emma Goldman, 'Free Speech Suppressed in Barre, Vt.,' *Free Society* (March 5, 1899), 3.
40. Mikhail Bakunin, 'God and the State' [1871], in *Bakunin on Anarchy*, 229–230; cf. Errico Malatesta, *Anarchy* [1891], ed. V. Richards (London: Freedom Press, 1974), 37; Uri Gordon, 'Power and Anarchy', in Nathan Jun and Shane Wahl (Eds), *New Perspectives on Anarchism* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 45.
41. Bakunin, 'God and the State', 230.
42. *Ibid.*, 229.
43. *Ibid.*, 230.
44. Mikhail Bakunin, 'Address to the League of Peace and Freedom' [1867], in *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin*, ed. G. P. Maximoff (New York: Free Press, 1953), 224.
45. *Ibid.*
46. Bakunin, 'Federalism, Socialism, and Anti-Theologism', in *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin*, 221.
47. Bakunin, 'The Program of the Alliance' [1871], in *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin*, 248.
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50. Bakunin, 'Statism and Anarchy' [1873], in *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin*, 249.
51. Peter Kropotkin, 'Declaration of the Anarchists Arraigned Before the Criminal Court in Lyon' [1883], in Daniel Guérin (Ed), *No Gods, No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism, Book One* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 1989), 299.
52. Errico Malatesta, *Anarchy* [1891], ed. V. Richards (London: Freedom Press, 1974), 14.
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54. Proudhon, *The General Idea of Revolution in the Nineteenth Century*, 108.
55. Rudolf Rocker, *Anarcho-Syndicalism: Theory and Practice* [1938] (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2004), 13.
56. Bakunin, 'Federalism, Socialism, and Anti-Theologism', in *Bakunin on Anarchy*, 134.
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59. Malatesta, *Anarchy*, 11.
60. Goldman, 'The Individual, Society, and the State', 113.
61. Gustav Landauer, 'Weak Statesmen, Weaker People' [1910] in *Revolution and Other Writings: A Political Reader*, ed. and trans. Gabriel Kuhn (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010), 214.
62. Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture*, 35.
63. Rocker, *Anarcho-Syndicalism*, 33.
64. Peter Kropotkin, 'Words of a Rebel' [1881], in *No Gods, No Masters*, 301.
65. Goldman, 'The Individual, Society, and the State', 98; cf. Bakunin, 'Revolutionary Catechism' [1866], in *Bakunin on Anarchy*, 76.

66. Malatesta, *Anarchy*, 10, 15.
67. Rocker, *Anarcho-Syndicalism*, 33.
68. Goldman, 'The Individual, Society, and the State', 115.
69. Rocker, *Anarcho-Syndicalism*, 33.
70. Ibid.
71. Peter Kropotkin, 'Finland: A Rising Nationality', *The Nineteenth Century* 27:97 (Mar. 1885), 530.
72. Cf. Emma Goldman, 'Patriotism: A Menace to Liberty', in *Anarchism and Other Essays* (New York: Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1910), 127–144; Leo Tolstoy, 'Patriotism and Government', in *Government Is Violence: Essays on Anarchism and Pacifism*, ed. D. Stephens (London: Phoenix Press, 1990), 77–92.
73. Kropotkin, Quoted in Jean Caroline Cahm, 'Kropotkin and the Anarchist Movement', in E. Cahm and V. C. Fišera (Eds), *Socialism and Nationalism*, vol. 1 (Nottingham, UK: Spokesman, 1978), 56.
74. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, 38; cf. A. Cudd, *Analyzing Oppression* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 52.
75. Jun, 'On Philosophical Anarchism', 559; cf. Cudd, *Analyzing Oppression*, 25, 50, 52.
76. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *What is Property?* (London: William Reeves, 1969), 43.
77. Bakunin, 'Science and the Urgent Revolution Task' [1870], in *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin*, 211.
78. Bakunin, 'Statism and Anarchy', in *Bakunin on Anarchy*, 328.
79. Ibid., 330.
80. Proudhon, *What is Property?*, 43.
81. Peter Kropotkin, 'Modern Science and Anarchism' [1912], in *Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets*, 181.
82. Bakunin, 'Science and the Urgent Revolutionary Task', 358.
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84. Bakunin, 'Science and the Urgent Revolutionary Task', 365.
85. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 'The Manifesto of the Communist Party' [1848], in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), 475.
86. Vladimir Lenin, 'The State and Revolution' [1917], in *The Essential Works of Lenin*, ed. H. Christman (New York: Dover, 1987), 274.
87. van der Walt, 'Anarchism and Marxism', 523; cf. Karl Marx, 'After the Revolution: Marx Debates Bakunin', in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 544.
88. Mikhail Bakunin, 'Letter to *La Liberté*' [1872], in *Bakunin on Anarchy*, 282–283.
89. Marx, 'After the Revolution', 544.
90. Bakunin, 'Science and the Urgent Revolutionary Task,' 365.
91. van der Walt, 'Anarchism and Marxism', 522–523.
92. Jun, 'On Philosophical Anarchism', 561.
93. Goldman, *Anarchism and Other Essays*, 67.
94. Jun, 'On Philosophical Anarchism', 563.
95. McLaughlin, *Anarchism and Authority*, 28.



Individual and Community

Laurence Davis

Scholars of political ideology commonly allege that anarchism is not a coherent ideology because of the coexistence within it of irreconcilably opposed individualist and communalist strands. The political theorist David Miller, for example, argues from a market socialist perspective that there is no coherent core or consistent set of ideas shared by anarchists. Focusing specifically on the many ideological differences and disagreements between individualist and communalist anarchists, Miller concludes that ‘we must face the possibility that anarchism is not really *an* ideology, but rather the point of intersection of several ideologies’.¹

Terence Ball and Richard Dagger echo Miller’s claim in their influential text *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*. According to Ball and Dagger, all anarchists agree that the state is an evil to be abolished in favour of a system of voluntary cooperation. But the agreement ends there. Again emphasising the relationship between individual and community in anarchist thought (as well as conflicting ideas about the role of violence), Ball and Dagger observe that whereas some anarchists are ‘radical individualists who advocate a competitive, capitalist—but stateless society’, others are ‘communalists who detest capitalism and believe that anarchism requires the common ownership and control of property’. They conclude from their brief analysis that the disagreements and differences among anarchists ‘overwhelm the single point on which they agree’.²

Andrew Heywood makes a similar point in his best-selling textbook *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*. In a chapter replete with inaccuracies and misleading and reductive popular stereotypes about anarchism, Heywood maintains that anarchism is less a unified and coherent ideology in its own right and more

L. Davis (✉)
Department of Government and Politics, University College Cork,
Cork, Republic of Ireland
e-mail: L.davis@ucc.ie

a ‘point of overlap between two rival ideologies—liberalism and socialism—the point at which both ideologies reach anti-statist conclusions’.³ While he concedes that anarchism nevertheless ought to be treated as a separate ideology because its diverse supporters are united by a series of broader principles and positions, he emphasises anarchism’s ‘dual’ and derivative character: ‘it can be interpreted as either a form of “ultra-liberalism”, which resembles extreme liberal individualism, or as a form of “ultra-socialism”, which resembles extreme socialist collectivism’.⁴

In contrast to this line of argument, which is a commonplace in the scholarly literature on political ideologies, I will argue in this chapter that anarchism is indeed a coherent and distinctive political ideology and that the coexistence within it of well-developed and very different individualist and communalist strands is a primary source of its ideological distinction and political strength. Far from being a weakness or a sign of incoherence, efforts by anarchists to maximise individuality *and* community highlight anarchism’s pluralistic and contested character, and its ideologically unique balancing of individuality and community in a dynamic and creative tension.

The plan for the chapter is as follows. First, I will critically analyse one of the leading theoretical works on the relationship between individuality and community in anarchist thought. I will then consider in turn arguments, assumptions, and imaginative explorations of the proper relationship between individual and community in debates between so-called ‘lifestyle’ anarchists and ‘social’ anarchists, anarchist conceptions of democracy, and the anarchist literary utopian tradition. I conclude by reflecting on the ideological importance of anarchism’s enduring ability to embrace seemingly contradictory extremes.

THE ANARCHIST IDEAL OF COMMUNAL INDIVIDUALITY

In his book *Anarchism: A Theoretical Analysis*, Alan Ritter analyses the relationship between individual and community in anarchist thought, as well as in wider comparative ideological perspective. His argument is essentially twofold. First, anarchists regard individual and community as mutually dependent values, an amalgam Ritter refers to as ‘communal individuality’ and which he claims they regard as their chief political objective. Second, while anarchists are not alone in advocating such an ideal, they have more to teach us about it than other ideological traditions.

As evidence for the first of these claims, Ritter assesses the meaning and significance of individuality and community in the work of classical anarchists such as Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin. He finds that notwithstanding their many differences, all of them share a common understanding of individuality as self-development, and of community as reciprocal awareness. Moreover, and very importantly, all of them seek to combine the greatest individual development with the greatest communal unity. Contrary to popular misconception, in other words, the chief goal of the anarchists is not freedom above all else, but a society of strongly separate persons who are strongly bound together in a group.

Ritter's second key argument, that anarchism has more to teach us about communal individuality than other ideological traditions, broadens the scope of the analysis beyond the classical anarchists to encompass their liberal and socialist contemporaries. Having acknowledged that anarchists are not the only theorists who regard individuality and community, understood as mutually dependent values, as their chief political objective, Ritter maintains that their conception of communal individuality is distinctively appealing. This is so because they work out in detail, and with no resort to legal government, how to create, organise and maintain a regime in which communal individuality flourishes.

In contrast to their liberal counterparts, who tend to assign community a lower normative status either because it is normatively irrelevant or an interference with the satisfaction, freedom, or individuality they most prize or at best an instrumental value, anarchists strive to maximise individuality and community seen as equal, interdependent values.⁵ While Ritter concedes that there are signs of devotion to community among some liberals, he contrasts this tepid or ambivalent commitment with the strong anarchist emphasis on communal individuality, yielding the conclusion that this disagreement between the two groups in normative starting point is decisive evidence that 'anarchists, far from being an especially hardy breed of liberals, are an entirely difference race'.⁶

If anarchists and liberals part company on the value of community, anarchists and socialists disagree most vehemently about the nature of the state. Marx and Engels, for example, who like the anarchists regard community and individuality as potentially mutually reinforcing values (even if they were reluctant to sketch out in any detail how a socialist society might be organised so as to maximise these values) and are critical of the liberal bourgeois state, believe that the state debases and estranges its subjects primarily because of its transient class character. This sets them apart from their anarchist contemporaries, who while they appreciated that particular effects of each state are shaped by its changeable attributes, also emphasised the inherent legality and coerciveness of every state as a constant source of its more serious effects. Ritter puts the point as follows, 'For the anarchist ... its makes no difference, so far as concerns its more important effects, who runs the state, how it is organized, or what it does. It debases and estranges its subjects regardless of these contingencies, just because it is a state'.⁷

Ritter's argument is not without its difficulties and limitations, three of which are particularly noteworthy. First, he pays very little attention to the work of the individualist anarchists. While clearly a limitation, this is not one that is fatal to Ritter's argument, which is in fact confirmed by a wider focus on the individualist anarchist tradition. Contrary to Ball and Dagger's misleading assertion cited above, the individualist anarchist tradition is historically not anti-socialist but anti-capitalist. From Benjamin Tucker in the United States to Henry Seymour in Britain, individualist anarchists explicitly referred to themselves as socialists⁸ and opposed the exploitation of labour, all forms of non-labour income, and capitalist property rights. Like their social anarchist

counterparts, they opposed profits, rent and interest as forms of exploitation, and property as a form of theft. They rejected representative democracy, called for the complete abolition of the state, argued for a revolution that would eliminate capitalism, and sought to return the full product of labour to labour in the context of an egalitarian society. As to their understanding of the relationship between individual and community, Tucker's remarks are exemplary, 'Liberty has always insisted that Individualism and Socialism are not antithetical terms; that, on the contrary, the most perfect Socialism is possible only on condition of the most perfect Individualism; and that Socialism includes, not only Collectivism and Communism, but also that school of Individualist Anarchism which conceives liberty as a means of destroying usury and the exploitation of labour'.⁹

Second, Ritter's legitimate focus on anarchism as a normative political philosophy, or a set of moral arguments about the justification of political action and institutions, yields a somewhat bookish form of analysis divorced from historical context and engagement with anarchism as a social movement and practice. Again, however, this limitation does not undermine his basic argument, for as John Clark has pointed out with specific reference to Ritter's work:

Ritter, a careful student of classical anarchist thought, explains that in espousing communal individuality, the anarchist tradition asserts that personal autonomy and social solidarity, rather than opposing one another, are inseparable and mutually reinforcing. He sees the theoretical defense of this synthesis to be "the strength of the anarchists' thought." One might add that one of the great achievements of anarchist *practice* has been the actualization of this theoretical synthesis in various social forms, including personal relationships, affinity groups, intentional communities, cooperative projects, and movements for revolutionary social transformation.¹⁰

Third and much more damaging is Ritter's tendency at times to overstate his case in a way that obscures the dialectical richness of the anarchist theoretical tradition. The following remark is indicative:

By committing themselves equally to individuality and community, anarchists raise doubts whether their chief aims are consistent. For lacking a principle to adjudicate between individuality and community, how can they judge situations where the courses these norms prescribe conflict? To meet this objection anarchists deny the possibility of conflict; they view each of their aims as dependent on the other for its full achievement.¹¹

While the claim that anarchists view each of their aims (individuality and community) as dependent on the other for its full achievement is valid, the further claim that they deny the possibility of conflict between them is not. And the evidence Ritter presents does not support this further claim. Bakunin did, indeed, believe that 'the infinite diversity of individuals is the very cause, the principal basis, of their solidarity' and that solidarity serves in turn as 'the

mother of individuality'.¹² Likewise, there is ample evidence to support the argument that other anarchists more or less explicitly agreed, believing that communal awareness springs from developed individuality and that developed individuality in turn depends on a close-knit common life. However, it does not follow that they denied the possibility of conflict between individuality and community.

Ritter appears to half recognise this point some 100 pages later when he notes that 'Anarchist individuality and community are patently discordant [...] Just as individuality fragments community, so community makes it hard for individuality to grow'.¹³ This recognition, in turn, prompts him to articulate a somewhat more nuanced position than his earlier claim that anarchists deny the possibility of conflict between individuality and community, 'neither a shattering individualism nor a stifling communitarianism contaminates an ideal anarchy, because its individualizing and communalizing tendencies fructify each other so as to prevent destructive excess'.¹⁴ As we shall see, however, even this formulation overemphasises the role of ideal harmony in anarchist thought. In contrast to Ritter, I will argue in what follows that the sometimes competing demands of the individual and society can never be fully and perfectly reconciled, even in an 'ideal anarchy'. I also contend that this seeming limitation of anarchist theory is actually one of its greatest strengths. More generally, I argue that anarchist theory and practice are truest to the ideology's core value of communal individuality when they steer a careful course between the Scylla of presuming an unbridgeable chasm between individual and community and the Charybdis of striving for a perfect and complete reconciliation between the two.

SOCIAL ANARCHISM AND LIFESTYLE ANARCHISM

Perhaps nowhere are the difficulties involved in balancing individualism and communalism more evident than in fraught movement debates about so-called lifestyle anarchism, the attempt by individuals to enact the principles of anarchism in their daily life. As one commentator has accurately observed, the question of lifestyle within anarchist movements highlights this tension precisely because it is a tactic that has both individualist and collectivist aspects.¹⁵

In contrast to their ideological cousins and sometime political rivals, liberalism and 'scientific' socialism, most anarchists—like so many feminists, pacifists, ecologists, anti-imperialists, and libertarian and utopian socialists—regard the liberation of everyday life as a defining feature of both their social ideals and the means of achieving them.¹⁶ The political thinker Murray Bookchin articulated this point with memorable clarity in the aftermath of the rebellions of the 1960s: 'It is plain that the goal of revolution today must be the liberation of daily life. Any revolution that fails to achieve this goal is counter-revolution. Above all, it is *we* who have to be liberated, *our* daily lives, with all their moments, hours and days, and not universals like "History" and "Society"'.¹⁷

Contemporary anarchists generally tend to use the term 'lifestyle anarchism' to refer to this feature of the anarchist movement. For example, James Purkis

and Jonathan Bowen employ it to describe the ‘living [of] one’s life in accordance to particular [anarchist] principles’.¹⁸ However, the term is now also frequently deployed with a pejorative intent, to ‘deride someone who is perceived to be more interested in cultivating their own personal liberation than in achieving social transformation’.¹⁹ Ironically, perhaps the most widely known use of the term in this pejorative sense is Murray Bookchin’s 1995 polemic *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm*. In this brief but hugely controversial work, Bookchin lambastes contemporary anarchists for abandoning their social revolutionary and utopian aspirations in favour of an introspective personalism, escapist aestheticism, and chic boutique lifestyle culture that poses no serious threat to the existing powers. He also contrasts lifestyle anarchism unfavourably with the social anarchist tradition, concluding that between them there exists ‘a divide that cannot be bridged’.²⁰

The differences between Bookchin’s earlier and later assessments of anarchist lifestyle politics are worth examining in some detail in part for what they reveal about the ideological pitfalls faced by those attempting to reconcile anarchism’s strong commitments to both individuality and community.²¹ In his earlier work, Bookchin repeatedly praised the counterculture of the 1960s for encouraging a libertarian lifestyle that provided the revolutionary with the psychic resources necessary to resist the subversion of the revolutionary project by authoritarian or elitist propensities assimilated in hierarchical society. As he observed in a piece originally composed in Paris in July 1968, the habits of authority and hierarchy are instilled in the individual at the very outset of life.²² The revolutionary movement must therefore be ‘profoundly concerned with lifestyle’ if it is to avoid becoming a source of counterrevolution.²³ And the revolutionary must try to reflect in his or her own person the conditions of the society (s)he is trying to achieve—at least to the degree this is possible in the constraining circumstances of the here and now. Anarchist organisations, Bookchin observed elsewhere (in response to changes by Marcuse and Huey Newton that anarchists rejected revolutionary organisation in favour of individual expression), differed from socialist political parties precisely by virtue of being social movements combining ‘a creative revolutionary life-style with a creative revolutionary theory’.²⁴ Both were essential, insofar as ‘life-style is related as intimately to revolution as revolution is to life-style’.²⁵

In contrast to those socialists who dismissed as a form of ‘bourgeois individualism’ the ‘intensely personal’²⁶ nature of the countercultural revolution spreading through society in the 1960s, the Murray Bookchin of the early 1970s drew a distinction between the atomised egotism produced by capitalism and the libertarian communist struggle for a free and joyous society in which each individual might acquire control over her or his everyday life. Viewed as an element of the latter project, he suggested, the process of anti-authoritarian *individuation* initiated by the counterculture was *itself* revolutionary insofar as revolution may be understood as self-activity in its most advanced form: the individuation of the ‘masses’ into conscious beings who can take direct, unmediated control of society and of their own lives. As such,

the revolutionary process was necessarily an organic rather than a mechanical one, and would affirm 'not only the rational but the joyous, the sensuous and the aesthetic side of revolution'.²⁷ More specifically, it would affirm and extend the counterculture's practical and wide-ranging challenges to both the unconscious and conscious legacies of domination: for example, its commitment to the autonomy of the self and the right to self-realisation; the evocation of love, sensuality, and the unfettered expression of the body; the spontaneous expression of feeling; the de-alienation of relations between people; the formation of communities and communes; the free access of all to the means of life; the rejection of the plastic commodity world and its careers; the practice of mutual aid; the acquisition of skills and counter-technologies; a new reverence for life and for the balance of nature; and the replacement of the work ethic by meaningful work and claims of pleasure.

A leading theorist of the anarchist and revolutionary personalist dimensions of the counterculture of the 1960s, some 25 years later Bookchin adopts a much more strident and combative tone towards countercultural, lifestyle-oriented anarchism in his 1995 polemic, *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism*. Whereas in the late 1960s and early 1970s he welcomed the individualism, spontaneity, cultural and sexual freedom, and undisciplined libertarian lifestyle that he associated with the counterculture, in the 1990s he lambastes contemporary anarchists for exhibiting precisely these same qualities. Moreover, he places the blame for this alleged degeneration of Euro-American anarchism on those same participants in the counterculture of the late 1960s whom he earlier praised for their utopian and revolutionary cultural experimentation. According to the elder Bookchin, individualist and communalist forms of anarchism cannot coexist, because the 'chasm' that now separates them is not simply a transient contemporary phenomenon but an 'unbridgeable' divide deeply rooted in the history and theory of anarchism. One or the other must triumph, and he leaves no doubt about which side of the struggle he is on.

There are numerous problems with this later account of anarchism. First, it conceives the relationship between individual and community in a reductively non-dialectical fashion. Whereas Bookchin criticises 'anarchism's failure to resolve [the] tension'²⁸ between individual autonomy and social freedom, a more dialectical²⁹ and less perfectionist understanding of the relationship between the two would allow for the possibility of a creative tension between the individualist and communalist dimensions of anarchism. Second, Bookchin presents a distorted picture of the relationship between individual and community in the history of anarchist theory and practice. From Godwin, Bakunin, and Kropotkin to Reclus, Malatesta, and Goldman, most anarchists have consistently affirmed the importance of both individual autonomy and social justice, and recognised their inseparable interrelationship, even as they disagreed about how these goals should be held in balance and what the best strategies are for achieving them.³⁰ Third, Bookchin's account of even individualist anarchism is historically inaccurate and reductive, most notably in its

conspicuous failure to acknowledge the socialist and egalitarian dimensions of the current. Fourth, while there is a kernel of truth in some of his criticisms of the contemporary anarchist movement, his polemical intent drives him to make sweeping generalisations unsubstantiated by the available empirical evidence. To be sure, the conditions of neoliberalism have made it particularly difficult for practitioners of lifestyle activism to ‘connect microscopic interventions to macroscopic struggles in a non-superficial way’,³¹ and one may legitimately criticise the tendency of groups like CrimethInc. to prioritise personal liberation for a privileged few over the construction of collective revolutionary movements working for the betterment of all. However, Bookchin’s either/or theoretical premises, and the markedly strident and uncompromising tone of his argument, serve only to belittle and demean the Herculean efforts of those many contemporary anarchists attempting to build bridges between the personal and political aspects of libertarian revolutionary social change in very difficult social circumstances. Contrary to what the Bookchin of *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism* would have us believe, both the communalist and the individualist tendencies of anarchism are now very much alive and thriving. The revolutionary personalist spirit of the American anarchist counterculture that he once praised lives on in the decentralised networks of the global Occupy and European *Indignado* movements; world-wide anti-austerity and anti-capitalist mobilisations; interconnected alter-globalisation struggles from Latin America to Asia and Africa and the Middle East; deep green ecological and climate justice campaigns led by small farmers and indigenous peoples in the global South; student struggles from Chile to Quebec and the United Kingdom; and countless experiments in cooperative production and distribution, alternative media and art, and collective living.

Perhaps even more damagingly, Bookchin’s polemic foreclosed precisely the sort of reasoned dialogue that his earlier work had initiated. If in the 1960s he ‘made the need for a convergence between the counterculture and the New Left the focus of most of [his] activities’,³² and consequently muted or expressed constructively any reservations he had about lifestyle-oriented cultural politics, in the changed circumstances of the 1990s he put his earlier bridge-building efforts behind him and turned instead to what he perceived as the then far more urgent political task of extinguishing once and for all the mortal threat to the revolutionary anarchist tradition posed by individualistic, liberal, or lifestyle anarchism. This shift proved to be both counterproductive and ultimately futile.

It was counterproductive because Bookchin’s growing ideological rigidity blinded him to empirical evidence pointing to political conclusions very different from those which he came to regard as axiomatic.³³ It was ultimately futile because the chasm of Bookchin’s ideological imagination separated not lifestyle anarchism from social anarchism, but his own idealist and context insensitive interpretation of lifestylism from empirical reality. Whereas Bookchin sought to pass a final moral judgement on lifestyle politics, a grounded and hence more constructive ethical critique would as Laura Portwood-Stacer has suggested balance recognition of the positive potential of lifestyle politics under certain conditions, with sensitivity to the specific conditions that may make them less

practicable and productive on other occasions. It would strategically ascertain ‘in what situations and for what goals is lifestyle activism an effective course of action’, and hence commit to ‘nuanced, situational critique that accepts the presence of lifestyle as a site of engagement while aiming to maximize its most promising potentials’.³⁴

In short, what is now urgently needed in anarchist movement discussions of lifestyle politics is not further polarising discourse about ‘unbridgeable chasms’, but bridge building in the form of intelligent, appropriately self-critical and context-sensitive dialogue that recognises common ground. Bookchin’s work in the aftermath of the rebellions of the 1960s was a model of such bridge building, whereas his later writing served only to exacerbate existing splits in the movement. Sadly, his 1995 polemic was also a prelude to his ultimate break with anarchism, which in the years before his death he consistently mischaracterised as an inherently anti-social and anti-political ideology that ‘above all seeks the emancipation of individual personality from all ethical, political, and social constraints’.³⁵ Hence the need he perceived for an international Left to advance beyond anarchism altogether—and indeed beyond Marxism, syndicalism, and ‘vague socialist framework[s]’³⁶—towards Bookchin’s own longstanding libertarian municipalist, non-anarchist democratic project, now dubbed simply Communalism.

Stepping away from Bookchin’s work, I turn now to historical and contemporary debates about the relationship between anarchism and democracy. Like debates about lifestyle politics, I contend, they reveal hidden assumptions that illuminate the ideological pitfalls involved in attempting to balance individual and community in anarchist theory and practice. I argue, more specifically, that whereas positions on the issue tend to polarise into competing camps—either anarchism and democracy are fundamentally incompatible, or they are seamlessly compatible—a more nuanced account guided by the anarchist value of communal individuality would allow for the possibility that anarchism is the most radical form of democracy but also something qualitatively different from and beyond it. Anarchist democracy, in turn, might be conceived as what I have elsewhere termed a ‘grounded utopian’³⁷ ideal that can renew the democratic promise by recalling its radical heritage and continually pushing it towards a horizon both revolutionary and eminently realisable.

ANARCHIST DEMOCRACY

Like such terms as ‘freedom’, ‘equality’, ‘individuality’, and ‘community’, the concept of democracy is an inherently debatable and changeable idea.³⁸ In other words, there is no single agreed meaning of the term valid for all peoples at all times. Rather, its meanings at any given moment in history reflect struggles among different groups who understand and practice democracy very differently.³⁹ It follows that attempts to formulate a comprehensive, fixed, and static definition of the term are not only doomed to fail but are also anti-democratic, insofar as they strive to control and contain something that by its very nature must reflect the varying and complex needs and belief systems of people over time.⁴⁰

Political ideologies may be understood as evolving frameworks for interpreting essentially contested concepts, reflecting different fundamental political commitments on the part of those who hold them.⁴¹ Regardless of their perspectives on the democratic ideal, all the major political ideologies have engaged with it by providing more definite interpretations of its meaning. They have also considered whether it is desirable and possible, and if so, what form it should take.⁴² Anarchism is no exception, although as we shall see debates about the relationship between anarchism and democracy are particularly fraught, in part because of widely varying—if frequently unstated and unexamined—beliefs about the proper relationship between the individual and the community.

Critics of anarchism commonly allege that it is lacking in democratic credentials. Liberal and Marxist critics, in particular, regularly use the term ‘democracy’ as something of an ideological bludgeon in their analyses of anarchism. The Leninist Hal Draper, for example, selectively quotes from the work of Proudhon to support his contention that anarchism and democracy are fundamentally opposed, ‘Anarchism is not concerned with the creation of democratic control from below, but only with the destruction of “authority” over the individual, including the authority of the most extreme democratic regulation of society that it is possible to imagine’.⁴³ More recently, the Leninist Paul Blackledge again selectively quotes from the work of a range of anarchist scholars and revolutionaries to support his claim that anarchism’s ‘transhistorical conception of human egoism’ acts as a barrier to its conceptualisation of a new (i.e., Marxist-Leninist) form of democracy that could overcome the capitalist separation of economics and politics.⁴⁴

Notwithstanding the many historical inaccuracies and conceptual deficiencies of such arguments,⁴⁵ they highlight real disagreements within the anarchist tradition itself. Consistent with the pluralistic and contested nature of all political ideologies,⁴⁶ anarchism does not consist of a single set of consistent beliefs and doctrines. Rather, it contains diverse and sometimes incompatible elements which give rise to disagreements within the ideological tradition about its content and character. One particularly vigorous field of intra-ideological contention concerns the relationship between anarchism and democracy.

Many anarchists and anarchist groups, historical and contemporary, have maintained that anarchism and democracy are fundamentally incompatible. Malatesta, for example, famously associated democracy with majority rule, and proclaimed that ‘we are neither for a majority nor for a minority government; neither for democracy nor for dictatorship... We are for anarchy’.⁴⁷ More recently, Uri Gordon objects to the association between anarchism and democracy in part because of the element of coercive enforceability which he associates with the term ‘democracy’. According to Gordon, democratic discourse assumes ‘without exception’ that the political process results, at some point, in collectively binding decisions that are coercively enforceable. By contrast, the outcomes of anarchist process are impossible to enforce. It follows that anarchism represents ‘not the most radical form of democracy, but an altogether

different paradigm of collective action'.⁴⁸ Elsewhere, he also criticises efforts to recuperate democracy for anarchism because he believes that such efforts entangle anarchism with 'the *patriotic* nature of the pride in democracy which it seeks to subvert'.⁴⁹ In a similar vein, CrimethInc. too emphasises the coercive and exclusionary aspects of the theory and practice of democracy, from ancient Athens to modern representative democracy. Moreover, they contend that even direct democracy without the state will inevitably reproduce exclusion, and either coercion or confusion. They conclude that when we engage in collective activities, it is important that we understand what we are doing as a *collective practice of freedom* rather than as a form of participatory democracy.⁵⁰

Whereas partisans of what might be termed the 'unbridgeable chasm' thesis about the relationship between anarchism and democracy emphasise the worst (coercive and exclusionary) features of the democratic tradition, champions of the 'seamless unity' position uncritically focus on the best (libertarian, egalitarian, and radically participatory) aspects of the tradition. Wayne Price, for example, declares simply that 'anarchism is democracy without the state'.⁵¹ According to Price, 'democracy' has two contradictory meanings today: on the one hand, the justification of the existing state, and on the other hand a tradition of revolutionary popular liberation that serves as a standard for judging and condemning the state. Anarchism is ideologically aligned with the latter. To be sure, many anarchists have opposed democracy, and 'the individualist tendencies [within anarchism] are the worst in that regard', but these 'weaknesses of anarchism' can be corrected by a clear and unambiguous recognition that 'the program of anarchism' is to replace the bureaucratic-military state machine with a federation of decentralised popular assemblies and associations based on the principle of majority rule, in short democracy without the state.⁵² As for those anarchists such as Malatesta who have expressed principled concerns about majoritarianism from a social anarchist perspective, they are simply confused. Again according to Price, Malatesta 'mixes up' opposition to democratic ideology as a rationalisation for capitalism and the state with denunciation of the very concept of majority rule.⁵³ Whereas the former is justified from an anarchist perspective, the latter is not, because collective decisions agreed by a majority must be binding on dissenting minorities as well. People with minority views have the right to participate in all decision-making. They have the right to try to win a majority to their views. However, once a majority decision is made, they do not have the right to impede the execution of the majority's will, which if necessary will be enforced by 'coercion—reduced to the minimum possible at the time'.⁵⁴ Such coercion is consistent with anarchist principles because the goal of anarchism is to 'abolish the state', not organised coercion per se.⁵⁵ In sum, Price concludes without leaving any room for ambiguity or doubt, 'when everyone is involved in governing then there is no government'.⁵⁶

While many of Price's criticisms of anarchist anti-democratic arguments are valid, ultimately and somewhat ironically, his own absolutist position is the mirror image of theirs and only bolsters their case. Consider Malatesta's position,

for example. Far from being the confused thinker Price makes him out to be, Malatesta consistently opposed government of any kind, whether by a majority or a minority, because as an anarchist he objected in principle to any form of power or institution with a formalised and standing mechanism for forcing compliance to a set of decisions. He also raised legitimate concerns about a possible ‘tyranny of the majority’ in even the most participatory democratic society based on majority rule, not because he sought to defend a tyranny of the minority (which he regarded as the worst form of government), but because he valued freedom for all and recognised that majorities can and frequently do trample down the rights of minorities. By way of a nuanced alternative to majority rule, he offered the following helpful observation:

Certainly anarchists recognise that where life is lived in common it is often necessary for the minority to come to accept the opinion of the majority. When there is an obvious need or usefulness in doing something and, to do it requires the agreement of all, the few should feel the need to adapt to the wishes of the many [...] But such adaptation on the one hand by one group must on the other be reciprocal, voluntary and must stem from an awareness of need and of goodwill to prevent the running of social affairs from being paralysed by obstinacy. It cannot be imposed as a principle and statutory norm. This is an ideal which, perhaps, in daily life in general, is difficult to attain in entirety, but it is a fact that in every human grouping anarchy is that much nearer where agreement between majority and minority is free and spontaneous and exempt from any imposition that does not derive from the natural order of things.⁵⁷

In other words, in place of both majority and minority rule, he proposed a model of decision-making that eschewed coercive enforcement in favour of an ideal of free and spontaneous agreement consistent with the anarchist principle of communal individuality. Importantly, he also acknowledged the practical difficulties likely to be faced by those committed to enacting such an ideal.

More critically, we might perhaps inquire whether Malatesta, Price, Gordon, and CrimethInc. are correct in assuming that the idea of democracy is necessarily tied to the concept of majority rule. Carole Pateman, a leading participatory democratic theorist influenced by the anarchist tradition,⁵⁸ argues that it is not. Promisingly, she develops a theory of participatory democracy grounded in an anarchistic conception of self-assumed obligation incompatible with majority rule. According to Pateman, direct democratic voting in a genuinely participatory democratic society may be regarded as the political counterpart of promising, or free agreement. By directly voting in favour of a particular proposal, a citizen assumes an obligation to abide by it. However, the obligation in question is owed not to any external authority such as the state but to one’s fellow citizens. Moreover, someone who finds herself in a minority on a particular vote, or who abstains from voting, cannot be compelled to abide by the decision reached because any such imposition on individual autonomy would be contrary to the principle of self-assumed obligation.⁵⁹

Within the anarchist tradition, too, a wide range of anarchist thinkers have drawn on democratic theory, anarchist theory, and the long histories of democratic and anarchist revolutionary popular struggle to argue that anarchism is the most radical form of democracy, one moreover opposed to the principles of both state sovereignty and majority rule. Paul Goodman, for example, whose anarchism exercised a profound influence on the counterculture of the 1960s, maintained that ‘participatory democracy ... is, of course, the essence of Anarchist social order, the voluntary federation of self-managed enterprises’⁶⁰ and rejected the ‘rule of the majority’ as an ‘obvious coercion that soon, moreover, becomes unconscious under the cover of an illusion of justice, fair play, etc.’.⁶¹ The *Anarchist FAQ* notes that ‘instead of capitalist or statist hierarchy, self-management (i.e. direct democracy) would be the guiding principle of the freely joined associations that make up a free society’, but then takes pains to emphasise the point that ‘the coercive imposition of the majority will is contrary to the ideal of self-assumed obligation, and so it is contrary to direct democracy and free association’.⁶² Saul Newman argues that democracy ‘always exceeds the limitations of the state and opposes the very principle of state sovereignty’. However, for anarchists, it has to be more than simply majority rule, because this can threaten individual liberty. Rather, it ought to be conceived as a historical project involving the questioning of all forms of political power and social hierarchies and the assertion of collective autonomy or equal liberty. In short, it has to be re-imagined as a ‘democracy of singularities’, and democracy, ‘radically conceived’ in this fashion, ‘is anarchy’.⁶³ David Graeber observes that the anarchist identification with democracy goes back a long way. He conceives anarchism as a political movement that aims to bring about a genuinely free society in which people ‘only enter those kinds of relations with one another that would not have to be enforced by the constant threat of violence’. Democracy, in turn, is ‘not necessarily defined by majority voting’. Rather, it is a ‘process of collective deliberation on the principle of full and equal participation’. Considered together, anarchism is not the negation of those aspects of democracy ordinary people have historically liked; rather, it is ‘a matter of taking those core democratic principles to their logical conclusions’.⁶⁴

While Gordon is correct to point out that such understandings of democracy conflict with currently dominant popular usage, this is hardly a persuasive argument to abandon the long historical struggle to reclaim the term from those who have misused it to legitimate existing configurations of power. Moreover, it is an odd argument for an anarchist to make, as anarchists have long battled with popular opinion over the normative connotations of the term ‘anarchism’.

This suggests the need for a more historically informed and politically engaged interpretation of the relationship between anarchism and democracy. As Raymond Williams has accurately observed, the term ‘anarchy’ came into English in the mid-sixteenth century, and its earliest uses are not too far from the early hostile uses of the term ‘democracy’. Thereafter, however, the historical trajectory of the two terms diverged. Whereas the latter began to acquire a

more positive connotation in the public mind following its co-optation by post-revolutionary elites in the United States, and gradual re-definition in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a system of government or (even more narrowly) as a means of electing a government, the stubbornly un-co-optable anarchism retained its negative connotations.⁶⁵

Radical democrats and anarchists never gave up the battle for democracy, however. For them, democracy could never be simply a form of government or public administration. Rather, it signified a continuing historical project in which ordinary people challenged mastership and rulership in all their various guises in the name of an ideal of *self-government*. And this point, in turn, suggests a continuing role for anarchism as a grounded utopian ideal that can renew the democratic promise by recalling its radical heritage and pushing it towards a horizon both revolutionary and eminently realisable. Revolutionary in practical terms, because anarchism is not simply a collection of abstract ideas but a living revolutionary movement representing the hopes and dreams of the dispossessed and those consigned to the social margins. Revolutionary in theoretical terms, because even direct democracy is not anarchism, inasmuch as the power of all is not equivalent to the power of none. Anarchism thus remains a radically open-ended horizon for democracy, one in which political ‘sovereignty’ lies not in society or in the individual but in a continual unresolved tension between the two.⁶⁶

We will now consider the dramatic enactment of this tension in the anarchist utopian literary imagination, focusing specifically on Ursula K. Le Guin’s novel *The Dispossessed* (1974). My argument is that *The Dispossessed* can facilitate a creative and constructive dialogue between hitherto competing anarchist perspectives on the relationship between the individual and the community. I contend, more specifically, that it can do so by means of its imaginative exploration of the ways in which the conflict between individual and community might be significantly reduced but not eliminated entirely in an anarcho-communist society.

THE ANARCHIST UTOPIAN LITERARY IMAGINATION

Literary utopias explore both ‘what is’ and ‘what might be’, as well as the relationship between the two. They do so by means of a ‘speaking picture’ that surveys contemporary society’s norms, practices, and possibilities for change; portrays in some detail the principles and practices of one or more alternative imaginary societies; and enquires about the relationship between ‘what is’ and ‘what might be’ by considering the possibilities, effects, and desirability of various changes.⁶⁷ In contrast to conventional normative political theory, which attempts to organise our beliefs about right and wrong into systematic moral principles and abstract political theories, literary utopias cause us to ‘see’ an ideal philosophical city by means of a feigned concrete description, quite a different achievement from a mere explanation of the principles on which it should rest.⁶⁸ The differences between the two suggest the possibility that while ‘a careless theorist might be misled by the particularity or lack of rigour

characteristic of political stories', utopian literature might also help 'thoughtful theorists see what they may have missed, or illuminate what they may have seen only dimly'.⁶⁹

The Dispossessed, a work of science fiction which depicts and critically interrogates an experiment in anarchist communism in an imaginary future, tells the story of Shevek and his experiences on two contrasting worlds, 'Anarres' (based on an experiment in non-authoritarian communism that has survived for 170 years) and 'Urras' (where Shevek encounters a hierarchical capitalist society analogous in many respects to contemporary non-fictional capitalist states). From the outset, the novel explores the evolving and frequently fraught relationship between an individual (Shevek) and the ambiguously utopian anarchist community in which his individuality is both nourished and stymied. Among its many notable artistic achievements, *The Dispossessed* provides not only an exceptionally well-informed, highly imaginative, and persuasive description of what everyday life might be like in an anarchist communist society but also a sensitive literary exploration of the tensions between individual and community in anarchist thought and (imaginary) practice. To the thoughtful political theorist, it offers not an ideological blueprint but an unusually suggestive account of how the anarchist ideal of communal individuality might be approximated but never fully achieved in practice.

Drawing on the work of Kropotkin, whom Le Guin regarded as 'the greatest philosopher of anarchism',⁷⁰ Le Guin has her omniscient narrator observe of Shevek that he was 'brought up in a culture that relied deliberately and constantly on human solidarity, mutual aid'.⁷¹ Later, Shevek himself describes Anarresti society as follows: 'We have no law but the single principle of mutual aid between individuals. We have no government but the single principle of free association'.⁷²

This deeply ingrained ethic alone is insufficient to sustain a humane community on Anarres, in part because as one of the other central characters remarks in a heated debate with Shevek, 'the will to dominance is as central in human beings as the impulse to mutual aid is'.⁷³ In addition to the ethics of mutual aid, and the system of education that supports it, a wide range of social institutions, conventions, and practices are needed to 'embody, encourage, and reinforce the ethic ... and thereby ensure the responsible exercise of freedom by individuals'.⁷⁴ These include forms of post-capitalist economic and post-statist political organisation that prevent the concentration of economic and political power, the decentralised and democratic self-government of economic and social life, rotation of positions of leadership within organisations, practices of communal living, and the like.⁷⁵

Yet for all their accomplishments, the Anarresti have not succeeded in eliminating entirely the conflict between individual and society. Moreover, Le Guin suggests paradoxically, this apparent failing is also a virtue, insofar as the realisation of the perfectionist ideal of complete harmony between the two would entail the death of individual liberty and the diversity, novelty, creativity, and vibrant life it makes possible. Like Oscar Wilde and Emma Goldman in this

respect, and unlike her utopian predecessor William Morris, Le Guin acknowledges a prominent and enduring place in her utopian imagination for a socially disruptive form of individual assertiveness. In fact, it is fair to say that her representation of this disruptive assertiveness in the narrative of Shevek's progressive rebellion against the creeping conformity and stagnation of Anarresti society constitutes the main dramatic action of the novel.

Ultimately, Shevek comes to adopt a critical perspective on his home world. He criticises, in particular, the ways in which the *institutionalisation* of mutual aid has transformed the legitimate interest in and demand for cooperation and community into an interest in and demand for conformity and obedience. In conversation with his partner Takver, for example, he exclaims indignantly that 'the social conscience completely dominates the individual conscience, instead of striking a balance with it. We don't cooperate—we *obey* [...] We fear our neighbor's opinion more than we respect our own freedom of choice'.⁷⁶ Later, in a more public setting, he declares passionately, 'We've been saying, more and more often, you must work with the others, you must accept the rule of the majority. But any rule is tyranny. The duty of the individual is to accept *no* rule, to be the initiator of his own acts, to be responsible. Only if he does so will the society live, and change, and adapt, and survive'.⁷⁷

But he does not condemn Anarres absolutely. Rather, he comes to the conclusion that for all its manifest failures to live up to its high ideals, his society still holds out a promise of something very good and noble that might yet be redeemed by constructive revolutionary action. Pursuing this line of thought at a pivotal point in the novel, Shevek articulates a balanced position on the proper relationship between individual and community that recognises the vital importance of both. On the one hand, he emphasises the value of mutuality and community in facing necessity. More specifically, he embraces the Anarresti ideal of an organic community in which all share equally the inescapable burdens of life. On the other hand, he is alert to the dangers of a tyranny of the majority, and hence also to the value of protecting individual autonomy even and perhaps especially when it conflicts with prevailing social norms. These reflections eventually yield the following important insight, 'With the myth of the State out of the way, the real mutuality and reciprocity of society and individual became clear. Sacrifice might be demanded of the individual, but never compromise⁷⁸: for though only the society could give security and stability, only the individual, the person, had the power of moral choice—the power of change, the essential function of life'.⁷⁹

Taking this philosophy to heart, Shevek makes a brave decision. He resolves to fulfil his proper function in the social organism by becoming an anarchist revolutionary in an anarchist society conceived as a permanent revolution. In so doing, he reminds us of a truth frequently forgotten or overlooked by those theorists of revolution who conceive of it as a singular and absolute break with past structures of oppression. Specifically, he reminds us that because individual and community can never be perfectly reconciled, even in an anarchist communist society, but only balanced in a dynamic and creative tension, the revo-

lutionary process is necessarily a never-ending one. This is not an argument for ‘reformism’. To the contrary, it is an argument for a deeper conception of revolution, based on the recognition that patterns of institutionalisation in a post-revolutionary anarchist communist society will inevitably create new and unpredictable dangers and potential sources of oppression. Conceived in this broad historical perspective, anarchy in turn implies a sceptical questioning of all institutions, however democratic they might be. Like radical democracy,⁸⁰ anarchy may be understood as a performance art, which like all performance art exists only while it is being performed (think, for example, of a singer’s song, which ceases—though it may linger on in the mind and imagination—once the melody has resounded). In other words, anarchy is generated by people in an anarchist state of mind, and by the actions they take in accordance with that state of mind. When this action ceases, when individual and popular vigilance relax, then the door is opened to a tyranny of either the minority or majority. In this sense, eternal vigilance is truly the price of liberty, individuality, and community.

CONCLUSION

‘The Revolution is in the individual spirit, or it is nowhere. It is for all, or it is nothing. If it is seen as having any end, it will never truly begin’.

—Ursula K. Le Guin, *The Dispossessed*

Against those who argue that anarchism is not a coherent political ideology because of the coexistence within it of irreconcilably opposed individualist and communalist strands, I have argued in this chapter that it is indeed a coherent and distinctive ideology and that the coexistence within it of well-developed and very different individualist and communalist strands is a primary source of its ideological distinction and political strength. Far from being a weakness or sign of incoherence, efforts by anarchists to maximise individuality *and* community highlight anarchism’s pluralistic and contested character, and its ideologically unique balancing of individuality and community in a dynamic and creative tension. In contrast to other political ideologies and ideologically informed social movements, anarchists alone have explored in both theory and practice how to create, organise, and maintain a stateless society in which communal individuality flourishes.

Importantly, however, I have also argued that the sometimes competing demands of individuality and society can never be fully and perfectly reconciled, even in an ‘ideal anarchy’, and that this seeming limitation of anarchism is actually one of its greatest strengths. Anarchist theory and practice, I have maintained, are truest to the ideology’s core value of communal individuality when they steer a careful course between the Scylla of presuming an unbridgeable chasm between individual and community and the Charybdis of striving for a perfect and complete reconciliation between the two.

Moreover, there is room for legitimate disagreement among anarchists about how the goals of individual autonomy and social justice should be held in balance and what the best strategies are for achieving them. The responses to such questions are in part necessarily context-sensitive, which in turn suggests the need for situational critique and intelligent, appropriately self-critical and context-sensitive movement dialogue that recognises common ground.

I illustrated these points by means of a close examination of anarchist debates about the relationships between, respectively, social anarchism and lifestyle anarchism, and anarchism and democracy. In both cases, we found that unstated assumptions about the proper relationship between individual and community impeded the sort of creative dialogue and constructive bridge building necessary to advance such debates beyond unproductive ideological binaries. Finally, we saw how the anarchist utopian literary imagination can facilitate such a dialogue by dramatically enacting a thought experiment of a revolutionary society in which the anarchist ideal of communal individuality is approximated but never fully realised.

One legitimate objection that might be raised against the argument of this chapter is its failure to engage with the so-called ‘anarcho-capitalist’ tradition. As Benjamin Franks rightly points out, individualisms that defend or reinforce hierarchical forms such as the economic-power relations of anarcho-capitalism are incompatible with practices of social anarchism based on developing immanent goods which contest such inequalities.⁸¹ However, even here, a degree of caution is required. First, is anarcho-capitalism really a form of anarchism or instead a wholly different ideological paradigm whose adherents have attempted to expropriate the language of anarchism for their own anti-anarchist ends? Iain McKay, whom Franks cites as an authority to support his contention that ‘academic analysis has followed activist currents in rejecting the view that anarcho-capitalism has anything to do with social anarchism’,⁸² also argues quite emphatically on the very pages cited by Franks that anarcho-capitalism is by no means a type of anarchism. He writes, ‘It is important to stress that anarchist opposition to the so-called capitalist “anarchists” does *not* reflect some kind of debate within anarchism, as many of these types like to pretend, but a debate between anarchism and its old enemy, capitalism... Equally, given that anarchists and “anarcho”-capitalists have fundamentally *different* analyses and goals it is hardly “sectarian” to point this out’.⁸³ Second, Franks asserts without supporting evidence that most major forms of individualist anarchism have been largely anarcho-capitalist in content, and concludes from this premise that most forms of individualism are incompatible with anarchism. However, the conclusion is unsustainable because the premise is false, depending as it does for any validity it might have on the further assumption that anarcho-capitalism is indeed a form of anarchism. If we reject this view, then we must also reject the individual anarchist versus communal anarchist ‘chasm’-style of argument that follows from it.⁸⁴

In contrast to this perspective, I maintain that the ideological core of anarchism is the belief that society can and should be organised without hierarchy

and domination. Historically, anarchists have struggled against a wide range of regimes of domination, from capitalism, the state system, patriarchy, heterosexism, and the domination of nature to colonialism, the war system, slavery, fascism, white supremacy, and certain forms of organised religion. They have also conceptualised, and enacted in prefigurative practice, a rich variety of visions of social life structured according to principles other than hierarchy and domination. While these visions range from the predominantly individualistic to the predominantly communitarian, features common to virtually all include an emphasis on self-management and self-regulatory methods of organisation, voluntary association, decentralised federation, and direct democracy. In short, anarchists desire a decentralised society, based on the principle of free association, in which people will manage and govern themselves.

As is the case in all vibrant political ideologies, anarchists will continue to disagree robustly about many fundamental matters of value, including the proper relationship between individual and community. If its intra-ideological debates on this subject have been particularly sharp, it is perhaps worth recalling that one of the hallmarks of anarchist ideology has always been its enduring ability to embrace seemingly contradictory extremes. A protean and practice-grounded political ideology, anarchism is both traditional and innovative, scholarly and popular, reflective and action-oriented, libertarian and egalitarian, critical and constructive, confrontational and compassionate, destructive and creative, organised and spontaneous, rational and romantic, sensual and spiritual, natural and social, feminine and masculine, rooted and cosmopolitan, evolutionary and revolutionary, pragmatic and utopian, personal and political, individualistic and communitarian. Whether anarchism will be able to maintain this remarkable unity in diversity in a period of its profound ideological transformation⁸⁵ is an open question, as is the future of anarchism itself.

NOTES

1. David Miller, *Anarchism* (London and Melbourne: J.M. Dent, 1984), 3.
2. Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*, 4th ed. (New York and San Francisco: Longman, 2002), 14.
3. Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, 5th ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 142.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Alan Ritter, *Anarchism: A Theoretical Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 117.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, 127.
8. Individualist anarchism may plausibly be regarded as a form of both socialism and anarchism. Whether the individualist anarchists were *consistent* anarchists (and socialists) is another question entirely. See, on this point, Iain McKay, *An Anarchist FAQ*, vol. 2 (Edinburgh and Oakland: AK Press, 2012), 623–639. McKay comments as follows: ‘any individualist anarchism which supports wage labour is *inconsistent* anarchism. It *can* easily be made *consistent* anarchism by

- applying its own principles consistently. In contrast, “anarcho”-capitalism rejects so many of the basic, underlying, principles of anarchism ... that it cannot be made consistent with the ideals of anarchism’ (Ibid., 638).
9. Quoted in McKay, Ibid., 581–582; see also Peter Ryley, *Making Another World Possible: Anarchism, Anti-Capitalism and Ecology in Late 19th and Early 20th Century Britain* (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2013), ch. 4.
 10. John Clark, *The Impossible Community: Realizing Communitarian Anarchism* (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 170.
 11. Ritter, *Anarchism*, 28–29.
 12. Quoted in Ibid.
 13. Ibid., 137.
 14. Ibid., 140.
 15. Laura Portwood-Stacer, *Lifestyle Politics and Radical Activism* (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 142.
 16. Laurence Davis, ‘Love and Revolution in Ursula Le Guin’s *Four Ways to Forgiveness*’, in Jamie Heckert and Richard Cleminson (Eds), *Anarchism and Sexuality: Ethics, Relationships and Power* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2011), 104.
 17. Murray Bookchin, *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* (Edinburgh and Oakland: AK Press, 2004 [1971]), 10.
 18. Jonathan Purkis and James Bowen (Eds), *Changing Anarchism: Anarchist Theory and Practice in a Global Age* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 8; quoted in Portwood-Stacer *Lifestyle Politics*, 134.
 19. Portwood-Stacer, Ibid.
 20. Murray Bookchin, *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm* (Edinburgh and San Francisco: AK Press, 1995).
 21. I explore these contrasts in greater depth, and with much more attention to historical context, in a journal article that has significantly informed the current discussion. See Laurence Davis, ‘Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unhelpful Dichotomy’, *Anarchist Studies*, 18:1 (2010), 62–82.
 22. Bookchin, *Post-Scarcity Anarchism*, 168.
 23. Ibid., 11.
 24. Bookchin, ‘Anarchy and Organisation: A Letter to the Left’, reprinted from *New Left Notes*, January 15, 1969: http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/bookchin/leftletterprint.html. Last accessed on 24 September 2017.
 25. Bookchin, ‘Toward a post-scarcity society: The American perspective and the SDS’, May 1969: http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/bookchin/sds.html. Last accessed on 24 September 2017.
 26. Bookchin, ‘On Spontaneity and Organisation’ (London: Solidarity Pamphlet, 1975 [1972]).
 27. Ibid., 8.
 28. Bookchin, *Social Anarchism*, 4.
 29. Clark, *The Impossible Community*, 172.
 30. Cindy Milstein, *Anarchism and Its Aspirations* (Oakland and Edinburgh: AK Press, 2010); Clark, Ibid.; Ritter, *Anarchism*; Portwood-Stacer, *Lifestyle Politics*.
 31. Portwood-Stacer, Ibid., 142.
 32. Bookchin, ‘Whither Anarchism? A Reply to Recent Anarchist Critics’, 1998: http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/bookchin/whither.html. Last accessed on 25 September 2017.

33. See, on this point, my discussion of the autonomous social movements of the 1980s in Davis, 'Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism', 75–76.
34. Portwood-Stacer, *Lifestyle Politics*, 140, 151–152.
35. Murray Bookchin, *The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy* (London and New York: Verso, 2015), 139.
36. Bookchin, 'The Communalist Project', *Harbinger, A Journal of Social Ecology*, 3:1 (September 1, 2002): <http://social-ecology.org/wp/2002/09/harbinger-vol-3-no-1-the-communalist-project/#8230>. Last accessed on 1 October 2017.
37. Laurence Davis, 'History, Politics, and Utopia: Toward a Synthesis of Social Theory and Practice', in Patricia Vieira and Michael Marder (Eds), *Existential Utopia: New Perspectives on Utopian Thought* (New York and London: Continuum, 2012), 127–140.
38. Anthony Arblaster, *Democracy* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987), 5.
39. James Cairns and Alan Sears, *The Democratic Imagination* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 161.
40. Benjamin Isakhan and Stephen Stockwell (Eds), *The Secret History of Democracy* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 2.
41. Matthew Festenstein and Michael Kenny (Eds), *Political Ideologies: A Reader and Guide* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3.
42. Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*, 8th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2011), 39.
43. Hal Draper, 'The Two Souls of Socialism', *New Politics*, 5:1 (Winter 1966), 57–84: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/draper/1966/twosouls/4-anarch.htm>. Last accessed on 2 October 2017.
44. Paul Blackledge, 'Freedom and Democracy: Marxism, Anarchism and the Problem of Human Nature', in Alex Prichard et al. (Eds), *Libertarian Socialism: Politics in Black and Red* (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 19–22.
45. See, for example, Iain McKay's thorough online critiques of Draper and Blackledge in 'Hal Draper, Numpty!', parts 1–2' (April 2008 and October 2009): <http://anarchism.pageabode.com/anarcho/hal-draper-numpty> and <http://anarchism.pageabode.com/anarcho/hal-draper-numpty-part-deux>: Last accessed on 15 September 2017; and 'Yet another SWP numpty on anarchism, parts 1–5' (March 2013–September 2014): collected at <http://anarchism.pageabode.com/anarcho/yet-another-swp-numpty-anarchism-part-5>: Last accessed on 15 September 2017.
46. Festenstein and Kenny, *Political Ideologies*, 4–5.
47. Errico Malatesta, 'Neither Democrats, nor Dictators: Anarchists', *Pensiero e Volontà*, May 1926; Translated by Gillian Fleming and published in Vernon Richards (Ed), *The Anarchist Revolution* (London: Freedom Press, 1995): https://archive.org/stream/al_Errico_Malatesta_Neither_Democrats_nor_Dictators_Anarchists_a4/Errico_Malatesta__Neither_Democrats__nor_Dictators__Anarchists_a4#page/n1/mode/2up. Last accessed on 4 October 2017.
48. Uri Gordon, *Anarchy Alive!: Anti-Authoritarian Politics from Practice to Theory* (London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2008), 67–70.
49. Uri Gordon, 'Democracy: The Patriotic Temptation': <https://crimethinc.com/2016/05/26/democracy-the-patriotic-temptation>. Last accessed on 29 September 2017.

50. CrimethInc., 'From Democracy to Freedom': <https://crimethinc.com/2016/04/29/feature-from-democracy-to-freedom>. Last accessed on 29 September 2017.
51. Wayne Price, 'Anarchism as Extreme Democracy', *The Utopian*, vol. 1 (2000), 7: https://www.utopianmag.com/files/in/1000000006/anarchism_extreme.pdf. Last accessed on 4 October 2017.
52. *Ibid.*, 10.
53. *Ibid.*, 6.
54. Wayne Price, 'Are Anarchism and Democracy Opposed? A Response to Crimethinc', *AnarchistNews.org* (July 2016): <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/wayne-price-are-anarchism-and-democracy-opposed>. Last accessed on 1 October 2017. Not surprisingly, Blackledge finds affinities between his own conception of democracy and Price's. See Blackledge, 'Freedom and Democracy', 22–23.
55. Rather unhelpfully, Price conflates a range of different varieties of coercion with his catch-all use of the term. For more sophisticated philosophical accounts, see Michael Taylor, *Community, Anarchy and Liberty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Magda Egoumenides, *Philosophical Anarchism and Political Obligation* (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2014); and Richard Sylvan, 'Anarchism', in Robert E. Goodin et al. (Eds), *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
56. Price, 'Are Anarchism and Democracy Opposed?', 54.
57. Errico Malatesta, 'A Project of Anarchist Organisation', 1927: <http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/errico-malatesta-and-nestor-makhno-about-the-platform>. Last accessed on 4 October 2017.
58. David Goodway reports that Pateman was an anarchist throughout the 1960s and that she once wrote to him that 'the critique of subordination which runs throughout my work has its genesis in anarchist political theory'. See David Goodway, *Anarchist Seeds Beneath the Snow: Left Libertarian Thought and British Writers from William Morris to Colin Ward* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012), 265.
59. Carole Pateman, *The Problem of Political Obligation* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1985), 159–162; see also Robert Graham, 'The Role of Contract in Anarchist Ideology', in David Goodway (Ed), *For Anarchism: History, Theory, and Practice* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 170–173.
60. Paul Goodman, 'The Black Flag of Anarchism', first published in *The New York Times Magazine* (July 14, 1968); reprinted in Taylor Stoehr (Ed), *Drawing the Line: The Political Essays of Paul Goodman* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1979), 209.
61. Goodman, 'Unanimity', first published in *Art and Social Nature*, 1946; reprinted in Stoehr (Ed), *Ibid.*, 40.
62. Iain McKay, *An Anarchist FAQ*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh and Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2008), 41.
63. Saul Newman, *The Politics of Postanarchism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011 [2010]), 2, 33–34.
64. David Graeber, *The Democracy Project* (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 154, 186–188.
65. Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society* (Hammersmith, London: Fontana Press, 1988 [1976]), 37; see also Graeber, *Ibid.*, ch. 3.

66. Amedeo Bertolo, 'Democracy and Beyond', *Democracy and Nature*, 5:2 (July 1999), 311–324: www.democracynature.org/vol5/bertolo_democracy.htm. Last accessed on 4 October 2017.
67. Peter Stillman, "'Nothing is, but what is not": Utopias as Practical Political Philosophy', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 3:2&3 (Summer/Autumn 2000), 11.
68. Bertrand de Jouvenal, 'Utopias for practical purposes', in Frank Manuel (Ed), *Utopias and Utopian Thought* (London: Souvenir Press, 1973), 219–220.
69. Dan Sabia, 'Individual and Community in Le Guin's *The Dispossessed*', in Laurence Davis and Peter Stillman (Eds), *The New Utopian Politics of Ursula K. Le Guin's The Dispossessed* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 111.
70. Ursula K. Le Guin, quoted in Charles Bigelow and J. McMahon, 'Science Fiction and the Future of Anarchy: Conversations with Ursula K. Le Guin', *Oregon Times* (December 1964), 29.
71. Ursula K. Le Guin, *The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia* (New York: Harper Collins, 1974), 204.
72. *Ibid.*, 300.
73. *Ibid.*, 167–168.
74. Dan Sabia, 'Individual and Community', 116.
75. *Ibid.*, 116–119.
76. Le Guin, *The Dispossessed*, 330.
77. *Ibid.*, 359.
78. Shevek is presumably referring to 'compromise' of an individual's personal integrity or fundamental humanity.
79. Le Guin, *The Dispossessed*, 333.
80. See, for example, C. Douglas Lummis, *Radical Democracy* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 159–163.
81. Benjamin Franks, 'Anarchism', in Michael Freeden et al. (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 393–394.
82. *Ibid.*, 393.
83. McKay, vol. 1, 478.
84. Interestingly, and revealingly, Franks misquotes the title of an earlier journal article of mine in his thoughtful discussion of it. The citation listed in his bibliography is 'Davis, L. 2010. "Social anarchism or lifestyle anarchism: An unhelpful distinction", *Anarchist Studies*, 18 (1): 62–82', whereas the actual title of the article is 'Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unhelpful Dichotomy'.
85. See, on this subject, Laurence Davis, 'Anarchism', in Vincent Geoghegan and Rick Wilford (Eds), *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, 4th ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 213–238.



Freedom

Alex Prichard

INTRODUCTION

In his famous essay *On the Solution of the Social Problem*, in 1848, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon argued that ‘The Republic is a positive anarchy [...] it is the liberty that is the MOTHER, not the daughter, of order’.¹ What he meant by this was that the communities that anarchists build are the positive institutional embodiment of the negative principle of anarchy. Anarchy denotes a condition of liberty, of freedom from the arbitrary domination of government. But the positive incarnation of this is a set of rules and principles, rights and duties that members of a community agree amongst themselves in order to constitute an order that will be the best means for them to realise their vision of the good. In this sense, institutions are central to freedom.

No doubt this way of prefacing a survey of anarchist approaches to freedom will raise eyebrows. Aren’t anarchists antithetical to rules and institutions? The simple answer is no. In fact, Proudhon’s view of anarchy and the republic has, with considerable variation, constituted the largest part of the anarchist tradition ever since. It was a system which drew from the functional federation of the watchmakers of the Jura and the complex institutional design of the Swiss confederation, both influencing the thinking of Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin, which fed through to the innumerable experiments in anarchist syndicalism, including the CNT and the IWW, transnational worker federations like the International Workingmen’s Association, the confederalist visions of political community in Bookchin’s municipalism, now taken and modified by Abdullah Öcalan and the Rojava cantons of Kurdistan, and in Colin Ward’s post-statist visions for the European Union.²

A. Prichard (✉)

Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
e-mail: a.prichard@exeter.ac.uk

While the institutional imagination is central to the problem of freedom for anarchists, it is also premised on a sophisticated political philosophy, and it is this which this chapter will primarily focus on, as a way of defending or substantiating this retelling of the story of anarchist approaches to freedom. I will first look to provide answers to questions such as what does it mean to be subject to arbitrary domination? How can one freely make oneself in community? In what ways are power and freedom related? What do we need to be free? Do anarchists think differently about the freedoms of groups to those of individuals? Have anarchists all and always thought about the need for institutions? In short, what do anarchists think freedom is?³ The aim is to show that answers to these questions have almost always resulted in innovative institutional design.

My argument is that for the majority of anarchists you can only be free in conjunction with others, and most anarchists have developed quite elaborate institutional designs to defend this anarchic community. Taking society seriously means we also need to take seriously the problem of the ways in which societies should relate to one another, such that we can be collectively free in the presence of those who also want to be collectively free from you. Are the same theories applicable to free groups that are applicable to free individuals? This is a subject that is routinely overlooked when we discuss freedom, and not only by anarchists. Usually group freedoms are denied because only individuals, it is argued, can be bearers of moral right, and it is only through individuals that the right can be enacted or realised.⁴ But this argument doesn't seem to hold, ironically enough, when it comes to the rights of states. States are sovereign, it is argued, and their freedom is inviolable (except when other states chose for it not to be). Moreover, it is routinely argued, it is from this sovereign collective that the individual gets their freedom, and, ironically, while individuals cannot be trusted to live alone without states, and their immediate communities are denied political autonomy and representation (unions, families, tribes, cities, etc.), states can and must be trusted to co-exist without descending into mass violence.⁵

In this chapter I will show that anarchists develop a robust theory of freedom that links individuals with groups and groups with each other and articulates conceptions of freedom with what ought to be present and what ought to be absent in order for us to be free. I will show that the anarchist theory of freedom has roots in three traditions of political thought, republican socialism, liberal utilitarianism and left Hegelian and that these origins shape the broad contours of how contemporary anarchists approach the question of individual and collective freedom in modern society. While the context is important, I also divide these three approaches analytically, to show what they imply in terms of three types of freedoms: negative freedoms from external domination; positive freedoms, meaning rights to certain conditions and visions of the good; and freedoms in or substantive claims about the sorts of institutions anarchists ought to build. I close the discussion with a set of claims about what anarchists ought *not* to defend. I argue that while autonomy, empowerment and independence are valuable, they ought not to be seen as absolute values to

be defended without due regard for the competing demand for institutionalisation and constitutionalisation. This claim will strike many as implausibly anarchist, but I will show that in fact it is consistent with much of what anarchists have always done, even if they haven't always articulated it in these terms. The fullest freedom possible, for the most people and in defence of the primary values, I will argue, hinges on durable anarchist institutions.⁶

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF ANARCHIST ACCOUNTS OF FREEDOM

One thing that has been remarkably consistent in the history of anarchist thinking about freedom has been to contrast ideas about what it means to be free with a specific antonym: domination. Uri Gordon puts it like this: '[t]he term domination in its anarchist sense serves as a generic concept for the various systematic features of society whereby groups and persons are controlled, coerced, exploited, humiliated, discriminated against, etc.—the dynamics of which anarchists seek to uncover, challenge and erode'.⁷ He continues that 'any act of resistance, is in the barest sense, "anarchist" when it is perceived by the actor as a particular actualisation of a more systemic opposition to domination'.⁸ Not only is domination shorthand for multiple intersecting regimes that render us less free or unfree, but to combat these directly is what makes anarchists anarchists.

Domination has historically been a key object of attack for anarchists, and it was often treated as synonymous with authority, hierarchy, slavery, law, and so on. This conceptual proliferation was generally caused by the populist rhetoric of anarchists, but also the range of concepts used by those they engaged, and has no doubt resulted in much conceptual confusion. For example, authority means something quite different during the death throes of absolutist states than it does today, in societies with advanced and impersonal bureaucracies. Likewise hierarchy can mean rank ordering as well as a relation of domination, and the former is not always synonymous with the latter. Law was often the expression of the will of monarchs and leaders, whereas, today, there is at least democratic access to lawmaking in principle, even if in practice it is very distant from our grasp. Cutting through this complexity is important if we are to understand what it is we want to be free from.

One concept that united thinking about freedom, and still has incredible heuristic value for us today, is slavery. Slavery as an institution and as a condition epitomises what it means to be unfree. A slave is subject to the arbitrary domination of the slave master. The slave master forces the slave to act against her will and, even in the absence of direct interference, will remain a looming threat that will cause those subject to his or her command to toady and submit, limiting the fullest realisation of who that person could be by conceiving oneself as simply the property, and hence an extension of the will of the owner. This is not simply an individual-individual relationship, but an institution and structure of social

relations from which many benefit(ed) indirectly, whether it kept the wages of non-slaves artificially high, the costs of goods artificially low or the pleasures of life, whether legal equality, or the ability to have a public life, premised on the exploitation and inequality of slaves.⁹ Slavery was not abolished in the United States until 1861 and Russia in 1863, that is, at precisely the time anarchism became a mass movement Europe-wide.

But what is also crucial is the language through which this account of freedom from slavery was articulated, and at this time, there were three primary sets of discourses that shaped anarchist thinking: liberal utilitarianism, republicanism and socialism.¹⁰

The liberal tradition is vast and practically impossible to summarise in a few lines here, but in so far as liberals considered the problem of freedom and slavery, the response was in terms of self-ownership, and the problem was to theorise and extrapolate the consequences of self-ownership for social order. If I am self-governing and your interference with me is a violation of this autonomy, how can society exist, and where would it come from? From Hobbes to Adam Smith to Mandeville's fable of the bees, the general proposition was that liberty consisted in harmonising individual self-interest. For liberal political society to exist, the alienation of one's property in the self to the state, and to the employer was vital. Thus merchants and industrialists, as well as the state, could in principle rely on the voluntary relinquishing of your right to your self-ownership, leasing your body to an employer, or giving up part of your autonomy in return for state protection.

This vision of freedom repulsed Rousseau, arguably the modern political philosophers who had the most influence on the development of anarchism. Chapter one of his *Social Contract* opens with the following words: 'Man is born free; but everywhere he is in chains'.¹¹ The reason for this slavery is the iniquity of the systems of autocratic domination, in which the people are governed by force rather than law, slaves to their material interests rather than the good, and, in giving their tacit consent to the autocratic institutions of the state, had in effect enslaved themselves once more. Money, luxury and self-interest were the bane of society, which led to a psychological enslavement to common mores, and the endorsement of a tacit political enslavement to the Old Order. Only a system of universal laws, agreed by direct, voluntary or presumed consent, could counter this political enslavement.

The second most famous formulation of the problem of slavery and freedom in the nineteenth century is Hegel's master-slave dialectic.¹² Here, while the master and slave face each other as unequals, their demand that the other recognise their status as (non)master or (non)slave demands a mutual recognition, which is the motor of the development of self-consciousness, destroying the particularity, or assumed transcendent nature of that relationship, and waking both to the equality at the heart of social relations. Hegel believed that the ideal context for this mutual recognition is the legal state, in which citizens can attain collective sense of their social nature, something which was primordial in the people but overlaid by unjust institutions which distorted this nascent freedom.

William Godwin (1756–1836) is arguably one of Rousseau's first anarchistic readers, but a reader steeped in the utilitarian traditions of eighteenth-century liberal England. Whether he is an anarchist or not need not detain us here. What is more significant is the way in which so many have read him as such and have deployed his ideas to anarchistic ends over 200 years after his death. His utilitarianism presumed that the greatest happiness for the greatest number could only be attained by each coming to the fulfilment of their own rational and moral self-direction, and that all means to that end of general happiness were permissible, come what may. This is not, however, a strictly consequentialist logic. Godwin objected to Rousseau's social contract on the grounds that the alienation of individual liberty to the lawmaker, for example, was antithetical to the absolute injunction to independence of will. But Godwin's rejection of bourgeois property relations on utilitarian grounds. Private property precipitated poverty and inequality, which in turn made the poor dependent on the wills of the rich. For Godwin, freedom is only possible where individual judgement is unimpeded, and in relations unconstrained by force of habit, of will, or of condition.

Slavery was the antithesis of freedom for Godwin, and his wife Mary Wollstonecraft, and a typical example of this bourgeois slavery was the marriage contract. This system of legal bondage rendered women unfree by habitual resignation to the norms of society that dictated she would be a second-class citizen, dulling her sense of self, all the while consecrated by state and church and through the economic means of dowry and family contract, most obviously in the nobility and aristocracy.

From Godwin, then, we can trace a conception of anarchic freedom that is utilitarian, rationalist and concerned primarily with a rejection of the interference of the state or of other bodies in the autonomously developed ideas of the individual. But we can trace another reading of Rousseau and slavery to the ideas of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865), who deployed Rousseau's ideas in order to reject catholic morality, republican democracy and the emerging liberal capitalist relations of mid-nineteenth-century France. Like Rousseau, Proudhon argued that inequality of conditions and of status rendered people unfree, and like Godwin, Proudhon disagreed that the republican state, democratic and/or legal, could provide for this freedom, precisely because through individual political representation the political and social capacity of all the constitutive collective forces that shaped society, from the town to the guild, from families to regions, was elided and actively suppressed.¹³

Proudhon connected the state to the emergence of capitalism, and both to slavery and domination in a way that had not been done before. Proudhon's argument was that defending claims of property in the person as the basis of liberal freedoms, was a transformation of slavery into wage slavery, rather than its abolition. To be a self-owner was no less ludicrous than to be a rightful owner of anyone else, he thought, because Proudhon rejected the idea that there were natural rights to property in the self or anyone else. Rather, he

argued, given the social construction of our individuality, as well as society itself, we are all of necessity beholden to one another and therefore have an equal right to stipulate the terms of our social relationships. Carridge return Tolstoy took this argument to its logical conclusion in a way that Proudhon did not.¹⁴ He argued that all law and right, republican law too, in so far as it prohibited the free association of peoples and the free development of human capacity, was based on force, and so far as force was needed to compel people to order, that order was merely a transformation of slavery, not its abolition. Carridge return Tolstoy, like Proudhon, agreed too that the state, because it required capital to persist, would press the interests of the propertied against those of the propertyless, which produced a clear class cleavage in society, between workers and employers, and between employers and the state and everyone else. The republican state's defence of Catholic morality, with its focus on providence, transcendental hierarchies and irrationalism, was central to possibility of this new slavery.

In his later works Proudhon linked this twin process of state-building and capitalism to colonialism and imperialism, relations which he also understood to be enslaving. The republican freedom of the French was predicated on the unfreedom of the non-French, whether in Algeria, Mexico, the Italian peninsula or elsewhere.¹⁵ This oppression of 'foreign' peoples had its correlate in the oppression of the diverse cultures and nations of France, which Proudhon counted in the hundreds in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, before the Napoleonic centralisation and homogenisation of the country. We can see similar processes in all major state-building exercises.¹⁶ Freedom, for Proudhon, could not therefore be an individual or formal status, it had to be collective and formally so too. For him, freedom was only possible in shared political institutions, institutions that defended the autonomy of groups in relation to one another as much as the freedoms of individuals, and he called this federalism.¹⁷ In Proudhon's hands these republican institutions look completely unlike anything that his contemporaries would have recognised as a state, being more localist and transnational, but federalist in spirit and law (I discuss this in more detail below).

While for Godwin, freedom is an individual mental state that requires certain social conditions to help it flourish, for Proudhon freedom is social, and in so far as groups are not free, nor are individuals. Contra Godwin, Proudhon praised society as a vital, irreducible source of our own individuality. He claimed that both 'I' and 'we' must be free for society to be dynamic and open. His conception of anarchic freedom is became civic, republican, rights based and institutionalised, in a way that for Tolstoy, and most anarchists that followed him, it was not—at least not explicitly. Carridge return this majority tendency tends to trace its evolution to Hegel. But this Hegelian legacy in anarchist thought divides spectacularly between the works of Michael Bakunin (1814–1876) and Max Stirner (1806–1856), both of whom were active participants in the Young Hegelian movement in the late 1830s. Both Stirner and Bakunin were drawn to the idea that political subjectivity was inherited and socially constructed, and both saw this to be almost wholly nefarious. But where Bakunin was profoundly influenced by revolutionary republicanism and the writings of Karl Marx, Stirner was not.

From Hegel, both Stirner and Bakunin agreed that human consciousness was historically and socially located and that our conceptions of freedom were inherited from religion, primarily. The objective of being free was to take control of this process of self-consciousness. The question was, where ought this to take place and how. For Stirner, any attempt to create new doctrines of freedom, or to make the construction of individuality a social process, would automatically re-inscribe new external dogmas. For Bakunin, the individual's 'freedom and reason, are the products of society, and not vice versa: society is not the product of individuals comprising it'.¹⁸ The point is that society proceeds us and we are its products, and only at the margins is our individual influence felt. Thus, the only way to come to true ideas about freedom was to first liberate society from the historical forces that constrained it and in so doing, consciousness itself would emerge. The way in which this would take place was through a dialectical process of destruction and renewal, where the experience of injustice, or of domination, awakens in the subject a desire for recognition, which is always contextually bound, generates a rebellion and a then reconstruction. For example, drawing on his reading of Marx's *Das Capital*, Bakunin argued that the emergence of capitalism had awakened the workers to their new status as wage slaves, forced to sell themselves in order to live.¹⁹ The class conflict that ensued was the motor of history. Where he departed from his German contemporary was on the status of the state in this process of emancipation, and on the virtues of freedom as such.²⁰

For Bakunin and Stirner, freedom and unfreedom were not reducible to the social conditions that produced them but rather emerged dialectically within them. Where Stirner breaks from Marx and Bakunin is in finding freedom in a pre-social domain. Stirner argued that the idea of freedom was itself shaped by social ideas, and didn't reflect anything transcendent or necessary. Republicanism was therefore an ideology of freedom, not the fulfilment of it, and in so far as ideologies tend to result in their uncritical acceptance by their followers, rendered them unfree at the same time. The ideas meant to emancipate us enslave us. Stirner looked at the pre-ideological state and asked, what do those who would emancipate themselves draw from? The fact that slaves are able to choose to be free and have a sense of their unfreedom independent of these ideologies, and are compelled to freedom in spite of this relative ignorance, implies an ontological freedom that is pre-social that they are seeking to recover. It is in recognising this ontological freedom (and implied equality) that our 'ownness', poorly translated as egoism, is to be found.²¹ Where this takes us in terms of social order is not clear, and I explore this below, because there is nothing in this account that permits of a vision of the good, and it pulls against the social. There are also clear links here with Godwin's ideas, specifically the notion that freedom is a cognitive or epistemic status. I explore this further in the final section of the chapter. But before we throw this out for lacking appropriate socialist credentials, it is important to see that Stirner shows us that freedom is not a domain towards which we can flee, nor is there such a place against which our contemporary liberty can be benchmarked. Rather, what matters for Godwin

and Stirner is the individual, and for Proudhon, Bakunin and Tolstoy social, conditions of (collective) emancipation.

What can we take from this first set of observations? Firstly, the systems of domination we face are historical and social, and freeing ourselves *from* them is the primary demand of an anarchist ethics. This demands a critical philosophy able to uncover these systems of domination and (as Stirner tells us) to be able to see within these social philosophies the legacies of domination too, whether of inherited ideas, or the ways in which theory sustains other modes of domination. Secondly, classical anarchists wrote extensively on the necessary conditions *for* freedom, but they disagreed on what these would be. Finally, anarchist disagreed about the appropriate institutional frameworks *in* which we might realise freedom, if any were appropriate at all. Distinguishing freedom from, from freedom to and freedom in, is a very useful way of theorising freedom from an anarchist point of view, and it is to this that I now turn.

FREEDOM FROM

One way to explore the legacy of these ideas, and to unpack their logic a little more, is to do so via a useful but somewhat distracting distinction between positive and negative liberty, devised by Isaiah Berlin in 1958 as an analytical tool to distinguish liberals from socialists during the Cold War.²² Negative accounts of freedom stipulate what you ought to be free from without stating what this would necessarily entail, while positive accounts of freedom denote the social or political conditions necessary for the flourishing of individuality, the latter being synonymous with freedom. For Berlin, the problem with positive accounts of freedom is that the struggle to put into place the conditions necessary for freedom might well undermine negative freedoms and tends to a consequentialist logic. For example, the Soviet drive for equality, and the denial of negative freedoms, led to the gulags.

This framing makes it very difficult to theorise anarchism as a political philosophy of freedom. Anarchists are stern advocates for social and material equality as preconditions to human flourishing, and argue that very particular forms of social organisation are central to the possibility of freedom, from municipal organisations, to revolutionary syndicalist unions, to affinity groups, intentional communities, communes, and so on and so forth. But anarchists also declaim the state and all manner of other forms of arbitrary domination and suggest that freedom can only be realised in their absence. Can the two concepts of freedom be reconciled? Let's first unpack what anarchists mean by negative liberty, then we will look at positive accounts of freedom in anarchist thought, before looking at the question of institutions in more detail in the penultimate section of this chapter.

The first thing to note is that for a theory of negative freedom to be valuable at all, it must be unhooked from any necessary predicates. You can't be strictly free in the negative sense if your freedom depends on the a priori presence of some other thing. In other words, to be free in the negative sense of the term

cannot presuppose or necessitate the state, for example. For anarchists in the nineteenth century, this meant that there was no negative freedom worth defending that also had the nation state, positive constitutional law or capitalism as its necessary social and institutional form.

Patriarchy is a good example here. Proudhon's sexist conception of freedom from domination presumed that in order for men to be free, men must have the fullest scope for participation in the public institutions that shape our social life. The state could not provide that in the nineteenth century and arguably fails to do this to this day. But part and parcel of Proudhon's argument was the claim that in order for men to have this public role, women need to run the home and refrain from taking public roles. While Proudhon rejected the bourgeois marriage contract as enslaving, he nevertheless believed (incorrectly) that women were naturally physically and mentally weaker than men. He also believed the quack science of his day that women played no role in procreation except as receptacles of the 'seed'. Given this passive nature and having no public role, the home was women's rightful domain, a matriarchy where they could focus on raising children and countering masculine virtue.²³

Anarcha-feminism first emerged out of a critical engagement with Proudhon's ideas, pushing them further in a negative sense that he did. Henriette Wild, responding to Proudhon's writings on love and marriage, wrote the following: 'Sainte Proudhon [...] the right of the strongest, constitutes the most sinful of properties [...] and] in love, property is [thus] rape'.²⁴ One of his most vocal and forthright critics, Jenny d'Héricourt, put it like this: 'You have naively mistaken the scalpel of your imagination for that of science'.²⁵

Twenty years later and across the Atlantic, Voltairine de Cleyre made similar arguments, arguing that women ought to reject the logic of property and selfhood: 'Young girls! If any one of you is contemplating marriage remember that is what the contract means. The sale of the control of your person in return for "protection and support"'.²⁶ De Cleyre called for 'equal freedom', where freedoms are not relative to this or that social status or role, but of a fundamental ontological nature, where men and women are recognised as being equal, and that this equality consists in their freedom to be who they desire to be and engage freely with others as equals, free of social, intellectual and material constraints.

An early twentieth-century brand of Stirnerite feminist egoism took this argument one step further. Rather than present an immanent critique of patriarchal anarchist theory, Dora Marsden, for example, rejected the anarchist tendency to kowtow to doctrines, emancipatory or not (Kinna 2011). This tendency to defer to established critical theory was typical of the women's movement more generally, she thought, imposing doctrines of liberty, rather than encouraging independent free thought. Appeals to the virtues of femininity, as opposed to masculinity, or to universal human qualities, imposed conceptions of what it meant to be these things upon others.

Spontaneity and individuality, the hallmarks of anarchism, were only possible in the absence of doctrine.

If we take this line of thinking to one extreme, it is not difficult to pigeon hole anarchists as extreme liberals, or ‘hyper-liberals’,²⁷ vigorously defending a sphere of non-interference, clamouring for a pristine refuge from the social and epistemic clutches of society, somewhere where they can live a life unencumbered by the pressures of other people. This no doubt resonates with some of the more primitivist conceptions of anarchism,²⁸ and would also likely find support in the ideas of some of the reclusive communalists scattered across modern societies. Here, rejecting the imposition of rules, of hierarchies of domination and rank ordering, and of oppressive social norms, is the corollary to a conception of freedom as a state of unencumbered isolation. But to conflate anarchism with this tendency would be a mistake. Indeed, as I will show, this freedom from can be institutionalised in impressive ways, ways that are consistent with anarchist ideals. In order to get a fuller sense of what an anarchist institution ought to look like, we must first get a sense of what it is they ought to promote, beyond the removal of regimes of domination.

FREEDOM TO

For women in the nineteenth century, the right to work was central to freedom from material dependence on men. For anarchists, and revolutionary socialists of other varieties too, the struggle this involved meant devising ways of emancipating labour too, since to work for a master, under the strictures of modern capitalism meant nothing but wage slavery, whether you were a woman or a man.²⁹ The question then was less what should we get rid of in order to be free, but what do we need in place such that we can be free?

Positive theories of freedom can be understood as justifications of particular scope conditions, or necessary enablements and attributes, needed in order to be able to be free. They might also be virtues in the presence of which, or through the practice of which, we can be said to be human, the fulfilment of which is the purpose of the good life, or *eudemonia*. For example, I may have all the rights in the world, and be free from all immediate acts of interference, but without the means to exercise these freedoms am I really free? Also, without a positive conception of what it means to be a human being, what exactly do my negative freedoms afford me? A pure negative liberty would leave me directionless and treading water. Without the resources to develop, and a sense of what to develop into, in what meaningful sense am I free?

Two of the most outstanding statements of the positive conceptions of anarchist freedom are undoubtedly those of John Clark and Murray Bookchin, comrades and brothers in arms in many respects, though they differ vociferously on the detail of their social ecology. What unites both thinkers is their defence of Hegel and how he can be used to anarchist ends to theorise positive conceptions of freedom. Hegel is used by these two social ecologists in two ways: as a method and in order to conceptualise the positive society. Both

Bookchin and Clark lament the failure of anarchists to take Hegel's dialectics seriously, for in it, they argue is an important set of observations about how direct action, that is individual and collective attempts at relatively unmediated attempts at the transformation of society, is constitutive of that future society. This may seem self-evident, after all, how else is society changed, but given the legacy of Hegel in social theory, it is an important move to make, placing agency in the hands of individuals and communities, without ignoring the social determinates of social action. Furthermore, for both Clark and Bookchin, the dialectic of recognition is an ecological one, in which humans come to understand themselves in dialectical relation with nature.³⁰ Finally, given that the process of self-understanding and social development is open, there is no necessary telos to this process, for Clark at least.

In *The Ecology of Freedom* and *Post-Scarcity Anarchism*, Murray Bookchin takes this notion of complexity and chaos, and aligns it with a Hegelian notion of social emergence, to ground a positive conception of political community and freedom.³¹ For him, no society that permits of formal, or informal but socially enforced or sanctioned, rank hierarchies of domination meets the demands of mutual recognition, or of equality. Gender parity, the end of anthropocentrism (or post-humanism in another key) and so on are all the prerequisites of his social ecology. An ecological society must also be built from within the society in which we find ourselves. It will need to be highly complex, Bookchin argues, such that the diversity and the openness that this implies, creates endless possibilities for becoming and social transformation. Bookchin rejected anarcho-syndicalism as the ultimate form of social order, and preferred the revitalisation of municipal politics as the locus of politics, and the federation of municipal centres transnationally.³²

There is no doubt here that the struggle for recognition is prefigurative, in the sense that the ends and means of struggle are codetermined. For Ben Franks, this account of prefiguration aligns neatly with the virtue ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre.³³ MacIntyre denies that there is any transhistorical conception of reason that can undergird a theory of the good, or any transhistorical notion of freedom that can shape our actions today.³⁴ Rather virtues, such as courage, justice or solidarity, are historically and culturally specific, sustained through practices and defended through the establishment of institutions. Institutions in anarchist terms can vary from affinity groups to revolutionary syndicalist unions, from the general assemblies of the Occupy Wall Street to the Paris Commune. I will discuss these in a little more detail in the following section, but suffice to say that none of these are the best or final way of realising the good for anarchists. They perform functions, can be instrumentalised, but also are explicitly animated by the virtues, or values, that anarchist hold dear, and in this sense are always historically and spatially contingent expressions of the good and of freedom from an anarchist point of view. But most importantly, they are nurseries in which society itself is raised. Proudhon called these expressions of collective reason and collective force and, like Bookchin later, argued that these ought to be federated and constitutionally defended.³⁵ Let me develop these ideas in a little more detail.

FREEDOM IN OR FREEDOM WITH? ANARCHISM AND THE QUESTION OF INSTITUTIONS

If we take the view that freedom is something we have to experience with people in groups, but also a freedom from constraints or dominations, this doesn't tell us much about how these groups ought to be formed, nor does it imply that the groups so formed will automatically be freedom-enhancing. Indeed, one of the most significant critiques of the lack of institutionalisation of affinity groups in the women's movement also bears directly on the anarchist movement. Jo Freeman's influential article 'The Tyranny of Structurelessness'³⁶ argued that in groups without formal institutional frameworks and clear decision making procedures, informal elites will and do emerge. These are often simple friendship groups to begin with but result in ossified and informal social structures of power that make it very difficult to locate accountability and to democratise participation (where democratising means facilitating the whole demos to speak). Groups that lack formal institutions can be and are often tyrannous.

A similar argument is made about the international order. The relations between states are largely informal and therefore structured by relations of domination and hierarchy. For numerous authors, anarchy is the solution, a formal anarchy in which the autonomy of states is *de jure* guaranteed by the defence of sovereignty, an 'anarchic freedom' of sorts.³⁷ But this anarchy tends to cement the power of the most powerful. The alternative is to constitutionalise, formally balance powers against one another, but again, the constitutional process in world politics tends to favour the most powerful and status quo distributions of wealth.³⁸

So, should anarchists institutionalise and constitutionalise or not? For Uri Gordon, the answer is no.³⁹ Anarchist societies are anarchist in so far as they are fluid and the possibility of change is always there. Institutionalisation closes this down. Gordon defines institutionalisation as the adoption of binding and formal rules, which in so far as they are binding make them un-anarchist, and if they are not binding, then they are not institutionalised. This is a real puzzle and one worth exploring to elaborate the third dimension of freedom in anarchist thought.

First, what is an institution? Institutions are not too dissimilar to regimes, a term Gordon uses (above) to denote informality. In International Relations (IR) scholarship, perhaps an odd place to turn, there has been extensive discussion of institutions that anarchists might draw on here. Formally at least, the international domain lacks a final point of authority. What scholars disagree about is what maintains order in this stateless domain. Is it capitalism, the biopolitics of neoliberalism, the balance of power between states, patriarchy, or institutions like NATO, OPEC and the UN? Norms often shape behaviour more than laws, and laws neither write nor enforce themselves. Bearing this in mind, we need to see institutions as a complex of norms, rules and decision making procedures, as Steven Krasner puts it, that are shaped by and shape behaviour.

When we think about it carefully, there is not a collection of anarchists anywhere that is not governed in some way by something like formal or informal rules or emergent structures of power. Whether this is a set of decision making procedures or an informal set of rules, norms or habits that reproduces their communities. What marks the anarchists out is the ways in which these rules, norms and decision making procedures are benchmarked against positive and negative accounts of freedom, and the degree to which participation and active involvement are key to being able to tell how anarchist they are. To this end, anarchists have proven to be real innovators when it comes to institutions. From unions, to intentional communities, communes, worker-owned factories and so on and so forth, each consist in a set of formal and often informal rules, subgroups nested or affiliated within or alongside one another, and elaborate and varied decision making procedures aimed at maximising participation and inclusivity.

Freedoms are constituted by the mutual constraints placed upon free agency by our agreed decision making procedures, while the rules developed collectively and collaboratively shape mutual interactions, and the nature of that decision making. Where these rules are written down they give longevity to those groups, enabling them to outlive 100% of their participants and persist in a recognisable form into the future. The most successful such institutions in the anarchist movement have been the anarcho-sindicalist unions. The CNT in Spain had 700,000 members at the height of its influence, while today it has a fraction of that. More work needs to be done to see whether the constitutions of these groups exclude or include, whether they are historical millstones or important rallying points. But one thing is clear, they are enduring. As Lucien van der Walt and Steven Hirsch have pointed out, syndicalist and revolutionary syndicalist unions were stronger and more numerous outside Europe and North America, and a global context for understanding these institutions is central to understanding the global historical institutionalisation of anarchist movements, not to mention their roles in shaping twentieth-century world history.⁴⁰

What is as interesting for our purposes is the way in which most anarchist labour organisations have historically been federations, and the ways in which this federative model pervades anarchist organising. Federalism was central to the normative and institutional vision of Bakunin, Kropotkin and Proudhon, as I have discussed above. For all three, what was to be federated was much more than geographical locales and the centres of power therein. Rather, all had in mind the multiple and plural groups and economic units that workers and citizens would reclaim. Each economic unit would meet the needs of the locale, or functional body (like unions, postal services, etc.), each locale would act as a regional administrative unit, each regional or functional administrative unit would be federated with others to coordinate across wider scales, but would not supersede the others in an institutional hierarchy. Rather the economic and administrative units would nest within one another, with members from each taking part in the administration of the other, and vice versa, cooperatively.⁴¹

Proudhon believed that the formalisation of these relations was inevitable, and that the authority structures that would emerge would need to be counterbalanced with the liberties that people demanded.⁴² And this was a vision of order and freedom that was remarkably consistent throughout his life. As he put it in *What is Property?*:

Liberty is equality, because liberty exists only in society; and in the absence of equality there is no society. Liberty is anarchy, because it does not admit the government of the will, but only the authority of the law; that is, of necessity. Liberty is infinite variety, because it respects all wills within the limits of the law.⁴³

Freedom and institutionalisation are co-dependent. Community-building is necessarily an institutionalising project, embedding social practices such that they become relatively durable and give all a sense of the rules of the game and a hand in shaping them. But as institutions become durable, they also become outward facing, concerned with their own longevity, and they grow and change internally and in their relations with other groups. This complex and non-linear process will throw up challenges and problems that, according to MacIntyre at least, invariably lead to the sacrifice of the virtues and the development of vice. Whether states or communes, institutions need critical care and attention, reflection and analysis. Developing this critical understanding is partly what creates them, gives them direction and is an indication of, and enables, mass participation.

AGAINST EMPOWERMENT, AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE

Thus far I have argued that freedom is always relative to a social material and intellectual context, and to be durable will need to be institutionalised. In short, there is no non-social domain of freedom. If this is the case, there are three concepts that anarchist regularly use to understand freedom that probably ought to be rejected as foundational principles for anarchist ethics and theorising freedom. These are empowerment, autonomy and independence. It is not that anarchists ought not to be empowered, autonomous or independent, only that these cannot be consistent groundings for an anarchist social theory of freedom in the absence of institutionalisation.

Take away all social impediments and consider the subject as an ontological singularity. Assume that all social imaginaries, like law and the state, place the possibility of freedom outside ourselves in institutions, and so must be rejected. Who we are, or who we would become, is left to the happenchance of our ability to achieve a status within these epistemic domains. Unless I can determine the conditions of my own identity, I am not free. For Stirner, realising our freedom consists in mastering all these external forces such that each is a voluntarily chosen part of ourselves—we internalise the social, in other words, we remove all social impediments to our personally defined subjectivity. For Stirner, being free is not the same as realising it in any given context. Realising

one's freedom is about self-mastery and the appropriation of social and epistemic properties you require to make you who you are. Saul Newman sums it up like this: 'Freedom, for Stirner, should be a question of self-empowerment and the recognition and affirmation of one's own self as the condition and measure of freedom, rather than any external condition'.⁴⁴

But how can I be free in the absence of other people, and if there are other people, how do we regulate our coercion and our mutual attempts to be ourselves, without recognising needs and demands, or visions of the good, beyond ourselves? For Uri Gordon freedom is also centrally a question of empowerment. It is through empowerment that we are able to resist domination. Following Starhawk, Gordon argues that empowerment is first a critique and battle against 'power-over', that is the rule of others over us. In order to actualise or realise the promise of this critique, we have to develop 'power to' and 'power with'. These three faces of power map neatly onto our conception of freedom outlined above. 'Power to' relates to mastery and learning, 'power with' to the cooperativeness and support necessary to personal empowerment in mutualist communities. Central to realising this is the redistribution of power to the end of 'equality',⁴⁵ a system in which we are all equally unable to dominate, rather than one in which a distribution of goods reaches universal parity.⁴⁶ This can be a fluid and negotiated rebalancing of power relations in accordance with principles of solidarity and equality, but it is one which is primarily predicated on communities of identity, not institutions of collective self-rule.⁴⁷

Gordon rejects the institutionalist argument for anarchist politics on the grounds that formalisation does not counter the imbalances of power, but would sediment new ones, and it would remove the intersubjective form of the anarchist political culture that has been so central to its effectiveness and the possibility of realising equity and 'power with'. Gordon prefers the anarchist impulse to 'decentralisation', the multiplication of centres and 'diffuse social sanctions'. A truly anarchist politics, Gordon argues, refuses institutionalisation, both in principle and in practice.⁴⁸

At some point, however, this struggle for autonomy, empowerment and independence will result in the end of society itself. The Stirnerite injunction to question all social norms and to adopt only those that accord with one's self-creation, would render a shared society impossible, unless of course a shared conception of the self is desirable, in which case oneness itself becomes a less stable ontological category, and more an epistemic one. Gordon's understanding of 'power with' will in some senses mollify the brute struggle for power empowerment entails, while the development of epistemic communities of power/knowledge that a more Foucauldian sensibility might suggest would develop 'power with' in more epistemic terms. But neither is particularly durable. When people become burnt out, tired or disillusioned, or they begin to dissociate with the group, the society will falter and fail. Likewise, it seems an implausible way to structure inter-group relations to rely on ideological cohesion or identity.

Identity and epistemic community are necessary but not sufficient components of freedom. In order to develop the durability of communities, and to enable the linking of communities across time and space, institutionalisation is required, and for this to flourish, notions of right and contracts are probably necessary. We need to think creatively about the relationship between articulating the voice of the anarchist demos, as well as the limits of modern democracy, and how this would sit in productive tension with a set of rules and institutions that can provide the formal structure for those processes, without undermining anarchist values. There is no simple answer to this problem, but anarchist political thought provides a sophisticated set of critical tools to that end.⁴⁹

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I have focused on one prominent tradition in the history of anarchism more than I have on others: the republican tradition of anarchist praxis. This wing of the anarchist tradition engaged with freedom from the perspective of the social construction of the subject, and with a conception of the social conditions of freedom. This majority tradition was also highly institutionalised, whether in the syndicalist unions, in intentional communities, co-ops, federations, community organisations, municipal administration and military organisations like Durrutti's column, Mahkno's units or elsewhere. These institutions were constituted along lines that defended maximal participation in the decisions that were likely to affect those who took part. In so doing they shaped an anarchist ethos through institutional design, producing anarchist subjects in the process. In their failings, as well as in their successes, they also acted as nurseries of the development of future anarchist thinking and practice, often highly critical of the structures of domination that had emerged in those institutions or within society at large. From the French mutual aid societies and the Paris Commune, through to Occupy Wall Street, Decolonize Oakland and the Rojava constitution, the urge to freedom has always been a contextual affair.

NOTES

1. P.-J. Proudhon, 'Solution of the Social Problem', in I. McKay (Ed), *Property is Theft! A Pierre-Joseph Proudhon Anthology* (Edinburgh: AK Press, [1848] 2009), 280.
2. See, for example, S. Hirsch and L. Van der Walt (Eds), *Anarchism and Syndicalism in the Colonial and Postcolonial World, 1870–1940: The Praxis of National Liberation, Internationalism, and Social Revolution* (Leiden: Brill, 2010); L. Van der Walt and M. Schmidt, *Black Flame: The Revolutionary Class Politics of Anarchism and Syndicalism* (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2009); C. Ward, 'The anarchist sociology of federalism', *Freedom*, June/July, 1992; C. Cahm, *Kropotkin and the Rise of Revolutionary Anarchism 1872–1886* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); M. A. Bakunin and S. Dolgoff, *Bakunin on*

Anarchy. Selected Works by the Activist Founder of World Anarchism. Edited, translated and with an introduction by Sam Dolgoff (London: Allen and Unwin, 1973).

3. Liberty is a concept more central to the Anglo-analytical tradition of moral philosophy, while freedom and emancipation are concepts used more in the history of political thought and critical theory. For the purposes of this chapter, I will use liberty, freedom and emancipation interchangeably. Freedom translates as liberty in most Romance languages (e.g., *liberté*, *liberdade*, *libertà*), and these remain the conceptual vocabularies for non-Anglo anarchists. The association of liberty with the liberal rights tradition may explain some of the preference for thinking and speaking in terms of freedom. In this chapter, I use the concepts interchangeably. For good general discussions of liberty and freedom in the Anglo-American traditions of political philosophy, see J. Filling, 'Liberty', in *The Encyclopedia of Political Thought* (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2014) and N. J. Hirschmann, 'Freedom', in *The Encyclopedia of Political Thought* (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2014).
4. On this, republicans and libertarians are remarkably close. C. List and P. Pettit, *Group agency: The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 180–185. C. Kukathas, 'Liberalism and multiculturalism: The politics of indifference', *Political Theory*, 26 (1998), 686–699.
5. A. Prichard, 'Collective Intentionality, Complex Pluralism and the Problem of Anarchy', *Journal of International Political Theory*, 13 (2017), 360–377.
6. For more on this, see R. Kinna and A. Prichard, 'Anarchism and Non-Domination', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, (forthcoming), and www.anarchyrules.info.
7. U. Gordon, *Anarchy Alive!: Anti-Authoritarian Politics from Practice to Theory* (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 32.
8. Gordon, *ibid.*, 33.
9. For an excellent discussion of this, see A. Gourevitch, *From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
10. For fuller discussions of each, see K. S. Vincent, *Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican Socialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); J. P. Clark, *The Philosophical Anarchism of William Godwin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Van der Walt and Schmidt, *Black Flame*.
11. J.-J. Rousseau, 'Of the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right', in V. Gourevitch (Ed), *Rousseau: The Social Contract and other later Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 39–152.
12. For an excellent discussion of the uptake of Hegel in anarchist thought, see N. Jun, 'Hegel and Anarchist Communism', *Anarchist Studies*, 22 (2014), 28–54.
13. For more on this, see A. Prichard, *Justice, Order and Anarchy: The International Political Theory of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013).
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15. A. Prichard, 'Deepening Anarchism: International Relations and the Anarchist Ideal', *Anarchist Studies*, 18 (2010), 29–57.
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18. Bakunin cited in M. Bookchin, *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm* (Edinburgh: AK Press, 1995), 6.
19. M. A. Bakunin, 'The Capitalist System', *Anarchy Archives*, http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/bakunin/capstate.html [Accessed 27.11.217].
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21. S. Newman (Ed), *Max Stirner* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), S. Newman, "'Ownness created a new freedom": Max Stirner's alternative concept of liberty', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, ONLINE FIRST (2017), 1–21.
22. I. Berlin 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in I. Berlin (Ed), *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 121–154.
23. A. Copley, 'Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: A Reassessment of his role as a moralist', *French History*, 3 (1989), 194–221.
24. For a working translation of this, and other feminist critiques of Proudhon's anti-feminism, see Shawn Wilbur, <https://libertarian-labyrinth.org/working-translations/henriette-artiste-letter-to-proudhon-1849/> [Accessed 27.11.17].
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43. Proudhon, 'Solution', 136.
44. S. Newman, "'Ownness created a new freedom": Max Stirner's alternative concept of liberty', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, ONLINE FIRST (2017), 6.
45. Gordon, *Anarchy Alive*, 56.
46. Gordon, *ibid.*, 61.
47. See U. Gordon, 'Anarchism and Nationalism', in N. Jun (Ed), *Brill's Companion to Anarchism and Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 196–215.
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Anti-Capitalism and Libertarian Political Economy

Deric Shannon

‘Libertarianism’, in much of the Anglo world, has come to mean a hard right-wing position on political economy—a position that includes a rigorous defence of private property, the wage relation, and trade liberalisation through a market with relatively few restraints placed on the owners of property and capital. Interestingly, however, the term was actually ‘created by nineteenth-century European anarchists’.¹ As early as the mid-1800s, the French journal *Le Libertaire* was in circulation in the United States and the American anarchist, Benjamin Tucker, used the term ‘libertarian’ to describe his politics in 1897.²

The term ‘libertarian’ was intended, as such, to convey a thick anti-authoritarianism. Antipathy to or even complete contempt for the state was not enough for these visionaries. Rather, if one was going to claim the mantle of opposition to authority, one must be opposed to the authoritarian relations intrinsic to capitalism. Thus, throughout this chapter, I use the term ‘libertarian’ in its original sense, as a set of thick anti-authoritarian principles that includes opposition to the state, as well as capitalism or any relation of authority and institutionalised hierarchy. Sometimes I use the term ‘anarchism’ as a synonym, as it was intended by the term’s creators. Though I do not have high hopes for reclaiming the term ‘libertarian’, perhaps this can be one more

Parts of this entry are borrowed from past work in D. Shannon, A. Nocella, and J. Asimakopoulos, ‘Anarchist Economics: A Holistic View’, in D. Shannon, A. Nocella, and J. Asimakopoulos (Eds), *The Accumulation of Freedom: Writings on Anarchist Economics* (Oakland: AK Press, 2012), pp. 11–39 and D. Shannon, ‘Economy’, in N. Jun, L. Williams, and B. Franks (Eds), *Anarchism: A Conceptual Approach* (New York: Routledge, Forthcoming).

D. Shannon (✉)

Department of Sociology, Oxford College, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
e-mail: deric.shannon@emory.edu

in a long line of attempts. With this in mind, I will focus on libertarian, anti-capitalist political economy.

We might begin by defining *political economy* before we look at libertarian positions on it. Political economy, historically, came to supplant ‘economy’ as sets of ideas dealing with the production, distribution, and consumption of goods. Caporaso and Levine briefly trace this history, arguing that ‘[e]conomy, taken from the Greek usage, referred to household management. It had relevance to a society in which, to an important degree, wants emerged and the things that satisfied them were produced in the household. Political economy’ however ‘referred to the management of the economic affairs of the state’. Indeed, ‘to satisfy our wants we now depend on persons not our relatives, whom we might not even know’ and ‘the boundaries of want satisfaction are now political; responsibility for the system of want satisfaction devolves onto a public authority: the head of state rather than the head of the household’.³

Thus, political economy is a type of analysis that locates economics within larger relations of power, recognising that economic processes cannot be coherently abstracted from the rest of social life, particularly the state. For libertarians, as critics of all forms of hierarchy, politics and economy must be located socially along with *all* relations of inequality. As Rucker put it, ‘the war against capitalism must be at the same time a war against all institutions of political power’, recognising that ‘exploitation has always gone hand in hand with political and social oppression’.⁴ But since anarchists oppose state power, it could be said that they offer a *critique* of political economy.

This complicates libertarian approaches to political economy. Anarchists, for one, oppose the state, but some have argued for various forms of *governance* (most often, some form of democracy, despite widespread anarchist criticism of that position). Still others have argued that we might have the capacity to create abundance or post-scarcity, subverting any need for ‘economy’, as such, while some have explicitly argued for libertarian political economies, as blueprints for what a future society might look like. A political economy can also mean a certain kind of analysis of economics, the state, and other relations of power and we do certainly live in a world governed, in large part, by states managing a global economy. This allows for a diverse set of positions on how to define and analyse the existing political economic arrangements (i.e. capitalism), as well as differences on what a post-capitalist society might look like (for those libertarians who care to venture a guess).

Therefore, in this chapter, I attempt to give a broad outline of anarchist positions on political economy, starting with the way that libertarians have tended to define and critique capitalism. Next, I develop some anarchist arguments about why capitalism remains stable, despite the libertarian critique. Finally, I provide a sketch of anarchist positions on post-capitalism.

THE LIBERTARIAN CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

Anarchists have a long and proud history of opposing capitalism. One would be hard-pressed to make the case that anarchism could exist without an opposition to capitalism as *foundational* to it. As a practice, an ethic and/or a theory developed in opposition to hierarchical society, libertarianism's embrace of anti-authoritarianism is fundamentally contravened by the basic elements of capitalism, private ownership protected by states and the wage relation (i.e. being able to *rent* another person and extract value from her labour). Bakunin outlines the coercion and authoritarianism intrinsic to these relationships when he writes:

And once the contract has been negotiated, the serfdom of the workers is doubly increased; or to put it better, before the contract has been negotiated, goaded by hunger, he [sic] is only potentially a serf; after it is negotiated he becomes a serf in fact. Because what merchandise has he sold to his employer? It is his labor, his personal services, the productive forces of his body, mind, and spirit that are found in him and are inseparable from his person—it is therefore himself. From then on, the employer will watch over him, either directly or by means of overseers; everyday during working hours and under controlled conditions, the employer will be the owner of his actions and movements. When he is told: 'Do this,' the worker is obligated to do it; or he is told: 'Go there,' he must go. Is this not what is called a serf?⁵

Here, Bakunin points out the way that liberty is reduced through need, requiring workers to sell our labour for life's necessities. As we enter into waged and salaried relations in order to address those needs, accordingly, liberty is quickly traded for workplace hierarchies and social management. A basic function of capitalism is to create and enforce this hierarchical, authoritarian arrangement of property through the organised violence of the state, existing, of course, alongside authoritarian 'social dynamics which are generated, reproduced and enacted within *and* outside this apparatus'.⁶ Capitalism is then necessarily incompatible with libertarianism—a thick anti-authoritarianism, despite some misguided rhetorical attempts to fuse the two (predominantly in the Anglo world). But there is not shared agreement among anarchists on what exactly the defining features of capitalism are. As I have argued elsewhere,⁷ in order to outline anarchist political economic analyses of capitalism, one might describe capitalism in terms of the following broad features (some of which may not be exclusive to capitalism, depending on how we define it): wage labour/exploitation, private property, markets, class society, and states.

Wage labour/exploitation is one of the basic constituent parts of capitalism. In order to access the social product, as illustrated by Bakunin above, workers must rent themselves out for a wage or salary. The value produced under capitalism by workers, minus whatever wage the capitalist(s) pay, is then expropriated by capitalists in the form of surplus value—this process is exploitation.

Chomsky asserts that it used to be common for American workers at the turn of the century to refer to this set of relationships as ‘wage slavery’ to point out a historical continuity between *owning* another person and what is, essentially, *renting* another person.⁸ Not only do anarchists oppose wage labour and exploitation on the grounds that they are unfair, but these things are also against the material interests of working people and create a social relation of domination between the boss and the worker (which Bakunin so eloquently describes). Many anarchists argue that the wage labour relation is *the* defining aspect of capitalism.⁹ Kropotkin claimed that through this process of exploitation, capitalists in his day ‘appropriate[d] two-thirds of the products of human labor ... having reduced the masses to a point at which they have not the means of subsistence for a month, or even for a week in advance’.¹⁰

This social relation (exploitation) is made possible by private property. Typically, anarchists define private property as property that allows for long-term absentee ownership. This is often juxtaposed with what is referred to as *personal property* or *possessions* or forms of ownership that are defined by *occupancy* and *use*. This leaves plenty of room for disagreement about how we draw lines around use and occupancy, but it also visibilises a social relation between persons and things that emerged from the historical context of the processes of accumulation that led to the development of capitalism. The notion that one can ‘own’ a home, or better yet, a workplace, across the ocean, without ever having to see it, occupy it, or use it, while charging rents or expropriating the value produced by workers within that location is not some eternal phenomenon. It is specific to capitalism and its development. Berkman posited that this historical development of the notion of private property robbed workers of things they collectively created:

Though the workers, as a class, have built the factories, a slice of their daily labor is taken from them for the privilege of using those factories. That’s the landlord’s profit. Though the workers have made the tools and the machinery, another slice of their daily labor is taken from them for the privilege of using those tools and machinery. That’s the manufacturer’s profit. Though the workers built the railroads and are running them, another slice of their daily labor is taken from them for the transportation of the goods they make. That’s the railroad’s profit. And so on, including the banker who lends the manufacturer other people’s money, the wholesaler, the jobber, and other middlemen, all of whom get their slice of the worker’s toil.¹¹

Another element of capitalist society as we know it is market relations. Generally, and likely because in dominant narratives Marxian economics are juxtaposed with capitalist models, we are told that for allocation we have a choice between central planning and markets. Anarchists, however, have sometimes argued for decentralised forms of planning and some have suggested that we might have anti-capitalist, socialist markets.¹² This was a part of what was originally proposed by Proudhon and by workers who saw strategic advantages in

cooperative enterprises—a market socialism in which self-managed worker-owned firms would exchange in a market regulated by an ‘agro-industrial federation’ on the basis of reciprocity.¹³ This collective worker-ownership model would potentially resolve the problem of the appropriation of surplus value, allowing worker-owned firms access to the full product of their labours.

Anarchists point out that these economic arrangements lead to the development of class society. While we are often told that we are all equals under the law or that we all have equal power through voting, anarchists point out that these claims (which serve to justify and naturalise capitalist society) are absurd. Rather, we do not live in a society of equals. We live in a society of *classes*, with different material interests. The ruling class in capitalist society has an interest in maintaining capitalism while the rest of us have an interest in ending our exploitation. McKay, like many anarchists, argues for a two-class analysis with the following taxonomy:

Working class—those who have to work for a living but have no real control over that work or other major decisions that affect them, i.e. order-takers. This class also includes the unemployed, pensioners, etc., who have to survive on handouts from the state. They have little wealth and little (official) power. This class includes the growing service worker sector, most (if not the vast majority) of “white collar” workers as well as traditional “blue collar” workers. Most self-employed people would be included in this class, as would the bulk of peasants and artisans (where applicable). In a nutshell, the producing classes and those who either were producers or will be producers. This group makes up the vast majority of the population.

Ruling Class—those who control investment decisions, determine high level policy, set the agenda for capital and state. This is the elite at the top, owners or top managers of large companies, multinationals and banks (i.e. the capitalists), owners of large amounts of land (i.e. landlords or the aristocracy, if applicable), top-level state officials, politicians, and so forth. They have real power within the economy and/or state, and so control society. In a nutshell, the owners of power (whether political, social or economic) or the master class.¹⁴

However, not everyone fits neatly into these broad categories. And some radicals, anarchists included, argue for the existence of a third class. Some refer to this as ‘the middle class’, ‘the coordinator class’, ‘the techno-managerial class’, and so on. This is typically used to highlight the existence of people with a high degree of social power—often directly over working people—such as high-paid lawyers, tenured professors at elite institutions, and so on. This class is sometimes conceived as having their own sets of material interests, in opposition to the ruling class and the working class, and sometimes conceived as having similar interests as workers, but being placed above them in capitalist society due to their social power.

We might juxtapose this anarchist class analysis with sociological analyses of class that often split society into a lower (or ‘under’) class, working class, lower

middle class, upper middle class, and upper class. These popular sociological analyses are typically rooted in a Weberian analysis of power and one can certainly point to structural advantages that some workers have over others, cultural differences, and the like.¹⁵ However, in terms of *ruling* and *owning* society, this kind of broad-range sociological analysis of class can serve to mystify more than explain. Even a better-paid worker with more prestige than her counterparts, in some cases even in the same workplace, is still exploited and controlled by her boss at the end of the day.

Finally, libertarians point out that the social relations in capitalist society are protected and maintained by states. As Malatesta notes, we are taught that the state is ‘the representative ... of the general interest: it is the expression of the rights of all, construed as a limit upon the rights of each’ and that states are ‘moral ... endowed with certain attributes of reason, justice’.¹⁶ Anarchists point out that actually the state protects property relations, allowing for the existence of private property. A workplace can be owned and maintained and the workers exploited only through the organisation of violence to stop them from simply taking the workplace and running it themselves. While in contemporary capitalism, ownership has become more convoluted and diffused throughout society than during Malatesta’s time, it is still the state and its organised, legitimated violence that allows for the continued existence of private property. Emma Goldman succinctly explained this libertarian analysis of the state and why anti-authoritarians must reject statism when she wrote, ‘I believe government, organized authority, or the State is necessary *only* to maintain or protect property and monopoly. It has proven efficient in that function only. As a promoter of individual liberty, human well-being and social harmony, which alone constitute real order, government stands condemned by all the great men [sic] of the world’.¹⁷

Again, this is an attempt to break down capitalism to its basic and constituent elements: wage labour/exploitation, private property, markets, class society, and states. But this short descriptive analysis misses much. One might consider, for example, value production as central to capitalism, money or some other circulating medium of exchange, pricing mechanisms, and other possible essentials. Examining its fundamental constitution is important because capitalism is a resilient system, often changing forms in order to co-opt struggles against it. In what is perhaps one of its most insidious characteristics, capital’s drive for accumulation has, at times, meant creating commodities out of rebellion, generating release valves for struggles against its inexorable search for growth and profit and its commodification of human life and desire. Understanding these constitutive elements, then, is an absolute necessity for those who wish to undo capitalism.

THEN WHY CAPITALISM?

Of course, if capitalism is authoritarian, exploitative, if it robs the majority of the fruits of their labour, allows a minority to rule, and distorts social life surrendering desire to the need for capital accumulation, this raises the question

of why humans continue to reproduce it. In a more fundamental sense, it raises what might be the most poignant question in social science, perhaps even social life: Why do people obey? In large part, capitalism reproduces itself through the participation of people in its social relations, like any institutional arrangement. Libertarians can often be found advocating for mass refusals and the withdrawal of our participation in this social reproduction—sometimes in the form of general strikes; sometimes, as in the case of the illegalists, in the form of direct expropriations; sometimes in the form of occupations and the taking of space; and still other times in advocating for creating alternatives to capitalist relations in the here and now. But the advocacy of these kinds of practices highlights the question: If it is in our interests to abolish capitalism, why (and how) is capitalism continually reproduced in our social lives and why do we not abolish those social relations and begin writing a new future today?

Some of the possible answers to that question are contained within popular understandings of economics. Capitalism is justified by ideological assumptions about ‘human nature’, what is ‘pragmatic’, and just how wonderful and benevolent democracy can be. Given that mass media are either owned and operated by capitalists or the state, our popular forms of entertainment are most often commodities produced under (and by) capital; our compulsory educational systems are run by the state and so on; it might not be a surprise just how popular those kinds of ideological assumptions are.

For example, capitalism is often justified by a belief that it is ‘human nature’ to be greedy, to want to accumulate wealth at the expense of others, to desire power over other people, and the like. Yet, for most of human history, people lived in hunter-gatherer societies without any concept of private property, in collectivities that based their lives on personal possessions and forms of common, social resources (nothing that could properly be called *property*). Given that long history, how could it be ‘human nature’ to want to dominate, to own, to compete for resources? These ideas of ‘human nature’ are common among people the world over. This belief has been under sustained critique by libertarians, prompting Emma Goldman to declare, ‘Poor human nature, what horrible crimes have been committed in thy name! Every fool, from king to policeman, from the flatheaded parson to the visionless dabbler in science, presumes to speak authoritatively of human nature. The greater the mental charlatan, the more definite his [sic] insistence on the wickedness and weaknesses of human nature. Yet, how can anyone speak of it today, with every soul in a prison, with every heart fettered, wounded, and maimed?’¹⁸ Her larger point was that those things that we refer to as ‘human nature’ are projections of our dominant institutions into our very *selves*. Thus, capitalism is not some naturally occurring system. It is a system that is constructed and one that can be dispensed with.

Similarly, economists often object to anarchist alternatives to capitalism as utopian (in the pejorative sense of the term) or not being pragmatic. They argue instead that alternatives to capitalism would never ‘work’. First, this ignores the vast majority of the history of human social organisation, which

presumably ‘worked’ (i.e. we are still here and while people sometimes struggled in the past, clearly people have also thrived without capitalism).¹⁹ This also ignores human experiences and experiments outside of capitalist relations that exist within capitalist society²⁰ or in revolutionary situations.²¹ But more egregiously, it assumes that capitalism, even by its own ideological standards, is a system that ‘works’. Given massive poverty, privation, and hunger; the routine destruction of landbases and the despoiling of the natural environment; massive worldwide wars; periodic crises such as the 2008 financial collapse—given that a tiny elite owns massive amounts of resources (multiple homes, dozens of luxury cars, servants and coteries, and the like) while most of us struggle to survive—can we really say this is a system that ‘works’?

It is also often suggested that under democracy checks and balances are present in the form of state regulation of the economy that can address some of the failures of capitalism. But even a cursory look at recent history should demonstrate how absurd these deeply held beliefs about democracy are. Perhaps the best examples are when Leftist governments are voted into power. In much of Europe, we have a long history of socialist parties legislating regulatory mechanisms into the economy in order to create a kinder and gentler capitalism. And the age of austerity²² demonstrates just how lasting those reforms and regulations are. States can dismantle any reform or regulation they set in place at any moment. When the capacity for capital accumulation is in question, even erstwhile ‘socialist’ parties use the capitalist state to bring workers to heel.

Libertarianism—with its historical thick anti-authoritarianism—is a diverse body of anti-capitalist ideas. Libertarians tend to define capitalism by its major features, perhaps most commonly wage labour, private property, markets, class society, and states. But the deep critique offered by libertarian political economy of capitalism raises some questions about why we continue to reproduce it. In part, capital reproduces itself through ideological filtering mechanisms that serve to justify it, explain it away, or in some cases avoid critical scrutiny at all. But what positive visions have anarchists offered to replace capitalism as an organising principle?

LIBERTARIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY/ANTI-CAPITALISM/ POST-CAPITALISM

It is no simple task to pen a section on anarchist ideas about what a post-capitalist society might look like for a number of reasons. For one, many anarchists reject visionary or generative thinking, preferring instead a politics of negation. This is particularly true of anarchist tendencies inspired by nihilism. Anarchy, conceived under these terms, is not so much about creating an anti-capitalist society, but resisting society as such, a line of tension that runs across a wide variety of anarchist egoist, nihilist, and individualist thinking, perhaps, in many ways, exemplified by Max Stirner, who inspired Renzo Novatore, Emma Goldman, and many others.²³

Similarly, many anarchists are suspicious of visionary arguments and blueprints for the future, seeing anarchism as a conscious creation of the dispossessed and not a future that can be written within the context of the present. As Emma Goldman put it:

Anarchism is not, as some may suppose, a theory of the future to be realized through divine inspiration. It is a living force in the affairs of our life, constantly creating new conditions. The methods of Anarchism therefore do not comprise an iron-clad program to be carried out under all circumstances. Methods must grow out of the economic needs of each place and clime, and of the intellectual and temperamental requirements of the individual.²⁴

Following this, some anarchists would eschew labels and ‘hyphenations’ like ‘anarchist-communism’, preferring to refer to their desires simply as ‘anarchy’. Still others assume that visionary arguments are authoritarian, a method of conceiving a new society without the participation of those people who (will) compose it. In this way, the idea of a positive and visionary politics can be read as vanguardist and presumptive.

There is also a strong tradition of revolutionary pluralism in anarchism. Some libertarians advocate for an ‘anarchism-without-adjectives’, perhaps most famously advanced by thinkers such as Voltairine de Cleyre, to indicate a tolerance for many visionary (and strategic) differences. Similarly, there have been (and are) anarchists who advocate for specific proposals, but see a need for a commitment to pluralism in terms of vision. One of the best examples of this can be found in Malatesta, who advocated for anarchist-communism, yet stated:

One may, therefore, prefer communism, or individualism, or collectivism, or any other system, and work by example and propaganda for the achievement of one’s personal preferences, but one must beware, at the risk of certain disaster, of supposing that one’s system is the only, and infallible, one, good for all men [sic], everywhere and for all times, and that its success must be assured at all costs, by means other than those which depend on persuasion, which spring from the evidence of facts.²⁵

Similarly, Price argues that ‘it may be most productive to think in terms of an experimental, pluralist, and decentralized society, in which different parts face the problems caused by the transition out of capitalism and deal with them in different ways’.²⁶ Undoubtedly, these pluralist positions are also reflective of anarchist suspicion of visionary arguments and blueprints for a future society.

Nonetheless, one can identify strands of post-capitalist thinking by anarchists. These various positions can easily be found among contemporary anarchists, though often using different terms (and sometimes, advanced by thinkers who are not anarchists). This method of adoption might itself be reflective of anarchist pluralism, where contemporary anarchists often argue for any number of mixes of these arrangements or, at times, take on anti-state

political economic ideas outside of the anarchist tradition. Typically, the three major proposals are referred to as mutualism, collectivism, and (anarchist) communism.

MUTUALISM

Proudhon was an advocate of a form of market socialism that many people refer to as ‘mutualism’.²⁷ Mutualism, according to this view, is an anti-capitalist model that sees mutual banks and credit associations as a way to socialise productive property and allow for a form of dual power for workers, particularly through the use of low-interest loans, charging only the necessary interest to pay for administration. Using these loans, workers could buy and cooperatively own their means of production. Proudhon argued for mutualism not only as a post-capitalist vision but also as a strategic orientation stressing the need to build alternative economic relationships in the here and now that would eventually replace capitalism.

As Proudhon sketched it out, wage labour and landlordism would be abolished in a reciprocal arrangement of society. Ownership claims would be based on occupancy and use. Therefore, all workers would have access to their own means of production—most organising into cooperative, non-hierarchical firms. These self-managed firms would exchange in a market, regulated by a grand agro-industrial federation. Many mutualists have argued that these firms would function in ways similar to worker cooperatives contemporarily, but without some of the pressures of operating in the context of a capitalist and statist society. Further, rather than capitalists expropriating surplus value from workers, workers would keep or trade those products that they produce. This would mean that distribution in a mutualist society would be ‘by work done, by *deed* rather than need. Workers would receive the full product of their labour, after paying for inputs from other co-operatives’.²⁸ This is an important distinction, particularly as anarchists who advocate for communism argue for forms of distribution by *need* and parts of the debates over anarchist ideas about post-capitalism are centred on the distribution of the things that we produce.

Perhaps some of the most visible contemporary proponents of mutualism are Kevin Carson, Shawn P. Wilbur, or groups like the Alliance of the Libertarian Left or Center for a Stateless Society.²⁹ Many of these modern mutualists, particularly those at the Center for a Stateless Society, have altered features of Proudhon’s arguments in key ways, influenced by the American individualists like Benjamin Tucker and Josiah Warren. Some of the aforementioned groups see anti-statists working together across broad economic spectrums—some of whom are socialist, others who advocate forms of capitalism and could not therefore properly be called ‘anarchists’ or ‘libertarian’ (in the sense I use in this chapter). And there seems to be a split among contemporary mutualists, with people like Shawn Wilbur arguing for a return to original source materials

by Proudhon (whose ideas are still being translated into English). Under this lens, mutualism is a social science rooted in reciprocity, rather than a set of prescriptive political economic ideas.

COLLECTIVISM

Collectivism is most often associated with Bakunin, who referred to himself as a ‘collectivist’ to distinguish his theory from state-communists. While mutualism is often interpreted as a reformist and gradualist strategy that would try to *overgrow* capitalism over a long period of time, Bakunin saw a need for a revolutionary rupture with capitalism. Bakunin argued for a revolutionary movement that would expropriate property, socialising it.

Collectivism, then, begins with the assumption of social ownership of productive property. The product of labour, however, would be gathered into a communal market. Bakunin’s friend, James Guillaume, when outlining Bakunin’s vision called for a society where ‘items [...] produced by collective labor will belong to the community. And each member will receive remuneration for his [sic] labor either in the form of commodities [...] or in currency. In some communities remuneration will be in proportion to hours worked; in others payment will be measured by both the hours of work and the kind of work performed; still other systems will be experimented with to see how they work out’.³⁰ Where communities used currency, it would be used to purchase items from the collective market.

And yet Sam Dolgoff said of Guillaume that he ‘saw no difference in principle between collectivism and anti-state communism. The collectivists understood that full communism would not be immediately realizable. They were convinced that the workers themselves would gradually introduce communism as they overcame the obstacles, both psychological and economic’.³¹ Thus, in this way, the idea of remuneration was not seen as an end in Bakunin’s collectivism, but rather a transitional phase into a system of ‘full communism’, presumably where norms of remuneration would be done away with. The term ‘collectivism’ is still widely in use among anarchists, who often distinguish between collectivism and communist anarchism on the basis of debates over remuneration and distribution.

Contemporarily, there are few anarchists who advocate for collectivism, as such. But some of these concerns over remuneration can be seen as some anarchists advocate for participatory economics (or ‘parecon’), a non-market libertarianism developed by Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel and also advocated by Chris Spannos and the Organization for a Free Society.³² Albert writes that ‘citizens should have a claim on society’s economic product that increases if they do socially valued work longer or more intensely or under worse conditions’.³³ This is where we might see the descendants of collectivism in some ways. However, for advocates of parecon, it is typically not seen as a transitional phase into a full communism of free consumption, but an end unto itself, which differentiates it from Bakunin’s theory.

COMMUNIST ANARCHISM

Strategically, communist anarchists (sometimes referred to as anarcho-communists, anarchist-communists, or libertarian communists—with each of those terms, at times, connoting some strategic and theoretical differences) typically see a need for a revolutionary break with capitalism. Some envision, like Bakunin, this being a series of grand revolutionary events enacted by an organised working class. Others, however, see anarchism and communism more as processes than end goals and often advocate for insurrectionary moments that would, perhaps, coalesce into revolutions. This orientation is summed up quite well by Malatesta when he said, ‘the subject is not whether we accomplish Anarchism today, tomorrow, or within ten centuries, but that we walk towards Anarchism today, tomorrow, and always’.³⁴

Libertarian communists advocate for the social ownership of productive property and distribution on the basis of need or, perhaps better stated, an end to ownership and property relations altogether (i.e. the abolition of property). This libertarian communism argues for economic visions organised around the principle ‘From each according to ability, to each according to need’, though the details of how to realise this objective are certainly debatable. Added to this, ‘communism’ (much like ‘libertarian’) is also a contested term with a variety of meanings, both historically and contemporarily. This makes for a category that is difficult to pin down with simple definitions, but much of the early communist anarchist theory was written in reaction to the collectivist wages system.

Communist anarchists typically argue against any form of currency or remuneration. In Kropotkin’s view, the entire notion of remuneration for labour could possibly lead to the re-development of capitalism:

In fact, in a society like ours, in which the more a man [sic] works the less he is remunerated, this principle, at first sight, may appear to be a yearning for justice. But it is really only the perpetuation of past injustice. It was by virtue of this principle that wagedom began, to end in the glaring inequalities and all the abominations of present society; because, from the moment work done was appraised in currency or in any other form of wage; the day it was agreed upon that man would only receive the wage he could secure to himself, the whole history of State-aided Capitalist Society was as good as written; it germinated in this principle.³⁵

Kropotkin’s view presented one way forward for a post-revolutionary society that has ‘taken possession of all social wealth, having boldly proclaimed the right of all to this wealth—whatever share they may have taken in producing it will be compelled to abandon any system of wages, whether in currency or labour-notes’.³⁶ Emma Goldman also suggested a process of creating communism that precluded commercial processes:

To make this a reality will, I believe, be possible only in a society based on voluntary co-operation of productive groups, communities and societies loosely federated together, eventually developing into a free communism, actuated by a solidarity of interests. There can be no freedom in the large sense of the word, no harmonious development, so long as mercenary and commercial considerations play an important part in the determination of personal conduct.³⁷

Kropotkin was particularly adamant about this: ‘The Revolution will be communist; if not, it will be drowned in blood, and have to be begun over again’.³⁸

Some contemporary inheritors of libertarian communism are the relatively small platformist federations, organised around the Anarkismo website, or the anarcho-syndicalist groups affiliated with the International Worker’s Association. There are also insurrectionary communist anarchists who reject the formal organisations of platformists as well as the union form espoused by anarcho-syndicalists. One website, LibCom.org, acts as a hub for libertarian communist ideas. And there are contemporary egoist and individualist communists, some post-left anarchists, and an assortment of individuals and groups who are for the abolition of political economy, but might not refer to themselves as ‘communists’ for a variety of reasons.

LIBERTARIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ANTI-CAPITALISM

‘Libertarian’ is, at the least, a contested term. In much of the Anglo world it has come to be associated with a vicious authoritarianism that leaves capitalism unquestioned, the coercion created by need obscured, and the authoritarianism inherent in privately owned and controlled workplaces naturalised. Nevertheless, the originators of the term ‘libertarian’ intended it to describe a thick anti-authoritarianism. This necessarily put libertarian political economy firmly in the camp of anti-capitalist politics associated with global anarchism, the libertarian wing of the socialist movement.

This leaves scholars of libertarianism the task of finding some common political economic analyses in a diverse set of anti-authoritarian ideas. The libertarian critique of capitalism holds that wage labour is linked to exploitation, where owners rent workers and pay them a portion of what they produce, appropriating the rest in surplus value. This is made possible by a system of private property that allows capitalists to own productive property and homes without using or occupying that property. This leads to a class society, where some work for a living while others simply own, with market relations used for the distribution of goods. These social relationships are protected by the legitimised violence of the state.

But given the depth of the libertarian critique of capitalism, it raises questions about why humanity continues to reproduce such a political economy. Capitalism is legitimised and supported, in part, due to appeals to human nature. This is a way of avoiding any need to justify capitalism—if it is a part of

some inner wellspring of human nature, then no alternative is possible or desirable. This idea is strengthened by the notion that alternatives would never work, or perhaps could never work well. Of course, the ways that capitalism does not serve us well are reminders that, at least under a libertarian lens, capitalism is not a system that ‘works’ in any meaningful sense. And all of these justifications for capitalism are buttressed by the notion that our democratic activity under states balances out the worst excesses of capitalism.

Libertarians have also offered their own suggestions of what a future political economy might look like (or, perhaps in some cases, advocated for the abolition of political economy). Mutualists have argued for a market form of socialism, both as a strategic orientation but also as a vision of some aspects of what a libertarian economy might look like. Collectivists, following the ideas of Bakunin, argue for the social ownership of the means of production, with access to the social product organised around a person’s labour input. Libertarian communists argue for forms of production and distribution modelled after the slogan, ‘From each according to ability. To each according to need’. This can lead to both strategic and visionary debate amongst libertarian communists, as this norm can be interpreted in disparate ways.

Today, in much of the Anglo world, it would likely seem incoherent to talk of libertarian anti-capitalism, but this is a result of historical confusion and a thin application of anti-authoritarian principles. Indeed, a thick anti-authoritarianism necessitates a critique of capitalism. As such, many people use the term ‘anarchism’ to describe the anti-authoritarian wing of the socialist movement. Though, at present, there is not a lively social debate in the Anglo world over the possible meanings of ‘libertarian’, the historical record speaks for itself.

NOTES

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3. J. A. Caporaso and D. P. Levine, *Theories of Political Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1.
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5. Mikhail Bakunin, ‘The Capitalist System’, *Anarchy Archives*, N.D. Retrieved from http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/bakunin/capstate.html.
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7. See D. Shannon, A. Nocella, and J. Asimakopoulos, ‘Anarchist Economics: A Holistic View’, in D. Shannon, A. Nocella, and J. Asimakopoulos (Eds), *The Accumulation of Freedom: Writings on Anarchist Economics* (Oakland: AK Press,

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 11. A. Berkman, *What is Communist Anarchism?* (New York: Dover Books, 1972), 10.
 12. See, for example, <http://mutualist.org> or some modern examples of mutualist theory.
 13. *Ibid.*
 14. Iain McKay, *An Anarchist FAQ: Volume 1* (Oakland: AK Press, 2008), 185.
 15. For example, differences in income; cultural tastes in music, art, food, and so on; in some cases access to empowering work or forms of managerial power.
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 17. E. Goldman, ‘What I Believe’, *The Anarchist Library*, July 19, 1908. Retrieved from <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/emma-goldman-what-i-believe>.
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31. Guillaume, *Ibid.*, 159.
32. See, for example, Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, *Looking Forward: Participatory Economics for the Twenty First Century* (New York: South End Press, 1991); Chris Spannos (Ed), *Real Utopia: Participatory Society for the 21st Century* (Oakland: AK Press, 2008).
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34. E. Malatesta, 'Towards Anarchism', *Marxists*, circa 1930s. Retrieved October 7, 2017, from <https://www.marxists.org/archive/malatesta/1930s/xx/toanarchy.htm>.
35. P. Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread* (Oakland: AK Press, 2008), 195.
36. *Ibid.*, 194–195.
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Tactics: Conceptions of Social Change, Revolution, and Anarchist Organisation

Dana M. Williams

INTRODUCTION

Social movement tactics are all the things that movement participants do to achieve larger goals. In the day-to-day pursuit of goals, tactics fit into the general framework of a movement's strategy. If strategy is the broad organising plans for accomplishing goals, then tactics are the specific actions or techniques through which strategies are implemented.¹ Considered together, multiple tactics compose a protest repertoire²: the temporal, spatial, and cultural patterning of protest tactics into a toolkit of established approaches that movement participants use. Repertoires enable and often limit what people can do, although they do not guarantee any kind of action. Thus, repertoires are probabilistic, not deterministic. All the tactics within anarchist movement repertoires discussed below presumably contribute to the acquisition of anarchist goals and a more anarchistic future. However, anarchist movement tactics do no need to be deployed only by self-conscious anarchists; others can utilise 'anarchistic' tactics which sharply mirror those wielded by anarchists themselves.

Anarchist tactics aim to accomplish two things simultaneously. First, they oppose things that anarchists considered to be bad, such as hierarchy, repression, and inequality. In this respect, tactics serve a diagnostic function that negatively frames societal characteristics with an anarchist analysis. Second, anarchist tactics promote things that anarchists consider to be good, like horizontal relationships, liberation, and egalitarianism. Thus, tactics are also prognostic frames that suggest better, more positive forms of social organisation.

D. M. Williams (✉)

Department of Sociology, California State University, Chico, CA, USA
e-mail: dmwilliams@csuchico.edu

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These two interpretations of anarchist tactics reflect Mikhail Bakunin's oft-quoted adage that 'the passion for destruction is at the same time a creative passion'. Anarchist tactics can literally be destructive: destroying anti-anarchist things and practices. Monkey-wrenching tactics are deployed deliberately to stymie the efforts of authoritarian or unjust institutions. But, the flip-side to this destructive impulse is the emphasis that anarchist tactics place upon creation and the nurturing of community. By designing social organisations that live up to anarchist values or building things for the purpose of expanding the number of pro-anarchist individuals, such as a neighbourhood-based temporary autonomous zone, anarchist tactics are proactive, as well as reactive.

Consequently, there are tactics that serve either revolutionary or evolutionary ends. Revolution is a bold—but not necessarily quick or dramatic—disruption of the status quo, that involves a shift to broadly new and radical lifeways. Often the result of crisis conditions and insurrections, revolution embraces confrontation with the old order, as seen through the emergence and actions of the Russian soviets and Spanish militias. In less momentous times, evolutionary approaches seek the slow modification of cultural values, living differently, and instilling radical traits into the daily practices of everyday people. Evolutionary tactics tend to 'attack' the old social order from behind and patiently, as through innovative alternatives like communes and worker cooperatives.

Anarchist tactics result in two main outcomes (from anarchists' perspectives) that either intervene in the bad or illustrate the good (or both). First, doing something to intervene in hierarchical practices and the daily work-to-live grind that most people experience tends to be imminently practical. For example, a street blockade that attempts to prevent a Nazi march, or delivery trucks from a military depot stand in direct opposition to regular, hierarchical norms. These kinds of anarchist tactics constitute a vanguard approach, acting immediately and without representatives. This intervening approach is often called direct action. Direct action is much broader than a typical barricade, though, as it refers to any immediate attempt to self-manage one's own affairs. Instead of asking other people to act on one's behalf, the philosophy of direct action encourages people themselves to act. Thus, people do the things that are needed, acting either individually or collectively. Direct action can be contrasted against indirect or representative action, which requires going through an intermediary, official, or lobbyist. Thus, as in a story told by Matt Hern, instead of lobbying a local government to install needed speed bumps in a residential street where children regularly play, neighbours could band together and install a speed bump themselves using cement and basic tools.³

The second outcome of anarchist tactics is illustrating a better way to live, particularly in-line with anarchist values. Thus, anarchist tactics have a stark symbolic nature, as with a commune that represents the potential of collective power operating without centralised authority. The illustrative character of anarchist tactics is often called prefiguration. These tactics illustrate the desired future conditions with present-day actions. There is an explicit connection between means and ends; people act in such a way that the desired future is

created, in miniature, in the current moment. This implies that the things anarchists do have dual purpose: they accomplish short-term goals, but also work to create the conditions for long-term goals in the present. Prefiguration means that anarchists advocate using value-appropriate means to pursue value-based goals.

Both intervention and illustrating outcomes may be present within any given anarchist tactic. Ideally, anarchist tactics accomplish both concurrently; thus they have practical effects and are visionary. For example, anarchistic Critical Mass bike rides indirectly monkey-wrench car culture by filling streets with cyclists, but they also illustrate what a bicycle-based transportation system could look like, with all its benefits such as quiet, camaraderie, safety, and health.

The confluence of intervening and illustrating can be found in what was called ‘propaganda by the deed’. Popularly, this refers to late nineteenth-century attempts to assassinate wealthy and powerful individuals, with the goal of igniting revolutionary action. These *attentats* were often, but not always, committed by a variety of individuals who had some connection to anarchist movements.⁴ They constituted ‘propaganda’ in that they delivered a message to anarchists and other working-class people, that anyone can resist dominators, but were embodied in a ‘deed’ that actually resulted in a definitive blow against the powerful. Presumably such an assassination was a blow struck against capitalism and the state. However, most anarchist tactics can be considered propaganda by the deed, not just these rare assassination attempts. For example, present-day actions, such as Food Not Bombs (FNB), are nonviolent propaganda by the deed, wherein the act of recycling discarded food and giving it away to whomever wants or needs it is propaganda in opposition to both militarism and capitalism, and a deed that advocates in favour of, and embodies, mutual aid and a gift economy.

The character of anarchist tactics is determined by anarchist values. Numerous values are imbued in anarchist theory and ideology, which are realised in action. Anti-authoritarianism is a value that emphasises how tactics cannot be owned or restricted—thus, no one person or small group can dictate the selection or execution of a tactic. Horizontalism requires that everyone have equal control over a tactic (insofar as people consent to participation); anarchist tactics aim to level the playing field for everyone, including those not participating in the tactic. Self-management implies that people who are acting ought to be able to determine for themselves how they reach their goals, especially in terms of short-term decisions. Thus, anarchist tactics are not only crafted with such anarchist values in mind but are also created and decided upon via these values, with the ultimate goal of extending such values to the rest of society, in a virus-like fashion where people are inspired to adopt anarchist tactics for themselves.

There are particular issues relevant to how anarchist tactics are used. First, which tactics are selected from an available repertoire? Ideally, tactics should fit the circumstances and match the force of the opponent. Second, who employs the tactics are the very people who selected and directly benefit

from them (i.e., direct action). Lastly, how tactics are deployed depends upon the use of collective expertise, labour, and creativity. Thus, anarchist tactics reflect do-it-yourself principles, wielded by those who selected them, with the resources and tools they have at hand.

The ends served by anarchist tactics can be either offensive or defensive. Broadly speaking, anarchist tactics can be used to attack opponents. By knocking capitalists ‘back on their heels’ via strikes, expropriations, or propaganda by the deed, anarchists are choosing how they engage their opponents and seize opportunities in order to obtain ‘the upper hand’. In protests, anarchists may push into police lines, in order to open up access to march routes that police have blocked-off. One could envision many ways in which anarchist tactics serve as attacks on all sorts of systems of domination (including patriarchy, white supremacy, capitalism, the state, militarism, and others). But, anarchist tactics can also have defensive purposes, too. Sometimes anarchists help people to survive capitalism and state violence, perhaps by squatting abandoned buildings, communal living, or cop-watching. Defensive tactics seek to protect against or evade the control of the above systems of domination.

Finally, anarchist tactics are accomplished via social capital, which involves the interconnections between people, the strength and diversity of those relationships, and the trust embodied in those networks.⁵ Two types of social capital creation include social bonding and social bridging. Tactics that aim to reinforce the supportive bonds that already exist in anarchist communities are called social bonding. The goal here is to reinforce and rededicate people’s concern for each other. This may be done through radical reading groups where anarchists discuss theories, ideas, and history or through parties and picnics wherein people can develop closer friendships through socialising and recreation. Social bridging is accomplished by extending concerns and solidarity to otherwise to non-anarchists or anarchists unconnected to a local anarchist movement. People are brought together in some kind of anarchistic action, like joining a community campaign (like the anti-poll tax movement in the UK) or working with the various ‘plaza’ or ‘square’ movements (such as Occupy Wall Street, the Spanish Indignados, or other encampments). Bridging requires building new connections between people, while bonding is about strengthening existing connections. Sometimes both bonding and bridging happen concurrently, such as with anarchist bookfairs: many individuals are attracted to a common event hosted by local anarchists and anarchistic groups and projects. The people attending share space together, whether they are fellow anarchist activists or curious outsiders who have been invited to visit, explore, and meet local anarchists in a ‘safe’ environment surrounded by books and ideas.

Anarchist tactics also apply to the Leninist concept of dual power. Originally, Vladimir Lenin described dual power as the seizure of power through direct and indirect attack, working within government as well as in counter-institutions. Yet, anarchists modify Lenin’s idea to not *take* state power, but rather to disable it and replace it with creative non-state alternatives. The Industrial Workers of the World union advocated creating a ‘new society in the

shell of the old'. For anarchists, dual power refers to strategic efforts to confront existing state power, while simultaneously creating other organisational systems and institutions that accomplish similar ends, but without resort to hierarchy and domination—a general practice known as prefiguration. Ideally, these alternatives can become powerful and substantial enough to serve as a direct challenge to the dominant institutions. Thus, applied to anarchist tactics, dual power may involve direct blockading of oil pipeline construction, while simultaneously creating alternative energy systems or decentralised, eco-friendly energy-use via permaculture practices. Anarchists might actively protest and try to disrupt the campaigns, elections, and rule of politicians while also nurturing face-to-face democratic practices and organising communal decision-making structures such as workplace councils and neighbourhood general assemblies. They might also take on specific hierarchical organisations and systems such as corporations or capitalism through embracing revolutionary syndicalism and general strikes, which can be paired with the creation of anarchistic, alternative institutions such as worker-run and worker-owned cooperatives (although most mainstream cooperatives may not aim for the destruction of capitalism or the removal of hierarchies).

SOURCES AND CATEGORISATION OF TACTICS

There are few purely anarchist tactics. Anarchists do things that participants of many other movements also do. Consequently, anarchists do not even have the monopoly on tactics that are popularly identified as 'anarchist tactics'. Thus it is debatable whether any of the tactics that are associated with anarchists were created or developed exclusively by anarchists. For example, general strikes were developed in the revolutionary syndicalist milieu—which included many anarchists but also others. Black bloc street tactics were developed by the Autonomist Left in Central Europe, although strongly associated with anarchists and certain Marxists after the 1990s. Thus, anarchists were key advocates and popularisers of many things known as anarchist tactics, but in fact these tactics came from a broader ideological milieu. Moreover, often a tactic is developed in tandem with many different kinds of people or is refined by various groups until anarchists utilise it themselves, such as consensus decision-making in the US, which is an amalgam of Quaker-style meetings, indigenous communalism, and feminist-styled consciousness-raising circles. Tactics authentically become anarchist tactics when used in the context of an anarchist strategy.

The context in which anarchist tactics are used varies. Depending on the challenges faced by anarchist movements, some tactics may be preferred over others. The context is dependent upon whom the tactic is aimed at, and the nature of that interaction. For example, when facing the state, anarchists may assume an armed or unarmed stance. Since the state is always 'armed' or has the capacity and legal capacity for violence, the context is shaped by whether anarchists choose to meet the state on more comparable grounds. When

anarchists assume a more aggressive orientation toward the state, either militant or military tactics may be aimed at the state. Although most anarchist activities do not involve weapons, armed conflict, or combat, a struggle occurs when anarchists engage directly and comparably with violent state actors. If anarchists assume a less aggressive, but still assertive, orientation toward the state, street-based tactics can be deployed. This is most likely in the context of protests or other public events, with the tactics chosen in respect to the police forces present. Or, if anarchists aim to engage non-state actors or potential allies, community-oriented anarchist tactics are often selected. In this instance, enemies may either be absent or everyone is unarmed.

Anarchist tactics vary depending on the era in which they were used. The two main periods of modern anarchist history can be crudely split by the inter-war period. Prior to World War I, the societal context in which anarchism survived was noticeably different than later periods. While this is not a clean delineation, the world wars serve to separate contemporary anarchism from its ‘classical age’, which can be said to have begun with the First International, as anarchists broke free of their Marxist brethren. During this earlier era, anarchist movements were more heavily synonymous with revolutionary workers movements, especially via the tendency eventually known as anarcho-syndicalism. After 1945 and especially after the defeat of the Spanish anarchists in 1939, anarcho-syndicalism became less of a prominent feature of anarchist movements. New anarchist movements prominently featured a wider set of issues and struggles, and an arguably more weakly structured international movement. Thus, anarchism was rejuvenated—especially in the West—as it became an important part of a broader, and largely Marxist, militant New Left in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Consequently, anarchist ideas have permeated many other movements.

CLASSIC TACTICS

During anarchism’s classic age, a variety of military or militant tactics were deployed to engage state forces. Notably, various anarchist militias used decentralised organisational structures during the Spanish Revolution. For example, the Durruti Column and the Iron Column were known for their anti-authoritarian leadership, democratic decision-making, and improvised fighting tactics. Earlier, during the Russian Revolution, Ukrainian anarcho-communists led by Nestor Makhno fought both the reactionary White forces and the Trotsky-led Red Army.⁶ Outside the context of war and battles, violent tactics were also used by some anarchists to ‘decapitate the leadership’ of states and corporations. Thus, some anarchists attempted ‘propaganda by the deed’ or targeted assassinations on a variety of European and North American heads of state, police chiefs, and capitalist robber barons. Anarchists also used incendiary weapons (especially bombs and dynamite) against these adversaries. In such instances, bombs were used to not only attack and destroy the capacity of the state or capitalist adversaries but also to send a threatening message to other

foes of the anarchists (as in the case of the Haymarket bombing of 1886). In the US, the Galleanisti (adherents of Luigi Galleanisti's insurrectionary anarchist philosophy) were responsibly for numerous bombings during the 1910s, including US Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer's house (who coordinated raids that arrested or deported thousands of radicals) and J. P. Morgan's headquarters in New York City's Wall Street.

Anarchists have participated in insurrections and have helped build barricades in places as varied as France, Germany, and Spain to Mexico, Russia, and Argentina. The barricades (dating back many centuries in French history⁷) served to protect insurrectionists in the streets from police, paramilitary, and army attacks, as well as a focal point to concentrate organising energy and socialising the revolutionary spirit. Free-speech 'fights' have involved the use of mass action in streets to challenge attacks on workers' ability (and right) to organise freely and speak in public. In the US, Wobblies flooded into towns, which prevented them from speaking in public gatherings, by the hundreds to fill-up jails in direct challenge of such policies. Those arrested during insurrections and free speech fights have been supported by networks of free anarchists who lobbied, raised funds for legal defence, and kept the morale high for the arrested and imprisoned. The Anarchist Black Cross (originally the 'Red Cross') was organised in support of imprisoned Russian anarchists. Finally, with the appearance of European fascist movements, anarchists (and other Left partisans) formed anti-fascist self-defence units that patrolled working-class neighbourhoods to guard against fascist attacks on Leftists. These militant fighting units refused to accept fascist attempts to intimidate, recruit from, and dominate new territory in Italian and German cities.

Militant tactics also included the sometimes-violent enforcement of labour strikes, in which many anarchists participated. In workplace organising struggles, workers sometimes not only went on strike but also engaged in other antagonistic activities against the workplace owners and managers. These included physical confrontations or fights with such individuals, attacks upon replacement workers (called 'scabs'), blockading of the workplace entrances, occupations, rowdy chanting, and other tactics. In the case of general strikes, anarchists and other workers aimed to get as many workers as possible to go on strike, across all workplaces and industries. This involved traveling around a city or region and encouraging people to go on strike, coordinating the provision of essential resources for people, and confronting police and company-hired strikebreakers and thugs who aimed to end the strike and force workers back to their jobs.

Anarchists were regular participants in labour struggles. Although not always playing formal roles in unions—which many anarchists critiqued for being reformist, anti-immigrant, racist, or authoritarian—anarchists all advocated the overthrow of capitalism. Thus, many saw an important role for working-class people in not only their own liberation but also in the struggle against capitalism and the state. Anarchists helped to organise unions or other working-class organisations, plan and coordinate strikes and other campaigns,

and worked to extend the reach and ideological sophistication of anarchist organisations, often through the creation of revolutionary federations. Since the time of the First International (the popular name for the International Workingmen's Association or IWMA), anarchists worked across nation-state boundaries with fellow radicals for the goal of coordinating agitation, campaigns, and attacks upon capitalism. The St. Imier congress occurred in the wake of the IMWA's 1872 Hague congress wherein Marxists on the General Council expunged anarchists and adherents to Mikhail Bakunin's anti-statist ideas. Later congresses, such as the International Worker's Association (IWA) formed in 1922 aimed to unite various anarcho-syndicalists in a federation that sought anti-statist revolution. These efforts helped to systematise strategies and tactics, debate the next steps agitation should take, share resources, and channel news and propaganda throughout the world.

In revolutionary situations, such as during the Spanish Revolution, general strikes led to the expropriation of factories and workplaces from the capitalist class, giving workers control over their workplaces. These expropriations also extended to peasants seizing land for communal agricultural production from large landed estates and raiding armories for the defence of insurgents—as in the case of Barcelona where weapons were distributed to workers, who then formed militias to defend Catalonia from a military-led attempt aimed at overthrowing the Spanish Republic. These expropriated resources were taken by force from capitalists and the state, re-purposed for proletarian purposes, and self-managed. Ultimately these gains had to be defended against counter-attack by Franco (and Stalin's Popular Front forces), thus requiring the use of the aforementioned expropriated weapons. Expropriation also occurred outside of revolutionary situations, as in some American robberies that the Galleanisti initiated, or Argentinean anarchist robberies in the 1920s.

Various community-building tactics were employed by anarchists of the 'classical era'. Primarily these activities included the deepening and strengthening of the movement's autonomous culture, media production and sharing, and organising to reach out beyond the boundaries of the anarchist sub-culture. Anarchists engaged in cultural activities that had diverse purposes, such as theatre. Stage performances had the purpose of entertaining fellow anarchist comrades and others, as well as illustrating important anarchist values and voicing opposition to authority figures. Nudism was explored in some fringes of anarchist circles, which allowed participants to explore greater personal freedoms in their bodies. Anarchists also hosted picnics and other events that allowed for socialising and the socialisation of committed and neophyte anarchists.

From the initial period of the movement, anarchists were propagandists, journalists, and publishers. Most countries' anarchist movements had multiple working newspapers, journals, or publishing houses, although these often began and folded in quick succession, either due to issues of transience, burn-out, or suppression by authorities. These media projects aimed to share information of relevance to anarchist audiences, those interested but not yet

committed to anarchist ideas, and members of other social groups (like working classes or immigrant populations). The information delivered via these media included news on current events of interest (e.g., wars, labour struggles, political campaigns), anarchist-initiated campaigns and projects, and anarchist analyses and theorising on all manner of issues and subjects. These newspapers ranged from more theoretical to practical, sometimes assumed ideological orientations (e.g., anarcho-syndicalism, illegalism, or individualism), and targeted different audiences (ranging from the general public to smaller groupings of ethnicities in specific languages).

CONTEMPORARY TACTICS

Modern era anarchism has seen less deployment of military tactics, due in part to the lack of anarchistic revolutions and the trend away from modern revolutions generally. Still, numerous anarchist tactics qualify as militant and engage police or other hierarchical institutions directly. The most dramatic tactics used by anarchists have been the deployment of Molotov cocktails (thrown petrol bombs in glass bottles) in street confrontations with police. While anarchists have used these devices in countries such as Mexico, Canada, and Greece, they also have been used by non-anarchists—in fact, state forces and paramilitaries have a long, documented record of using Molotov cocktails, too. Fire-bombings have been initiated by anarchists against non-police targets, like Canada's Direct Action fire-bombing stores that sell violent pornography and a military contractor, and the Earth Liberation Front's arson of suburban home developments and SUV cars sold by auto dealers. These latter instances emphasise not only the practical destruction of their targets but also the anti-authoritarian and anti-domination values that anarchists advocate against those targets, as the ELF issues communiques denounce the environmental devastation caused by sprawl and automobile culture.

Less destructive, but equally militant, tactics continue to be used by anarchists in protest confrontations with police in the streets. One of the tactics most widely associated with post-1990 anarchism is the use of masks to conceal identities. Drawing inspiration from the Zapatistas (who 'hid their faces in order to be seen') and security measures that many non-conformists use, anarchists use masks (often coloured black) to subvert surveillance, generate common solidarity, and to deflect some of the more noxious counter-measures police sometimes use (such as pepper spray and tear gas). German radicals known as 'autonomists' first used an all-black uniform with masks in their support of various squatted buildings in the 1980s. When formed in large groups during a street march, these were referred to as 'black blocs'. Since their German origins, black blocs have formed at protests around the world. The colour black not only deflects stains and dirt but also matches anarchist's symbolic preference for black flags. Black blocs are typically formations in which participants are willing to engage physically with police (whether due to police officers' harassment of people or police curtailment of free movement). Such marches

may be faster moving, more physically hostile toward police, and throw projectiles at police to drive them away from the bloc. This militancy sometimes allow black blocs to achieve their radical tactical objectives more often than less mobile marches that do not challenge police restrictions; but black blocs also face stronger and more violent police efforts to control them. Since militant marches tend to attract the state's wrath, black blocs have a social norm of 'de-arresting' participants who are snatched by police. People who are placed in police custody face legal repercussions that other bloc members do not. Therefore, black bloc members may try to grab physically a comrade who is being detained by police and pull them back into the crowd's mass. If there is a great size differential between bloc participants and police, this job may be easier, as participants can overwhelm police with attempts to liberate an arrestee.

Militant street protests (such as black blocs) may involve targeted property destruction. State and corporate storefronts along roads serve as ideal targets for black blocs, which may smash front windows, deface the building facade, write oppositional graffiti messages on the building, and even ransack its contents if the crowd can gain access. Favourite targets of anarchist black blocs include corporate chain stores, banks, police stations, and military recruiting offices. This property destruction not only causes inconvenience to those institutions and a monetary cost for repair but sends a very clear message about the bloc's opposition to it—people who witness the destruction understand not only anarchists' disapproval of the target but also that anarchists are willing to go to destructive ends to display that disapproval.

Property destruction does not only occur during militant marches. Numerous other groups have acted to destroy inanimate objects, usually those associated with or directly responsible for hierarchy and domination. For example, anarchistic Plowshare and Catholic Worker activists in the US and Europe have regularly broken into military facilities and destroyed warheads, fighter planes, and computer systems with hammers and other tools. In some cases, radical nuns have thrown their own blood on these war machines to symbolise their willingness to make personal sacrifices in order to prevent future bloodshed. Often, but not always, these actors are nonviolent activists who are willing to be arrested. Also, as with the Earth Liberation Front, other radical environmentalists have destroyed machinery that is used to ravish natural habitat, such as bulldozers and logging trucks. Early Earth First! Tactics included tree-spiking to dissuade logging by chainsaw, which could kick-back upon hitting an undetected spike buried in a tree designated for logging. As this could easily also injure the logger, Earth First! eventually moved away from this tactic toward nonviolent actions that would not harm individuals.

Less aggressive (but non-passive) street actions also include blockades and 'disobedient' tactics. For the former, anarchists may 'lock-down' across a street, using chains, 'sleeping-dragons', lock-boxes, or simply by linking arms, thereby blocking traffic or access to a given location. Human blockades like this have been used to try to shut down an entire neighbourhood, prevent access to meetings of heads of states and capitalists (e.g., in Seattle 1999 at the World

Trade Organization conference), or to blockade a railway line, forest road, or other thoroughfare. Blockades also can involve inanimate objects, as with Reclaim the Streets (RTS), wherein a road may be blocked by a derelict automobile or other difficult-to-move object, like a large tripod, while simultaneously being surrounded by a large crowd of people engaged in collective behaviour (such as a dance party in the streets). Moving blockades have included the decentralised bike ride known as Critical Mass (CM) that involves bicyclists (perhaps numbering in the dozens, hundreds, or thousands) biking slowly through a city's streets, thereby slowing-down and sometimes completely blocking the flow of fast-moving automobiles. A movable swarm like CM or a fixed swarm like RTS provides a substantial challenge for police, who must find a way to move a crowd of celebratory, but defiant, individuals.

Disobedient actions during the Global Justice Movement included *Ya Basta!* of Italy and the WOMBLES (White Overalls Movement Building Libertarian Effective Struggles) in the UK. These formations involve activists who wear heavily padded objects (e.g., helmets, knee pads, shin-guards, inflatable tubes, and other items) to protect them from police-administered truncheon blows. Once their physical safety from police violence is guaranteed, a disobedient crowd can be more assertive when around police. They can collectively push through police lines, endure police charges and attacks, and remain in the streets thanks to the protection they are wearing. Such crowds are able to get access to a location where more civil disobedience and blockading can thus occur.

Direct action street tactics also engage with non-police, too. For example, anti-fascist organisations like Anti-Fascist Action, Anti-Racist Action, and Red and Anarchist Skin Heads are prominent in their confrontation of white nationalists. When white nationalists like the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, or racist skin-head gangs try to organise rallies to recruit new members, anti-fascist organisers participate in efforts—commonly called ‘antifa’ actions—to converge large masses of people in opposition. This opposition focuses upon trying to shut-down far-right and other white supremacist rallies, believing that every person recruited and every inch ceded to white supremacists constitutes a threat to freedom. Since the legacy and memory of fascism is particularly strong in countries of Central Europe, antifa anarchists point to a very recent history of unbri-dled fascist power and advocate no tolerance for its current manifestations.

Other public direct action efforts target the social power of everyone from corporate executives, government bureaucrats, reactionary news reporters, and even former progressive activists. For example, using a popular cultural idea of insult via pie-throwing, activists affiliated with the Biotic Baking Brigade aimed to ‘bring down a notch’ the powerful through the same associated with a pie in their face. People as diverse as free-market propertarian theorist Milton Friedman, capitalist Bill Gates, heads of the World Trade Organization, and even former anarchist Daniel Cohn-Bendit have been pied by activists who aim to ‘touch the untouchable’, modifying the public's perception of them as infinitely powerful.

As with their classical predecessors, contemporary anarchists also tend to participate in many activities that are non-street-based and more community-oriented. Often these efforts aim to achieve short-term goals as well as create a pathway toward a longer-term, more anarchistic future. For example, projects like Food Not Bombs (FNB) can be viewed as public demonstrations of anarchist values—against war and hunger, and for community-sharing and peace—as well as survival programmes. FNB helps to provide immediate food for people (in particular, but not exclusively, the homeless) while showing that societies' priorities upon war-making are misplaced. Capitalist excess produces enough food that could keep the world's poor from being hungry, but ownership and the market prevents and limits access to that food. Thus, FNB serves as a rebuke of misplaced priorities and models how to provide mutual aid for each other via 'survival programmes pending revolution' (as the Black Panthers referred to their Free Breakfast programmes). Similarly, German anarchists have been known to converge en masse and raid grocery stores to re-distribute food to those in need.

Cooperatives are organisations created for the purpose of sharing resources, reducing risk for individuals and expanding benefit for collectivities, and encouraging a non-competitive economy. In particular, worker cooperatives help to provide goods and services for local people in an equitable fashion for those who need those things, as well as justly compensating workers. In worker cooperatives, the people who make goods or provide services either own their workplace themselves or control the decision-making apparatus of that workplace, or both. Anarchists view worker cooperatives as organisations that practise direct democracy and worker self-management, and can (but do not necessarily always) challenge capitalist exploitation, as they still tend to function within the capitalist marketplace.

Contemporary anarchists continue the long tradition of revolutionary propaganda initiated by their classic-era peers. However, more media are now available beyond print journalism and public speaking to advocate for the anarchist ideal. Thus, contemporary anarchists utilise a wide variety of formats to advocate for anarchist values, for participation in anarchist movements, and to illustrate anarchist practices. Public propaganda continues to utilise newspapers and magazines, which, while widely available to anarchists, have limited circulation in most societies. With the advent of the Internet, many of these periodicals are accessible for free online, as well as huge archives of earlier anarchist writings. For example, most of the major works of famous anarchist theorists (and propagandists) such as Peter Kropotkin, Errico Malatesta, and Emma Goldman, as well as contemporary writing, are easily attainable through a variety of websites. Anarchists have branched out into radio broadcast, hosting local radio programmes on many stations throughout the world as well as via low-power pirate radio projects. Other anarchist radio projects broadcast online or make their programmes available via online conduits for rebroadcast on traditional radio. Numerous anarchist video projects have taken footage from street demonstrations, community campaigns, and anarchist interviews to

create compelling digital propaganda that can be easily shared. As in the past, many small anarchist presses publish books and pamphlets about the anarchist movement, anarchist ideas, or written by anarchists available to varied readerships. While some of these publishing houses have limited distribution, the Internet has made many of them considerably more accessible than in the past. Informal networks of distributors and tablers (those who provide reading materials from a temporary table) exist, who appear at local community, cultural, and political events, to make these writings available to attendees who might otherwise not search for them.

Less conventional and forbidden efforts have to take the form of guerrilla media. For example, 'billboard improvement' consists of activists who modify the content (whether imagery, words, or both) on a large, unattractive advertisement in order to subvert its intended meaning and direct it toward revolutionary ends. Similarly, graffiti artists and street artists regularly contribute anti-capitalist, anti-state, anti-white supremacist, anti-militarist, anti-imperialist, and anti-patriarchal messages to walls, buildings, and other structures in cities around the world.

Other guerrilla tactics can be found in the ways that anarchists act to utilise unused space. In addition to squatting abandoned buildings, anarchists have dug up both publicly and privately owned land and planted gardens. These newly transformed spaces help to beautify local areas (which may otherwise be blighted) and preserve a sense of local control and agency, as well as provide fresh food for residents.

The organisational structures and decision-making protocols used by anarchists are also key tactical tools. The majority of anarchist projects involving a significant number of participants operate on the basis of either direct democracy or consensus. This means that all participants contribute their ideas and can enact their will within group decisions either through popular, direct voting, or through processes designed to bring a group toward a rough consensus. Anarchists prioritise either leaderless (no one is officially in charge), leaderful (everyone is in charge), or anti-follower (no one is subordinate to anyone else) models. To accomplish this, facilitators often guide a group toward a decision, while being expressly forbidden to contribute and steer the group according to their own designs as an authoritarian leader would. Other roles that groups may use include note-takers who transcribe the decisions of a meeting and vibes-watchers who focus on the emotions and collective mood of the group to recommend possible course changes. Groups may use a variety of tactics to brainstorm and summarise ideas, and ultimately find consensus, without coercion. Participants do not casually block consensus, except in the event where a decision would violate the overall goals or values of the group. In place of consensus, other groups pursue direct democracy. This approach usually involves active participation of all individuals with decisions made via the support of the vast majority. Ideally, a super-majority of people should be in agreement with any decision and a small, dissenting minority should give a group pause.

The organisational configuration best suited to consensus decision-making is the affinity group. These organisations officially date back to militant configurations before and during the Spanish Revolution (similarly styled groups have existed for most of anarchist history, although not always called affinity groups). Affinity groups are family-like units composed of a small number of individuals—usually 5 or more, but less than 20—who share a variety of commonalities. An affinity group may have a common purpose or goal (e.g., to publish a newspaper, support strike picket lines, or provide free food at protests), common background (having a similar political outlook or ideological sub-variant), or simply share a long-term association and friendship. This configuration was reintroduced to anarchist movements in the 1960s as a way of fostering autonomous creativity, collective empowerment, and stable security. Anarchists (and others) who work in affinity groups can direct their own projects or plan events independent of the wider movement around them, thus fostering a flowering of diversity within that movement, while also maintaining the freedom and autonomy desired by anarchists. Affinity groups also aim to build power by being collaborative enterprisers: the members are there to support each other and the group's objectives, to find effective ways of achieving success, and are a tangible way to participate in the broader anarchist movement. Finally, affinity groups are adapted to prevent outside surveillance, particularly by law enforcement and other state agents. They are impervious to outside intrusion because outsiders are prevented from being full-participants and membership often requires long-term trust, something that is difficult and costly for states intent on subversion to invest in.

Organisational forms are dependent upon the strategic choices made by anarchists. A double-pronged strategy has long-existed in anarchist movements, wherein strictly anarchist organisations are combined with mass-based organisations that are not explicitly anarchist. The former organisations are a social place for anarchists to gather and coordinate activities, particularly regarding their role and efforts within the latter organisations, which aim to involve large numbers of people who are not politically committed to anarchism, but are not opposed to acting in anarchist-compatible ways. Working together, these two types of organisations are presumed to influence each other: mass-based organisations are able to accomplish much more social change, while the strictly anarchist organisations provide committed anarchist partisans and the ideological training to operate amongst non-anarchists in the mass-based organisations. A prime example of this strategy can be found in the classic-anarchist era Iberian Anarchist Federation of Spain and its efforts to keep the National Confederation of Labor on an anarchist path toward revolution.

An active community of computer programmers and hackers has existed for decades that both creates free and liberatory software for anyone's use, and provides tools for people to protect themselves against state surveillance and attack. The 'free software' community practices are anarchistic at heart, and have evolved to inspire the creation of online 'tech collectives' (such as

Riseup.net, Mutualaid.org, Squat.net, Sindominio.net, and Resist.ca), real-world computer-sharing spaces called ‘hacklabs’ that allow people to use computers running free software, and political hacktivism. This latter group of hacktivists are people who use computer tools to both defend Internet freedoms and attack state and corporate adversaries using a variety of tactics. Some tactics of defence involve the creation of anonymising networks and protocols like TOR (the onion router) and off-the-record messaging, advocacy and innovation of encryption systems, and actively denying corporations access to activists’ data by refusing to use their systems of storage (instead using the aforementioned tech collectives). Hacktivists’ offensive measures have been varied, but a popular technique has been ‘dedicated denial of service’ attacks that submits thousands of website requests per second, thus overwhelming a target’s webserver, rendering it unusable to actual users.

MEANING AND DIFFUSION OF TACTICS

As with other radical movements, anarchist tactics implicitly *mean* something once manifested. Anarchist tactics embody at least three fundamental things: principled values, collective direct action, and the notion of taking and retaining space. Each of these meanings can be located in the general repertoire of anarchist tactics, but one or multiple meanings may be present in any specific action.

Principled values are latent throughout all anarchist tactics, as they reflect anarchist priorities and ideas. Outsiders can easily witness such tactics and implicitly learn about anarchist values by those actions. For example, Really Really Free Markets—where people give away objects to whomever would like them—reflect both anarcho-communist and gift-economy values. When radical pacifists like the Plowshares or Catholic Worker destroy military weaponry, their anti-militarism is on open display. Similarly, eco-anarchists who engage in the destruction of bulldozers, blockade logging roads, or disrupt pipeline or road construction projects are expressing a concern for the Earth and future generations of life, as well as a willingness to go to jail for their beliefs.

Collective direct action is embodied by anarchist tactics when people seize the moment to create with other people new forms of community, without intermediaries. As opposed to voting, individualistic acts, or lobbying efforts, anarchists aim to use collective strength to create the ends they want. These collectivities could be relatively small (as with an affinity group), may involve a community (perhaps inside a neighbourhood), or consist of a general insurrection that includes large numbers of very diverse people (most of whom are likely not conscious anarchists). For example, unpermitted marches allow people to pick the time and place to flex their collective muscle and voice their grievances. Wildcat strikes enable workers to resist managers and owners in their workplaces, without relying on professionalised or bureaucratic mechanisms such as collective bargaining negotiations or interacting via union leadership. Anarchist street ‘parties’ (e.g., Reclaim the Streets in the 1990s)

allow large numbers of people to feel their collective power in the safer context of a festive atmosphere. And rebellions clearly demonstrate collective power and the efficacy of direct action both to participants and many observers, whether through a riot in response to poverty or police violence, or a declaration of military invasion or political *coup d'état*. In such rebellions, anarchists are participants who help to both educate fellow conspirators on effective tactics and to inspire resistance through example.

Anarchists take and retain space to both embody their values of liberation and justice, as well as to demonstrate the empowerment felt through collective direct action. Anarchist tactics render ideas visible and create community in a physical territory. Such tactics help to provide a space to congregate, disseminate ideas, plan collective action, and practise liberatory social relations (whether through direct democracy or other forms of decision-making). For example, land or building occupations secure a space for movements to use for their own purposes, as with bank occupations in the Argentinean financial crisis of 2001, or the plaza and Occupy movements of 2011–2012 in Greece, Puerto Rico, Wisconsin, New York City, Spain, and elsewhere. The formation of community or neighbourhood assemblies provides people the venue to take control of their localities with their fellow citizens or residents. Political squats have been able to provide a space for people to live, cook, conduct meetings for activist organisations, and provide cultural entertainment for large numbers of people—in particular, social centres in central and southern Europe have played this role, inside of unused, privately owned buildings that activists have squatted in. Likewise, infoshops and radical bookstores are locations of radical information sharing and an epicentre of organising activities in local communities. Finally, militant protests can themselves liberate streets for participants to create community, empower individual action, and re-envision and resist the hegemonic ways that space is typically used by private and government actors.

Regardless of meaning, anarchist tactics can be spread, across time and location, in a variety of ways. However, as no central coordinating anarchist organisation exists to require one group of anarchists to adopt a particular repertoire of tactics, tactical diffusion occurs horizontally and is decentralised. There are no 'legitimate' anarchist tactics or official standards to compare anarchist tactics against, so all individual anarchists and organisations tend to utilise tactics because they believe them to be effective, suitable for the situation, and embody anarchist values.

Even though diffusion occurs horizontally and through decentralisation, there is much commonality in anarchist tactics across time and space. Anarchist tactics and organisations often have numerous similarities, despite there being no effort to coordinate such similarities. These similarities can be seen within organisational directories, like the Anarchist Yellow Pages, which listed many entries for Anti-Racist Action or Anti-Fascist Action, Critical Mass, Earth First!, Food Not Bombs, and Independent Media Center. In each instance, multiple organisations exist, across the planet, which have similar (if not identical) values and practices at the local level. While these organisations often network with

each other, no top-down umbrella organisation exists. These anarchistic franchise organisations are not necessarily composed totally of anarchists, although each organisation behaves anarchistically and has anarchist values. It is a ‘franchise’ because it spreads through copying and mimicry—but, unlike many other franchise organisations, there is no headquarters that approves of new organisations or coordinates its activities.⁸

Anarchist organisations and tactics diffuse through numerous avenues. The simplest method of diffusion is for people who have participated in certain kinds of organisations or used certain tactics to re-use them in different times, places, and with other groups of people. If someone is not able to re-create an organisation or tactics because they have not participated in it themselves, they can borrow ideas from people they know who have. This presumes a social network of anarchists who share stories and analysis of their experiences, reflecting upon the efficacy, efficiency, practicality, and successes and failures of their efforts. Unlike with people who have themselves participated in such tactics, emulating the actions of friends and comrades assumes trust for their interpretations and understandings of what they witnessed, as well as the ability to translate it to local conditions. More distantly, anarchists can work from stories and ideas they witness in mainstream media—this is most reasonable in areas where anarchists have been excluded or isolated from others, especially in the pre-Internet days. Mainstream media has the tendency to foster weird interpretations of social movements (especially radical movements such as anarchism), to report on them incompletely or inaccurately, and to water-down the results of those tactical deployments. A stronger source for manifesting a media interpretation of anarchist tactics is activist media. If anarchists are connected to specialised media outlets (whether print, video, web, or others), they receive less-filtered analysis of anarchist tactical choices, experiences, and results.

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Anarchism and Cosmopolitanism

Carl Levy

INTRODUCTION: THE TWO FACES OF COSMOPOLITANISM

The concept of cosmopolitanism has always been Janus-faced. While the term was coined and brought into use by the Cynics and Stoics, the definition of cosmopolitanism has spanned a wide gamut of meanings and intentions. The better known variety is in fact in direct opposition to the theory and practice of anarchism. The Alexandrine, Roman and British imperial traditions had very little to do with the anarchic cosmopolitanism of Diogenes of Sinope, the wandering, homeless philosopher who ordered Alexander the Great to move as he was blocking his sunlight. Or for that matter with Zeno, the *metic* (an outcast of Phoenician or Semitic background), whose *Republic* described a ‘city in the sky’, the cosmopolis, which was a boundary-less city where laws and compulsion had ceased to be.¹ For Augustus or Benjamin Disraeli, the Empire wore the benevolent mask of cosmopolitanism in which a variety of cultures could flourish under the hegemony of imperial law and administration, governed at the metropolitan centre by selfless administrators ruling through a universal morality informed by restrained human passions of Stoical provenance, which had formed their educations and personalities and which thus ensured that local rivalries would be managed sensibly with all the citizens and subjects of the Empire granted justice. In a more flamboyant, indeed crasser manner, the putative American Century after 1945 and the rebooted American ‘hyper-power’ of the 1990s also proclaimed the selfless duties of the world hegemon, the so-called indispensable power, the guardian of human rights and the purveyor of humanitarian interventions in a world where ‘history had ended’ and politics revolved around the technicalities, which liberalism could not settle

C. Levy (✉)

Department of Politics and International Relations, Goldsmiths,
University of London, London, UK
e-mail: c.levy@gold.ac.uk

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immediately. Needless to say, as Noam Chomsky of the anarchist tradition has shown, this was bound up with a high quotient of hypocrisy and self-interest.²

From the perspective of civil society, cosmopolitanism since 1945 and/or the end of *that* Cold War (we may be in a new one), has also been associated with, on the one hand, the ideology of the 'frequent flyer class' who, lived off and administered the process of capitalist globalisation, and on the other, the alternative globalisers who pursued them in increasingly ritualised confrontations at meetings of the WTO, the World Bank, the G7/8/20 nations or Davos-like gatherings.³ Indeed it could be argued that the contestation over the meaning of cosmopolitanism has become a central cleavage in the national and international body politic since 1989. This wider cleavage posited the winners against the losers of globalisation, and undermined traditional social democratic parties in the Global North, in which rust belt and anti-immigrant narratives were used to potent effect by national populist parties.⁴ Another cleavage occurred in the Global Justice Movement itself over its meaning and the nature of its constituencies and their representatives and leadership. Thus the Global Justice Movement was a rather shaky coalition of activists from the Global North, which spanned anarchists to centrist trade unionists and manifested strengths (Seattle 1999) and tensions (World Social Forums) because of this. On another plane, despite the differences in the role, numbers and representativeness between the fissiparous Northern coalition and the Zapatistas, Latin American social movements, peasant and trade unions of the Indian subcontinent and the radical governments (Venezuela, Bolivia, etc.) in Latin America, from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, real pressure was placed on the WTO, the World Bank and unbridled neo-liberal globalisation.⁵

Since 2007–2008, this cleavage line has shifted, and this shift had been anticipated by the growth of nationalist populism in the Global North's 'rust belts' since the 1990s. Since the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the dawn of the so-called Age of Austerity, the latent cleavage between the winners and losers of globalisation in the Global North has been revealed. This is a different cleavage than the one manifested between the Global Justice Movement in the North and their on-off trade union allies, but has a similar class valence to it.

Paolo Gerbaudo has described the series of Occupy-like movements and the growth of left and right populism as a struggle between 'The Mask' (of small 'A' anarchism) and 'The Flag' (of local, regional and national patriotisms). National and local patriotism was present in the Arab Spring from the beginning and arguably also present in Occupy Wall Street and elsewhere in the metropolitan centres of the Global North (the upsurge of Catalan nationalism and SYRIZA's national-popular message, being two other examples). Thus the cleavage between the cosmopolitan 'Mask' and the national-popular 'Flag' runs right through the Occupy and anti-austerity movements of the past decade. It is but the newest version of a dilemma, which anarchists and the cosmopolitan left has confronted over centuries.⁶

It is usually argued that classical anarchism and its syndicalist cousins were undermined, disoriented and ultimately marginalised due to the dual effects of 1914 ('The Flag': national identification, World War (s)), and of 1917, an

alternative authoritarian radical ‘Mask’ (the Bolshevik Revolution and the Marxist-Leninist model). In short, national identity and Communist internationalism were the two forces which dissolved the global presence of anarchist and syndicalist forms of cosmopolitanism during the ‘short-twentieth century’ (1914–1991). In the twenty-first century, the dilemmas faced by the cosmopolitan anarchists and syndicalists of the first decades of the twentieth have returned in a new but not unfamiliar guise.⁷ Furthermore, as I have suggested, the meaning of these Occupy-style movements and the previous Global Justice Movement posed different profiles depending on the participation of organised trade unionists, the urban poor, people of colour and indebted, largely white, lower and middle-class youngsters, North and South. Thus the themes posed in this chapter transcend the interests of historians and the systems building and classification quests of social scientists and political philosophers. The themes of this chapter go to the heart of our condition in the early twenty-first century.

This chapter uses a methodological cosmopolitanism to trace the complex and indeed tortured relationship of cosmopolitanism and anarchism.⁸ In so doing it also casts light on the constant debate about the periodisation of anarchism, since the concept of cosmopolitanism is shared by the ‘pre-anarchist’ libertarian impulse before the ‘ism’ was formulated in the nineteenth century, the phase of classical anarchism (1840s to 1940s), and the new anarchism(s) of the post-1945 epoch. This chapter illuminates the usages of cosmopolitanism in the recent surge of anarchist historiography, as well as anarchist-inspired theoretical work in the disciplines of International Relations (IR), Political Science and the interface of modernism and post-modernism. Finally the politics of space, language and community, an aspect of the scalar dimension, and its impact on notions of national identity and local patriotism, conclude this chapter. Thus I suggest that the encounter of cosmopolitanism with anarchism can cast light upon our present condition and politics, but it can equally serve as a methodological tool for understanding how we got here.

ANARCHIST COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERNITY

Peter Kropotkin noted that the road to the modern state was not preordained and should not be equated with a happy march from the darkness to sunlight uplands of modern statist progress.⁹ If we look in the Muslim world, for example, an anti-cosmopolitan fundamentalist narrative of the origins of the *umma* can be counter-posed by the work of the classical thinker Ibn Khaldun, the cosmopolitan cities of *al Andalus* (Andalusia) under the Cordoba Umayyads or the trade exchanges of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal Empires.¹⁰ The endpoint is not the modern state¹¹: and if we look at another case, modernity in Europe was promoted by transnational Christian orders, confraternities, guilds and the Republic of Letters.¹² Even the inherent brutality of the instrumental rationality of the Enlightenment, the target of the Frankfurt School, post-modernists and post-colonial thinkers, can be read in a

different light through the humanist and open-ended cosmopolitanism of the Radical Enlightenment of democratic rationalism, secularism or atheism associated with Spinozism and other subterranean traditions. Indeed, during the Early Modern Period, Spinoza was named the new Stoic and compared with the antinomian cosmopolitan, Zeno.¹³ Even if commercial cosmopolitanism in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century can be allied with the horrors of the international slave trade and settler imperialism in the New World, Africa and Australasia, there is also an alternative reading pointing to pirate confederacies, maroon settlements and radical organisations of artisans and workers, and an alternative, radical reading of Adam Smith, John Locke and David Ricardo from which anarchism and indeed Marxism drew their original impulses.¹⁴ Thus there was a trans-Atlantic counter-blast to slave fortresses and the plantation system in a systematic dispersal of the radical cosmopolitan politics of Mary Wollstonecraft, Tom Paine, William Godwin and Anacharsis Cloots ('the orator for the human race'), who fought both aristocratic reaction and the restrictive nationalism of the French Jacobinism of Robespierre.¹⁵

The waves of social radicalism which have flowed around the globe since 1848 (the pre-1914 syndicalist upsurge, the era of council communist and factory militancy *and* the Bolshevik Revolution (1917–1924), '1968', '1989' (in a different key) and indeed '2011–2013') have been informed by a cosmopolitan sensibility which was allied to a libertarian spirit, direct action and at times conscious anarchism.¹⁶ If we stop here and consider the period of 'classical anarchism', where large 'A' anarchism was most manifest, the attempt to understand anarchism in the form of national case studies has been superseded by a series of individual and collective enterprises which chart anarchism as a global network in which the first instincts of a cosmopolitan world order and sensibility are foremost in the research agendas of historians and social scientists.¹⁷ The signal event which established anarchism on the political map and became the lodestone of the anti-authoritarian wing of the First International, and assumed pride of place in the calendar of the Left, and especially the anarchist left until 1917, was the Paris Commune of 1871. Recent accounts of the Commune have stressed the role of women and foreigners in Paris: the Commune was an unabashedly cosmopolitan event which renounced the centralised French state and identified itself as part of a broader federated cosmopolitan order where exiles and immigrants in Paris played an oversized role in the proceedings.¹⁸ Davide Turcato and Travis Tomchuk have re-imagined the history of Italian anarchism not as a peninsular-bound affair but a global movement of migrants from the 'boot' and its islands.¹⁹ Other studies have traced the movements of Spanish/Argentine anarchists between Spain and Argentina from the 1890s to the 1940s,²⁰ the interchange of Japanese, Korean and Chinese anarchists across the great cities of East Asia²¹ or the various permutations of anarchism and syndicalism between Cuba, Florida, Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone.²² One of the most recent studies uses the global dimension to understand the history of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) during its heyday in the first two decades of the twentieth century and an earlier collective study

focussed more broadly on wider globally situated syndicalist movements up to and beyond the 1940s.²³

Thus the exilic networks, great port cities and the spread of networked movements of anarchists and syndicalists, who operated within a global framework and therefore mimicked, in an antinomian fashion, the flow of capital and attendant imperial networks, have given rise to studies of the ‘anarchist’ Atlantic, Pacific and Mediterranean.²⁴ Network analysis informed by cosmopolitanism is perhaps at its most intriguing in recent studies which focus on liminal port cities such as New York and its environs,²⁵ San Francisco,²⁶ Los Angeles/San Diego/the borderlands,²⁷ various cities and towns in Peru²⁸ and Chile,²⁹ and London,³⁰ where exiled, home and cosmopolitan networked anarchists and syndicalists lived in close proximity and collaboration. The biographies of José Rizal,³¹ Errico Malatesta,³² Louise Michel³³ and Emma Goldman,³⁴ to name just four examples, are only understood using this method. The same cosmopolitan sensibility has informed new histories of art in which artistic spaces and art markets are located in the bohemia of this fluid world: the histories of Post-Impressionism, Cubism, Futurism and Dadaism, and for that matter the complicated and at times fraught Orientalist exchanges between radical artists of the Global North and South, can only be understood using local and global network analysis of London’s Fitzrovia, New York’s Greenwich Village or Paris’s Montmartre.³⁵ A methodological anarchist cosmopolitanism not only undermines state-centric case studies of a movement dedicated to the abolition of states but has deconstructed and de-provincialised the Eurocentrism of a historiography without falling into an essentialising identity politics, in short embracing a methodology advanced by Paul Gilroy whose work on the Black Atlantic has been superseded by what he terms ‘planetary humanism’,³⁶ a form of post-race thinking and akin to the Latin American theorist Walter D. Mignolo’s ‘worldly culture’, which seeks to avoid the trap of hegemonic Northern modernism by endorsing the liminality of ‘border thinking’, transcending national borders and Northern historical narratives.³⁷ Gilroy and Mignolo hail from a Marxist heritage but, their first principles, seem to be closer to Élisée Reclus than Lenin or Mao.³⁸

The rise of the modern state system of international ‘anarchy’ has always been accompanied by a shadow system, which appears and then disappears between brief reversals of the established order, identified in waves of anti-state and boundary defying reshufflings and challenges to the powers who rule the Earth. These cycles have not gone unnoticed by the doyen of World Systems theory, Immanuel Wallerstein, who was even invoked by the champion of the last wave (2011–2013), David Graeber.³⁹ Nor has this ‘secret history’ been ignored by the anarchist-learning novelist Thomas Pynchon whose 2006 novel, *Against the Day*, is a transnational novel tracing pre-1914 cosmopolitan anarchism (Wobblies, bombers, anarchist communities) immersed in world of plutocratic imperialist geopolitics. Indeed he suggests that this is an alternative take on the lead-up to the First World War in which these cosmopolitan forces are an alternative to geopolitics and nationalism.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, the interna-

tional historian Jeremi Suri, in more sober academic attire, argues that the Great Power détente of the late 1960s and early 1970s arose not only from the nuclear stalemate or the debilitating effects of the Vietnam War but within the background of social radicalism endemic in global civil society (anticipating, I would argue, the cosmopolitan radicalism of the movement of movements of the post-Cold War era), which threatened the stability of élites East and West and threatened to spiral into a series of events which had to be managed from above so as to restore more predictable state-to-state International Relations, in much the same fashion that order was restored by the Great Powers after 1848–1849.⁴¹ This naturally leads us on to the complex and entangled discussions of the world system and world politics and demonstrations of how this ‘anarchist/cosmopolitan turn’ has affected the most interesting debates in International Relations, International Political Theory and Political Economy in the twenty-first century.

THE ANARCHIST COSMOPOLITAN TURN AND WORLD POLITICS

An anarchist approach to cosmopolitanism can fruitfully be applied to the variety of approaches, which have flourished in political theory, sociology and history since the end of the Cold War. First let us examine the revival of the Kantian project. It would seem that there is little in common between anarchism and the Kantian approach. Of course it is true that Kant did not envisage a world-state or world federation in the manner that Daniele Archibugi has proposed.⁴² Indeed, a world-state would have been a failure of cosmopolitanism in the eyes of Immanuel Kant. Other recent attempts try to come closer to Kant’s legacy but also might have some similarities to an anarchist cosmopolitan approach. Thus Mervyn Frost has proposed a framework of ‘two anarchies’ in which sovereign states and a robust global civil society achieve a fruitful equilibrium, since the dictatorship of a state-centric international society (the so-called ‘anarchy’ treasured by the International Relations community) would at least be lessened and anarchists might be appreciative of the space and opportunities granted to non-state pluralism.⁴³ As Todd May has argued, whereas anarchists would resist world government, they would not disapprove of world governance. Governance can happen from the bottom-up through horizontal networks which take into account the rights and needs of individuals.⁴⁴ Jonathan Havercroft and Alex Prichard have recently suggested international anarchy ‘as a self-help system would give way, to a more democratic conceptualisation of an ordered international system that lacks a central orderer’.⁴⁵ In a similar manner, using the concept of freedom as non-domination found in republicanism, Cécile Laborde and Miriam Ronzoni argue that globalisation creates new dimensions of unchecked power, which allow states and non-state actors fresh opportunities for domination, and they call for a new balance of powers, from their republican internationalist position, which would result in ‘the mutual non-domination of all polities’.⁴⁶ This form of mutual non-domination of all polities, through a reciprocal balance founded on jus-

tice, is not far from certain strands of anarchism, albeit the importance of the state in Laborde and Ronzoni's argument would be an anathema to anarchists themselves. Yet Alex Prichard has shown that, unlike most other nationalist radicals of the nineteenth century, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon endorsed the seemingly status quo concept of the balance of power because its destabilisation through the rise of a united Poland, for example, would lead to world war and yet deeper forms of regressive chauvinistic nationalism and thus undermine the solidarity of the working classes across national borders.⁴⁷

The hidden agendas of mainstream Kantian cosmopolitanism have also been mapped out by anarchist and radical critics. Unorthodox radical Costas Douzinas and anarchist Noam Chomsky both emphasise its state-centric first premises, namely the regimes of human rights laws, refugee rights and courts with global jurisdictions, loaded in the favour of the hegemonic powers.⁴⁸ At present, of course, the putative US hegemon is guided by a Trump regime that is suspicious of the enterprise (the fear of 'globalists') but for very different reasons than critics on the alternative globalisation Left.⁴⁹ Perhaps the Kantian phase is being discarded for earlier policies which found favour in the mid-twentieth century of Fascist and Imperial geopolitics. But here, too, the anarchist or anarchist-influenced analysis was in the forefront.

Two contemporaries who lived in the age of totalitarian regimes, George Orwell and C. Wright Mills, warned precisely of the dangers of domination of the world by friend/enemy super-states. Orwell (a veteran of Barcelona's May Days in 1937, an anti-Stalinist socialist of anarchist inclination) gives us an imaginative portrayal of a dystopian international society in the year 1984, divided into Eurasia, Eastasia and Oceania, which engage in a series of inconclusive wars to mobilise their populations under similarly structured elites and ideologies.⁵⁰ Later Wright Mills, who was attracted to the legacy of the IWW, adapted the concept of bureaucratic collectivism and allied it to the nuclear tensions of the 1950s Cold War.⁵¹ Thus the origins of a possible Third World War, he argued in a passionate pamphlet, could be found in two mirror-image global military industrial complexes who might not keep their wars limited to inconclusive, if bloody pantomimes, as in Orwell's novel. More recently, and in a similar vein, Rob Walker has warned against super global sovereignty or the possibility of a future consortium of superpowers exercising a type of shared global sovereignty. But more focussed, conscious and consistent usages of the anarchist legacy, in short bringing anarchism into the debate in International Relations about 'anarchy', were pioneered by Richard Falk and others, and for the past decade, have been driven forward by Prichard.⁵²

One of the aims of Prichard and others is to demystify the totemic usages of 'anarchy' in IR, which recently Havercroft and Prichard have compared to the 'common sense' first premises of the dominant political economy of neo-liberalism. 'Anarchy' between states, the mainstream argument maintains, is inescapable: states exist in a lawless domain of egoism and self-interest and 'progress was defined by how far we move from it in philosophical-historical

time'.⁵³ Such a world view found in political economy, economics or IR denies the existence of self-organising systems of social life which rely on principles of reciprocity and mutual aid.⁵⁴ It therefore comes as no surprise that one of the few earlier efforts to break out of IR parochialism was launched by a joint project of Robert Keohane and Elinor Ostrom, the latter an interesting scholar who bridged the worlds of voluntary cooperation and the commons with the so-called laws of the free marketplace.⁵⁵ In fact IR's usage of the term 'Hobbesian International Anarchy' may be a distortion of what Hobbes meant and an incorrect juxtaposition of Hobbes's description of the behaviour of individuals in certain circumstances, to how a state will or should behave on the global plane. In this manner the first assumptions of IR, the prevalence of 'anarchy' in the global arena, can be challenged by using methodological anarchism and more directly the ideology known as anarchism.⁵⁶ Prichard has pointed to David Held's work on cosmopolitan world politics and compares this project to a Proudhonian approach, since both opt for multi-level and federal solutions.⁵⁷

It is certainly the case that a 'methodological anarchism' has brought fresh insight into the debates over the nature of the international system under both the Westphalian and post-Westphalian orders and indeed posits a good deal of scepticism about the neat schematic quality of both or indeed the very existence of the Westphalian system in the first place.⁵⁸ The debate which raged (particularly in the 1990s and 2000s) over the extent to which globalisation and mainstream cosmopolitan politics were forms of neo-medievalism are viewed in a fresh light by invoking an anarchist stance.⁵⁹ Even regional integration, especially European integration, has connections to the Proudhonian legacy. An intellectual history of the European project, especially the centrality of functionalism, would be remiss to forget that Harold Laski and David Mitrany both read Proudhon carefully.⁶⁰ But equally Falk and Prichard have pointed out the similarities between the civil society forms of cosmopolitanism and the Proudhonian legacy, the type endorsed by the critical supporters on the Left in the beleaguered European Union, in the shared attributes of cooperation, non-violence, community, small-scale organisation and local solutions.⁶¹ I will now turn to the similarities and differences between anarchist cosmopolitanism and post-modern thought.

POST-MODERNISM, POST-ANARCHISM, LIBERTARIAN SOCIALISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM

Post-modernist cosmopolitanism in the later works of Jacques Derrida is very close to the anarchist tradition, especially his concept of the New International in which the uniqueness of the individual is placed in dynamic tension with the need for global collective action.⁶² Thus Derridean-type projects of 'cities of refuge' for global migrants in their libertarian and statist-political incarnations, and more directly the practice of the No-Borders campaigners, who are small 'A' anarchists,⁶³ bring to mind and expand in a unprecedented manner earlier

attempts in the immediate post-1945 era by anarchists and pacifists to refuse to recognise national borders, by employing passive resistance at national frontiers and in refusing to use passports when travelling.⁶⁴ Recently, activists and thinkers have taken Hannah Arendt's slogan of the 'right to have rights' out of its republican context and applied it to the No-Borders movement, something it should be added, Arendt would have opposed.⁶⁵ John Lechte and Saul Newman have sought to counterpose Arendt's plea with Giorgio Agamben's meditations on the 'bare life' of the stateless refugee, asking whether the crisis in the state-based systems which administer forced migration, can only be repaired if we think beyond an international society of states and a domestic society of citizens, and another separate group of disempowered human beings.⁶⁶ On a practical level, a former high-flying British diplomat, Carne Ross, has initiated an NGO of former diplomats who work for a grassroots diplomacy of global civil society.⁶⁷ There have also been attempts to meld the two camps (Arendtian Libertarian Republicanism with the new cosmopolitanism) in the work of Bonnie Honig,⁶⁸ who would like to promote a form of agonistic cosmopolitics and Andrew Dobson's rather similar notion of 'thick cosmopolitanism',⁶⁹ both of which endorse world-building projects but not to the extent that they undermine locally controlled institutions, even the democratic state: one might say a diluted version of Proudhonian federalism.

Other cosmopolitanism projects on the post-modern or post-workerist Left are harder to assimilate into the anarchist tradition. In series of widely read works, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri⁷⁰ sought to posit Empire against the Multitude, but it is unclear if this is merely a recycling of Marx's take on the rise of global capitalism harnessed to the search for a new agent, 'the Multitude', once the traditional proletariat had failed its 'historic' task.⁷¹ It is hard to understand if Leninism has been squeezed out of their scenarios or merely re-enters in new garb.⁷² Indeed there are many Marxists who would argue that they have forgotten that the workshop of the world has merely moved from Manchester to the east coast of Leninist-Capitalist China. Recently, the unorthodox Marxist geographer David Harvey has suggested the recovery of capitalism after the crisis of 2007–2008 was a joint project of Chinese Keynesian demand management resulting in the building of myriad airports and high-speed trains in China and unsustainable levels of debt, and the near zero interest rate/quantitative easing regimes of Western financialised zombie capitalism.⁷³

But it is Saul Newman's elaboration of the neologism, 'post-anarchism', which has most consistently drawn the connections between classical anarchism and post-modern thought and related arguments found in the fields of cosmopolitan and globalisation studies.⁷⁴ Here is not the occasion to engage in a long discussion of his ideas, which in any case can be found elsewhere in this volume. Newman argues that post-anarchism is a post-modernist take on classical anarchism purged of its scientific and positivist encrustations through a course of post-modernist medicine. He also argues that whereas much of what he takes to be the classical anarchist canon needs this remedy, Max Stirner and to a degree Mikhail Bakunin, anticipated the key concepts of Foucault, Deleuze

and others. For Newman, the Zapatistas, the Global Justice Movement and the movements of the square and Occupy, the *sans-papiers* and the previously mentioned cities and camps of refuge are practical manifestations of post-anarchist cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, Newman also has deployed the term anarchy against its purveyors of realism in International Relations studies to defend his post-foundationalist, post-anarchism in a curious operation in which he employs Carl Schmitt, the purveyor of Nazi geopolitics, as a foil to expose the hypocrisies of the current global order.⁷⁵ For Newman, post-foundationalism undermines the hegemonic certainties, indeed platitudes, found in IR.

COSMOPOLITANISM, ANARCHISM, ETHNICITY AND PATRIOTISM

The cosmopolitanism of the anarchist movement during the heyday of ‘classical anarchism’ was not unproblematic. In the studies cited above, the melding of various exilic, economic, intellectual and artistic networks was unstable and boundaries between networks were not absent. Language groups or groups of kindred languages therefore offered threats and opportunities for political practice. Studies which investigate the spread of anarchism and syndicalism in Latin America and the Caribbean stress that Spanish was the lingua franca, and if we look more closely at the spread of anarchism in Brazil or Argentina, we will find a language kinship between Spanish, Portuguese and Italian. It may be true that the IWW spread its methods and creeds via a group of nomadic and cosmopolitan worker migrants and particularly maritime workers, but within these episodes, we witness a series of stories that align with language groups: thus the spread of syndicalist ideas in the British Isles (including Ireland), the USA, Canada, South Africa and Australasia was facilitated by an ‘antinomian Anglosphere’. The previously cited study by Turcato or other studies of the Italian anarchist movement as a global movement, with interchanges with others, still can only be understood to a large extent as global movement living through the Italian language.⁷⁶ Indeed it was merely another example of how the concept of ‘Italy’ as a unified unit of understanding, and Italian as a received language of exchange, erased previous local dialects, or some would argue, the separate Romance languages of the migrants and their parents.⁷⁷

Thus language communities aligned to ethnicities or shared cultures forced the issue of boundaries back into the anarchist and cosmopolitan networked world. One of the most telling case studies is the Yiddish-speaking communities of Jewish anarchists and syndicalists who thrived in the ‘Yiddishland’ of East-Central Europe and the Czarist Empire, as well as in the cosmopolitan world cities of London, Paris, New York and Buenos Aires.⁷⁸ This does not lack a certain pathos, given the fact that the Jews became the targeted ‘enemies of the people’, the ‘rootless cosmopolitans’ of the Nazi and late Stalinist regimes. The question of whether the Jews were a people, ethnicity or a religion was inherently interesting in an era of nation-state formation, but once we place this question in the context of other language-family based anarchist networks, a number of cross-cutting connections and problems can be detected. In terms of the history of cosmopolitanism, the Jewish anarchist communities are in

some respects unique, and rather similar to other case studies; a fully functional and dynamic community of Jewish anarchists was tied to a specific form of Yiddish radicalism, which died when the Yiddish language was no longer spoken.⁷⁹ It should also be recalled that during the heyday of this movement in New York, London or Paris, young anarchist militants cut their teeth first in the language community's institutions. Famously, Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, before they mastered English, were politicised in the Yiddish- and also German-speaking anarchist milieu but only later in life assimilated into English-speaking movements in the USA. Indeed in their case, when they were forced to live exilic lives in Russia, France, the UK and Canada, they felt bereft of the customs and cadences of the USA.⁸⁰ Even if some of the newspapers of the Yiddish anarchist movement in New York and elsewhere had long-term afterlives, the movement was undermined by the assimilation of later generations of host-language speaking children who moved away from identifiable Jewish ghettos in London or New York to the suburbs. Communism, Zionism (Modern Hebrew) and even a return to Orthodoxy undercut these previously dynamic movements.⁸¹ So how do we assess the linkage between language, nation and state for these anarchist cosmopolitan movements? Those associated with the Yiddish and Jewish anarchists in the early twentieth century addressed this issue in interesting and multifarious ways.

Gustav Landauer was a German Jew, very much assimilated into German culture but with a sensitive ear to Yiddishland and Jewish Orthodoxy. He defined himself as South German, German, Jew and indefinable 'I'. In many respects, just as Newman claimed that Stirner anticipated post-modern thought, so too did Landauer. Thus Landauer combined strands of Stirner and Nietzsche and formulated his thoughts with a shockingly modern tone. Like Foucault, he sought to fight his 'inner statist' and like the French theorist, he too argued that the real source of power is micro-power. He advocated an anarchist politics based on the spirituality of the community which was decidedly different from Foucault and the other master thinkers of post-modernism. If 'the state' resided in our inner selves, this illusion which enslaved us had to be contested so that the foundations of a liberated community could be forged; nevertheless, the 'folk' was not a mythical illusion; the folk brought hope and life. But Landauer read Herder in a very different manner than many Germans; his concept of the *Volk* was not related to racial hierarchies. So Landauer sought a synthesis in which the uniqueness of each culture was preserved but the final goal, a libertarian cosmopolitan politics, would flourish because it would not be built on artificial and arid foundations.⁸² Although he embraced a form of spiritual Zionism which included the new community which would be a source of inspiration for the kibbutz,⁸³ his Zionism did not involve the actual settlement of Palestine. For Landauer the Jewish people were the least attracted to the idea of the state and therefore they could construct these communities outside of its structure, even outside a Jewish state located in a given physical location.⁸⁴ So in many regards, Landauer foreshadows a form of libertarian cosmopolitanism which does not completely dismiss the arguments of present-day communitarians such as David Miller⁸⁵ and has affinities with those advocates of new forms

of regionalism which are neither subordinated to a powerful centralised state nor force various cultures to lose their distinctiveness in overarching larger structures. One can therefore point to the similarities in the arguments of those who advocate a Europe of regions (which of course is also Proudhonian)⁸⁶ or the communal experiment in Northern Syria, in Rojava, where some Kurdish nationalists have sought to create in multi-communal confederal polity, in part inspired by the Libertarian Municipalism of Murray Bookchin.⁸⁷

Another thinker and activist who was a contemporary of Landauer and addressed similar issues was Rudolf Rocker. Rocker was a German gentile who became the charismatic leader of the thriving community of London's East End Jewish anarchists before 1914. In many respects Rocker's position was akin to the Austro-Marxists who also grappled with the issue of nation-state-class in the multi-ethnic and confessional Austro-Hungarian Empire.⁸⁸ Unlike Landauer, Rocker was a child of the Enlightenment; he had little time for Stirner and was a firm rationalist. Unlike Landauer who was attracted to the *völkisch* Herder, Rocker's was attracted to the rationalist cosmopolitan, Wilhelm von Humboldt, an enthusiasm shared by Noam Chomsky,⁸⁹ albeit Rocker also insisted that Herder was no romantic or as restrictive as his German nationalist followers allowed, because languages defied national borders and relied on global borrowings to grow and prosper. Indeed one could say that the positions of Landauer and Rocker on the national question echo to a certain extent recent divisions in nationalist studies between primordialists (Landauer) and modernists (Rocker).⁹⁰ Anticipating the position of the scholar of nationalism, John Breuilly, the nation, according to Rocker, was a product of the state and elite power plays.⁹¹ The foundational community for Rocker was the folk group (perhaps what we would term the *ethnie*). Folk groups were melded together through the coercion and inventive imagery of power seekers. The problem was that power and the state destroyed or distorted the libertarian potential of culture. But these folk groups, unlike Landauer's take, did not share some ineffable *Geist*, they were not primordial facts, but living and evolving bundles of common cultural traits shared individually and separately from the group itself. The individual was not bound to a group but could draw from his/her birth group at will. Rocker may have helped himself by following the path of Benedict Anderson,⁹² who appreciated the interplay of language, print culture and shared experience, but this was not fleshed out to a sufficient degree in his major work on the subject, *Nationalism and Culture*,⁹³ first published in 1937 during Rocker's long American exile and at the very moment Yiddish culture was being eradicated through the genocidal policies of the Nazis and less deadly but hostile policies of Stalinist control in the USSR.

One way to bridge the language gap between ethnicities, nations and even neighbouring communities of exiled anarchists speaking a different home language was through Esperanto or other artificial languages invented to overcome linguistic barriers. For rationalists, followers of a certain form of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, Esperanto, along with the Modern School of the anarchist rationalist educationalist, Francisco Ferrer, would foreshadow the future cosmopolitan anarchist commonwealth and these aspirations were

shared partially by other well-meaning republicans, anti-clericals and radical liberals who embraced many of the same first premises and principles of this libertarian culture.⁹⁴ It was therefore fitting that the inventor of Esperanto hailed from the multi-cultural and polyglot Bialystok in the heart of Yiddishland.⁹⁵ But the anarchists were not unequivocal supporters of this new language, as some of the anarchists were disturbed by forms of anti-clericalism and radical republicanism which placed them too closely to the radical bourgeoisie, because after all, these erstwhile allies were in the capitalist camp and on occasion faced them across the picket line.⁹⁶

However there were other differences between the anarchists, which hark back to the divisions between ‘primordialists’ such as Landauer and the ‘modernists’ such as Rocker. Landauer was harshly critical of Esperanto, indeed in an article published in 1907, he enjoined his readers: ‘Do Not Learn Esperanto!’⁹⁷ For Landauer, Esperanto lacked a passionate attachment to real life. Rocker’s position was more nuanced. On the one hand, Rocker was no essentialist, which one could argue Landauer was, and did not feel that his adopted Yiddish Jewish community was bound together by inherent racial attributes or state-based official scripts. This community was malleable and changed across time and space; indeed he, a gentile, born a German Catholic, had wholeheartedly embraced it and helped shape its cultural life (one biographer even describes him as ‘the Anarchist Rabbi’).⁹⁸ In his future cosmopolitan world federation based on ‘voluntary socialism’, each individual would have the right to pursue and practise his or her own culture and thus a folk culture was built from the free association of sovereign individuals who chose which culture they wished to embrace, in much the same way Rocker had done in his own life. So Rocker sought to meld the rationalism of the Enlightenment with elements of Landauer’s essentialist message since Rocker still recognised that definable group cultures existed and should exist in the anarchist future.⁹⁹

Landauer’s harsh injunctions are in fact much closer to Antonio Gramsci’s. In earlier work I sought to demonstrate that Gramsci as pre-Leninist council communist in Turin worked with anarchists and syndicalists and constructed a form of libertarian Marxist socialism, which however was based on premises which were inherently hostile to much of the discourse and methods of ‘classical anarchism’.¹⁰⁰ Being a trained philologist and dual speaker of Sardinian and standard Italian, Gramsci was very sensitive to the connections of language to culture, identity and power. Indeed, his arguments about socialism and communism can only be grasped if one understands that his metaphors, analogies and reasoning about politics are substantially drawn from this professional training and personal obsession with philology.¹⁰¹ It is striking that at different times and without mutual acknowledgement, Gramsci and Landauer both criticised the chief Italian anarchist advocate of Esperanto, Luigi Molinari.¹⁰² For the young Gramsci and the ‘*Prison Notebooks* Gramsci’, Molinari’s quest for Esperanto and the more general attachment of pre-Fascist socialists and anarchists to this world of ‘Free Thought’, anti-clericalism and most particularly Esperanto, was a form of artificial cosmopolitanism, which was why pre-1917 Italian socialism could never be truly popular, because it was not rooted

in the essence of Italian popular culture. Like the Roman Catholic hegemony rooted in the city of Rome and the Vatican, Italian national-popular culture was undermined by a pernicious form of cosmopolitanism which ironically the enemies of the Church had recreated through international manifestations such as Esperanto and crude forms of anti-clericalism. Thus Gramsci argued for Communist internationalism rooted in an Italian national-popular culture and he sought to translate the practices of Leninism into Italian but ultimately this Italian Leninism still had to be guided by the selfless and clear-eyed Comintern. Furthermore, he also felt that anarchist forms of education, particularly naïve Free Thought, with Esperanto a rather silly and pernicious flowering therein, undermined the ability of the subaltern and working classes' ability to master the codes of the humanist elite (who promoted in fact their own specious form of bourgeois cosmopolitanism) and therefore prevented the powerless from achieving hegemony in Italy.

Landauer and Rocker shared Gramsci's attraction to the heritage of European culture and spent a good deal of their lives promoting both classical humanism but also the emerging canon of modernism. Perhaps all three were still too Eurocentric and at times even Orientalist; nevertheless, Landauer's and Rocker's form of anarchist commonwealth shared little with the rigid Communist internationalism of Gramsci, who fell prey to his own form of doctrinaire and scientific ideology. Gramsci argued that historicist Marxism was more libertarian than the anarchists' anarchism because it was more realistic and therefore could achieve results in the real world. But it can also be argued that Gramsci embraced Leninism and the unquestioned lead of the Comintern not because it aligned with his pre-Leninist ideas but because Lenin and the Bolsheviks had been successful and he and his Italian comrades were dismally unsuccessful. The roughest form of pragmatism motivated Gramsci, not internationalism: nothing succeeds like success.¹⁰³ Rocker wrote *Nationalism and Culture* just as Gramsci was penning his prison notes, which ruminated over the rise of fascism and perhaps secretly the rise too of Stalinism. Gramsci retained his visceral hatred of all forms of cosmopolitanism associated with the pre-1914 anarchist/libertarian subculture and saw the national-popular as a remedy for the demagogic national populism of Fascism and the biological populism of the Nazis. Rocker sought to meld together the lessons of the 'primordialists' and the 'modernists' in a new synthesis in face of the same horrors.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF COSMOPOLITANISM AND ROOTED COSMOPOLITANISM

If we turn full circle, return to our initial arguments in this chapter concerning the role of cosmopolitanism and globalisation in the twenty-first century, disputes over the role of global English, the Latin of today's Empire, have interesting parallels with the half-forgotten disputes over the utility and political effects of Esperanto. Daniele Archibugi the present-day supporter of world federation suggests a need for an Esperanto-like solution to the language of

business in a projected world parliament.¹⁰⁴ Peter Ives, a keen student of Gramsci's philological studies,¹⁰⁵ has addressed Archibugi in light of Gramsci's intellectual biography. In a curious way, this is a re-run of Gramsci's encounter with the Italian anarchist, Molinari. How can a new cosmopolitics in Archibugi's parliament or for that matter in today's global civil society be expressed in a new Esperanto of Global English (or possibly in the future in Global Mandarin, Hindi, Arabic or Spanish), when the language will largely not be intimate to the speaker?¹⁰⁶ Or as Hannah Arendt responded to Karl Jasper's enthusiasm for cosmopolitan world government in a language which is dated and offensive, 'A world citizen, living under the tyranny of world Empire, and speaking a kind of Esperanto, would no less be a monster than a hermaphrodite'.¹⁰⁷

One way out of this impasse is to embrace the concept of the 'rooted cosmopolitan', a term which has inspired my quest in charting the global life in exile of the Italian anarchist, Errico Malatesta, and a term which I noticed has been embraced separately by several writers in different contexts outside the field of anarchist studies.¹⁰⁸ David Turcato notes in reference to Malatesta, love of birthplace, a preference for one's own language is beneficial for the fostering of solidarity in human groups so long as it does not breed exclusivity and sense of superiority.¹⁰⁹ And Malatesta also argued that even if we are cosmopolitans (Malatesta was in fact a member of a club called the 'Cosmopolitans',¹¹⁰ where radical exiles and locals met in a room in a pub in Covent Garden during the 1890s, whose landlord was no other than the denizen of the 'antinomian Anglosphere', Tom Mann), one is forced to submit to the political regime where one lives, one's solidarity with the distant worker is a duty but solidarity within one's own culture is more keenly felt. In the cosmopolitan city, this meant solidarity with fellow workers whose origins were distant in, for example, Malatesta's organising of solidarity amongst the Italian tailors of the London's West End during a massive strike of the East End's Jewish anarchist-led unions.¹¹¹ While some French anarchists, perhaps still influenced by the exceptionalism associated with the French Revolution and indeed a prevailing anti-Semitic cadence, refused the badge of cosmopolitanism because it was considered antipatriotic and embraced the term internationalist even though logically the unit of analysis would be a world of states, Malatesta, drawing from the cosmopolitanism of the *Risorgimento* and his own life story choose another path.¹¹² In both multi-national and multi-national settings in exile and in the sharp regional particularisms of the new and artificial nation-state called Italy, an overriding sense of patriotism, love of a locality and not a state or dominant ethnic group, generated Malatesta's reasoned position. This approach is also prevalent in the adaptation of Bookchin's communal federalism in Northern Syria's Rojava in contradistinction to the sectarianism elsewhere in that region or in the so-called 'identitarian' populism which threatens globally to bring back the worst horrors of the twentieth century. In his heart Rocker was a rationalist cosmopolitan, who bowed reluctantly to the need to accommodate cultural differences but longed for a world of global citizens. Using

Bookchin's concept of Libertarian Municipalism, Sean Wilson has suggested that a theory of libertarian cosmopolitan democracy (which goes beyond Held or Archibugi) can be supplemented by a cosmopolitan conception of citizenship.¹¹³ Though not fully anarchist, this construct based on majority rule, grassroots participation and multi-level governance is a far more inspiring aspiration than others proposed in our dangerous and dismal present.

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Anti-Imperialism

Ole Birk Laursen

INTRODUCTION

From its early days as an organised political movement with its own distinct theoretical and practical expressions, emerging in the wake of the First International in the late 1860s, anarchism has stood in opposition to imperial domination and oppression. In one of his final works, *Statism and Anarchy* (1873), after he had abandoned the liberatory force of pan-Slavic nationalism, Mikhail Bakunin challenged that ‘the construction of a great Slavic empire means only the enslavement of the Slavic people’.¹ Extending this analogy, he doubted whether ‘imperial Europe’ could continue its colonial rule because ‘Two-thirds of humanity, 800 million Asians asleep in their servitude will necessarily awaken and begin to move’.² Peter Kropotkin, too, often championed the right of colonial subjects to overthrow imperialist regimes and saw it as a necessary step towards the realisation of anarchism. His friendship with Margaret Noble, the Scots-Irish socialist also known as Sister Nivedita, translated into anarchist influences on the Indian revolutionary movement as she brought Kropotkin’s work with her to India.³ A few decades later, after the disillusionment with the Russian Revolution had set in among the global radical left, alongside anarchists from Argentina, Chile and Mexico, a group of Indian revolutionaries attended the formative meeting of the anarcho-syndicalist International Working Men’s Association (IWMA) in Berlin in late December 1922 and attempted to bring anarchism into India’s freedom struggle.⁴ With Fascism on the rise across Europe in the following decade, the IWMA re-affirmed this commitment to anti-imperialism when it resolved at its convention in Spain (1931) that it ‘is most emphatically opposed to any form of imperialism and to the brutal oppression of the so-called colonial peoples.

O. B. Laursen (✉)
Open University, Milton Keynes, UK

It proclaims its fullest solidarity with the exploited of all countries and of all races, and is resolved to take all possible means to draw these people into the great brotherhood of struggling humanity'.⁵ Despite such long-standing commitment to the internationalist principles of anti-imperialism, historians of anarchism's international reach have only recently begun to explore these dimensions.

This chapter provides a synthesis and overview of the growing body of scholarship on anarchist anti-imperialism. Following a recent transnational and postcolonial turn in anarchist studies, publications such as Benedict Anderson's *Under Three Flags* (2005), Steven Hirsch and Lucien van der Walt's edited volume *Anarchism and Syndicalism in the Colonial and Postcolonial World, 1870–1940* (2010), Maia Ramnath's *Decolonizing Anarchism* (2011), Geoffroy de Laforcade and Kirk Shaffer's *In Defiance of Boundaries* (2015) and Barry Maxwell and Raymond Craib's collection *No Gods, No Masters, No Peripheries* (2015) have brought attention to the ways in which anarchists approached the question of imperialism and how, reciprocally, anti-colonialists embraced anarchist ideologies and praxes.⁶ More recently, Peter Cole, David Struthers and Kenyon Zimmer's global history of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), *Wobblies of the World* (2017), includes chapters on South Asia, Oceania, Ireland and South Africa.⁷ In comparison to the Marxist international, Anderson notes that, 'just as hostile to imperialism, [anarchism] had no theoretical prejudices against "small" and "ahistorical" nationalisms, including those in the colonial world'.⁸ Similarly, Hirsch and van der Walt propose that 'anarchism and syndicalism were important currents in anti-imperial, including anti-colonial, struggles in the late nineteenth and early-to-mid twentieth centuries—and were, for the most of this period, more important than their Marxist rivals'.⁹ In her book, Ramnath attempts to re-angle our understanding of anarchism in relation to anti-imperialism and anti-colonial struggles to uncover, instead, a global tradition of 'antiauthoritarian thought/praxis, of a universal human urge [...] toward emancipation, which also occurs in many other forms in many other contexts'.¹⁰ To look for such varieties of anarchist thought and praxis outside Europe reveals not necessarily an anti-imperialist politics, but helps to 'counter the lingering diffusionist (and implicitly Eurocentric) perspectives that can characterize work on ideas and movements', as Raymond Craib notes.¹¹ In other words, such scholarship has carved out important avenues of inquiry into the centrality of anti-imperialism to the broad historical tradition of anarchism as a global phenomenon.

ANARCHY IN THE EMPIRES: HISTORIES, CONTEXTS AND DEBATES

Focusing on resistances to British, French, Spanish, Portuguese and American imperialism from 1870 to 1960, the period under consideration in this chapter is marked by the expansion and height of colonialism, rapid globalisation and migration, and the development of technological advances, at the one end, and the end of the Second World War and onset of decolonisation, at the other.

Whereas the first wave of European imperialism from the fifteenth century was marked by ecclesiastical rule, slave trade and capitalist expansion by companies, the second wave from the 1870s onwards involved a race by European nation states and the United States to colonise formally territories across Africa and Asia. At the same time, parts of Latin America, Australia and Canada often suffered under the repressive regimes of post-independent/neo-colonial rulers, who principally continued the expansionist policies of former colonial masters and initiated their own imperial adventures. These historical processes of colonialism and their attendant resistances have been usefully explained by Immanuel Ness and Zak Cope as ‘the military, political, legal and/or economic control of one people’s territory by another so that the subject territory is made to relinquish resources, labour and produce for little or no compensation’, which is a valuable working definition of imperialism for this chapter.¹²

From the outset, the second wave of Euro-American imperialism met resistance wherever it spread across the colonial world, but within the metropolises of Europe and the United States, too, resistance to imperialism was tangible. As a growing body of scholarship has noted, despite scepticism about the nationalist character of anti-colonial struggles for independence, anarchists were among the chief figures to both articulate and practise a politics of anti-imperialism on the home front. At the same time, there has been increasing scholarly attention to the ways in which anarchism developed and spread across national borders during that same period and, in the process, challenged and confronted the ideologies of colonialism in toto. Taking on board Stephen Howe’s working definition of anti-imperialism as, both, a commitment to the equality of European and non-European peoples and cultures combined with the right to self-determination and, also, to the political praxis of eradicating colonialism in one’s own country through national and international alliances, the chapter interrogates alliances, solidarities and antagonisms between two strands of revolutionary thought and praxis: anarchism and anti-imperialism.¹³ It brings together a new corpus of scholarship to provide an overview of the ways in which anarchist anti-imperialism emerged as a central component within global struggles against European imperialism.

The intellectual impetus behind such an undertaking, however, must take into account the early attempt by Sam Mbah and I. E. Igariwey to illuminate the ways in which anarchism as a way of life impacted African societies in *African Anarchism* (1997).¹⁴ Their study is a useful reminder of the ways in which anarchism in Africa emerged not necessarily as a European Enlightenment philosophy, as George Ciccariello-Maher has cautioned, but also as a praxis and life-style often found in African societies.¹⁵ Indeed, Mbah and Igariwey note that, ‘the ideals underlying anarchism may not be so new in the African context. What is new is the concept of anarchism as a social movement or ideology. Anarchy as an abstraction may indeed be remote to Africans, but it is not at all unknown as a way of life’.¹⁶ While Mbah and Igariwey’s book does not deal specifically with African anarchism as an anti-imperialist ideology and praxis, it reveals some of the ways in which colonialism disrupted and restructured indig-

enous societies across Africa. By contrast to their philosophical conception of anarchism, argues Lucien van der Walt, it is anarchism as a socialist and working-class movement rooted in the debates in the International Workingmen's Association (IWA), 1864–1877, and immersed in anti-imperial and anti-colonial struggles, that demands a global perspective in which 'the movement's rich history in the colonial and postcolonial world is placed centre-stage'.¹⁷ Following van der Walt's line of inquiry, from an anarchist perspective, anti-imperialism challenges European colonialism's destructive impact and, instead, advocates demands for freedom, mutualism and equality among all peoples.

What is more, exploring core principles of anarchist anti-imperialism with a vision of postcolonial societies, the chapter discusses issues of nationalism and the nation-state, anti-statism and political organisation, transnationalism, exile and diaspora, anti-capitalism and science, cooperativism and boycott. In doing so, it pays particular attention to so-called 'propaganda by the word' and 'propaganda by the deed', theory and praxis, ideological sympathies and strategic revolutionary methods, including terrorism, insurrection and sabotage. Within these discussions, the chapter highlights antagonisms and incompatibilities among and between anarchists and anti-colonialists, allowing for an assessment of the limitations of anarchism within the anti-colonial context and, conversely, the shortcomings and flaws that often have impacted postcolonial societies.

Reflecting the internationalist movements of anarchists during this period, it offers broader surveys as well as case studies from across the British, French, Portuguese and Spanish colonial worlds. However, while colonial subjects and anarchists were subject to certain national and colonial legal regimes, they frequently travelled across national borders in pursuit of freedom from imperial rule. Therefore, to understand properly the global reach of anarchism and anti-imperialism, this chapter also seeks to bring to light networks of resistance across imperial territorial divides. Extending Constance Bantman and Bert Altena's transnational inquiry, it challenges orthodox lines of historicism that have, until recently, tended to focus on anarchist resistances within national borders.¹⁸ Keeping such transnational crossings in mind, however, the most productive way to present an overview of anti-imperialism as an articulation and praxis of anarchist struggle is to proceed via those colonial regimes being challenged.

ANARCHIST ANTI-IMPERIALISM IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE

With colonial possessions across North America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Oceania, Britain emerged as the biggest European empire in competition with France, Spain and Portugal. Alongside the rise of anarchism within the First International in the 1870s, Irish nationalists increasingly resorted to insurrectionist terrorism, propaganda by the deed and the use of dynamite in the struggle for Irish freedom. In his early account *The Secret Societies of the European Revolution* (1876), Thomas Frost contextualises the Irish struggles against British imperialism alongside

anarchists', Communists' and Nihilists' struggles against the Russian Tsar and suggests a form of revolutionary affiliation between such disparate forms of resistance to oppression.¹⁹ More recently, Niall Whelehan has brought attention to the early alliances between anarchists and Irish republicans, giving the example of Southern Italy as a space for insurrectionist guerrilla warfare against the 'internal colonialism' of the Italian monarchy for both Irish republicans and Italian anarchists.²⁰ Despite such kinship, though, anarchism as a political ideology and praxis did not substantially influence Irish struggles for independence, although it garnered sympathy from Britain's anarchist circles.²¹

However, Irish anti-colonialists such as James Connolly, William O'Brien and James Larkin found syndicalism useful in their articulation of Irish freedom. In his recent book, Conor McCarthy examines Connolly's involvement with the IWW in the United States and how it influenced his anti-imperialist activities. 'Syndicalism helped to shape Connolly's attitudes and positions not only during his time in America', McCarthy argues, 'but also to events and politics in Ireland when he returned there', and with its focus on workers and direct action, syndicalism influenced the formation of the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union (ITGWU) in 1909 and the articulation of anti-imperialism.²² Extending the historical focus on Connolly, O'Brien and Larkin, Emmet O'Connor has demonstrated how industrial unionism helped to decolonise the labour movement in Ireland. However, O'Connor cautions that 'there was never a formally syndicalist organization in Ireland' nor much of an overtly anarchist influence on syndicalism.²³ Stemming from a different line of inquiry, Federico Ferretti has recently explored the role of Ireland in Élisée Reclus' geography, biography and political thinking to argue that 'the direct links between Reclus' circle and the Irish Socialists and Republicans ... confirms the existence of a grassroots solidarity, and hence mutual contamination, among transnational movements for social liberation in the Age of Empire'.²⁴ In other words, despite anarchism's relatively minor impact on anti-imperialist struggles in Ireland, considering it alongside a broader spectrum of political ideologies and methods, including Irish republicanism and syndicalism, gives a much better understanding of the political value and deeper history of anarchism as a global phenomenon of antiauthoritarian and anti-imperial praxis.

Much like in Ireland, the IWW and syndicalism briefly inspired revolutionary workers in both Australia and New Zealand in the early twentieth century. However, relatively minor in impact, ending principally with the rise of Communism in the wake of the Russian Revolution, labour struggles in Australia and New Zealand rarely took on an anti-imperialist nature and veered more towards syndicalist rather than anarchist principles of organisation. Settled primarily by white European workers, labour struggles in these newly independent nations, instead, threw up some of the discrepancies between indigenous peoples and the white working classes that usually translated into anti-imperialist solidarity rather than anti-imperialist activities.²⁵

More concrete forms of grassroots' anti-imperialist solidarity, though, also existed between anarchists and Indian nationalists, particularly in the North

American and European diasporas. In many ways, the history of anti-imperialism and anarchism in Canada is entwined with both British colonial policies and the growth of US imperialism in the early twentieth century. As both Maia Ramnath and Seema Sohi have demonstrated, Indian nationalists in the Ghadar Party on the US West Coast and in British Columbia, Canada, associated with anarchists and radical working-class unions. Lala Har Dayal, to take one example, became a member of the Oakland branch of the IWW, formed the Fraternity of the Red Flag, and set up the Bakunin Institute to spread anarchist thinking among the Indians in North America. Pandurang Khankhoje and Taraknath Das, too, had contacts with Wobblies, and the ideas of syndicalism certainly influenced their articulation of anti-colonialism.²⁶ Kenyon Zimmer has noted, moreover, how Indian radicals in the Ghadar party formed alliances with American anarchists in their struggle against the British Empire as well as racist American immigration laws. Against the scepticism of some anarchists towards the nationalist bent of the Indian revolutionaries, the Bakunin Institute's paper *Land and Liberty*, edited by the Indian-born William C. Owen, championed such freedom struggles across the colonial world.²⁷ These anti-imperialist alliances, Zimmer has noted elsewhere, also influenced American anarchist debates before and during the First World War, especially among the Italian anarchists in the United States who protested the invasion of Abyssinia in 1895 as well as among Cuban exiles who joined forces with anarchists to fight in the Cuban War of Independence (1895–1898).²⁸

In Europe, Indian nationalists, too, associated with anarchists, and many adopted a position of solidarity with such freedom struggles. However, Thomas Keell, editor of *Freedom*, and Guy Aldred, editor of *The Herald of Revolt*, supported the Indians in London and, conversely, the Indian nationalists donated money to the Malatesta Release Committee in 1912. Despite ideological differences, Aldred even went to prison for printing the propaganda organ *The Indian Sociologist* in 1909 and remained involved in the Indian revolutionary movement until the outbreak of the First World War.²⁹ At the same time, the wave of 'propaganda by the deed' that had affected Europe around the turn of the century greatly inspired the Indians. For instance, P. M. Bapat and Hem Chandra Kanungo Das came to France specifically to learn how to make bombs from anarchists. Through Joseph 'Libertad' Albert, editor of *L'Anarchie*, they came into contact with the Russian Maximalist Nicolas Safranski, who taught them about explosives and bombs. In the spirit of anti-colonial solidarity, Safranski even intended to go to India to join his 'black comrades', as he called them, but never went.³⁰ This spirit of anti-colonial solidarity and 'propaganda by the deed' also led to a fateful alliance between the Indian nationalists Virendranath Chattopadhyaya and Abdul Hafiz and a group of Swiss-based Italian anarchists, led by Luigi Bertoni and Arcangelo Cavadini, to smuggle bombs and weapons into Switzerland, and later Italy, during the First World War. According to intelligence reports, the Indians and Italians also plotted to assassinate a number of European kings, presidents and prime ministers in an attempt to overthrow imperial regimes of power, but this never materialised.³¹

Such cross-political fertilisation between Indian nationalists and European anarchists, with particular emphasis on the praxis of terrorism, gives a more nuanced understanding of anarchism's influence on anti-colonial resistances.

Chattopadhyaya, though, also had close contacts within the European anarchist milieu, writing for Jean Grave's *Les Temps Nouveaux*, and in post-Russian Revolution Berlin associated with Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman. Despite Goldman's interest in the Indian revolutionary movement, and given that several Indian Ghadar members contributed to *Mother Earth*, she doubted Chattopadhyaya's anarchist ethics and remarked that 'it was Hindu nationalism to which he had devoted himself entirely'.³² Chattopadhyaya's long-time collaborator M. P. T. Acharya, however, also found himself in Berlin and, after becoming disillusioned with the promises of Bolshevism, joined the anarcho-syndicalist IWMA in 1923. For more than thirty years, Acharya immersed himself in the international anarchist movement, fusing his anti-colonial activities with anarchist ethics, and attempted to bring anarchism to India. In doing so, Acharya charted a different path towards anarchist anti-imperialism than M. K. Gandhi, Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan.³³ He remains a solitary figure, however, and the Indian anti-colonial struggle for independence is dominated by Marxist influences.³⁴

Alongside the Indians in Europe and North America, Egyptian revolutionaries were influenced by anarchism in their struggle for independence. Not just because Egyptian nationalists travelled in the same Euro-American circles as the Indians but also because particularly Italian anarchists, including Errico Malatesta, brought the revolutionary tenets of anarchism to Egypt. According to Anthony Gorman, Italian political refugees and workers who benefitted from a network of labour, transport and communications across the Mediterranean first introduced anarchism to Egypt in the 1860s.³⁵ International in its outlook, the early Italian radical organisations in Egypt gradually seeped their ideas into Arabic Egyptian labour organisations by the early twentieth century, influencing writers such as Salama Musa and Shibli Shumayyil.³⁶

What is more, such commitments to moral, political, economic and social emancipation also gradually inflected anti-imperial resistances among Egypt's multifarious ethnic make-up and, indeed, the revolutionary nationalists that radicalised the independence struggle in the early twentieth century. In fact, just like the Indians, Egyptian nationalists often came into contact with anarchists in Europe and North America, and were particularly inspired by 'propaganda by the deed' and the praxis of revolutionary terrorism. While the Egyptians who travelled through European revolutionary networks among anarchists, such as Ibrahim al-Wardani, were not anarchists per se, Ilham Khuri-Makdisi notes that 'both elites and non-elites incorporated many aspects of anarchism into ambient discourses and practices'.³⁷ What is more, Khuri-Makdisi argues, 'anarchism and anarchist ideas, in Egypt and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, far from being confined to marginal and minority groups, were gaining ground and being synthesized in other revolutionary radical or social movements, which included proto-nationalist, nationalist, trade unionist,

and Muslim reformist movements'.³⁸ In other words, to think about anarchism in relation to anti-colonialism in Egypt requires a shift in our understanding of the value of anarchist praxis and terrorism for overthrowing colonial regimes.

In South Africa, both during British colonisation and after gaining Dominion status in 1910, anarchism and syndicalism has been central to the articulation of anti-colonial resistances. As a settler colony, workers and radicals from across Europe and North Africa, particularly British and Jewish immigrants, among them Wilfred H. Harrison, J. T. Bain, Henry Glasse and A. Z. Berman, brought with them anarchist and syndicalist ideas that fomented in South Africa from the 1910s onwards.³⁹ While the libertarian movement in South Africa may have started among white settlers, argues Lucien van der Walt, it gradually evolved and included African, Coloured and Indian revolutionaries.⁴⁰ Organised along the lines of the One Big Union model of the IWW, anarchist and syndicalist unions such as the Social Democratic Federation, Industrial Socialist League and the Industrial Workers of Africa emerged and flourished throughout the early decades of the twentieth century.⁴¹ Questions of race, anti-imperialism and nationalism were central to these unions, which translated into multiracial and international politics 'characterised throughout by a principled and distinctive opposition to racial discrimination and prejudice, with a commitment to interracial labour organising and working class unity'.⁴² Embracing anarchist and syndicalist ideas, African revolutionaries such as T. W. Thibedi, Fred Cetiwe, and Hamilton Kraai played a key role in anti-imperial struggles, especially against the so-called pass laws, and in organising dockworkers in Cape Town. In the early decades of the twentieth century, in other words, anti-colonialism in South Africa drew not just on the politics of the Communist International, as often held, but instead fused anarchism into the politics of liberation and organisation of a common society of free individuals, not a nation-state format.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM IN THE PORTUGUESE EMPIRE AND BRAZIL

In the first decades of the twentieth century, anarchism and syndicalism also reached the workers in Mozambique, although here it developed separately from South Africa, as an import from Portuguese immigrants and deported political prisoners. According to José Capela and van der Walt, it was primarily located in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) and centred around José Estêvam's Revolutionary League (formed in 1910) and the Grupo Libertário Francisco Ferrer (formed in 1911), but generally excluded Africans, although not *assimilados*, those exempt from the discriminatory colour bar, from their organisations. Anarchists and syndicalists published in a number of local periodicals as well as participated in strikes across the country, but martial law and the Portuguese dictatorship suppressed the radical press and independent unions, thereby crushing budding attempts to introduce anarchism into anti-colonial struggles in Mozambique.⁴³ The case of Mozambique, in other words, illustrates the ways in which anarchism in the colonial world did not necessarily

cross imperial borders and boundaries to mutate into an international movement of anti-imperialism. Instead, it emerged briefly as an import within the Portuguese empire.

In Brazil, however, anarchism and syndicalism had a much greater impact on the development of labour struggles and anti-imperial resistance. As Plínio de Góes, Jr. suggests, prior to Portuguese colonisation, ‘native Brazilians lived in an egalitarian society free from European religious experience’. With the arrival of the Portuguese and Catholicism, he argues, ‘anarchism was required in Brazil, as in Europe, precisely to cure diseases, the diseases of capitalism and hierarchy, which had been brought from abroad’.⁴⁴ As a growing body of scholarship on anarchism in Brazil has noted, Brazil became a haven for southern European immigrants who brought with them radical ideas and praxes for labour struggle.⁴⁵ Under the Empire of Brazil (1822–1889), trade unions were prohibited, but with the establishment of the republic in 1889, unions began to spring up across Brazil. Rodrigues, Ramos and Samis attribute the emergence of anarchism to the arrival of Italian immigrants in the late 1880s, and particularly of Artur Campagnoli in 1888, but soon followed Portuguese, Spanish, German and Russian anarchists.⁴⁶ With substantial immigrant communities in Rio Grande do Sul, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Santos, in particular, anarchism quickly influenced workers’ struggles, and anarchists organised against European imperialism, in general, and later on the imperialist ambitions behind the First World War, more specifically.⁴⁷ At the same time, as in other European settler colonies across the globe, the large wave of immigration from Europe sometimes caused tension between the native Brazilians and Afro-Brazilians (slavery had only been abolished in 1888), who organised and struggled along racial lines, and the European immigrants, who fought against imperialism through class affiliation.⁴⁸ That said, as Toledo and Biondi conversely argue, the Brazilian labour movement was also influenced by centuries of slave revolts and was not ‘characterized by division based on internecine ethnic and conflicts’.⁴⁹ Indeed, as Edgar Rodrigues has explored, the likes of Antonio Conselheiro’s Canudo community as well as the autonomous societies established by *quilombos* (descendants of fugitive slaves) inspired anarchist ideas and praxis in Brazil.⁵⁰ With no major conflicts between European immigrants and Afro-Brazilian workers, the unions were open to all races, and anarchists actively participated in the struggle for equality and freedom for all workers. Whether such struggles extended to the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea, Cape Verde, Timor, Macau and Goa remains unexplored.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM IN THE SPANISH EMPIRE AND POSTCOLONIAL LATIN AMERICA

Elsewhere in South America, across the former Spanish colonies in the Caribbean, and into Mexico, anarchists were instrumental in the struggle against Euro-American imperialism and its postcolonial legacies of racial and class oppression. A growing body of scholarship has paid attention to the ways

in which ‘in Latin America, where protracted resistance against the centralization of modern states followed the revolutions for independence in the 1820s, anarchists encountered models of regionalism and federalism that they interpreted as bearing historic potential for the future’.⁵¹ Resisting the European foundations of the nation-state and imperial endeavours in the New World, anarchists ‘participated in the creation of modern “national” identities in Latin America while combating conservative, atavistic, racialized discourses of national belonging’.⁵²

In Peru, European immigrant urban and rural workers readily formed alliances with indigenous peasants, as Steven Hirsch has shown. Although less influential than in Argentina and Brazil, Peruvian anarchists challenged imperialist trade and export policies, bypassing state-imposed laws and regulations, and extended their activities to the rural areas of Cuzco and Puno. During the 1910s and 1920s, Carlos Condorena, Ezequiel Urviola and Hipólito Salazar, for instance, articulated both anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist discourses and praxes and stressed the importance of taking pride in indigenous struggles.⁵³ The Peruvian anarchists stretched their activities across borders and often collaborated with Chilean and Argentinean workers too.

In Chile, the case of Casimiro Barrios’s expulsion on grounds of being an unwanted foreigner threw up some of the ways in which anarchists fought against imperial (and capitalist) structures of governance. As Raymond Craib has demonstrated, under the 1918 Residency Law and ‘enticed perhaps by Chilean colonization agents’, Barrios was faced with deportation in December 1920. Eventually expelled, Barrios tried to re-enter Chile in 1930, only to be executed by carabineros.⁵⁴

In the early twentieth century, anarchists in Latin America travelled frequently across national borders, hinting at the transnational nature of working-class revolutionaries. As in Peru and Chile, anarchists in Argentina confronted not only state bureaucracy and repression but also formed alliances with indigenous peoples in their acts of resistance. While some historians have debated whether anarchism was just another European import to South America, Geoffroy de Laforcade has argued that,

by the time the anarchist American Continental Workers’ Association (*Asociación continental Americana de trabajadores*, part of the syndicalist International Workers Association) met in Buenos Aires in 1929 ... delegates from Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Central America, and the Andes had developed a nuanced analysis of Latin American societies. They acknowledged political, economic and cultural differences between nations, calling for the study of indigenous and migratory antecedents, local and historical particularities, and working-class diversity. Their emphasis was on preserving autonomy of local organisations as an antidote to the centralizing institutions of modern politics.⁵⁵

Among longshoremen and dockworkers in Buenos Aires and further afield, questions of nationalism and internationalism often came up; however, as anarchist-inspired labour organisations quickly spread across the recently inde-

pendent nation, anarchists ‘fostered inter-ethnic solidarity’ in response to the Catholic hold on workers.⁵⁶ What is more, Laura Fernandez Cordero has drawn attention to the intersectionality of women’s participation in labour struggles and the overall resistance against domination.⁵⁷

Much like in South America, anarchists had a strong presence in Central America and readily mixed with, supported and defended indigenous and native peoples against European colonisation and its postcolonial legacies of domination. Sixty years after formal independence in 1847, in the early twentieth century a group of young radicals appropriated various strands of European anarchism to the sociocultural reality of Costa Rica and articulated a form of cultural defiance that, although small in significance, made its way into the discourse of anti-imperialism. Challenging the national discourse of Costa Rica as a white, progressive postcolonial nation, anarchists contributed to the confrontation of such narratives through the ideas of Proudhon and Bakunin. Nationalism conflated into patriotism was re-defined by these young intellectual anarchists in Costa Rica and, in doing so, they contributed to the development of anti-imperialist anarchism.⁵⁸

In Puerto Rico, a Spanish colony ceded to the United States after the Spanish-American war in 1898, anarchists fought both against Spanish rule and, subsequently, imperial US domination. As Kirwin Shaffer has explored, these struggles against Spanish and US imperialism were embodied by key figure Juan Vilar, whose anti-authoritarianism was directly linked to anti-imperialism. Despite the emotional appeal of nationalism in the struggle against colonialism, the history of anti-imperialism in Puerto Rico was less a ‘project of political nationalism and more about a collective identity of resistance—in short, a distinct form of antiauthoritarianism rooted in the island people’s collective nationality against colonialism’. Native Boricuas, Shaffer continues, ‘forged a culture of resistance to colonial rule throughout Puerto Rico’s history of subjugation’, which anarchists fused with international antiauthoritarian ideals of a stateless, non-religious and anti-capitalist post-independent society.⁵⁹

Further to the southwest, gaining independence from Colombia in 1903 but subsequently victim of neo-colonial US expansion, Panama became a brief nodal point for anarchists from across Latin, Central and North America as well as Cuban revolutionaries during the construction of the Canal (1903–1914). These areas were connected through a number of periodicals, most of them in Spanish, which enabled the development of an anti-imperialist modernity. Key figure M. D. Rodríguez often exposed the exploitation of workers in the Canal Zone, especially ‘black workers from throughout the Caribbean, who were the poorest paid and lived in the worst conditions’.⁶⁰ What is more, the configuration of Spanish and Cuban as ‘semi-whites’ by the US, meaning that they were relegated to dangerous work alongside black Caribbean workers, forged transnational, anti-imperial alliances between workers from across the isthmus.

The emergence of such alliances happened principally through publications printed in Spain and Cuba. If Panama was briefly a nodal point for transnational anarchist activity, Cuba had long been a hub for anarchists from across the Spanish hemisphere. During the independence struggle, as Kenyon Zimmer noted earlier, anarchists played a central role. Adapting international anarchism to the cultural politics of late nineteenth-century Cuba, anarchists engaged in the ‘anticolonial war versus Spain, the post-war symbolic use of the war and its leading figure José Martí, the role of immigration, and how all should contribute to an anarchist definition for a new Cuba’.⁶¹ The 1892 manifesto *Manifiesto del Congreso Obrero* tied anti-imperial and anarchist struggles together, giving life to Bakunin’s idea of supporting national liberation struggles as legitimate goals for anarchists, while remaining cautious of Martí’s nationalist Partido Revolucionario Cubano. According to Kirk Shaffer, ‘they pushed an “anti-imperialist” and “internationalist” agenda in the island’s war for independence; they saw the struggle not as a “nationalist” revolt, but as one link in the chain of an international anarchist revolution against all states, capital, and religion’.⁶² Following independence in 1898, many Cuban anarchists continued their struggle against the new state and what they saw as a continuation of the colonial regime. The Cuban cigar workers in Havana Key West and Ybor City, in particular, challenged the new regime failure to live up to promises of social, racial and economic equality and freedom for all.⁶³

Sitting next to Shaffer’s work, Benedict Anderson charts similar anti-imperialist networks in his erudite *Under Three Flags*, linking up Latin American anarchism with the Filipino writers José Rizal and Isabelo de los Reyes. In mapping ‘the gravitational force of anarchism between militant nationalisms on opposite sides of the planet’, Anderson brings to light exactly the historical prominence of anarchism within anti-imperialist struggle across the colonial world. Anarchism’s emphasis on personal liberty, autonomy, and non-hierarchy, argues Anderson, appealed to the oppressed workers and peasants across the colonial world.⁶⁴ Giving a more nuanced insight into the ethnic make-up of these struggles, Enrique Galvan-Alvarez has recently highlighted the particular role of Canary Islanders’ subaltern consciousness in the anti-colonial and anarchist struggles in the late nineteenth century Americas.⁶⁵ For example, Canarians like Secundino Delgado drew specifically on the colonial history of the Islands in his involvement in the Cuban independence struggle and US labour movements and the articulation of Canarian anti-colonialism from his exile in Venezuela (1896–1898). What Galvan-Alvarez and others ultimately contribute to is the growth of scholarly work on the history of anarchist anti-imperialism within the Spanish Empire.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM IN THE FRENCH EMPIRE

Stemming from another part of the Caribbean, the influential anti-colonial thinker Frantz Fanon was born in the French colony of Martinique. Although embedded in the Marxist tradition, attempts have been made to consider his

anarchist lineages as well. In his early work, Peter Worsley has drawn attention to Fanon's debt to Bakunin's thoughts on the 'lumpenproletariat', especially concerning anti-colonial violence, while Ryan Allen Knight puts Fanon and Bakunin into a productive conversation around anarchism's potential for anti-colonial struggles.⁶⁶ However, despite Daniel Guérin's initial praise of Fanon's *L'An V de la révolution algérienne* (1959), his influence on French anarchism remains limited and discussed primarily in relation to anti-colonial violence.⁶⁷ Instead, while opposing French colonialism as racist, repressive and exploitative, French anarchists adopted two positions on the Algerian revolution (1954–1962)—taking into account issues of national liberation, revolutionary violence, and collaboration with statist forces—'between those who feared corruption of the anarchist ideal and those eagerly embracing progressive allies as an escape from anarchism's usual isolation'.⁶⁸ Those debates that took place among French anarchists regarding the war in Algeria were, of course, not confined to the French Empire but happened across the imperial metropolises altogether and date back to the late nineteenth century.

As in Latin America, but fewer and less influential, anarchists in Algeria were almost exclusively from a European background. David Porter has identified three important anarchist presences: first, Mohamed Saïl, an Algerian-born, but Paris-based anarchist who joined the Union Anarchiste and the Revolutionary Syndicalist General Labour Confédération and wrote extensively about French colonialism in Algeria; second, the North African Libertarian Movement (MLNA), established in 1950, and led by Fernand Doukhan and later Léandre Valéro, actively participated in the revolution from 1954 until it was suppressed in 1957; third, exiled Spanish anarchists who had fled Franco's brutal regime and, by and large, remained sympathetic to anti-colonial resistances but also adopted a 'non-interventionist' stance in the Algerian war.⁶⁹ Each in their own way, these three strands articulated and practised forms of anti-imperialism that aligned with the general stance adopted by anarchists elsewhere across the colonial and postcolonial world.⁷⁰ As a precursor to the Algerian war, Benjamin Stora has looked at the wider Maghreb area and the formation of the 'Comité contre la guerre et l'union sacrée' in Paris in 1935, which included notable members such as Henry Poulaille, Simone Weil, Magdeleine Paz and Jean Giono, but also syndicalists (of the *La Révolution prolétarienne* group) and anarchists associated with the journals *Le Libertaire* and *Le Combat syndicaliste*.⁷¹

Looking back to an even earlier period, during her imprisonment in New Caledonia, Communard leader Louise Michel supported the indigenous Kanak Revolt in 1878: 'The Kanaks were seeking the same liberty we had sought in the Commune', she wrote in her memoirs.⁷² A quarter of a century later, the internationalist dimensions of French anarchism—not just cross-channel exchanges between France and Britain, as Constance Bantman has explored—extended to Louise Michel's and Ernest Girault's tour of Algeria in 1904.⁷³ Both Michel and Girault, argues Clotilde Chauvin, spoke vehemently about the exploitative nature of French colonialism in Algeria, but also about the

destructive influx of Italian, Maltese and Spanish immigrants.⁷⁴ Their tour of Algeria points to the longer history of anarchist anti-imperialism in the French context. As does Jean Grave's pamphlet 'La Colonisation' (1912) and the tireless agitation of Aristide Pratielle, but their anti-imperial efforts remain as yet unexplored. At the same time, however, as Sylvain Boulouque concludes, the overall influence of French anarchists in anti-imperial resistances and involvement in colonial wars was minimal. That does not mean, though, that their active role in trade unions and other revolutionary syndicalist associations should be overlooked, and more research is needed to open a window onto the history of anarchist anti-imperialism the French empire.⁷⁵

CONCLUSION

Taking on board Bakunin's support for national independence movements, the recent transnational turn in the global historiography of anarchism has surely been complemented by a postcolonial turn in recent years. As the case studies from across the British, French, Portuguese and Spanish empires in this chapter have demonstrated, the struggle for national independence easily gelled with anarchist ideals of freedom, anti-authoritarianism and equality across ethno-racial lines. Across empires, international anarchist principles of anti-imperialism challenged the nationalist tendencies in many independence movements to envision stateless, postcolonial societies where class struggle and freedom went hand in hand. The chapter has illuminated some of the discrepancies and antagonisms between anarchists and anti-colonial nationalists, but also shed light on the growing body of scholarship that leaves us wanting for more. This overview chapter, in other words, has only opened new avenues of inquiry into anarchist anti-imperialism.

NOTES

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Anarchism and Religion

Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and Lara Apps

INTRODUCTION

The intersection of religious studies and anarchism has proved a fertile ground for a variety of analyses in recent years.¹ Students and practitioners of religion have taken anarchism more seriously, and students and practitioners of anarchism have taken religion more seriously. The encounter can lead to tensions and expose unbridgeable differences, but in most cases explorations have been fruitful, opening up and investigating new avenues of thought and practice.

This dialogue encompasses a variety of rather different conversations: sometimes anarchists revisit their assessment of religion; sometimes religious scholars articulate a theology which engages with anarchist tropes; sometimes the focus is on how specific anarchists approach religion; sometimes general parallels are drawn between anarchism and religion; sometimes religious scriptures are interpreted to point to anarchist politics; and so on. In other words, the encounter between religion and anarchism can concentrate on very different facets of either, and involve different approaches, methodologies, modes and tones of enquiry. This variety

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A. Christoyannopoulos (✉)
Department of Politics, History and International Relations,
Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK
e-mail: a.christoyannopoulos@lboro.ac.uk

L. Apps
Athabasca University, Athabasca, Edmonton, AB, Canada
e-mail: lapps@shaw.ca

reflects not only the different themes of interest to both anarchism and religion but also different ontological, epistemological and methodological approaches.

This chapter sketches out some of the ways in which anarchism and religion intersect and influence each other's imagination. The aim is not to systematically present all the scholarship in this area, although an effort has been made to encompass a broad range of sources to compile an accurate map of the different *types* of scholarship around this topic. As often with typologies, the divisions and categories proposed might at times be rather arbitrary. They should not, therefore, be interpreted too strictly but rather heuristically, as an attempt to catalogue the territory.

The chapter is structured in four sections: the first considers some classic anarchist quarrels with religion and its institutions; the second surveys the scholarship on anarchist interpretations of founding religious scriptures and figures; the third discusses the growing interest in anarchist 'theology' as distinct from scriptural exegesis; and the fourth points to the variety of historical studies on specific religious anarchist thinkers, communities and movements.

It will quickly become obvious that the dominant religion in the scholarship is Christianity. One reason for this might be that (at least according to the traditional narrative) anarchist thought and practice cut many of its teeth in societies in which Christianity and its institutions tended to dominate. Nonetheless, even though the main religious interlocutor in this chapter is Christianity, other traditions are still cited whenever possible and appropriate, and the arguments which apply where anarchism and Christianity meet often apply in comparable ways to other traditions too.

ANARCHIST CRITIQUES OF RELIGION

It seems sensible to begin by acknowledging the frequent suspicion of, and, in some cases, outright hostility towards religion among many anarchists. This section outlines the critical views on religion expressed by several important early anarchists, as these have framed subsequent encounters between anarchism and religion.² Anarchist critiques of religion target both its institutional aspects and religious belief itself, with varying emphases depending on the individual thinker.

The essence of the anarchist critique of religion is that it is a source of inequality and injustice, a lie used by the priestly class and the state to increase their power by keeping the populace in fear and ignorance. Emma Goldman put it succinctly in 1908:

Religion is a superstition that originated in man's mental inability to solve natural phenomena. The Church is an organized institution that has always been a stumbling block to progress. Organized churchism has stripped religion of its naiveté and primitiveness. It has turned religion into a nightmare that oppresses the human soul and holds the mind in bondage.³

This critique was articulated earlier, by the anticlerical, materialist and atheist writers of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, some of whom, such

as the atheist priest Jean Meslier, also expressed anarchistic hostility to property, law and government. William Godwin, who is sometimes regarded as the progenitor of modern anarchism, cited the Baron d'Holbach's atheist treatise *The System of Nature* (1770) as a key influence on his own thinking.

In *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (1793), Godwin did not dwell on the issue of the existence of God or the truth of religion. His main concern regarded religion's lack of utility to the cause of moral improvement. Godwin argued that literature, education and political justice lead to moral improvement; there is no role for religion, which merely enslaves humanity through shame and superstition and is only able to do so because it is supported by government.⁴ Further, religious establishments and the demand for religious conformity require 'blind submission' and thus turn people into hypocrites who must outwardly profess adherence to the articles of their faith even when they disagree with them or do not believe them.⁵ The clergy, who are supposed to provide moral instruction to the laity, are intellectually inflexible, hypocritical men 'whose business it should seem to be to dupe their contemporaries into the practice of virtue'.⁶ Godwin also argued that the government should not compel anyone to support a religious institution:

If public worship be conformable to reason, reason without doubt will prove adequate to its vindication and support. If it be from God, it is profanation to imagine that it stands in need of the alliance of the state. It must be in an eminent degree artificial and exotic, if it be incapable of preserving itself in existence, otherwise than by the inauspicious interference of political institution.⁷

Finally, he argued against the suppression of religious and political 'heresy' on the grounds that ignorance does not lead to virtue and that the exploration of different opinions is not subversive; it is only when a government attempts to suppress opinions that citizens will disturb the peace by fighting back. The outcome is especially violent when governments support particular religions: 'The moment government descends to wear the badge of a sect, religious war is commenced, the world is disgraced with inexpiable broils and deluged with blood'.⁸

Like Godwin, Peter Kropotkin argued that morality did not depend on religion. In *Anarchist Morality* (1898), he theorised that 'the moral sense is a natural faculty in us like the sense of smell or of touch'.⁹ All animal and human societies possess the principle of treating others as we would like to be treated under similar circumstances; this natural, innate principle has been 'filched' by law and religion 'to cloak their own wares, their injunctions for the benefit of the conqueror, the exploiter, the priest'.¹⁰ Not only is religion unnecessary for morality but the state and the church, working together to dominate and oppress mankind through violence and fear, have poisoned and perverted our moral sense, which has led to a society in which human nature is degraded by exploitation and servitude. In order to recover its true morality, we must reject law, religion and authority, all of which conspire to perpetuate submissiveness.

Both Mikhail Bakunin and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon developed extended critiques of religion that included accounts of its origin and development. In *God and the State* (1882), Bakunin suggests that although belief in divinity was a necessary stage in humanity's evolution from a purely animal state, it is a form of slavery and collective insanity that must be eradicated. For Bakunin, the idea of God as a perfect being creates a necessarily negative view of humanity as God's opposite and inferior: 'God being truth, justice, goodness, beauty, power, and life, man is falsehood, iniquity, evil, ugliness, impotence, and death. God being master, man is the slave'.¹¹ All religions 'debase and corrupt' humanity by destroying reason, encouraging ignorance, dishonouring human labour, killing human pride and dignity and making humans cruel towards each other.¹² Religions persist because most people are still ignorant, weighed down by economic oppression, and deprived of the education and leisure to emancipate themselves from the idea of God. People turn to 'the dram-shop and the church, debauchery of the body or debauchery of the mind' in order to escape the misery of their wretched material and intellectual conditions. Only a social revolution 'will have the power to close at the same time all the dram-shops and all the churches' by allowing the full development of humanity in freedom.¹³ Bakunin took the non-existence of God for granted, but Proudhon interrogated the meaning of the idea of God, suggesting in *What Is Property?* (1840) that the original, primitive idea of Divinity has never been successfully defined and that anthropomorphism distorts or disfigures the idea of God. Further distortion results from the treatment of God as a possession: 'Represented in such monstrous form, God became everywhere the property of man and the state'.¹⁴ This is the origin of the corruption of morals by religion and is the source of pious hatreds and holy wars. Freedom of religion and separation of religious and secular authority will reduce these destructive influences of religion; religion is not, however, the primary cause of inequality and suffering, which stem from human beings at war with themselves.¹⁵

Proudhon extended his examination of the idea of God in *System of Economical Contradictions* (1846). He introduces the work with a lengthy consideration of what he calls the hypothesis of God, explaining that 'God is nothing more than collective instinct or universal reason'—a way for humans to understand their own self-consciousness within the world.¹⁶ Although he argues that the existence of God cannot be affirmed without empirical demonstration, which is lacking, he concludes that the 'hypothesis' still stands because it cannot be disproven. In part of his analysis, Proudhon elaborates on the classic problem of why evil exists in a world created and ruled by a benevolent God, arguing that if God exists, he has not only allowed evil to exist in the world but has created the conditions for human suffering by leaving us at the mercy of our own intellectual and moral limitations: 'God, whom faith represents as a tender father and a prudent master, abandons us to the fatality of our incomplete conceptions; he digs the ditch under our feet; he causes us to move blindly: and then, at every fall, he punishes us as rascals'.¹⁷ In other words, if

God is in fact benevolent, he would not abandon us to our own worst natures. Since he has, if he exists, so abandoned us, he is evil and 'a being deserving of hell'.¹⁸ As a consequence,

the first duty of man, on becoming intelligent and free, is to continually hunt the idea of God out of his mind and conscience. For God, if he exists, is essentially hostile to our nature, and we do not depend at all on his authority. We arrive at knowledge in spite of him, at comfort in spite of him, at society in spite of him; every step we take in advance is a victory in which we crush Divinity.¹⁹

Intellectual honesty requires an acknowledgement that we cannot know whether God is real or not, but since he is our enemy, then 'practical atheism' is the only reasonable course to follow.²⁰

Bakunin's and Proudhon's negative views of God are echoed in Sébastien Faure's *Does God Exist? Twelve Proofs of the Nonexistence of God* (1908), in which Faure argued that if God exists, then he is responsible for both physical and moral evil, and humans are slaves.²¹ Faure was not, however, taking the idea of God's existence seriously, as Proudhon does, but used this argument to attack the religious conception of God as benevolent and perfect. Like the other anarchist thinkers considered so far, Faure regarded religion as having oppressed humanity by encouraging superstition and demanding submissiveness. In *The God Pestilence* (1887), Johann Most attacked the Jewish and Christian God as a cruel despot, a spectre fabricated by scoundrels and a pestilence of the mind.²² Max Stirner also invoked the imagery of spectres, arguing in *Art and Religion* (1842) that God, the spirit and so on are fixed ideas, or 'wheels in the head' that haunt us; those who cling to such fixed ideas, particularly to the idea of the divine, are fools.²³ This critique of religion, however, is part of Stirner's general critique of fixed ideas, including conventional morality, legality, truthfulness and love.

Errico Malatesta offered a somewhat different perspective on religion. While agreeing with other anarchist thinkers that 'religion ought to wither away along with every cult through which men's ignorance and priests' cunning have manifested themselves', Malatesta argued that 'the religious question ... is an economic question', and that failure to grasp this fact is what has prevented 'the apostles of Freethought' from converting the masses.²⁴ Dismissing the issue of religious truth as effectively irrelevant, Malatesta focuses on the organisation of the church, pointing out that it mirrors the organisation of the state in every way except that the church uses fraud rather than force to persuade the people to turn their possessions over to it.²⁵ He also points out that if the priestly class's contribution to society is prayer, it makes a living out of praying and thus evades its obligation to do actual labour. As Malatesta puts it, the priest is 'nothing but a collector of ecclesiastical taxes'.²⁶

While these anarchist thinkers share a negative view of religion that can be boiled down to certain core elements, this survey shows that not all anarchist critiques of religion are the same. It is important to consider that each critique

is embedded within a matrix of related ideas about authority, equality, the nature of the world, human psychology, and so on. Another important aspect of these critiques is that although these thinkers targeted Christianity, they intended their criticisms to apply to all religions. Finally, as Colin Ward has noted, anarchists and other nineteenth-century political thinkers believed that religion was on the wane and would fade away, especially if encouraged to do so through education of the masses and amelioration of their living conditions.²⁷ This has not happened: the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen a resurgence of religious commitment that presents a serious challenge to the idea of religion's inevitable disappearance. Anarchists must still, then, reckon with religion and its impact on the societies they wish to change.

The anarchist critique of religion is certainly open to challenge and qualification. There is not enough space here to address the complex history of the relationship between religion(s) and the state, which includes persecution of religious groups by the state and by other religious groups, as well as power struggles between secular and religious authorities. To give just one example, during the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, radical religious groups such as the Anabaptists were both anticlerical and opposed to secular authority²⁸; modern history, too, provides examples of religiously motivated protest and resistance. From an atheist perspective, however, empirical counter-examples to the narrative of church collusion with the state do not attenuate the forcefulness of their criticisms of religion.

The view of God as a despotic master may also be challenged: significant currents within religious traditions have been critical of their own patriarchal structures, and 'gods' are not always, or only, defined as 'masters'. As Alexis-Baker notes, in the Christian Bible, 'God is also identified as Creator, Liberator, Teacher, Healer, Guide, Provider, Protector and Love', so that anarchists and Christians *alike* who are 'making monarchical language the primary descriptor of God' in fact 'misrepresent' his 'full character'.²⁹ To understand God as a despot is therefore to misunderstand the varieties of the multifaceted understandings of 'God' even within the Christian tradition. (Hugo Strandberg also argues, using Max Stirner as an interlocutor, that it is a mistake to see religion as *necessarily* requiring servitude.³⁰) Again, however, since from an atheist perspective a multifaceted God is still a delusion, such views may have little impact.

For some anarchists, the same consistent critical thinking which leads to anarchism must also lead to atheism.³¹ Some go as far as to almost see an avowed anarchist's atheism as one of the measures of their commitment to an anarchist approach. Certainly atheists have been strongly represented in the writings of many classical anarchists and in many anarcho-sindicalist circles. Atheism is not, however, a strictly necessary precondition for reaching anarchist conclusions: as the following sections of this chapter show, the two sets of conclusions do not depend on each other, and even though they can reinforce each other, a dismissal of all religion following atheist arguments is analytically separable from the dismissal of the religious, political and economic establishment following anarchist arguments.

Despite the substantial (though varied) hostility to religion in anarchist milieus, many anarchists today nonetheless display considerable tolerance of their religious comrades, an openness to respectful yet critical discussions of unfamiliar perspectives and a willingness to leave some of their differences on religion aside in their shared contemporary struggles against various forms of oppression. Indeed, as Barclay shows, even several classical anarchists had some sympathy for some aspects of the religions they encountered—such as the emphasis on love and mutualism in the teachings of Jesus, the radical politics of some religious sects and movements, and so on.³² Kropotkin's famous entry on anarchism in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* provides one example of this,³³ and Gérard Bessière's *Jésus selon Proudhon* discusses Proudhon's productive fascination with the figure of Jesus and his conclusion that Jesus was a social and moral reformer whose message was corrupted and 'spiritualised' by Paul and his generation.³⁴ John Clark's 'Anarchism' entry in the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature* also paints a detailed picture of 'anarchist tendencies across history that have held a spiritual view of reality', thus showing that the meeting of anarchist and religious currents is not new.³⁵ Hostility to all aspects of religion, therefore, is not a trait universal to anarchists.

Furthermore, as some scholars have argued, certain parallels can be identified between anarchism and religion. Aurelio Orensanz's *Anarquía y Cristianismo* discusses the similarities between several central Christian themes and values and those propounded by anarchists (in particular Bakunin, interestingly)³⁶; Keith Hebden's 'Building a Dalit World in the Shell of the Old' examines the parallels between anarchism (as defined by Colin Ward) and Dalit values and practice³⁷; Demetrio Castro Alfin's 'Anarquismo y Protestantismo' considers the parallels between the anticlericalism of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Andalusian anarchist peasants and that of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century protestant agitators³⁸; Franziska Hoppen discusses the 'mystical anarchism' of Gustav Landauer and Eric Voegelin to reveal common threads in their vision of an 'anti-political community'³⁹; and Simon Podmore juxtaposes Søren Kierkegaard's theism with Proudhon's anti-theism to reveal surprising affinities such as a similar critique of the abuses of Divine Providence.⁴⁰ In other words, certain views and practices can be found in both anarchist and religious groups.

Finally, it is worth atheist anarchists bearing in mind that too cavalier a dismissal of religion can have regrettable effects in alienating potential allies and comrades emerging from different journeys yet keen to share and build bridges. Erica Lagalisse's 'Marginalizing Magdalena' examines some of the pitfalls of the typical antireligious prejudice among anarchists by reflecting (from a feminist, anti-colonial perspective) on the marginalisation of a female Oaxacan activist during a speaking tour in Canada.⁴¹ What can be dismissed as 'religion' includes many aspects and phenomena (beliefs, communal practices, moral commitments, etc.), and while anarchists might converge in denouncing domination and oppression where those are indeed displayed, it may be that today

many of those other facets of ‘religion’ are not the main sources of domination—indeed, as many secular anarchists have recognised, there is much to learn from religious comrades in the struggle against structures of oppression (including their own). Besides, if Paul-François Tremlett is correct that in early anarchist writings, ‘religion’ as a category was formed and functioned as ‘a cipher for thinking about the past’ (whether as something that was looked back at nostalgically or as something that needed to be overcome), then perhaps the broader context has evolved enough for the time to have come to reconsider the variety of facets and experiences of ‘religion’ and work with those religious people who share many of the goals of fellow anarchists.⁴²

ANARCHIST EXEGESIS

Having outlined and discussed some of the traditional suspicions of religion among anarchists, it is time to look at examples of more favorable interactions. One example of a positive encounter comes from studies that interpret religious scriptures to advocate anarchism or to otherwise imply anarchist conclusions—that is to say, anarchist exegesis. Here, the ‘anarchism’ is in the political deductions of those scriptural interpretations, in other words in the criticisms of the state, capitalism and other structures of oppression—including indeed many aspects of ‘religion’—that these interpreters derive from major religious texts. This approach therefore refuses to dismiss all religion a priori, reads foundational religious texts and finds their line of reasoning to lead to anarchist conclusions. Alexandre Christoyannopoulos’ *Christian Anarchism* considers many examples of notorious anarchist exegeses and weaves them together to present a relatively generic and systematic anarchist interpretation of the Christian gospels.⁴³ Here, a brief outline of the main interpretations will illustrate some of the variety of styles and focuses involved.

The author who is traditionally cited in *anarchist* circles as the primary example of Christian anarchism is Leo Tolstoy, and the most frequently cited book is his *Kingdom of God Is within You* (1894).⁴⁴ In it, Tolstoy covers at length topics such as military service, state violence and revolutionary methods, and defends his interpretation of Christianity against what he sees as perversions of it. That book, however, was originally written in response to the reception of his earlier and more methodical exegesis published as either *What I Believe* or *My Religion* (1884), which outlines Tolstoy’s analysis of Jesus’ teaching in meticulous detail.⁴⁵ Interesting too is Tolstoy’s harmonised and translated version of the gospels (‘The Gospel According to Leo’, as it were), which, by what it includes and excludes, illustrates how Tolstoy interprets the four canonical scriptures.⁴⁶ As an exegete, however, Tolstoy was a maverick. He rejected and ignored everything he saw as irrational, and focused squarely on the moral teaching of Jesus. He also ignored much of the Old Testament, Paul’s epistles and the rest of the New Testament. Predictably, therefore, his exegetical approach has been widely criticised, and it may not be surprising that even in *Christian* radical circles, Tolstoy tends to be approached with caution. Nonetheless, one

of the merits of his exegesis is its stubborn refusal to shy away from the logical implications of Jesus' teaching with regard to the state's perpetration and legitimation of violence.

Less unconventional as an exegete and more respected as a theologian is Jacques Ellul. A prolific scholar, he wrote dozens of volumes, several of which interpret specific books and passages of the Bible. He gained particular notoriety for his critique of what he called our *société technicienne* (usually translated as 'technological society'), a society in which the obsession with efficiency overrides ethical concerns. His most explicitly anarchist contribution to biblical exegesis, however, came in the chapter 'Anarchism and Christianity' and the short book *Anarchy and Christianity* (1988).⁴⁷ In these works, Ellul offers an explicitly anarchist interpretation of several Bible passages, including some largely ignored by Tolstoy, such as the Old Testament Book of Samuel, 'render unto Caesar' (which Tolstoy deals with rather hastily) and the Book of Revelation. Although he does not match the piercing eloquence of Tolstoy's denunciation of state violence, both Ellul's coverage of the Bible and his theological approach are more conventional than Tolstoy's, making him more amenable for contemporary Christians to identify and engage with.

Several other writers have published explicitly anarchistic exegeses of Christian scripture. One somewhat controversial example is Vernard Eller's *Christian Anarchy*, which proposes a reading of Romans 13 which has not always been well received by Christian anarchists and poses problems for secular anarchists, yet nonetheless articulates clear criticisms of the state despite the counter-intuitive method it proposes to subvert it.⁴⁸ Other anarchist exegeses include Niels Kjær's *Kristendom og Anarkisme*; Michael Elliott's *Freedom, Justice, and Christian Counter-Culture*; Dave Andrews' *Christi-Anarchy*; Matt Russell's 'Anarchism and Christianity'; Mark Van Steenwyk's *That Holy Anarchist*; and Paul Dordal's *In Search of Jesus the Anarchist*, each of which reflects on Jesus' teaching, often contrasts it with the mainstream church interpretation of it and gives examples of Christian communities that have tried harder than the mainstream to remain faithful to it.⁴⁹

Further examples include David Alan Black's *Christian Archy*, which revisits the meaning of God's 'kingdom' in the New Testament⁵⁰; Tom O'Golo's *Christ? No! Jesus? Yes!*, which argues that Jesus and his first followers were anarchists and that Paul corrupted Christianity⁵¹; Greg Boyd's 'The Bible, Government and Christian Anarchy', which comments on a variety of biblical texts in support of an anarchist interpretation⁵²; Nekeisha Alexis-Baker's 'The Church as Resistance to Racism and Nation', which looks to scripture to describe how the church can embody an opposition to both the idea of race and the nation-state⁵³; Peter Pick's 'A Theology of Revolutions', which analyses Abiezer Coppe's use of the Bible as a weapon against the earthly authorities of his day⁵⁴; and Justin Meggitt's close reading of scriptural sources to interrogate the claim that 'Jesus was an anarchist'.⁵⁵ There are therefore numerous examples of explicitly anarchist exegeses, many written relatively recently.

Also noteworthy, because cited by contemporary Christian anarchists, are exegeses which, even though not explicitly anarchistic, come very close to it because of their criticism of violence or of political elites, such as John Howard Yoder's *Politics of Jesus*, Ched Myers' *Binding the Strong Man* and Walter Wink's studies of the 'powers'.⁵⁶ A further example is Shane Claiborne and Chris Haw's *Jesus for President* with its associated website, YouTube clips, speaking tours and DVDs.⁵⁷ Written primarily for US Christians and adopting a format which is both lively and colourful, their book aspires to 'provoke the Christian political imagination' beyond the narrow confines of electoral politics. However, perhaps to minimise the risk of alienating its readership and maximise the chances of convincing it, the word 'anarchism' seems deliberately avoided. Yet its exegesis, its commentary on church history and its reflections on the political engagement of contemporary Christians are all strikingly anarchistic, similar to and indeed often relying on the writings of several of the authors cited above.

In a sense, these exegeses tend to focus their direct criticism on the state, and to some extent the church, more than on capitalism, even though many secular anarchists today see capitalism as at least as dangerous as the state. Of course, the precise nature of the overlap, interaction and mutual reinforcement of 'the state' and 'capitalism' is complex and evolving, and whether there even is a single and primary source of 'evil' in the global political economy is debatable. Besides, Christian anarchists do frequently interpret scriptural passages as challenging contemporary economic orthodoxies, and they do frequently criticise the capitalist system on that basis. However, their arguments from scripture to the state seem to require fewer logical steps than those from scripture to capitalism. It is presumably easier to interpret ancient scripture to denounce the political and religious establishments (although, of course, the state today is a complex phenomenon too) than it is to denounce the web of interests and the instruments of oppression that form the 'establishment' in the globalised capitalist economy. Still, whether borrowing Hardt and Negri's notion of 'empire' in pamphlets such as Jason Barr's *Radical Hope* or in numerous Iconocast podcasts, denouncing responses to the financial crisis in Christian anarchist blogs and newspapers, or turning some classic submissive passages from the King James translation of the Bible into an empowering call to 'occupy the land' and 'cast wickedness into the furnace of fire', contemporary Christian anarchists do spend much time denouncing the current economic order.⁵⁸ To date, however, Christian criticisms of capitalism rooted directly in exegesis tend to be less ubiquitous and less developed than those of the state or church.

In any case, anarchist interpretations of religious scripture are not restricted to Christianity. In Islam, for instance, both Mohamed Jean Veneuse's *Anarca-Islam* and Abdennur Prado's *El Islam como Anarquismo Místico* demonstrate that the Koran can be interpreted anarchically as an anti-authoritarian, anti-capitalist and anti-patriarchal text—indeed, also (just as the Christian gospel) as a text critical of the religious establishment.⁵⁹ These studies, however, seem to

be the first detailed attempts at such exegesis so far (at least in English). Outside monotheistic traditions, John Clark's *Master Lao and the Anarchist Prince* aims to show that 'the Daodejing is in accord with [...] holistic ecological anarchism',⁶⁰ and in *Zen Anarchy* Max Cafard (Clark's alter-ego) similarly argues that Zen was always meant to be anarchic, indeed that it *is* 'the practice of anarchy', and demonstrates this through an interpretation of respected Zen and Buddhist writings and teachings.⁶¹

In short, there are numerous examples of interpretations of scripture that lead to anarchist conclusions. These examples do of course illustrate the paradox of anarchism *derived from scriptural authority*. Even if the conclusion is an anarchist critique of the state, the economy or even of religion, secular anarchists may still justifiably denounce the 'revealed' point of departure as not very anarchist. Yet that is also the strength of that position. Within contemporary *religious* circles, appeal to scriptural authority can act as a theological trump card, and religious anarchists have sometimes used it in precisely this way. When a holy text can be convincingly and consistently argued to imply an anarchist position, this can help persuade coreligionists. Anarchist exegesis therefore provides an essential line of reasoning for religious anarchist arguments.

ANARCHIST THEOLOGY

'Theology' is a term that can be misunderstood in non-religious circles, and sometimes the word 'theological' gets used almost as a synonym for 'religious'. Yet theology refers to a specific mode of inquiry and understanding, one more deeply rooted in religion than 'religious studies'. It follows a style of argument which is more contemplative, which often assumes 'belief', and which thinks within (and uses the language of) religious traditions. Compared to exegesis, therefore, theology is less concerned with scripture and its interpretation, and more with approaching specific questions and themes (such as war, evil, peace, justice, love) from a particular religious or cosmological understanding. Theology ultimately seeks to remain faithful to scripture, but not be reduced to it.

There is some debate within religious studies as to whether the term 'theology' should only be applied to Christian or at least monotheistic thought, or whether it can be used to describe the similar thinking and philosophy which can emerge from any religious tradition. Yet even though some religions have no deity (*theos*) to 'reason' (*logos*) about, Christianity is not the only religion to engage in the mode of reflection rooted within a religious tradition which is described by the term: 'theology'. Hence, although somewhat ethnocentric, the word does name a type of investigation which is not necessarily restricted to Christian thought. Therefore, the label of 'anarchist theology' can similarly be applied to anarchist reflections rooted in any religious tradition, thus helping differentiate such a mode of thinking from a more exegetical one focused on interpreting foundational texts.

At the same time, the boundary between exegesis and theology is not rigid. Theological discussions are not necessarily directly rooted in scripture, but many ultimately are. Exegetical discussions can be narrowly focused on the specific verses they seek to interpret, but frequently evoke theological ideas and debates which have matured within their religious tradition. In short, ‘exegesis’ and ‘theology’ point to two types of analyses which are driven by different primary concerns but are nonetheless complementary and often used together. For instance, Christian anarchists have contributed to theological discussions on restorative justice (theology), and they have articulated a detailed interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount (exegesis), but they have also criticised mainstream theological developments such as just war theory on the basis of scripture (both).

Nevertheless, not all Christian anarchism is merely about scripture, and several Christian anarchists have articulated *theological* considerations of specific contemporary questions. Claiborne and Haw’s *Jesus for President* and Ted Lewis’ *Electing Not to Vote* both address various themes around voting and elections⁶²; Ellul’s *Violence* ponders the topic of violence from a variety of Christian perspectives⁶³; Keith Hebden’s *Seeking Justice* blends personal experience and theology, and more broadly stories and theory, to explore ways in which activists can be inspired to challenge unjust structures⁶⁴; and Ronald Osborn’s collection of essays reflects, from a radical perspective influenced by Tolstoy and Chomsky, on a number of topics related to war and political power including Obama’s Nobel Prize, the political contribution of the Seventh-day Adventist Church and the Vietnam War.⁶⁵ These publications all address specific themes and debates grounded within an anarchist-leaning Christian tradition.

Such theological discussions often engage with and find support in existing theological schools of thought which, although not reaching explicitly anarchist conclusions, have developed arguments which are sympathetic to it. For instance, much ‘theology of liberation’ considers themes close to anarchism. Its critique of oppression and of the capitalist economy and its preference for grassroots and community-based forms of organisation, for instance, chime with anarchism. Given liberation theology’s indebtedness to socialist thought, this is probably not surprising. Rarely, however, is anarchism explicitly mentioned in liberation theology, and rarely is a specific criticism of the state expressed in arguments more familiar to anarchists. Indeed, empowerment of the oppressed is often envisaged in statist terms. Yet just as anarchism is ideologically close to (indeed arguably a stream of) socialism, anarchist theology is not far removed from liberation theology. Linda Damico’s *The Anarchist Dimension of Liberation Theology* explores precisely this ideological proximity,⁶⁶ and Hebden’s *Dalit Theology and Christian Anarchism* illustrates this proximity in the particular postcolonial Indian context of Dalit theology.⁶⁷

Similar arguments can be made of pacifist theology. One of the main reasons some Christian anarchists (Tolstoyans in particular) are anarchists is that they apply their pacifist rejection of violence to the state—they see their anarchism

as a consistent and essential extension of their pacifism. Conversely, some Christian anarchists have found support in arguments made by leading theologians such as Yoder or Hauerwas who, although not anarchists, have articulated powerful theological cases against violence.

A more recent school of theological thought, which at times echoes anarchist themes, is Radical Orthodoxy, in particular in some of the writings of William T. Cavanaugh.⁶⁸ This theological current aims to return to and affirm 'orthodox' interpretations of Christian faith such that, implicitly or explicitly, it is critical of contemporary ideas and institutions such as secularism but also of the modern sovereign nation-state established by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Even if its main concern is not necessarily with politics, and even if its critical engagement with much secular thought brings it into direct philosophical conflict with much anarchist thinking, when some of its scholars engage with political questions, it can find itself close to an anarchist position. Richard Davis has explored Cavanaugh and Milbank (possibly the most notorious theologian in this school) and discusses their critique of the state on theological grounds, using the language of creation, preservation and redemption to examine the origins of the state and present the church (in the 'radical orthodox' sense) as an alternative to it.⁶⁹ Most secular anarchists will presumably reject the grounding in theology as well as the critique of secularism, but Radical Orthodoxy nonetheless presents an example of theology which leans towards anarchism in its critique of the state.

At the same time, even when the state or capitalism are criticised theologically, rarely do theologians openly adopt the 'anarchism' label. This reluctance might be driven by a degree of caution and distrust based on the perception that anarchists unfailingly dismiss all things religious, or perhaps sometimes to avoid lengthy justifications of the appropriateness of the label. But this seems to be changing. In both activist and scholarly circles, there is a palpable buzz around religious (especially Christian) anarchism, and in religious groups in particular a desire to articulate and discuss it *theologically*. Whether in current research projects, online discussion fora, recent publications or conference papers, there is perceptible enthusiasm for more explicitly anarchist-leaning theology.

One example is the quality of theological discussions hosted on websites such as Jesus Radicals, whether in essays and podcasts,⁷⁰ at conferences convened through it, or in publications emerging from these.⁷¹ Also interesting and indicative of the present appeal of anarchist theology is Kevin Snyman's *Occupying Faith*, which is a collection of sermons, reflections and other resources placing Jesus among the Occupy movement and exploring how Christians can respond 'through prayer, meditation, liturgy, stories, art, reflection and theological debate' to today's 'unjust economic and political systems'.⁷² Mohamed Jean Veneuse's ambitions for 'Anarca-Islam' is similarly rooted in the contemporary political economy and blends exegesis with more theological considerations.

In any case, anarchist theology is not entirely new. As noted, several established schools of theological thought have hovered close to anarchist conclusions. Hundreds of articles printed in the *Catholic Worker* newspaper since its launch (in 1933) have echoed central anarchist themes using theological language. Moreover, most of the books mentioned above as ‘exegetical’ also at times engage in more ‘theological’ reflection and argument. For instance, Ellul, Boyd, Wink, Yoder and Andrews, to name but a few, have published theological works which lend themselves well to Christian anarchist arguments. As to Gary Snyder’s *Buddhist Anarchism*, it also probably best comes under the category of ‘theology’ rather than ‘exegesis’ in that it articulates anarchist reflections from a Buddhist position.⁷³ What examples such as these illustrate, therefore, is that the recent burst of scholarship on anarchist theology has older foundations.

A more controversial set of theological publications might perhaps be qualified as ‘polemics’, ‘tracts’ or ‘pleas’ (an analogous French term might be *plaidoyer*). For instance, Jacques de Guillebon and Falk van Gaver’s *L’Anarchisme chrétien* blends an avowedly selective reading of renowned French Catholic theologians with meandering discussions of anarchist themes and figures such as Tolstoy, Ellul and Day, thus painting a deliberately controversial, yet rich and stimulating, canvas.⁷⁴ Another example might be Paul Cudene’s *The Anarchist Soul*, which journeys through the anarchism of Bakunin, Gustav Landauer and Herbert Read but also through esoteric forms of religion, psychology and existential philosophy to present anarchism as a complete way of being in contrast to the alienating life of modern society.⁷⁵ One could also mention Kerry Thornley’s *Zenarchy*: unorthodox in its structure, provocative in its arguments and typical of its author, it describes itself as ‘a way of Zen applied to social life’, a ‘non-combative, non-participatory, no-politics approach to anarchy intended to get the serious student thinking’. Such publications may not follow conventional or academic lines of argument, but they do offer thought-provoking contributions to anarchist theology.⁷⁶

Lastly, the recent work of Simon Critchley engages with theology even though it is not ‘theological’ in the sense of speaking from within a theological tradition. Both his ‘Mystical Anarchism’ and his *Faith of the Faithless* journey through Schmitt’s political theology, Rousseau’s civil religion and medieval mysticism and millenarianism in order to reflect on the mystical, anarchist and arguably millenarian potential for love of fellow humans to transform both the self and our understanding of the common.⁷⁷ Critchley is not speaking from a Christian context, but his work is ‘theological’ in the sense that it contributes to what Schmitt understood as ‘political theology’ (which sees political discourses and institutions as secularised theological ones), and it discusses the theological work of medieval mystics and millenarians. Ted Troxell’s ‘Christian Theory’ arguably adds to Critchley (and to the view that all politics is in some ultimate sense ‘theological’) by bringing into careful dialogue a number of post-anarchist themes with theological reflections articulated by John Howard Yoder, thus presenting Yoder as a potential contributor to post-anarchist theory.⁷⁸

In short, anarchist theology refers to diverse modes of analysis which are relatively distinct from anarchist exegesis, although complementary. As anarchist exegesis is gaining increasing recognition, so, too, is anarchist theology. Several schools of theological thought have come close to anarchist territory in the past, but rarely have theological discussions explicitly embraced anarchist reasoning and conclusions. More recently, however, a number of scholars and activists have been developing theological reflections that are sympathetic to and driven towards anarchist themes and arguments, so it seems likely that anarchist theology will continue to bear a variety of fruits in the coming years.

RELIGIOUS ANARCHIST HISTORY

A third, more loosely defined type of scholarship, in which anarchism and religion supportively encounter each other, is the analysis of specific thinkers and movements. This type of scholarship varies between the biographical and the discursive, some studies concentrating on mapping the lives and genealogies of individuals or movements and others more concerned with reflecting on or discussing their ideas and philosophies, perhaps drawing parallels and charting currents across different historical contexts. What is common to such studies, despite significant variety, is their concern to present (indeed often recover and affirm) the life and thought of religious anarchist figures—who did what when, how this was religious and anarchist, and why it matters for the broader histories of those contexts.

Examples of such studies abound and include studies of Tolstoyan colonies⁷⁹; Charlotte Alston's monograph on Tolstoyism as an international movement⁸⁰; Valerio Pignatta's book on sixteenth-century English religious revolutionaries⁸¹; Bojan Aleksov's history of religious dissenters in early twentieth-century Hungary⁸²; André de Raaij's account of Dutch Christian anarchists in the same period⁸³; Harold Barclay's short book describing various religious sects and his earlier article centred more narrowly on Muslim communities⁸⁴; Patricia Crone's presentation of ninth-century Muslim anarchists⁸⁵; Anthony Fiscella's panoramas of Islamic anarchist individuals and movements⁸⁶; Ruy Blanes' discussion of the Tokoist church in Angola⁸⁷; Tripp York's biographies of Dorothy Day, Clarence Jordan and the Berrigan brothers⁸⁸; Terrance Wiley's reflections on the confluence of anarchism and religion in Thoreau, Day and Rustin⁸⁹; the several studies chronicling the lives of Catholic Worker individuals and communities,⁹⁰ as well as, of course, the autobiographical publications of some of those individuals⁹¹; John Clark's overview of anarchist-leaning and 'nature-affirming spiritualities' including Daoism, Buddhism, Zen and many more⁹²; John Rapp's accounts of the anarchist impulse in the Dao De Jing, in Daoist philosophers and poets, and in more recent Chinese figures⁹³; Michael T. Van Dyke's chapter on Kenneth Rexroth's Zen and anarchist leanings and on the post-war spiritual counter-culture in San Francisco⁹⁴; and Enrique Galván-Álvarez's discussion of Shinran Shonin's Buddhist anarchism.⁹⁵

One could also mention Jesse Cohn's presentation of Jewish anarchists⁹⁶; studies of Jewish anarchists prior to the First World War in the United States, Central Europe and London⁹⁷; Amedeo Bertolo's edited volume bringing together the proceedings of a conference on anarchism and Jews⁹⁸; research on the role of Judaism on the radicalism of anarchists such as Emma Goldman⁹⁹; as well as works by and about thinkers such as Martin Buber and Landauer, for instance. However, one difficulty here is that 'Jewish' is a label that is as cultural and ethnic as it is 'religious', and—apart perhaps from Buber—it is not always clear how far Jewish anarchists are anarchists based on specifically *religious* arguments.

There are therefore many publications that have narrated and reinstated the histories of religious anarchist movements and activists. These studies are rarely *purely* descriptive and biographical, but they do perform an important role in writing or rewriting oft-neglected religious anarchists back into their historical contexts, in presenting some of their original contributions and telling the story of their political and religious impact. They paint a rich tapestry of religious anarchist practice and thought across time and space, thus empowering contemporary practice and thought with a historical perspective.

In addition to those publications, Tolstoy and Ellul are two Christian anarchist authors who have enjoyed significant attention, with many publications providing relatively integrated studies of both their thought and biography. Predictably, given his notoriety as an author of classic fiction, countless biographies and analyses of Tolstoy have been published. However, the specifically anarchist aspects of his later thought are rarely explicitly engaged with. Numerous studies discuss his unconventional religious views, but his political ones tend to be more quickly dismissed as too eccentric, or only described in passing or in rather vague terms. This applies as much to the scholarship on Tolstoy as to the many news articles, documentaries and other publications which commemorated the centenary of his death in 2010. Still, a few studies have nonetheless directly engaged with both his religious and his anarchist thought. Christoyannopoulos listed several of these,¹⁰⁰ and others have been published since. Colm McKeogh's *Tolstoy's Pacifism*, for instance, is a notable recent study which presents Tolstoy's religious and political ideas, including his anarchist thought, in significant depth.¹⁰¹ Rosamund Bartlett's recent biography also gives some space to Tolstoy's anarchism as well as his take on religion.¹⁰² By and large, however, the scholarship on Tolstoy tends to focus on other aspects of his writings than his anarchist thought, or if it does touch on the latter, it does so in vague and frequently dismissive terms.

Jacques Ellul is the other notable Christian anarchist whose thought has been the subject of a number of scholarly publications. One recent issue of the *Ellul Forum*, for example, includes four essays devoted to taking seriously the anarchist dimension of his thought.¹⁰³ In general, however, as with Tolstoy, the anarchist elements of Ellul's thought are rarely engaged with in much detail. Indeed, Frédéric Rognon's *Génération Ellul*,¹⁰⁴ which lists and briefly describes the various 'successors' of Ellul's thought today, only includes three 'anarchists',

even though his *Jacques Ellul* includes discussion of Ellul's anarchist thought and its relevance for contemporary ecological and global justice movements.¹⁰⁵ Of the biographies of Ellul, however, Andrew Goddard's is perhaps the one which analyses Ellul's religious and anarchist thought in most detail.¹⁰⁶ Still, most of the scholarship on Ellul's social and political work tends to engage with his analysis of the technological society more than with his less abundant explicitly anarchist musings.

In terms of historical figures and their thought, there are also well-known thinkers who are not usually identified as religious anarchists, but whose thought, some have argued, is closer to anarchism than typically acknowledged. For instance, Peter Marshall presents William Blake as a forerunner of modern anarchism¹⁰⁷; Christopher Hobson examines Blake's perception of Jesus and how it informs his anarchist-leaning politics¹⁰⁸; Mitchell Verter discusses Emmanuel Levinas' use of the term *anarchy* and the extent to which his thought resonates with that of classical anarchists¹⁰⁹; and Richard Davis argues that Søren Kierkegaard's call for indifference to the state makes him a peculiarly Christian type of anarchist.¹¹⁰

As to histories of much more recent examples, the religious anarchist community still appears to be thriving. Religious anarchism seems particularly vibrant in North America, but significant communities are perceptible in the British Isles, Australia and the South Pacific, as well as in continental Europe and beyond. Websites such as Jesus Radicals provide a hub and a source of information for religious anarchist networks, as does social media, online fora and other online tools and campaigns such as Occupy Faith. Offline, these networks organise conferences and other gatherings, and religious anarchism is practised daily in communal living, in providing care and support for the victims of the global political economy and in 'liturgy' and agitation against the powers and for a more just global society. For many, one important aim is to affirm, through practice, alternative traditions which are more faithful to scripture or to the origins of their particular religion, and in so doing to engage mainstream coreligionists as well as anarchist comrades and the broader citizenry. In any case, and despite their similarities, today's religious anarchists are rooted in a variety of religious traditions and political contexts, and it will be a task for future scholarship to tell the history of their life and thought.

CONCLUSIONS

While this survey is not comprehensive, we have attempted to show the variety of ways in which anarchism and religion engage with each other. Anarchists have articulated a number of criticisms of religion, including atheist dismissals of religion; but not all anarchism is atheist or takes a negative approach to religion. Critical anarchist questioning, *including* by religious anarchists, of dogmatic claims and oppressive institutions continues, but religion is not the only target nor is 'religion' necessarily the main or only problem.

Anarchist exegesis is a slightly different mode of analysis than anarchist theology. It is one thing to study and try to faithfully interpret the founding texts of a religious tradition, and another to ponder specific contemporary challenges and phenomena from within the language of a religious understanding. As the historical studies introduced in the fourth section show, the reading of founding religious texts has encouraged anarchist tendencies across the centuries, and the scholarship covered in the second section underpins such interpretations. The more intellectually innovative and challenging scholarship, however, is probably in anarchist theology, where sincere reflections and musings about various questions confronting the world are articulated in ways that seek to resonate within the authors' religious traditions.

The impact of anarchism in religious studies is therefore varied: sometimes anarchism criticises religion; sometimes parallels are noted between anarchist and religious ideas and practices; sometimes scriptural interpretations lead to anarchist conclusions; sometimes theologians lean towards anarchist themes in their religious debates; sometimes historical individuals and movements are studied and reinstated; and meanwhile, many religious anarchists try to live out their religious anarchism.

In a global arena, witnessing what some scholars have described as a 'resurgence' of religion, anarchist encounters with religion are not likely to become rarer. In that context, the emergence of religious anarchism radicalises religion and thus empowers religious people to join anarchist ranks and build bridges with fellow travellers confronting similar anarchist struggles. With a good balance of respect and critical enquiry, these bridges can enrich both anarchism and religious studies with a better understanding of anarchism, religion and religious anarchism.

NOTES

1. This includes the following collections of essays: A. Christoyannopoulos (Ed), *Religious Anarchism: New Perspectives* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009); A. Christoyannopoulos and M. S. Adams (Eds), *Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume I, Stockholm Studies in Comparative Religion* (Stockholm: Stockholm University Press, 2017), available from <https://doi.org/10.16993/bak> (accessed 14 August 2017).
2. For other overviews of classic anarchist criticisms and their main proponents, see, for instance, H. Barclay, 'Anarchist Confrontations with Religion', in N. Jun and S. Wahl (Eds), *New Perspectives on Anarchism* (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2010); J. Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1991); N. Walter, 'Anarchism and Religion', *The Raven: anarchist quarterly*, 25:7/1 (1994).
3. A. K. Shulman, *Red Emma Speaks: An Emma Goldman Reader* (Amherst, NY: Humanity, 1996), 7.
4. W. Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (Dublin: Luke White, 1793), I:28–29.
5. *Ibid.*, 151–152.

6. Ibid., 154.
7. Ibid., 155.
8. Ibid., 160.
9. R. Baldwin (Ed), *Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets* (New York: Dover, 1970), 98.
10. Ibid.
11. M. Bakunin, *God and the State* (New York: Dover, 1970), 24.
12. Ibid., 25.
13. Ibid., 16–17.
14. P.-J. Proudhon, *What Is Property?*, ed. D. R. Kelley and B. G. Smith, trans. D. R. Kelley and B. G. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 21.
15. Ibid., 20–21.
16. P.-J. Proudhon, *System of Economical Contradictions*, trans. B. R. Tucker (New York: Arno, 1972), 5.
17. Ibid., 445.
18. Ibid., 446.
19. Ibid., 448.
20. Ibid., 468.
21. S. Faure, *Does God Exist? Twelve Proofs of the Non-Existence of God* (The Anarchist Library), available from <http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/sebastien-faure-does-god-exist> (accessed 7 August 2013).
22. J. Most, *The God Pestilence* (Anarchy Archives), available from http://dward-mac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bright/most/godpest.html (accessed 27 November 2015).
23. M. Stirner, *Art and Religion* (The Anarchist Library), available from <http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/max-stirner-art-and-religion> (accessed 11 August 2017).
24. E. Malatesta, *The Method of Freedom: An Errico Malatesta Reader* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2014), 42.
25. Ibid., 25–26.
26. Ibid., 27.
27. C. Ward, *Anarchism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
28. See H.-J. Goetz, 'Radical Religiosity in the German Reformation', in R. Po-Chia Hsia (Ed), *A Companion to the Reformation World* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004).
29. N. Alexis-Baker, 'Embracing God, Rejecting Masters', *Christianarchy*, 1/1 (2005), 2.
30. H. Strandberg, 'Does Religious Belief Necessarily Mean Servitude? On Max Stirner and the Hardened Heart', in Christoyannopoulos and Adams (Eds), *Essays*.
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Anarchism and Science

Elliot Murphy

Though it is still largely regarded as a wholly political tendency, anarchism has long enjoyed a close relationship with the sciences. In his seminal essay ‘Modern Science and Anarchism’, Peter Kropotkin wrote at the beginning of the twentieth century that ‘Anarchism is a world-concept based upon a mechanical explanation of all phenomena, embracing the whole of Nature—that is, including in it the life of human societies and their economic, political, and moral problems. Its method of investigation is that of the exact natural sciences, by which every scientific conclusion must be verified’.¹ Anarchism, Kropotkin claimed, is the only ideology not bound to arbitrary stipulations about the proper functioning and organisation of societies. In particular, he placed stress on how the ethical principles of state capitalist societies are not in any way a reflection of human nature, but are rather imposed from above:

When, for instance, we are told that Law (written large) “is the objectification of Truth;” or that “the principles underlying the development of Law are the same as those underlying the development of the human spirit;” or that “Law and Morality are identical and differ only formally;” we feel as little respect for these assertions as does Mephistopheles in Goethe’s “Faust.”²

As Kropotkin predicted, the psychological and behavioural sciences have since made considerable advances in exploring the structure and origin of our moral faculties.³ Departing from modern liberalism and conservatism, anarchism is perhaps the only political ideology which proposes that morality is a mind-internal procedure and not aligned purely with an externally defined set of principles. More specifically, how the brain is responsible for aspects of human nature such as morality and how the brain sciences might even be able

E. Murphy (✉)
University College London, London, UK
e-mail: elliott.murphy.13@ucl.ac.uk

to inform discussions of political ideology are major topics of current neuroscientific research. As such, it is worth reflecting on particular developments in the sciences and their implications for domains ranging outside naturalistic investigation and to consider to what extent our current understanding of the brain can inform accounts of political action. It will be argued here that by now it can be shown very evidently that aspects of political critique can, and should, be grounded in a naturalistic basis; a conclusion which immediately departs from a number of figures (Lacan, Barthes, Althusser, Derrida, Foucault, Kristeva, Butler, Meillassoux) who typically keep to discourse analysis, but reinforces the intuitions of Kropotkin and other anarchist thinkers reviewed here.

FOUNDATIONS

Many anarchists have long argued that we should cast suspicion on those who revere what Bertrand Russell called the ‘intellectual rubbish’ which often results from the anti-scientific concepts emerging from certain corners of the humanities, in particular, literary studies.⁴ This is often done in the name of radicalism, leftist politics, and even revolution. When discussing state capitalists and state socialists, Kropotkin writes in *Modern Science and Anarchism*:

Perhaps we are wrong and they are right. But in order to ascertain who is right, it will not do either to quote this and that authority, to refer to Hegel’s trilogy, or to argue by the “dialectic method.” This question can be settled only by taking up the study of economic relations as facts of natural science.⁵

Bringing this mindset into more modern times, in 1965, during the escalation of the war in Vietnam, the anarchist Noam Chomsky was invited to a conference which brought together the opinions of social scientists and representatives of ‘various theological, philosophical, and humanist traditions’ in order to ‘find solutions that are more consistent with fundamental human values than current American policy in Vietnam has turned out to be’. He responded to the invitation:

The only debatable issue, it seems to me, is whether it is more ridiculous to turn to experts in social theory for general well-confirmed propositions, or to the specialists in the great religions and philosophical systems for insights into fundamental human values If there is a body of theory, well tested and well verified, that applies to the conduct of foreign affairs or the resolution of domestic or international conflict, its existence has been kept a well-guarded secret.⁶

The scientific impulse of anarchists has been channelled through a range of pursuits, not necessarily purely naturalistic in tone. For instance, ‘dream literature’ throughout English history has proven to be a viable medium through which authors have engaged in dialogues with classical texts and developed a robust understanding of empirical inquiry. In Chaucer’s terminology, these

'olde bokys' (*old books*) can often be detected as an influence and a guide, yielding a 'new science' (or understanding) for the audience of medieval poets to interpret their place in the natural world and the hierarchical social structures imposed on them by church and state. In Chaucer's *The House of Fame*, the narrator is guided by an eagle around a glass temple decorated with images of classical heroes. His guide soon begins to expound on the Aristotelian physics behind falling bodies, with Chaucer (unlike Petrarch and the Italian humanists) being one of the few medieval poets open to the 'new science' of the Merton natural philosophers.⁷ The work on matter, mechanics, and dynamics by Bradwardine (present in the *Nun's Priest's Tale*), Heytesbury, Strode (to whom Chaucer dedicated *Troilus and Criseyde*) figures in the background as the eagle explores through logical reasoning the physics of sound, pledging 'A preve by experience' (*to prove through experience*).⁸

Chaucer's oeuvre typically frames this 'experience' in opposition to 'authority', a dichotomy which, in *Fame* (with its lack of chapels, monasteries, and paradises), supports a secular appreciation of naturalistic inquiry over the 'auctorite' (*authority*) of instinct and purely imaginative literature. Though Chaucer restricts the eagle's exposition in order not to distort the poem's artistic merits, one would not be mistaken in describing this as a form of popular science and one which employs the findings of scientists to undermine the claims of concentrations of domestic power, a core motivation of classical anarchist thought.

There are a number of other ways in which the scientific perspective aligns very closely with the goals and motivations of anarchists. Though his suspicious gaze was cast primarily on eloquence, Francis Bacon's remarks could easily be seen as a valuable lesson for contemporary cultural, literary, and critical studies: '[M]en began to hunt more after words than matter; and more after ... tropes and figures, than after the weight of matter ... [and] soundness of argument'. Unlike Bacon, postmodernists and many contemporary Marxists and neo-Marxists typically reject the rationalist tradition of the Enlightenment, promote a cognitive and cultural relativism which views science as merely a 'narration' or social construction, and engage in theoretical speculations disconnected from any empirical test. The anarchist and political scientist Michael Albert notes in this respect: 'There is nothing truthful, wise, humane, or strategic about confusing hostility to injustice and oppression, which is leftist, with hostility to science and rationality, which is nonsense'.⁹

This general theme—of finding ways to align scientific pursuits with some apparently non-scientific domain, like anarchism—has been pursued in recent years by philosopher Galen Strawson, who opens an essay on metaphysics with the following Russellian statement:

Philosophy is one of the great sciences of reality. It has the same goal as natural science. Both seek to give true accounts, or the best accounts possible, of how things are in reality ... Philosophy, unlike natural science, usually works at finding good ways of characterizing how things are without engaging in much empirical or a posteriori investigation of the world ... Many striking and unobvious facts

about the nature of reality can be established a priori, facts about the structure of self-consciousness, for example, or the possibility of free will, or the nature of intentional action, or the viability of the view that there is a fundamental metaphysical distinction between objects and their properties.¹⁰

Yet politics and the sciences can also be aligned in less principled, theoretical ways, and in more pragmatic, bureaucratic ways as part of political power plays. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for instance, was aware of the deceitful role certain elements of academia play in defending illegitimate authority: ‘Need raised up Thrones; the Sciences and Arts have made them strong’. They ‘spread garlands of flowers over the iron chains’, which limit the public’s understanding and ‘throttle in them the sentiment of that original freedom for which they seemed born, make them love their slavery, and fashion them into what is called civilized Peoples’.¹¹ The Christian anarchist Leo Tolstoy (1930) often remarked on the successful men who were indoctrinated with the mythos of capitalism:

I know that most men—not only those considered clever, but even those who are very clever and capable of understanding most difficult scientific, mathematical, or philosophic problems—can seldom discern even the simplest and most obvious truth if it be such as obliges them to admit the falsity of conclusions they have formed, perhaps with much difficulty—conclusions of which they are proud, which they have taught to others, and on which they have built their lives.¹²

Rousseau’s ‘garlands of flowers’ could be cast aside through the spreading of scientific and humanistic knowledge, countering artificial political narratives, national and religious mythologies, and so forth. Reversing the Marxist claim that culture is economically determined, and instead arguing that economic systems are culturally determined, the anarchist Rudolf Rocker believed that capitalism would be transcended not through abolishing the rich Western cultural heritage, but through redistributing it freely. He claimed that ‘[w]hat the human spirit has created in science, art and literature, in every branch of philosophic thought and aesthetic feeling is and must remain the common cultural possession of our own and of all the coming generations. This is the starting-point, this is the bridge to all further social development’.¹³ Relatedly, Watkins is in an important minority in stressing that, ‘[h]istorically, the culture of the left, from Marx to Trotsky, Lukács to Sartre, focused overwhelmingly on literature, with far less to say about the visual arts, let alone painting’; although exploring this particular topic takes us considerably beyond the scope of this chapter.¹⁴

SCIENCE EDUCATION

The anarchist Oscar Wilde, though not concerned in the slightest with natural philosophy or metaphysics, wrote a perceptive essay on Chuang Tzu, drawing upon his ideas to ultimately conclude: ‘All modes of government are wrong.

They are unscientific, because they seek to alter the natural environment of man; they are immoral because, by interfering with the individual, they produce the most aggressive forms of egotism; they are ignorant, because they try to spread education; they are self-destructive, because they engender anarchy'.¹⁵ Again, the use of science to ridicule state capitalism is used to some effect; and, in Kropotkin, we find a stress on the malign delimitation of scientific research at the hands of finance and funding-based structures: 'As long as men of science depend upon the rich and the governments, so long will they of necessity remain subject to influence from this quarter'. Moreover, the structure of scientific fields of inquiry are often much more democratic than the political sphere. There are no leaders of physics or neuroscience; it is a collaborative process, with such collaborations typically being voluntary. The chemist Linus Pauling gave the following suggestion, reminiscent of the enormous significance Kropotkin, Aldous Huxley, and other anarchists placed on science:

Science is the search for truth—it is not a game in which one tries to beat his opponent, to do harm to others. We need to have the spirit of science in international affairs, to make the conduct of international affairs the effort to find the right solution, not the effort by each nation to get the better of other nations, to do harm to them when it is possible.¹⁶

Kropotkin's brother, Alexander, had written to him years before he came to prominence about the influence of Darwin's *The Descent of Man*. 'Those nice children', he wrote of the tsarist government, 'simply don't comprehend that it is more dangerous than a hundred A. Kropotkins'.¹⁷ The dissident potential and democratising effects of science have not gone unnoticed: The Copernican world view subverted the authority of the Church just as much as Jesus's teachings undermined the aggression of the Roman Empire. Nonetheless, in large part thanks to the arbitrary ranking of disciplines across much of the world, science can often provide a dangerously neutral moral ground for some. The Brazilian philosopher of education Paulo Freire wrote in *The Politics of Education* of how many people, both students and teachers, 'might try to hide in what [they] regard as the neutrality of scientific pursuits, indifferent to how [their] findings are used, even uninterested in considering for whom or for what interests [they] are working'. They 'might treat [the] society under study as though [they] are not participants in it. In [their] celebrated impartiality, [they might] approach this world as if [they] were wearing "gloves and masks" in order not to contaminate or be contaminated by it'.¹⁸

A walk along the corridors of any modern science department seems to confirm the general basis of this suspicion, but it also does not follow that the *findings* of these departments are wholly depoliticised—indeed, they are of potentially outstanding interest for political critique and social activism. Rejecting Arendt's conclusion in her essay 'The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man', which claimed that scientists should not even enter political debates because their professional loyalties are to non-political theory con-

struction, it is possible to sketch out a number of potentially fruitful ways that the sciences—in particular, the burgeoning neurosciences—can inform, and even direct, policy formation.¹⁹ What neuroscience can provide is a set of principles grounded in biology and psychophysics to explain a range of politically relevant behaviours, rooted in evolutionary development and able to be realised in societies ranging from the anarchistic to the fascistic. The question of how well they can function differs based on the society and its compatibility with the predispositions revealed to us through the brain sciences.

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Discussions of science and anarchism cannot be complete without recognising the role of technology as a crucial mediating influence. Wilhelm von Humboldt believed that the promotion of human creativity should act as a path towards self-perfection, but by forcing a labourer to perform a certain task not out of his own choice or preference, he moves closer to an automaton: ‘The true end of Man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal and immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole’.²⁰ The technology used in factories and offices is morally neutral—it could be used to drive workers into Marx and Humboldt’s feared robotic state, or it could be used to negate the need for demeaning labour. For instance, the Luddites, often regarded as harbouring a deep hatred of all technology, in fact condemned only that technology which was ‘hurtful to Commonality’. And the poet and radical Percy Bysshe Shelley, though a student and advocate of natural science, nevertheless recognised the alienating effects of technological advance: ‘We want the creative faculty to imagine that which we know ... The cultivation of those sciences which have enlarged the limits of the empire of man over the external world, has, for want of the poetical faculty, proportionally circumscribed those of the internal world’.²¹

The anarchist Herbert Read, like the Marxists, believed that humanity could technologically manipulate nature and its workings for its own needs. But he qualified that ‘Marxism is based on economics; anarchism on biology’.²² In a letter to James Guillaume, Kropotkin stressed that ‘*Kapital* is a marvellous revolutionary pamphlet but its scientific significance is nil’.²³ He also ‘distrusted Marx’s claim to have discovered in the nebulous world of economics a science of human society’; a doctrine informed largely by academic exercise.²⁴ Anarchists have almost uniformly adopted a more rigorous conception of science than the loose one employed by Marxist thinkers; witness the Marxist Richard Seymour’s dilettante forays into brain plasticity in order to politicise controversial, and far from settled, neurobiological debates, where an interest in the brain is invoked only insofar as it will reinforce some pre-existing ideology.²⁵ Anarchists are highly suspicious of intellectualism (not to be confused with anti-science), rhetoric, and the social science ‘theory’ best embodied by the French academy; or ‘the attempt to impose order on reality by means of rational consciousness,

and encompass it within abstract theory', which 'robs life of its infinite variety and individuality', as Shatz puts it.²⁶ This mentality can be found most forcefully in the works of Chomsky, Albert, and in Kropotkin's *Modern Science and Anarchism*:

The book of nature, the book of organic life, and that of human development, can already be read without resorting to the power of a creator, a mystical "vital force," an immortal soul, Hegel's trilogy, or the endowment of abstract symbols with real life. Mechanical phenomena, in their ever-increasing complexity, suffice for the explanation of nature and the whole of organic and social life.

Elsewhere in his essay, Kropotkin elaborates on his philosophy of science by adding that '[t]he social sciences are still very far removed from the time when they shall be as exact as are physics and chemistry', and so it would be 'unreasonable' to expect the social sciences to 'foretell social events with any approach to certainty'. He concludes that '[n]ot out of the universities, therefore, does Anarchism come'. Rather, it comes from an aspect of human neurobiology which we could summarise as that which seeks *peaceful collaboration with others and creative self-determination within oneself*; a tendency which cannot currently be grounded in any particular physical framework, although the beginnings of neuroscientific inquiry into this domain can be illuminating in this respect, as reviewed below.

Drawing an explicit alignment between the development of anarchist thought and contemporary technology, Kropotkin concluded that '[b]y means of the ... popular creative power and constructive activity, based upon modern science and technics, Anarchism tries now as well to develop institutions which would ensure a free evolution of society'. Continuing this conversation, physicists David Bohm and F. David Peat, exhibiting the fundamentally anarchistic nature of science, write that '[c]learly what is called for is a kind of free play within the individual and society so that the mind does not become rigidly committed to a limited set of assumptions, or caught up in confusion and false play. Out of this free play could emerge the true creative potential of a society'.²⁷

What Friedrich Nietzsche called the 'Last Man' in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, described below so perceptively by the anarchist Chris Hedges, seems to fit well with the philosophy and attitude of the intellectual and celebrity classes which distance themselves from these goals and, like Freire's dreaded 'neutral' and self-satisfied scientist, give no further thought to the matter of human progress:

Nietzsche foresaw the deadening effects of the bourgeois lust for comfort and personal satisfaction. Science and technology might, instead, bring about a race of *Dauermenschen*, of Last Men. The Last Man would ignore and disdain all that went before him. The Last Man would wallow in his arrogance, ignorance and personal contentment. He would be satisfied with everything he has done. He

would seek to become nothing more. He would be stagnant, incapable of growth, part of an easily manipulated crowd. The Last Man would confuse cynicism with knowledge.²⁸

Kropotkin also understood that '[f]rom all times, two currents of thought and action have been in conflict in the midst of human societies'. On the one hand lies the 'mutual aid' tendencies, exemplified through tribal customs, musical ceremonies, village communities and all institutions 'developed and worked out, not by legislation, but by the creative spirit of the masses'. On the other hand lies the authoritarian spirit, adopted by the 'magi, shamans, wizards, rain-makers, oracles, and priests' and also the legal bodies and the 'chiefs of military bands'. 'It is evident', concludes Kropotkin, 'that anarchy represents the first of these two currents ... We can therefore say that from all times there have been anarchists and statists'.²⁹ This is something Hermann Göring confessed at Nuremberg:

Naturally the common people don't want war: Neither in Russia, nor in England, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy, or a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the peacemakers for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country.³⁰

If Chekov was right when he wrote that 'man will only become better when you make him see what he is like', then the sciences—in particular the psychological and behavioural sciences—should be regarded as having great potential political significance, handing effective tools to either, in Kropotkin's terms, the anarchists or statists.³¹ Socialists, anarchists, and political activists of all stripes have for centuries been able to construct perceptive and illuminating accounts of political dynamics, and behavioural or neurophysiological data is certainly not required to coherently reject any number of social policies, which can be done quite independently of laboratory experiments. But the brain sciences can nevertheless be used—as they have not been so far—to add significant weight to certain political critiques. In fact, it isn't so much the causal relations between cortical and socioeconomic structures which pose the central problem, but rather the silent, unacknowledged existence of these connections.

This perspective does not come without its risks. As in every area of naturalistic inquiry, an appropriate level of analysis must be sought. It makes little sense, for instance, to ask what implications the recent discovery that nerve cells cover their high energy demand with lactate has for parliamentary democracy. The findings of neuroscience need to be politicised in the appropriate way, and one of the ways they have been exploited is through so-called 'neuropol-

tics', ultimately a form of neuromarketing. The current field of neuropolitics itself is far from worthy of the name; no genuine neuroscientific theory of political organisation currently exists. Neuropolitical arguments often proceed as follows: X group of people show Y type of activity in region Z of their brains during the presentation of images of their preferred electoral candidate. Region Z is associated with personal pleasure and reward. Therefore, this select group of voters are biologically determined to select candidates for purely selfish reasons. Therefore, voters act on their own interests. Therefore, the human race is ruthless, cunning, and selfish. In truth, the arguments are scandalously baseless and illogical, designed to self-fulfil the researcher's own biases, and simply amount to 'If X, therefore Y, so why not Z?'

In most popular neuro-inspired frameworks, 'not only is there not much neuroscience to be found, but neither is there much of the host discipline to be found either', as De Vos points out.³² What constitutes current neuropolitics is lacking both in its grasp of biology and its approach to political critique. While philosophers of physics and philosophers of mathematics need to be closely familiar with their respective fields in order to enter into professional discussions, it is particularly odd that philosophers of neuroscience can confidently pontificate without any demonstrable grasp of neurobiology. At the same time, we should not conclude from this that neuroscientific studies of, for instance, schizophrenia and autism cannot deliver an explanatory account of what some scholars call 'organicity' (a peculiar term to use, as if these sorts of disorders can have their origin in anything but biology).³³ Most of the neuroscientific data heralded by Western governments has been of the variety which supports the capitalistic image of 'flexibility', with the brain being shown to have a number of self-managing, risk-organising, and adaptive functions. But these findings are fairly general and ideologically uninformative, and the extensive collection of studies which support alternative political outlooks is rarely consulted.

The remainder of this chapter will provide a tentative step towards establishing empirically sound and theoretically plausible relations between brain function and behaviour of the kind informative to anarchist politics. Although the number of neuroscientific studies of politically relevant cognition and behaviour is currently slim, and the field is certainly in its infancy, enough has already been established to at least allow for new questions and perspectives to emerge. Instead of being grounded purely in the humanities, the study of anarchism would benefit greatly if it made greater contact with the sciences.

NEUROBIOLOGY

At the close of the nineteenth century, after the socialist and anarchist movements had been fractured through violence and intimidation, Kropotkin wrote in a speech (for a lecture he was subsequently prevented from delivering) something which seems in a way perhaps more appropriate to the present era than to his:

When a physiologist speaks now of the life of a plant or of an animal, he sees rather an agglomeration, a colony of millions of separate individuals than a personality one and indivisible. He speaks of a federation of digestive, sensual, nervous organs, all very intimately connected with one another, each feeling the consequence of the well-being or indisposition of each, but each living its own life. Each organ, each part of an organ in its turn is composed of independent cellules which associate to struggle against conditions unfavorable to their existence. The individual is quite a world of federations, a whole universe in himself.

The neurologist William Grey Walter also saw the advantages of collectivist models of both political and naturalistic phenomena, writing in a remarkable paper in 1963:

In comparing social with cerebral organisations one important feature of the brain should be kept in mind; we find no boss in the brain, no oligarchic ganglion or glandular Big Brother. Within our heads our very lives depend on equality of opportunity, on specialisation with versatility, on free communication and just restraint, a freedom without interference. Here too local minorities can and do control their own means of production and expression in free and equal intercourse with their neighbours. If we must identify biological and political systems our own brains would seem to illustrate the capacity and limitations of an anarcho-syndicalist community.³⁴

In more recent times, neuroscience has been used to defend, and not reject, corporate capitalism, as when much of the press inform us that we are ‘hard-wired’ for jealousy, competition, selfishness, and other neoliberal proclivities, simply because these features have some form of biological basis. What has not been understood by both the neuro-informed critics and defenders of neoliberalism is that there is no longer a coherent conception of *matter* in the post-Newtonian world, and so it cannot be justifiably claimed that the bounds of the physical are unable to adequately capture free choice action, altruism, and participatory economy-building (the so-called ‘mind-body problem’ cannot even be formulated, lacking any conception of body/matter, as Chomsky and Strawson note³⁵); nor can it therefore be claimed that these egalitarian concepts are mere illusions and social constructions.

In addition to these purely naturalistic concerns, the fact that we increasingly experience ourselves as neuro-subjects leads to a situation in which, as Ortega has argued, it is ‘impossible to differentiate the brain as a scientific object and the brain as an object of extra-scientific study’.³⁶ It is somewhat misleading to say with Rose and Abi-Rached that via the rise of neuroscience ‘[m]ental processes—cognition, emotion, volition—could be explained in entirely material ways’.³⁷ What is placed under the MRI or MEG scanner is not the human mind or the unpleasant ‘external world’, but rather a particular psychological theory, which can be supported or rejected on the basis of subsequent data analysis.

It should be stressed, then, that it is not so much the case that the general signifier ‘neuro’ is now emerging as the ultimate unit of explanation, but rather that the neurosciences are shedding new light on the underlying mechanisms responsible for current conceptions of morality, education, and emotions. The common claim that the neural level is the ultimate explanatory source is peculiar and misguided: science progresses in whatever manner it can using the most powerful explanatory tools available, and we can easily imagine the development of a lower-level physico-chemical framework replacing ‘neuro’ at some point in the near future. The claim that neuroscience is the final point of explanation appears remarkably similar to Fukuyama’s infamous claim that post-Soviet neoliberalism represents the final point of political and economic development, or the ‘end of history’.³⁸ When approaching the issue of neuropolitics, it is consequently vital that attention be placed largely on empirical findings which can potentially tell us something new about humans as political animals.

Neuroscience has shed much-needed light on the decision-making capacities and in-group/out-group relations of humans and has informed policy debates concerning the proper treatment of PTSD; even devices like cochlear implants reflect a slow, general shift towards neuroscientifically based self-governance.³⁹ The unwillingness to act on a moral urge, a habitual cultural activity which dominates the neoliberal world, has been shown not to implicate the major emotional regions of the brain, as opposed to the action of fulfilling a moral impulse, suggesting that a level of self-denial and internal suppression (and not just awareness of one’s inaction) accompanies moral failure.⁴⁰ The encultured brain consequently restricts emotional regulation—often with disastrous effects on mental health.

Similar innateness arguments can be made about our sense of fairness. Neuroimaging studies have revealed that fair monetary offers yield higher ratings of happiness and increased activity in various reward regions of the brain (such as the ventral striatum and the orbital and medial prefrontal cortex) relative to unfair offers.⁴¹ Fair treatment has more generally been shown to strongly implicate reward centres irrespective of whether or not the subject is the recipient of the fair monetary amount (even rodents appear to prefer cooperation to working alone for identical rewards). The motivation to cooperate, produced by these reward centres, is modulated by a cognitive control network in the lateral prefrontal cortex (interpreting extrinsic cooperative incentives) and a system of social cognition processing trust/threat signals in the temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex. Irrespective of the actual motive (categorical imperative, empathy, mores, self-interest), altruistic decisions are uniformly associated with reward system activation.

Experiments involving the punishment of those who act unfairly also implicate these cortical networks, suggesting that a sense of justice is deeply rooted in neurobiology and is not purely some kind of socially manufactured power tool, while unreciprocated cooperation leads to substantially reduced activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. The empirical evidence that concepts of

fairness and cooperation are generated in identical brain regions to monetary gain suggests that these independent factors (gauged in different ways by governments, corporations, economists and workers) may in fact require the same level of consideration when constructing political spaces and organisations.

It is also worth noting that many neuroscientific concepts, like plasticity, arguably originate in the humanities, and since countless brain studies rely so heavily on notions already well-developed in humanistic terms, the neurosciences should seek (as they are not currently doing) to critique and transform the concepts they often inadvertently import from other disciplines. For instance, an emerging consensus about the neurobiological basis of selfhood has the potential to undermine, amongst other things, the partially and very dubiously attributed legal personhood of corporations, a topic anarchists have long discussed.

A number of Marxist and anarchist critics of neoliberalism have noted how state capitalism demeans reward through hyper-consumerist cycles, converting pleasure into a series of micro-transactions. Decety et al. have developed a neurobiological account of cooperation and competition which does not so much lend support to these critiques as it opens up new avenues for the evaluation of social and personal rewards.⁴² Their basic conclusion from a range of imaging studies is that cooperation is highly socially rewarding and associated with activation in the medial orbitofrontal cortex, part of the familiar reward centres. As Kropotkin already noted, cooperation is the defining feature of human tribal life—ethological research even shows that non-human primates such as capuchin monkeys respond negatively to the distribution of unequal rewards.⁴³ All of this suggests that the neurological basis for a strong cooperation-reward network exists (with the main avenue to cooperation being through the lateral frontal cortex generating cognitive control and monitoring the presence/absence of extrinsic cooperative incentives) and that inhibiting its self-reproducing and self-sustaining computations is not simply a minor obstacle to self-development but stands in direct conflict with the brain's function.

Given the brain's highly sophisticated empathetic and egalitarian tendencies, the dominant neoliberal culture documented and critiqued by anarchist scholars seems to have overruled and suppressed the reflexive neurobiological drives of cooperation and solidarity. To take one of numerous examples: Although modern scientific progress in the form of social media arguably strives towards cooperation and collectivism, it also promotes a peculiarly ruthless and vicious form of competition, ironically fulfilling the neoliberal model of online networking. A particular sector of the Left (what the anarchist and anthropologist David Graeber has called 'the Loser Left') are obsessed with winning online arguments purely because they could never feasibly win anything else.⁴⁴ These activists purposefully secure themselves into political circumstances that guarantee that their only victories will be on Twitter and Facebook, not in the world of social justice movements. Social media is typically centred on narcissism and taps into the reward centres of the brain much more often than it does the more critical, empathetic centres. Because social

media is today used to construct our external internet selves/avatars, any criticism levelled at political opinions expressed online inadvertently turns into an attack on our very identities. And so instead of fostering cooperation, social media ultimately turns debates about political movements and activist tactics into a cavalcade of intensely self-oriented identity crises. It is along similar lines that we can ask whether the great naturalists pursued truth and empirical evidence not out of some scientific spirit or sense of wonder, but out of what the anarchist John Cowper Powys called ‘an aristocratic desire to stamp their own theories upon the plastic clay of the universe’.⁴⁵

The picture becomes more complicated when we acknowledge that in certain populations, typically termed Machiavellian individuals, Bereczkei et al. have found evidence for dedicated neural operations in particular social dilemmas which aid the exploitation of others.⁴⁶ Unlike ‘low-Mach(iavellian)’ individuals, high-Machs appear to have cognitive heuristics allowing them to predict future rewards in risky social situations. During financial negotiations with a partner, high-Machs relative to low-Machs not only come out with a higher reward but also display stronger activation in a number of regions responsible for monitoring cognitive conflicts and abstract reasoning, including reasoning about social situations, such as the bilateral middle frontal gyrus. This region is also implicated in executive control and the anticipation of beneficial decisions, and it is likely that Bereczkei’s results reflect the opportunistic and exploitative nature of high-Machs.

These and other fMRI studies could potentially inform workplace management operations in that they very clearly reveal that high-Machs (who, as Joel Bakan notes, typically dominate managerial and senior positions) prosper when given greater decision power and fewer constraints than others.⁴⁷ Given that many business managers and executives have personalities which have been shown to border on the psychopathic, the need that these studies reveal for redistributive decision-making power and greater constraints on the use of company resources and finances seems fairly strong. Larry Young, summarising recent work, relatedly points to the deleterious effects of organisational hierarchies on the brain: ‘Social subordination and social instability have been associated with an increased incidence of mental illness in humans’.⁴⁸ Along with the therapeutic benefits of this research, Young notes that ‘it also calls on us to evaluate how we construct social hierarchies—whether in the workplace or school—and their impacts on human well-being’. Political activism is suitably becoming fuelled less by hierarchy and more by varieties of swarming. People teem in crowds, created and organised through networks, and few top-down procedures are required (or desired). As the above studies indicate, it is by now virtually undeniable that morality, cooperation, and empathy arise not from the passing down of religious and philosophical principles, but instead emerge in a bottom-up fashion from brain structure and function—leading to what Ferguson has called ‘the deep biology of politics’.⁴⁹

Certain other studies are highly relevant to this deep biology. For instance, Romeo et al. used MRI scans to reveal that the brains of children from lower

socioeconomic backgrounds have less developed language regions than children from wealthier backgrounds (specifically, children from higher socioeconomic backgrounds exhibited greater cortical thickness in bilateral perisylvian and supramarginal regions), due to the range and variety of linguistic stimuli they are exposed to.⁵⁰ This was the first study to show a possible causal relation between wealth and neural composition, and, if attention was paid to this from outside academia, this may well have considerable impact on the shaping of educational and welfare policies.

Recent years have seen a move towards biologically grounded perspectives of cognition; keeping to high-level, abstract discussions of ‘memory’, ‘theory and mind’ and ‘semantics’ will not suffice, and so neither will concepts like ‘reciprocal altruism’ and ‘competition’. We are left in a situation which is almost necessitated by the facts that: (1) A purely reductionist neuro-based approach is inadequate in dealing with complex social phenomena; (2) A purely cultural approach leads to a similar pitfall to the one found in shallow ultra-social perspectives, with no room for a causal relation between biological and political structures. Instead, it seems that a highly multi-disciplinary perspective is required, leading to an extensive level of hybridity being filtered into scientific concepts of politics, cooperation, and morality. An example of this type of thinking can be found in Jara-Ettinger et al., a study which draws a strong connection between the development of a child’s linguistic competence (specifically, counting skills) and their moral faculty of fairness.⁵¹ Many other language-cognition and language-morality linking hypotheses have been drawn up over the past decade, and it is possible to think of many other potential avenues.

Neuroscientific technology has also recently been used to examine the mental processes of anarchists and political moderates. Anarchism is a particularly compelling ideology to study due to its proponents bearing fairly dissimilar ethnic prejudices and personal values amongst themselves, unlike the relative uniformity of moderates and communists, according to a study by Van Heil (though this is something of an over-generalisation).⁵² In an event-related potential experiment by Dhont et al., anarchists exhibited stronger late positive potentials (LPP, an electrophysiological signature of change evaluation, occurring 400–900 ms post-stimulus) in response to a range of political words, ostensibly because their political attitudes are more emotionally charged than those of moderates.⁵³

Political labels are a far cry from natural kinds, however, and it is questionable to what extent neuropolitical studies of ‘left-wing’ or ‘right-wing’ tendencies can be of any use. Zamboni et al. took similar considerations of complexity into account when conducting an fMRI study which went beyond the simple (and psychologically inflexible) left/right-wing spectrum, exploring the neural correlates of three independent political dimensions.⁵⁴ Their results suggested that individualism is substantially generated in the medial prefrontal cortex and the temporoparietal junction, conservatism in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and radicalism in the ventral striatum and posterior cingulate. A finer-grained

political perspective in experimental designs, bypassing familiar ideologically loaded terms, will likely produce a more satisfactory understanding at the neural level, with ‘conservative’ and ‘radical’ being able to be unpacked much further.

In conclusion, one of the most potentially meaningful forms of rebellion a genuine neuropolitics can lead to is an objection to current humanistic orthodoxy, which approaches political critique as if brain structure, function, development, and evolution play no part in the determination of socioeconomic hierarchies and relations. Questions of power, exploitation, and domination clearly play a vital role, but grounding a number of political concepts in a neurobiological base may also force us to conclude that several higher-order constructs are—as Auden said of love and matter—‘much odder than we thought’.⁵⁵

NOTES

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PART II

Core Traditions



Mutualism

Shawn P. Wilbur

Within the anarchist tradition, *mutualism* has a long, complex and contentious history. That history has been written by *divers hands*, with opponents often contributing as significantly as proponents. As a result, we face a range of interpretive choices, none of which provides a complete picture. Approached as a single tendency, mutualism seems to defy definition. When we identify the common threads that unite the tradition, we find they are often not the elements that have defined the various mutualisms individually. Between each stage in the history we find nearly as much discontinuity as continuity.

Considered in all its richness, taking into account the elements abandoned or added along the way, the history of mutualism sheds light on much more than just the portions of the anarchist tradition generally designated as mutualist. The price of those insights, however, is a willingness to exercise considerable interpretive care and caution, together with a willingness to allow the history its twists and turns.

The language of *mutualism*, which emerged in the 1820s, predates Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's appropriation of *anarchy* and *anarchist* in 1840, just as those terms predate *anarchism*, which did not come into widespread use until the late 1870s. Originally defined in terms of *mutual aid*, *reciprocity* and *fair play*, the term has designated both the general notion of *mutuality* and a series of more specific social programmes and ideologies. Once appropriated by Proudhon for his anarchistic project, it would remain associated with his thought, sometimes functioning as a designation for his entire project. That association would shape the understanding of mutualism within the anarchist milieu, which was repeatedly remade according to the fortunes of Proudhon's thought in the emerging movement. Once rivals emerged to claim the *anarchist*

S. P. Wilbur (✉)
Independent Scholar, Gresham, OR, USA

label and *anarchism* became widely used, *mutualist* and *mutualism* could not simply function as synonyms for these terms and a more radical shift in meaning took place.

It was at the end of the nineteenth century that the conception of anarchist mutualism was most significantly transformed, becoming largely a conceptual foil for anarchist communism, which emerged as a dominant tendency after the split in the International and the death of Mikhail Bakunin.¹ Redefined as non-communist anarchism, it retained nominal connections to Proudhon's thought, but in fact only reflected those aspects of his project not easily assimilated by rival tendencies. The emphasis on social and economic reciprocity remained, although it now became more likely that individuals would distinguish between *mutual aid*—and its associations with the anarchist communist Peter Kropotkin—and *mutuality*—now specifically associated with exchange and market reciprocity. Other defining characteristics were a penchant for practical, legal reform—in distinction to more overtly revolutionary means—and a rhetoric drawing on the language of commerce and contract. For a time, the dominant narrative was that there were two distinct and opposing forms of anarchism: anarchist communism and a mutualism most closely associated with *individualist*, *philosophical* or *commercialist* tendencies.²

While the starkest, most divisive aspects of this narrative could not survive, challenged as they were by a variety of tendencies, all subsequent definitions of mutualism undoubtedly owe something to this particular formulation. At present, the existence of multiple mutualist currents, each drawing very different conclusions from the available histories, only underlines the extent to which mutualism, in the broadest sense, has come to be defined at least as much in terms of what it is not as it is by the ideas dearest to its various proponents.

What follows, then, is a survey of representative episodes drawn from the history of mutualism, highlighting key moments in the evolution of the idea. In each episode considerable emphasis will be placed on those elements, beyond the shared thread, that differentiated the various individual mutualisms. This is a history rich in possibilities and rife with conflict, which cannot be understood without acknowledging these elements.

Much of the modern political lexicon emerged early in the nineteenth century, often arising in multiple locations and languages before being clarified and standardised in the international movements of mid-century.³ The language of *mutualism* (*mutualist*, *mutuality*, etc.) dates to the 1820s. In his *Traité de l'association domestique-agricole* (1822), Charles Fourier used the phrase 'mutualisme composé convergent' to describe the process of mutual education in his proposed system, a radical variation on the monitorial system, by which the education of children would be largely in the hands their slightly older peers.⁴ In 1826, a series of articles were published in the *New Harmony Gazette* under the title 'The Mutualist, or, Practical Remarks on the Social System of Mutual Cooperation', in which a decentralised, more libertarian adaptation of the Owenite experiment at New Harmony was proposed. The author signed the articles as 'a member of a community', and the community

was probably the Friendly Association for Mutual Interests, located either at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania or Kendal, Ohio.⁵ In 1828, the *canuts*, French silk workers in Lyon, established the *Société du Devoir mutuel* (Society of Mutual Duty), which played a militant role in the labour revolts of the 1830s. Its motto was ‘Vivre libre en travaillant ou mourir en combattant!’ (‘Live free working, or die fighting!’).⁶

In each of these cases, we find individuals who would be associated with anarchist mutualism in tantalisingly close proximity. In 1827, Josiah Warren, who had visited the Kendal community in 1825, would leave New Harmony to pursue his own libertarian project, the proto-anarchist ‘equitable commerce’. In 1829, Proudhon encountered Fourier during the printing of the latter’s *Le Nouveau monde industriel et sociétaire*, and in 1843 he was living in Lyon, where *mutuellistes* were still an active, if largely clandestine, presence. But while there is no shortage of suggestive echoes and possible connections, we would probably be hasty to read too much into either the popularity or the persistence of the language of mutualism in an era when even the most familiar terms could be subject to repeated appropriation and reuse.

We know that Proudhon practised this sort of appropriation. His famous declaration, ‘Je suis anarchiste’, is an obvious example. And we know that he performed similar transformations of the language of property, Fourier’s serial analysis and the phrase *laissez faire*, to cite just a few examples. The most obvious provocations were, in fact, grounded in a point of principle. In 1853, in *The Philosophy of Progress*, he declared that ‘it is not my place to create new words for new things and I am forced to speak the same language as everyone’. Moreover, ‘there is no progress without tradition, and the new order having as its immediate antecedents religion, government and property, it is convenient, in order to guarantee that evolution, to preserve for the new institutions their patronymic names, in the phases of civilization, because there are never well-defined lines, and to want to accomplish the revolution by a leap would be beyond our means’.⁷ Sometimes, of course, speaking ‘the same language as everyone’ means allowing even important words to assume multiple meanings or approaching a single topic with multiple vocabularies—and this is what we find in Proudhon’s work.

While mutualism has at times become a shorthand designation for Proudhon’s thought as a whole, we know that for him it was one tool in a very extensive kit. In much of Proudhon’s work, *mutualism* and *mutuality* simply designate reciprocal social relations. ‘Credit’, Proudhon tells us in the *Confessions of a Revolutionary*, ‘is, from the point of view of social relations, a *mutualism*, an exchange’.⁸ There are, however, more programmatic uses. At the end of *The System of Economic Contradictions*, having explored the various unresolved contradictions that he believed dominated modern society, he claimed that ‘in order to arrive at the definitive organization that appears to be the destiny of our species on the globe, nothing remains but to make a general equation of all our contradictions’ and that the ‘formula’ of that equation must be ‘a law of *exchange*, a theory of MUTUALITY, a system of guarantees’.⁹

The practical application of this ‘formula’ was to be the subject of a sequel and Proudhon’s notebooks for 1846 are filled with notes for a ‘Program of the Progressive Association, or Theory of Mutuality’, which was his attempt to sketch a model of anti-capitalist self-organisation for the working classes. However, this work, which was probably the most comprehensive attempt to sketch a mutualist programme in the nineteenth century, is only now due to be published.¹⁰

After the French Revolution of 1848, Proudhon prepared a new mutualist programme, based this time around the notion of *free credit*. In 1849, a long series of articles appeared in *Le Peuple*, under the general title ‘Demonstration of Socialism, Theoretical and Practical, or Revolution by Credit’. In these, Proudhon addressed many of the details regarding his Bank of the People, which aimed to provide a secure and inexpensive currency to workers who were otherwise excluded from most commerce. In the sixth article in the series, ‘Deduction of the Revolutionary Idea.—Gratuity and Mutuality of Credit’, he discusses the ‘right to credit’ and the duty to extend it, concluding that if they exist they must be equal. ‘Now’, he says, ‘if the right to credit and the duty to extend it are equal; if obligation is born from guarantee, and vice versa, then we arrive at this formula: RECIPROCITY OF CREDIT, MUTUALISM’.¹¹ The full exposition is striking, drawing as it does on a variety of arguments pertaining to different spheres of knowledge, but it was the basic practical proposal that was imitated so faithfully for so long, particularly in the United States.

Proudhon’s influence on the emerging international workers’ movement can be traced to a third attempt at a mutualist programme. *The Political Capacity of the Working Classes*, the final work completed before his death, was in many ways a return to the project of ‘progressive association’. Framed as a response to a group of Parisian workers questioning the advisability of supporting worker candidates in upcoming elections, Proudhon’s response was a lengthy sketch of the ‘Mutualist System’ by which the workers could achieve liberty through self-management.¹²

These same Parisian workers were then instrumental in the establishment of the First International, although their influence was not to last. According to E. E. Fribourg, ‘the history of the *International* divides into two parts: the first period, which I will call Parisian, corresponds to the founding and the first two congresses, at Geneva in 1866, and Lausanne in 1867. During this time the association was *mutualist*, demanding of the collectivity only the guarantee of the execution of contracts that have been freely discussed, and freely consented to’. In the second part, ‘the moral direction inevitably escaped the hands of the French workers, passed to Belgium, and in that second period, which we will call Russo-German, the International became communist, which is to say authoritarian’.¹³ But what Fribourg, himself part of the Paris contingent, describes as a change of tendency was described by César de Paepe, one of the most influential of the Belgian workers, as a dispute among mutualists.

During the 1867 Congress, in the midst of a debate on the social ownership of the soil, de Paepe stated:

Like the citizens Tolain and Chemalé, I am an adherent of the mutualist socialism, which wants to realise the principle of reciprocity in all the transactions of men; but I do not consider the idea of the inclusion of the soil in social property as incompatible with mutualism—quite the contrary. What, indeed, does mutualism demand? It demands that the product of labour belongs, in its entirety, to the producer and that this product only exchanges in society for an equivalent product, one costing the same amount of labour and expense; but the soil is not the product of anyone's labor, and the reciprocity of exchange is not applicable to it [...] It is because I am a mutualist that I want, on the one hand, the cultivator to have some guarantees that assure them, with regard to society, the full product of their labour and, on the other hand, some guarantees for society with regard to the cultivator: and this is why the soil can only be the property of the social collectivity, and the cultivator can only have simple possession, the right to use without abuse. Mutualism is not only the reciprocity of exchange; it is also the reciprocity of guarantees.¹⁴

In this, de Paepe was largely correct and represented that faction among the collectivists who saw in their own ideas, as Bakunin put it, 'Proudhonism, greatly developed and taken to its ultimate conclusion'.¹⁵ We see here the possibility of a different evolution of mutualism, perhaps one in which his analysis of collective force and progressive association might have found development. But pressures within the International tended to heighten tensions and deepen the gulfs between factions. Ultimately, de Paepe would defect from both the mutualist and anti-authoritarian collectivist camps, siding with Marx and others to whom Bakunin would not hesitate apply the 'authoritarian' label.

As for Bakunin himself, while his work shows numerous indications of Proudhon's influence, he chose, even in the heat of his battles with Marx, to praise Proudhon for his instincts, rather than his social science. In 1872, he wrote that 'Marx, as a thinker, is on the right track', while Proudhon 'had the true instinct of the revolutionary—he adored Satan and he proclaimed anarchy'. About mutualism he had little or nothing to say.¹⁶

It is clear that by the 1870s mutualism was a waning force within the anarchist milieus. Some isolated Proudhonian thinkers continued to develop his ideas, often in a collectivist direction. Some of the best of this work, however, did not appear under the mutualist banner. Claude Pelletier, an exile in New York, published a number of striking Proudhonian works under the general title *Atercracy*, which he considered equivalent in meaning to anarchy, but perhaps less threatening to the uninitiated.¹⁷

As mutualism waned in significance as an anarchist label and as Proudhon waned as a reference among anti-authoritarians increasingly drawn toward collectivism, if not communism, *anarchism*, which had seen some use by anarchist

communist Joseph Déjacque after 1859, arose as a label around which an anarchist movement might form in the wake of the splits in the International. At first, very few of the anti-authoritarians outside mutualist or ‘Proudhonian’ circles adopted the anarchist label. In his 1881 essay ‘On Order’, Peter Kropotkin described the process by which the label was reluctantly accepted. Having noted that rebels had often had their names imposed on them, he observed that:

[It was] the same for the anarchists. When a party arose in the heart of the International that denied the authority in the Association and rebelled against authority in all its forms, that party first gave itself the name *federalist* party, then that of *anti-statist* or *anti-authoritarian*. In that era, it avoided even giving itself the name of anarchist. The word *an-archy* (that is how it was written then) seemed to link the party too much with the Proudhonians, whose ideas regarding economic reform the International combated at that moment. But it was precisely because of that, in order to spread confusion, that the adversaries took delight in using that name; besides, it allowed them to say that the very name of the anarchists proves that their sole ambition is to create disorder and chaos, without thinking of the results.¹⁸

This is the account of a succession, by which one group of anarchists, the Proudhonians, have been replaced by another, proponents of a ‘modern anarchism’ that Kropotkin identified with anarchist communism. Five years later, *Hazell’s Annual Encyclopaedia* for 1886 would report that ‘Anarchists are divided into *mutualists*, who hope to bring about their economic results by Banks of Exchange and a free currency, and *communists*, whose motto is: ‘From every man according to his capacity, to every man according to his needs’.¹⁹ By that time, as well, a new mutualist faction had emerged to take its place opposite the anarchist communists.

The individualists who would claim the mutualist title at the end of the nineteenth century were largely the product of a development in the United States, parallel and often independent of the European movements. Proudhon’s mutualism had arrived there by 1849 and for a brief period the term had a wide currency in the radical press, even if its meanings did not always conform to Proudhon’s thought. Among the translations in *The Spirit of the Age* (1849–1850), a short-lived reform paper, appeared a long passage from *The System of Economic Contradictions*, under the title ‘The Coming Era of Mutualism’.²⁰ In this translation of the passage already cited, the ‘theory of MUTUALITY’ became a ‘theory of MUTUALISM’ and the accompanying discussion makes it clear that Proudhon’s ideas were being treated as compatible with the Fourierism and Christian socialism already present in the milieu. In a somewhat distorted echo of the *System of Economic Contradictions*—where Proudhon gave the notion of Providence his own anti-theist twist—editor William Henry Channing framed the mission of paper in mutualist terms:

“What transformation does Providence now intend?”

We can but denote some of the impending changes which Humanity plainly commands and Heaven sanctions—thus presenting germs to be hereafter unfolded; and we invite the aid of practical persons in marking out the stages of this next era of *Guarantees*, as it was denominated by Fourier, or *Mutualism*, as Proudhon calls it.²¹

While the approach was eclectic, it was the sort of well-read eclecticism that could make the connection between Proudhon’s *mutualism* and Fourier’s *guarantism* long before Proudhon made it explicit in his own work. Mutualism was also the subject of articles by Charles A. Dana, Joshua King Ingalls, Francis George Shaw and Albert Brisbane. Translated excerpts from Proudhon’s *Confessions of a Revolutionary* also appeared, as well as unsigned articles on mutual banking clearly drawn from the work of William Batchelder Greene.

Greene was himself another eclectic, eccentric character, a soldier-turned-minister with ties to New England transcendentalism and the Massachusetts abolitionists, who left for France after the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law, countering Proudhon during his stay, and then returned to lead a Union artillery regiment during the Civil War. In 1849–1850, he was adapting Proudhon’s mutual credit schemes to conditions in rural New England, attempting to reconcile the work of Proudhon with that of his rival Pierre Leroux, and seasoning the mix with his own brand of esoteric Christianity.

The first edition of Greene’s work on mutual banking was a two-volume compilation of articles written in 1849 under the name ‘Omega’ for the *Palladium* of Worcester, Massachusetts. *Equality* was published in 1849 and *Mutual Banking* was published the following year. In those early volumes, we find not just Greene’s adaptation of Proudhon’s bank proposal but also legal and religious meditations on usury, together with an explanation of mutualism that presents it as the successor to Christianity.

[D]ispensation follows dispensation; each dispensation being adapted to its peculiar stage of human progress. New light will soon break forth from the Gospel, and the NEW CHRISTIANITY will establish itself in the world—a Christianity as much transcending the one now known in the Churches, as this last transcends the religion of types and shadows revealed through Moses.

This is the order of the dispensations:—*the Covenant with Noah; the Covenant with Abraham*; THE MOSAIC DISPENSATION; CHRISTIANITY; CHRISTIAN MUTUALISM.

Christian Mutualism is the RELIGION of the coming age:—Sanskrit, *yuga*; Heb. *yom*, or *ivom*; Gr. *aion*; Lat. *aevum*; Light’s manifestation, revolving age, dispensation, world, day.²²

Later editions, including two published by Greene himself and several published after his death, would dispense with the religious framing, but the original volumes are essential for understanding just how the milieu surrounding papers like *The Spirit of the Age* differed from the later individualist anarchist milieu associated with Benjamin R. Tucker and *Liberty*.

Absent from the pages of *The Spirit of the Age*, but present in the Boston free thought forums during precisely the same period, was Josiah Warren, theorist of *equitable commerce*—a system of cost-price exchange employing a unique variety of labour notes. Warren, despite his own avoidance of labels, would become known as a mutualist retrospectively, thanks to his influence on Tucker and his circle, but the movement for equitable commerce that developed around him was a force in Boston's reform circles at the time.²³

Twenty years later, the same eclectic mix of reformers and interests that had filled the pages of *The Spirit of the Age* would find an organizational expression in the New England Labor Reform League (NELRL) and various associated organisations. Founded in 1869, the NELRL was largely the brainchild of Ezra H. Heywood, who had long been active in abolitionist circles and had come to embrace both anarchistic mutualism and free love. With his wife, Angela Heywood, he published *The Word*, a paper of generally anarchistic tendencies, from 1872 through 1893.²⁴ The Heywoods were instrumental in publishing and distributing the works of Greene, Warren and others in their general circle. The last edition of *Mutual Banking* published during Greene's lifetime was published under the auspices of the NELRL.

Greene, Warren and Heywood were all present at the 1872 conference of the NELRL. Also in attendance was a young Benjamin R. Tucker, who had been attending meetings of the Boston Eight-Hour League, but without feeling that he had found the economic answers he was looking for. His encounter with the leading lights of the NELRL was transformative and set Tucker on the road to becoming the most prominent individualist anarchist in the United States, with few peers anywhere in the world.

Almost immediately on meeting the older radicals, Tucker threw himself into the milieu, working on *The Word* and then moving on to publications of his own, launching first the short-lived *Radical Review* and then *Liberty*, which appeared from 1881 to 1907. Initially, his circle included a wide range of reformers, but Tucker's consistent response to his indisputably broad range of influences was a steady narrowing and distillation of his own thought, often accompanied by noisy schisms in the pages of various periodicals. Tucker was proud of adhering to a 'plumb-line' politics, and he developed an analysis of society according to which it was various forms of *monopoly* that stood between people and a free society based on voluntary association. He then proceeded to adapt insights drawn from Proudhon, Greene, Warren and a host of other thinkers to this worldview, which was in many ways entirely alien to the original works of those thinkers.

Perhaps the clearest single expression of Tucker's philosophy is the 1888 essay 'State Socialism and Anarchism: How Far They Agree, and Wherein They Differ'.²⁵ Here, Tucker divides the modern socialist movement according to socialists' adherence to either the principle of *authority* or that of *liberty*. Faced with the choice between these principles, he says, in a partisan retelling of the history, 'Marx went one way; Warren and Proudhon the other. Thus were born State Socialism and Anarchism'. Kropotkin and the martyred Haymarket

anarchists, he continues, seem headed down the wrong road as well. And the essay ends with the republication of a long ‘Socialistic Letter’ by Ernest Lesigne, outlining the distinctions between ‘The Two Socialisms’. It begins:

There are two Socialisms.
One is communistic, the other solidaritarian.
One is dictatorial, the other libertarian.

And it continues for another 600 words, drawing the distinctions in no uncertain terms, ending with the prediction:

One is the infancy of Socialism; the other is its manhood.
One is already the past; the other is the future.
One will give place to the other.
Today each of us must choose for the one or the other of these two Socialisms, or else confess that he is not a Socialist.²⁶

Although this is clearly a reflection of the division noted by *Hazell’s Annual Encyclopaedia*, Tucker did not himself make the distinction one of mutualists vs. communists. However, in 1894, Henry Seymour, in what was essentially a rewriting of Lesigne’s letter, presents the struggle between ‘The Two Anarchisms’ in precisely those terms:

There are two Anarchisms. That is to say, there are two schools of Anarchism.
One is communistic, the other mutualistic.²⁷

And, in the decades to follow, the identification of mutualism with individualism would increasingly go unchallenged. In 1927, for example, Clarence Lee Swartz’ *What is Mutualism?* would address socialism in a chapter on ‘Proposed But Inadequate Remedies’.

Tucker’s plumb-line individualism is, of course, well worth study on its own merits, in the context of the larger tradition of anarchist individualism, and the contributors to *Liberty* included a wide range of interesting and able anarchist thinkers. However, as mutualism came to mean simply non-communist, the content that seems specifically vital to a history of mutualism dwindled. Among Tucker’s associates, the one agitation that stands out as particularly mutualist was the long propaganda in favour of the mutual bank.

Indeed, in that one regard, the individualists of the Tucker school proved themselves tirelessly faithful to the projects of Proudhon and Greene. Alfred B. Westrup produced a series of tracts on the subject, culminating in the book *The New Philosophy of Money*, and organised the Mutual Bank Propaganda to spread the mutual credit gospel. Anarchist insurance broker Herman Kuehn produced *The Problem of Worry*, a variation on the familiar model organised according to principles derived from the insurance industry. And a substantial portion of Swartz’s *What is Mutualism?* was dedicated to the question of mutual credit.

For much of the twentieth century, mutualism remained essentially moribund. With the arrival of the twenty-first, however, and perhaps particularly with the improved access to historical documents that has come with the advent of the internet, interest in mutualism revived considerably. At the centre of this largely grassroots revival has been Kevin Carson, an independent writer and scholar who over the past decade has produced four self-published volumes and a large number of essays exploring mutualism.²⁸ His first major work, *Studies in Mutualist Political Economy*, attempted to show that elements of Marxian and Austrian economics could be understood as compatible, particularly in the context of a Benjamin R. Tucker-inspired mutualism or ‘free market anti-capitalism’.²⁹

Subsequent works have expanded the project, extending the initial synthesis to include material from a wide range of scholarly disciplines, literary genres and reform movements. While the fundamental vision of a market-centred individualist anarchism is perhaps not substantially removed from that of Tucker, the eclectic range of materials and the ambitious, experimental approach to constructing ‘low overhead’ transitional institutions recalls various nineteenth-century mutualists.

The internet era has also provided new stimulus to the study of Proudhon’s work. *Property is Theft*, the first significant collection of full texts and lengthy excerpts in English, was a product of the same culture of online debate that produced *An Anarchist FAQ*. Some of the texts included there originated in the Proudhon Library project, a proposed continuation of Tucker’s original Proudhon Library. A number of book-length works have been translated and work has begun to bring at least a partial edition to print.³⁰

Perhaps the only thing more difficult than summarising mutualism’s past is speculating about its future. While the continued expansion of Carson’s project and the continued recovery of Proudhon’s seem likely to offer new resources to the anarchist movement, it is less clear to what extent mutualism is an adequate framework for the development of the anarchist project and to what extent it remains too closely tied to partisan conflicts that are now well over a century old. Only time will tell how long mutualism remains viable through cycles of appropriation and revision, but, as I hope this narrative suggests, the existing tradition contains enough unexplored material to occupy students for some time to come.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Dyer D. Lum, “Communal Anarchy,” *The Alarm*, 2:15 (March 6, 1886), 2. “A distinction has been sought between what has been termed “Mutualistic Anarchy” and communistic anarchy...”
2. Regarding these distinctions, see Steven T. Byington, “Anarchist Labels,” *The Demonstrator*, 1:2 (March 18, 1903), 2.

3. For an overview of this creative period, see Arthur E. Bestor, Jr., "The Evolution of the Socialist Vocabulary," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 9:3 (June 1948), 259–302.
4. Charles Fourier, *Traité de l'association domestique-agricole*, tome II (Paris: Bossange, 1922), 349.
5. "The Mutualist," *New Harmony Gazette*, 1:37 (June 7, 1826), 294.
6. David Barry, *Women and Political Insurgency* (New York: Springer, 1996), 140.
7. P.-J. Proudhon, *The Philosophy of Progress* (Gresham, OR: Corvus Editions, 2012), 29.
8. P.-J. Proudhon, *Les confessions d'un révolutionnaire* (Paris: Au Bureau de la Voix du Peuple, 1849), 141.
9. P.-J. Proudhon, *Système des contradictions économiques*, tome II (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846), 527.
10. Edward Castleton has prepared an edition under the title *La propriété vaincue. Théorie de l'Association universelle*, slated for publication in 2018. See his essay "Association, Mutualism and the Corporate Form in the Published and Unpublished Writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon," *History of Economic Ideas*, 25:1 (2017), 143–172, for a discussion of this work and a useful overview of Proudhon's work on mutualism.
11. P.-J. Proudhon, *Mélanges*, tome II (Brussels: Lacroix, Verboeckhoven & Co.), 39.
12. P.-J. Proudhon, *De la capacité politique des classes ouvrières* (Paris: Dentu, 1865).
13. E. E. Fribourg, *L'Association internationale des travailleurs* (Paris: Armand Le Chevalier, 1871), 2.
14. *Procès-verbaux: Congrès de l'Association Internationale des travailleurs* (Chaux-de-fonds: La voix de l'avenir, 1867), 80–81.
15. Mikhail Bakunin, *Oeuvres*, tome III (Paris: Stock, 1908), 252.
16. Bakunin, "To the Brothers of the Alliance in Spain," (1872) <https://www.libertarian-labyrinth.org/bakunin-library/bakunin-to-the-brothers-of-the-alliance-in-spain-1872/>.
17. See, for example, Eudalc Reitelple, *Les Soirées socialistes de New York* (New York: n.p., 1873).
18. Pierre Kropotkine, *Paroles d'un révolté* (Paris: C. Marpon et E. Flammarion, 1885), 99.
19. *Hazell's Annual Encyclopaedia* (London: Hazell, Watson & Viney, 1886), 17.
20. P.-J. Proudhon, "The Coming Era of Mutualism," *The Spirit of the Age*, 1:7 (August 18, 1849): 107–108.
21. William Henry Channing, "Topics and Their Treatment," *The Spirit of the Age*, 1:7 (August 18, 1849), 105.
22. William B. Greene, *Mutual Banking* (West Brookfield, MA: O. S. Cooke & Company, 1850), 94.
23. The best source on the equitable commerce movement in Boston, between 1846 and 1855, is the *Boston Investigator*, which followed its progress closely.
24. See William B. Greene, "Communism versus Mutualism," *The Word*, 3:7 (November 1874).
25. Benjamin R. Tucker, *State Socialism and Anarchism: How Far They Agree and Wherein They Differ* (London: A. C. Fifield, 1911).
26. *Ibid.*
27. Henry Seymour, *The Two Anarchisms* (London: Proudhon Press, 1894).

28. Carson's works, which are all self-published, include *Studies in Mutualist Political Economy* (2007), *Organization Theory: A Libertarian Perspective* (2008), *The Homebrew Industrial Revolution* (2010) and *The Desktop Regulatory State* (2016).
29. Kevin Carson, *Studies in Mutualist Political Economy* (Charleston: BookSurge Publishing, 2007). For more on "free market anti-capitalism, see Carson's website at www.mutualist.org.
30. Translations can be found at proudhonlibrary.org.



Individualism

Peter Ryley

The Canadian individualist feminist, Wendy McElroy, opens her provocative defence of pornography against the attacks of radical feminism¹ with a memorable anecdote. As part of her research, she interviewed women who acted in porn films and one performer startled her:

I don't need Andrea Dworkin to tell me what to think or how to behave. "She seemed genuinely angry". And I don't appreciate being called psychologically damaged! I have friends in the business who call themselves 'Anarchists in High Heels.' They'd love to have a word with her.²

The intellectual hauteur of the condescending anthropologist had been disturbed by the erudition of the subject. A porn actor had, in McElroy's own word, made her feel 'outradicated'.³

'Anarchists in high heels' is as delightful a phrase as it is perturbing. Where do porn actors fit in to the anarchist pantheon? The answer is that they do, but only inside the distinctive approach of the individualist tradition. These performers were right. They saw themselves as self-reliant and independent women engaged in a legitimate commercial exchange. And in doing so, they shared the analysis of some unlikely predecessors, both theorists and activists, who argued that collectivist politics, whether by class, gender, or ethnicity, does not offer liberation. Instead, freedom can only come through the political, economic, and moral autonomy of each individual.

It's a diverse tradition. There is no single individualism, only a series of variations on a theme of individual liberty in a stateless society. Even though some collectivists try and deny the anarchist authenticity of individualism, it is

P. Ryley (✉)
University of Hull, Hull, UK
e-mail: p.n.ryley@hull.ac.uk

an integral part of the movement. However, by rejecting both the enforced collectivism of the state and the voluntary collectivism of anarcho-communism, individualists set themselves apart and became critics of mainstream anarchism as the two strands diverged.

Individualist anarchists are consistent in their opposition to collectivism. They argue that loss of freedom can be as much the product of enforced collective rules or moral censure by a society, as by the rule of the state. Their unbending adherence to this principle makes for stimulating reading and leads them into becoming iconoclastic proponents of their distinctive anarchism. Yet their consistency can take them away from sensible compromise and simple common sense. For example, the German writer, John Henry Mackay, wrote:

Anyone should be free to heal any illness if he believes that he is able to do so ... it is aggressive to make the medical profession available only to 'qualified' doctors and to punish those who practise without qualification.⁴

He wasn't alone in this judgement, which, given the history of quackery, makes this particular freedom a close companion to manslaughter. The strength of individualists' refusal to bend before conventional wisdom becomes a weakness when it develops as a contrarian rejection of reality and grows into ideological rigidity. But that isn't to deny its value and clarity of purpose. Individualist anarchism is interesting and insightful. It is sharp-eyed in spotting the failings of utopian collectivism. It is certainly radical and has just as much a claim to the title anarchist as any other part of the movement.

Individualism and its libertarian offshoots are with us today, but the aim of this chapter is mainly historical. It will try to explain how the diverse strands of individualist thought emerged and developed from the intellectual milieu of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Individualist anarchism produced a large body of literature, both major theoretical works and a profusion of minor journals, newspapers, and pamphlets. This chapter is necessarily selective and the people I discuss here are used as examples of the main elements of individualist thought. This isn't a comprehensive guide. And although I am not uncritical, I think some of these ideas carry an important resonance for today.

There are three main elements to individualist anarchist thought. The first is the idea of the autonomous moral individual drawn from the Egoism of Max Stirner; the second is a distinctive political economy based on direct ownership, together with a discussion of alternative models of exchange; and finally, an insistence on individual autonomy, produced opposition to conventional morality, social control, and imposed gender ideologies that would limit the individual's right to determine freely their own way of life. Taken together, they produced a libertarian economics opposed to the statism of the left and the right, a social model that rejected all forms of moral and physical coercion, and a political model without government where individual liberty and autonomy is the source of all legitimacy.

THE AUTONOMOUS INDIVIDUAL

Individualist anarchism's philosophical basis owes much to Max Stirner.⁵ Egoism, the intellectual movement based on his thought, is not synonymous with individualist anarchism and many activists and writers rejected it. However, egoists were part of the anarchist movement and Stirner's ideas influenced it. Writing in the 1840s, before the full development of modern industrial society, Stirner is awkward and unsettling to read, questioning the assumptions of liberals and the left with his radical individualism. For instance, while democrats and libertarians celebrated freedom and equal rights as their highest aim and value, Stirner did not. Stirner saw liberalism as insufficient.

Freedom teaches only: Get yourself rid, relieve yourselves of everything burdensome; it does not teach you who you yourselves are.⁶

Instead of the negative liberty of liberalism, Stirner proposed a form of positive liberty, which he called 'ownness'. This positive liberty is not adherence to some imposed notion of authenticity; it is a process of self-liberation. The liberty you have is the liberty you take for yourself.

Stirner's critique of orthodox liberalism is that rights and liberties are granted to an abstract humanity rather than to the concrete human. They are bestowed by authority, circumscribed by law, and restricted in practice. They form what he refers to as a 'State-community'. You are human as long as you belong. Even as it describes itself as universal, it excludes others. By doing so it creates an 'un-man'.

But although every un-man is a man, yet the State excludes him; it locks him up, or transforms him from a fellow of the State into a fellow of the prison...

To say in blunt words what an un-man is is not particularly hard: it is a man who does not correspond to the *concept* man, as the inhuman is something which is not conformed to the concept of the human ... he *appears* indeed as a man, but *is* not a man.⁷

This language should be familiar in these times of populist politics.⁸ Populists define themselves and their supporters as 'the people'; they draw on abstractions such as 'the will of the people' and in doing so imply that those who dissent or oppose are not 'real people'.⁹ They have created 'un-persons' out of their opponents.

The abstract collective idea of humanity to which we have to conform for the common good meant that rights and liberties are not a form of liberation, they are an imposition on the 'ownness' of the individual. They are a facet of modern states and are essentially theological constructs, resting on a divine concept of humanity. And as such they have to insist on morality to sustain them. Morality in turn demands duty in the service of the collective, annihilating the individual. Both force individuals to act against their will and their

interests. Therefore the state is the enemy of the egoist, compelling individuals to conform to what the state thinks they should be. For Stirner, 'Every State is a *despotism*, be the despot one or many'.¹⁰

How to change it? Only be (sic) recognizing no *duty*, not *binding* myself nor letting myself be bound. If I have no duty, then I know no law either.¹¹

You do not change the world by dedicated self-sacrifice to a noble cause, or by devoting yourself to the welfare of others. Egoism despised altruism in all its forms. Instead, there is only one world to free—yourself. And you do it by taking and holding what you can, according to your own will, by acting freely, and by your own might rather than a bestowed right. You are your own saviour.

Egoism marks one of the extreme boundaries of individualism, but human interdependence, particularly in political economy, limits individual autonomy. Stirner recognised this and wrote of annihilating the state while replacing it with a 'Union of Egoists',¹² but without any programmatic detail. Instead it was Pierre-Joseph Proudhon who offered a mechanism for free collaboration through mutualism and federalism, regulated by voluntary contract.¹³ Stirner was critical of Proudhon.¹⁴ He thought Proudhon's advocacy of possession through use, as a replacement for property based on legal title, ushered in the possibility of collective rather than individual ownership. However, later individualists saw a commonality in both writers and incorporated aspects of their ideas as they developed their own models of individualist anarchism.

INDIVIDUALIST POLITICAL ECONOMY

The philosophical concept of the autonomous individual was translated into political economy by a range of theorists and activists in the late nineteenth century. The leading figure in the United States was Benjamin Tucker, whose journal *Liberty* published articles by the major individualists of the era.¹⁵ Tucker had translated Stirner and Proudhon into English and was influenced by both. However prominent, he was only a focal point for an intellectual movement that spanned the developed world. Once again, this was not a single, coherent ideology. Individualist anarchism embraced diverse economic models and encouraged intellectual experimentation. The spectrum of ideas included people on the fringes of classical liberalism, for instance Tucker also claimed Gustave de Molinari as an influence, the social radicals who followed Herbert Spencer, and those inspired by the mutualism of Proudhon and the practical activism of Josiah Warren and his Cincinnati Time Store.

Given their opposition to collectivism, it might be surprising that some individualist anarchists, though not all, described themselves as socialists. This was because their political economy was based on returning the full value of labour to the labourer. However, they were anti-state socialists. The state could not redistribute rewards without destroying the workers' freedom at the same time

while expropriating unjust reward for itself. The state was the greatest exploiter of them all. As for communism, whether the anarchist or the statist version, it would deprive workers of their guarantee of independence and greatest aspiration, to own property. Instead, other methods had to be found.

The individualists' target was monopoly. Nearly all subscribed to the labour theory of value. Value was created by labour, but this raised the question of why the working classes' reward was so poor. The answer individualists gave was monopolisation. The monopoly of land extracted rent, the monopoly of capital produced interest, the monopoly of the means of production resulted in profit. The compensation for the workers was wages, given with one hand as profitable underpayment for their production and taken by the other in rent and interest. The interests of the monopolists were protected by the repressive powers of the state that maintained itself by extracting yet more value through taxes. The remedy the individualists proposed was not the creation of an alternative collective monopoly but dispersed property rights. Only direct individual ownership by the workers would allow them to realise the full value of their production.

The way in which property was to be held varied. Some followed Proudhon in suggesting a form of usufruct, that use confers ownership while that property is being used. Others had an orthodox liberal view of property rights, arguing that dispersed property rights constrained the abilities of others to monopolise ownership. There were also ingenious schemes, for example, Wordsworth Donisthorpe's notion of 'labour capitalisation'.¹⁶ Donisthorpe, who was one of a group of followers of Herbert Spencer, known as the English Individualists, bridged the gap between fundamentalist liberalism and anarchism.¹⁷ He envisaged workers entering into equal partnership with capital in profit-sharing enterprises. Whatever the method of ownership, however, the value of labour cannot be realised without exchange.

Anarcho-communists imagined a world of universal benevolence in a property-less society, where production and distribution would be based solely on need. Their solution to the inequalities of capitalist market economies was to abolish private property and the market. Individualists countered this with classic market theory. Commerce, competition, and individual self-interest would enable owner/producers to directly benefit themselves and thereby serve the greater good. It's straight from Adam Smith.

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.¹⁸

Markets distorted by monopolies are exploitative, but where people enter into them as equal property holders, any inequalities arising are solely based on effort and talent. Without the ability to accumulate the property of others,

those inequalities are not structural and do not perpetuate themselves. What is more, competitive markets based on dispersed property rights are also instruments of collaboration. In Smith's words, commerce creates 'a bond of union and friendship'.¹⁹

However, once people move beyond barter, the complex relationships created by market exchange can only operate with some form of currency. It is here that individualist anarchist confronted what they saw as one of the most damaging monopolies of all—the state's monopoly of money. Not only did the state create the only legal tender, by fixing its value to gold, they also created an artificial scarcity that stifled free exchange and rendered work done without financial reward as worthless. Individualists sought to overcome this by the creation of what they referred to as 'free currencies'.

None of this was new. Proposals for currency reforms and experiments with alternatives proliferated in early industrial societies. The first sought to tie value to working time. This was the basis of the Labour Notes issued by Robert Owen's National Equitable Labour Exchange, founded in 1832, and Josiah Warren's Time Store, set up earlier in 1827. Warren's *Manifesto*, published in 1841, describes his new currency:

It goes to establish a just and permanent principle of trade which puts an end to all serious fluctuations in prices and consequently, to all the insecurity and ruin which these fluctuations produce; and to build up those who are already ruined.

It tends to put a stop to all kinds of speculation.

It has a sound and rational circulating medium, a real and definite representative of wealth. It is based exclusively on labor as the only legitimate capital. This circulating medium has a natural tendency to lessen by degrees the value and the use of money, and finally to render it powerless; and consequently to sweep away all the crushing masses of fraud, iniquity, cruelty, corruption and imposition that are built upon it.²⁰

Currencies based on time are still with us in the form of LETS (Local Exchange Trading Systems), but this was not the only alternative medium for exchange that was proposed. John Gray, who belonged to the group known as the Ricardian Socialists, also promoted alternative currencies.²¹ Proudhon had tried, and failed, to found a 'Bank of the People' in 1849,²² while others suggested tying the value of money to common commodities. By the end of the century, W. B. Greene's *Mutual Banking* had eclipsed Warren as the most influential basis for individualist thinking.²³ A mutual currency would be limited to being a medium of exchange and not be a tradable commodity. He described it thus:

... the bill of a Mutual Bank is a bill of exchange, drawn by all the members of the banking company upon themselves, endorsed and accepted by themselves, payable at sight, but only in services and products.²⁴

J. H. Mackay is typical of many others who elaborated on this to present a vision of competitive currencies in a free market:

Money would be issued through free banks at a price determined by free competition in its manufacture and distribution. It would be obtainable from banks founded upon the principle of mutual benefit for all, so that a person with no property could offer his labour as security. Money would be plentiful because it was cheap, and cheap because it was free of all restrictions!²⁵

Currency reform was one of the ways in which individualist anarchists distinguished themselves from classic liberals. They were advocates of the free market but saw the medium of exchange as being something radically different. And their opposition to monopoly made them anti-capitalist too. In current political discourse, capitalism, as a pattern of ownership, is often conflated with markets as a system of exchange. Individualist political economy separated the two and espoused something that was, in effect, free market anti-capitalism.

THE FREE SOCIETY

An autonomous individual could only flourish in a free society. That autonomy rested on a common principle; self-ownership. Property was not solely an economic concept; individual freedom was underpinned by the ownership of our own selves, giving people the right to live as they saw fit. Again, it is a principle that can be found in classic liberalism. John Locke wrote:

... every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his.²⁶

Locke described an intrinsic right to the ownership of the products of labour, which individualist political economy sought to realise, but Josiah Warren widened it out:

... *EQUITABLE COMMERCE* is founded on a principle exactly opposite to combination; this principle may be called that of Individuality. It leaves every one in undisturbed possession of his or her natural and proper sovereignty over its own person, time, property and responsibilities; & no one is acquired or expected to surrender any "portion" of his natural liberty by joining any society whatever; nor to become in any way responsible for the acts or sentiments of any one but himself; nor is there any arrangement by which even the whole body can exercise any government over the person, time property or responsibility of a single individual.²⁷

Warren was not just affirming the individual right of property in the product of labour but was also denying that there was any legitimate authority over an individual's life at all. Self-ownership conferred self-sovereignty. It was absolute.

This is the principle that individualists insisted on. The only restriction was the principle described by Herbert Spencer as the law of equal liberty, ‘that every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other man’.²⁸

If individuals are the sole arbiters of their own actions, then forcing them to conform to moral codes or social mores, whether by the use of law or by social sanction, is illegitimate. And though law is imposed by the state and enforced by legal penalties, moral codes are the product of other institutions as well, both formal ones such as religion, or the informal strictures of the conventions of ‘polite society’. Both should be resisted. Individualists rejected all forms of coercion, not just that of the state.

The question then arose of how was this to be done. Individualists were not eschatological revolutionaries. Violent revolution was equally coercive and utterly impractical. Instead, their revolution was a slow one of everyday life. There is a memorable passage in Christopher Hitchens’ short book, *Letters to a Young Contrarian*, that captures the essence of their praxis perfectly,

Vaclav Havel, then working as a marginal playwright and poet in a society and state that truly merited the title Absurd, realised that “resistance” in its original insurgent and militant sense was impossible in the Central Europe of the day. He therefore proposed living “as if” he were a citizen of a free society, “as if” lying and cowardice were not mandatory patriotic duties...²⁹

And so, individualists lived together without marriage, published and distributed treatises on birth control, campaigned against state regulation, discussed homosexuality, promoted secularism and freethought, and sometimes paid a heavy personal price in ostracism or even gaol. Individualists became proponents of ‘free love’, the idea that all human sexual relationships should be solely based on choice and unrestricted by law.

Given the moral double standards and legal discrimination against women, it was inevitable that individualist anarchism would become strongly feminist. There were exceptions, however. The eccentric British individualist anarchist, Henry Seymour, was an enthusiastic proponent of a different version of free love. In *The Anarchy of Love*, he makes an excruciatingly feeble excuse for his proclivities:

A forcible instance favourable to polygamous relations consists in the great preponderance of females, brought about by wars and other unwholesome employments of men, and the effect of political government generally. If exclusiveness were rigidly enforced, the greater number of women would be compelled to live and die without a single experience of the pleasures of love. The amount of mental and physical suffering thus caused would not be compensated for by the observance of any amount of what is called morality, for morals that injure health are a superstition and a sham, and it is the duty of everyone to violate such as opportunities permit.³⁰

Far more impressive than this piece of sophistry are the combative writings of the American writer, Voltairine de Cleyre. She argued from the individualist concept of self-ownership. This was denied to all women. They were prevented from earning their living, marriage turned them into the property of their husbands, and their sexual subservience led to frequent marital rape. Women were denied the economic independence together with the personal and sexual self-expression that was their need and their right.

Yet she was a subtler writer than many. In her essay, *Those Who Marry Do Ill*,³¹ her case against marriage is based more on individual psychology, than legal oppression.

... I am concerned with the success of love. And I believe that the easiest, surest and most applicable method of killing love is marriage ... I believe that the only way to preserve love in anything like the ecstatic condition which renders it worthy of a distinctive name—otherwise it is either lust or simple friendship—is to maintain the distances. Never allow love to be vulgarized by the common indecencies of continuous close communion. Better be in familiar contempt of your enemy than of the one you love.³²

This is illustrative of the way personal preference can be elevated into political principle, but it also shows that her priority for the liberation of women was always independence. And nothing is more important than economic independence. In *The Case of Woman Versus Orthodoxy*,³³ she wrote,

I know all of the evils resultant to woman from the factory system; I would not prolong them. But I am glad that by these very horrors, these gigantic machines which give to me the nightmare with their jaws and teeth, these monstrous buildings, bare and many windowed, stretching skyward, brick, hard and loveless, which daily swallow and spew out again thousands of frail lives, each day a little frailer, weaker, more exhausted, these unhealthy, man-eating traps which I cannot see blotting the ground and the sky without itching to tear down, by these very horrors women have learned to be socially useful and economically independent—as much so as men are. The basis of independence and of individuality is bread. As long as wives take bread from husbands because they are not capable of getting it in any other way, so long will the decree obtain: “Thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee,” so long will all the talk about political “rights” be empty vagaries, hopeless crying against the wind.³⁴

Economic independence, however it is gained, breaks the chains of patriarchy—permanently. There is no going back.

Which bring us back to our ‘anarchists in high heels’. They are earning their living, being independent. They are doing so against strong moral disapproval from ‘the Religious Right (who view porn as sin) and the Radical Left (who view it as violence)’.³⁵ They are being who they have chosen to be, not what others say they ought to be. It is worth remembering that the anarchists and progressives of the late nineteenth century were also branded as immoral,

prosecuted under the Comstock Laws and the Obscene Publications Act. Their fight for contraception, abortion, sexual freedom, and gay rights brought something hidden into plain view and demanded that it be accepted. McElroy made a perceptive remark, when she thought about her own unease with her research. ‘Perhaps this is why society reviles sex workers. Perhaps they show us things we don’t want to see’.³⁶ Yes, anarchist is an appropriate term for them to claim.

LATER DEVELOPMENTS

A free society is one that is free of coercion. That meant that individualism offered an untrammelled hostility to the state as the ultimate source of force and ‘aggression’. The idea of duty to the state is anathema. Government by consent is a fiction. Lysander Spooner’s pamphlet, *No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority*,³⁷ demolishes the grounds of constitutional consent in that the original parties to any social contract are all dead and the contract has never been renewed. However, by taking its argument to extremes, *No Treason* raises considerable doubts. For example, Spooner writes:

The secret ballot makes a secret government; and a secret government is a secret band of robbers and murderers. Open despotism is better than this.³⁸

Really? Is the secret ballot worse than the prisons and torture chambers of a despot? And what about this?

These money-lenders, the Rothschilds, for example, say to themselves: If we lend a hundred millions sterling to the queen and parliament of England, it will enable them to murder twenty, fifty, or a hundred thousand people in England, Ireland, or India; and the terror inspired by such wholesale slaughter, will enable them to keep the whole people of those countries in subjection ... and from the wealth thus extorted from them, they ... can afford to pay us a higher rate of interest for our money than we can get in any other way.³⁹

This is the central premise of the worst anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that infest the far right and have found their way into the thinking of some of the left. Individualism was facing a dilemma. The twentieth century was the era of an increasingly successful social democracy. In rejecting the democratic state, individualists risked irrelevance.

The eventual result was that individualism was subsumed into a new ideology, libertarianism. The most important synthetic theorist was Murray Rothbard.⁴⁰ Given growing political polarisation, libertarianism allied with conservatism. It did so by making its peace with capitalism, abandoning free currencies in favour of sound money, incorporating the Austrian school of free market economics, and subscribing to traditional American non-intervention and isolation in foreign affairs. In the 1980s it became increasingly socially conservative too and continually opposed state regulation on issues such as public health and welfare. This anarcho-capitalism is the direct descendant of

individualist anarchism, but shorn of many of its most radical elements. A discussion of libertarianism is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is worth mentioning that left libertarians rejected this rightward move and they still attempt to combine economic liberty with social justice, more in keeping with their anarchist ancestors.⁴¹

Does this make Individualist anarchism nothing more than an historical curiosity? I would suggest not. It is a rich tradition and is currently asking questions that need to be asked. As populists and demagogues seek power on the back of identity politics and nationalism, something that counters them by saying, ‘What we are is not defined by what you say we are, we are who want to be, our identity is ours alone’, couldn’t be more valuable. Individualist anarchists are once more an important voice against oppression, whatever their footwear.

NOTES

1. W. McElroy, *XXX: A Woman’s Right to Pornography* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995).
2. *Ibid.*, Chapter 1. McElroy has made her text freely available (preferably with a voluntary PayPal donation) from her personal website: <http://www.wendymcelroy.com/xxx/> (accessed 9 October 2017). This is the text I have used. There are no page numbers.
3. For a fuller discussion of McElroy’s radicalism, see her edited collection: W. McElroy (Ed), *Freedom, Feminism, and the State* (Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute, 1991).
4. J. H. Mackay, *The Freedomseeker: The Psychology of a Development* (Freiburg & New York: Mackay Gesellschaft, 1983), 151.
5. M. Stirner, *The Ego and Its Own*, Translated by Steven Byington, with an introduction by Sidney Parker (London: Rebel Press, 1993).
6. *Ibid.*, 164.
7. *Ibid.*, 177.
8. For a superb discussion of populism, see J.-W. Müller, *What is Populism?* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).
9. In his victory speech after the UK referendum vote to leave the European Union on the morning of June 24, 2016, Nigel Farage, leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party, said that the vote ‘will be a victory for real people, a victory for ordinary people, a victory for decent people’.
10. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 196.
11. *Ibid.*, 196.
12. *Ibid.*, 179.
13. For a useful collection of translations of Proudhon’s writing see, I. MacKay (Ed), *Property is Theft!: A Pierre-Joseph Proudhon Anthology* (Edinburgh, Oakland, Baltimore: AK Press, 2011).
14. For Stirner’s critique of Proudhon see: Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 249–251.
15. Tucker published a selection of articles and commentary from the journal that as a comprehensive introduction to the ideas and debates of the time. B. Tucker, *Instead of a Book, by a Man Too Busy to Write One: A Fragmentary Exposition of Philosophical Anarchism* (New York: Tucker, 1897).

16. See W. Donisthorpe, *Individualism: A System of Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1889).
17. The other Spencerian individualists were Auberon Herbert and J. H. Levy. I discuss their ideas at greater length in my book, *Making Another World Possible: Anarchism, Anti-Capitalism, and Ecology in Late 19th and Early twentieth Century Britain* (London and New York: 2013), Chapter 3.
18. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Oxford University Press, 1998), I.ii, 22.
19. *Ibid.*, IV. iii, 306.
20. J. Warren, *Manifesto* (Peerless Press, Kindle edition, n.d.), locations 51–59.
21. See Noel Thompson, *The People's Science: The Popular Political Economy of Exploitation and Crisis 1816–34* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
22. An idea that was defended by Charles Dana and Benjamin Tucker: C. A. Dana, *Proudhon and his Bank of the People. Being a defence of the great French anarchist ... A series of newspaper articles*, edited by Benjamin R. Tucker (New York: Benj. R. Tucker, 1896).
23. W. B. Greene, *Mutual Banking* (West Brookfield, MA: O. S. Cooke & Co., 1850).
24. *Ibid.*, 51.
25. Mackay, *The Freedomseeker*, *op. cit.* 111.
26. J. Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government and A letter Concerning Toleration* (New York: Dover Publications, 2002), 12–13.
27. Warren, *Manifesto*, locations 14–19.
28. H. Spencer, *Social Statics: or, The Conditions Essential to Happiness Specified, and the First of them Developed* (London: John Chapman, 1851). Online edition. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/273> (accessed 31 October 2017), 105.
29. C. Hitchens, *Letters to a young Contrarian* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 36.
30. Henry Seymour, *The Anarchy of Love: or the Science of the Sexes* (London: H. Seymour, 1888), 11. The influence of Seymour was widespread throughout the radical milieu in the nineteenth century, though he is now neglected.
31. In S. Presley and C. Sartwell (Eds), *Exquisite Rebel: The Essays of Voltairine de Cleyre – Anarchist, Feminist, Genius* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2005), 197–206.
32. *Ibid.*, 199.
33. In *Ibid.*, 207–219.
34. *Ibid.*, 218.
35. McElroy, XXX, Chapter 7.
36. *Ibid.*, Chapter 7.
37. L. Spooner, *No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority*, Complete Series, Qualiteri Publishing, Kindle Edition.
38. *Ibid.*, Kindle locations, 794–798.
39. *Ibid.*, Kindle locations, 1069–1073.
40. See in particular, M. N. Rothbard, *For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto* (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006).
41. Some of the debates can be followed at this stimulating website <http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com>.



Anarchist Communism

Daide Turcato

Communism is a model of stateless society based on the common ownership of the means of production and informed by the principle ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’. In other words, common ownership is not limited to the means of production, but extends to the products of labour: under communism, ‘everything belongs to everyone’.

This definition remained stable and uncontroversial throughout the history of anarchism, and was always shared by communists of the Marxist school, who regarded the state as an instrument of class oppression and therefore believed that it had no place in a classless society. So, from a strictly theoretical perspective, there was neither evolution in the concept of anarchist communism nor even a distinctive concept of anarchist communism to be contrasted with other forms of communism.

However, different models of anarchist communist societies have been proposed. Moreover, the centrality of communism within the broader anarchist theory has shifted over time. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, anarchists and communists of different schools disagreed on the path to their common end. Hence, the anarchist communist tradition is best characterised in terms of tactical as well as theoretical beliefs and is best appraised contrastively, in relation to the beliefs of its opponents. In brief, the history of the anarchist communist current is not only the history of a concept but also the history of a label. From this perspective, that history is less linear than a narrow doctrinal perspective would suggest. The ‘anarchist communist’ label was taken up in time by anarchists of different types and in contrast with different opponents, and the dividing lines could vary considerably.

D. Turcato (✉)
Applied Scientist and Historian, Dublin,
Republic of Ireland
e-mail: dturcato@alumni.sfu.ca

Communism has not always been associated with anarchism. The anti-authoritarian branch of the International Workingmen's Association was initially collectivist, in contrast with the communist branch. Collectivism differs from communism in the way it envisages the distribution of the social product in a socialist society. Its informing principle is 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his work'. However, the real divide was not the distribution of the social product but freedom. The communist tradition, from Étienne Cabet to Wilhelm Weitling and Karl Marx, had been predominantly authoritarian. In that tradition, common ownership of the means of production meant ownership by an all-encompassing state. The key implication of the collectivists' claim that each was entitled to the full product of his work was the negation of any other source of entitlement, whether by a capitalist or a state. In this vein, Mikhail Bakunin claimed that he detested communism, because it necessarily ended with the centralisation of property in the hands of the state, and was instead a collectivist, because he wanted 'the organization of society and of collective or social property from the bottom up, by free association'.¹ In fact, anarchist collectivism was under-determined and inclusive with respect to the distribution of products. As the historian of anarchism Max Nettlau remarks, 'nobody then took care of determining in detail what *the full product of work* meant; it was understood that it was the product not decimated by the capitalist and the state, and this sufficed'. The search for practical and equitable means would be left to the future groups and associations.²

Nevertheless, by 1876, the collectivist formula had come under scrutiny. The beginning of an anarchist communist current can be dated to that year. Though anarchist communist ideas had been occasionally put forward in France, the decisive thrust came from the Italian branch of the International, which counted Carlo Cafiero and Errico Malatesta among its most prominent figures. Their criticism of collectivism was based on two arguments that have since remained the cornerstone of communism: it was impossible to give everyone equal access to the means of production since, for example, the fertility of the land differed from place to place, and physical and intellectual endowment differed from individual to individual; and it was impossible to determine each individual's contribution to production, since production was an inherently social process, in which each individual's work depended on the work of others. Collectivism, they argued, was bound to reinstate competition and inequality.³ A resolution that replaced the collectivist with the communist programme was passed at the 1876 congress of the Italian branch of the International in Florence.

In the following years anarchist communism came to be accepted in most countries where the antiauthoritarian International had a presence. From 1880 it came into use in France, Belgium, and Switzerland, where it was accepted by the Jura Federation in October of that year, with the support of Cafiero, Élisée Reclus, and Peter Kropotkin, who all lived in that country at the time. Kropotkin went on to become the best-known and most influential advocate of anarchist communism. Unlike earlier proponents, such as Malatesta, who acknowledged

that communism presupposed abundance of products and highly developed moral consciousness and therefore foresaw a transitional period before communism could be established, Kropotkin maintained that the immediate establishment of communism after the revolution was both necessary and practicable. In his distinctive scientific attitude, he claimed to refrain from any 'metaphysical conceptions' and to follow, instead, 'the course traced by the modern philosophy of evolution'.⁴ In this light, he maintained that existing societies 'are inevitably impelled in the direction of Communism', which he regarded as 'the synthesis of the two ideals pursued by humanity throughout the ages—Economic and Political Liberty'. Therefore he was convinced that 'the first obligation, when the revolution shall have broken the power upholding the present system, will be to realize Communism without delay'.⁵ Kropotkin envisaged a decentralised society. 'Political economy' he wrote 'has hitherto insisted chiefly upon *division*. We proclaim *integration*; and we maintain that the ideal of society—that is, the state towards which society is already marching—is a society ... where each individual is a producer of both manual and intellectual work ... and where each worker works both in the field and the industrial workshop'. He thus extolled the virtues of petty trades, small industries, and industrial villages, and discerned 'a pronounced tendency of the factories towards migrating to the villages, which becomes more and more apparent nowadays'. In those villages, factories and workshops would be at the gates of fields and gardens, and would be used by 'the *complete* human being, trained to use his brain and his hands'.⁶

Kropotkin's influential writings provided ammunition for an exclusivist and optimistic version of anarchist communism that took root in the Italian, French, and Spanish movements and was epitomised by the twin pamphlets *Les Produits de la Terre* and *Les Produits de l'Industrie*, published respectively in 1885 and 1887 in Geneva. The pamphlets argued, on the basis of statistical data, that 'the dwellings on earth are many more than is needed to comfortably accommodate all human beings', that 'foodstuff amounts to twice the quantity required to fulfill the human kind's needs', and 'the quantity of manufactured goods, estimated in francs, is *three times greater* than the amount representing the expenditure needed for all individuals'. In brief, statistical support was given to the claim that the communistic *pris au tas*, 'taking from the stockpile', was an immediate possibility.⁷ Outside of Europe, Kropotkin's ideas were especially influential in China and Japan. In 1914 the Chinese anarchist Shifu published the manifesto *Goals and Methods of the Anarchist Communist Party*, which included the following programmatic point: 'The products of labour—food, clothing, housing, and everything else that is useful—all are the common possession of society. Everyone may use them freely, and everyone will enjoy all wealth in common'.⁸

The one European country where communism did not gain predominance in the anarchist movement was Spain, where anarchist collectivism and anarchist communism vied for the favour of workers throughout the 1880s and beyond, in a protracted and often heated controversy that was both theoretical

and tactical. In Spain socialism had developed as a mass organisation guided by anarchist collectivist principles. By the end of 1882, the *Federación de Trabajadores de la Región Española* (FTRE) boasted a membership of 64,000 workers.⁹ In the Bakuninist tradition, Spanish collectivists advocated the worker's entitlement to the full product of his labour, as a matter of freedom, and rejected communism as authoritarian. In so doing, they explicitly upheld individual property. The need to distribute products according to the value of each individual's work presupposed a highly organised and systematically defined collectivity, which an 1881 FTRE manifesto described as 'a free federation of free associations of free producers'.¹⁰ The structure of the future society was mirrored by the structure of the FTRE, for the present workers' organisation was to be the embryo of the post-revolutionary collectivity. Therefore the FTRE had a complex federative organisation. Though it was believed that the collectivist society could only be ushered in by a social revolution, the path to revolution was essentially a syndicalist one, focused on the gradual growth of the labour movement and based on the tactics of 'legalism', aimed at preserving the organisation's public existence: in order to build a mass movement, violent tactics were rejected in favour of methods, such as strikes and boycotts, that could be carried out within legal boundaries.¹¹

The dissidence from the FTRE's policy arose first on the tactical ground, without questioning collectivism. In Andalusia, where legalist tactics were ill-suited for the starving peasants, the opposition to the FTRE's Federal Commission materialised in 1883 in the formation of the group *Los Desheredados* (The Disinherited). Another dissident group arose in the Catalan town of Gràcia, with the shoemaker Martín Borrás and the tailor Emilio Hugas as prominent figures. In 1883 they presented a draft regulation which, after reasserting the principles of anarchist collectivism, proposed a decentralised reorganisation of the FTRE.¹² In 1886 they published the first avowedly anarchist communist periodical, *La Justicia Humana*. Their opening editorial stated: 'We are anarchist communist ... We are illegalist ... We are not in favour of organizing the working classes in a positive sense; we aspire to a negative organization ... We believe this has to be by groups, without regulations'.¹³ In the historian George Esenwein's summary, communists were 'intractably opposed to trade unions, which were viewed as essentially reformist bodies'; 'they preferred to set up small, loosely federated groups composed of dedicated militants'; and they held a profound faith in the power of spontaneous revolutionary acts. 'Quite understandably, then, they tended to shun strikes and other forms of economic warfare in favor of violent methods, extolling above all the virtues of propaganda by the deed'.¹⁴

Not only did the tactical cleavage precede the ideological controversy, but it also had a broader geographical scope. Esenwein's outline of the Spanish anarchist communists' tactical tenets could be equally applied to Italian 'anti-organisationists', who engaged long and often harsh polemics with 'organisationists' that divided the Italian movement from the 1890s on over involvement in unions, propaganda by the deed versus mass action, and insti-

tutional forms of organisation such as parties, programmes, and congresses. In the Italian case, however, the ideological controversy had no prominent role, so that the advocacy of communism could be unproblematically shared by anti-organisationists such as Luigi Galleani and organisationists such as Malatesta. As the ideological controversy subsided in Spain, the divergence on organisation persisted in many countries. In brief, there is evidence that the tactical divide had deeper roots and that the ideological controversy in Spain was grafted onto it.¹⁵

While anti-organisationism did not strictly imply communism, the association was not arbitrary. In an 1893 essay, the Italian Francesco Saverio Merlino remarks that ‘much of what today goes by the name of anarchist communism is borrowed, unfortunately, from the individualist theory’. Like the individualists—Merlino argues—self-styled anarchist communists claim the *sovereignty of the individual* and ‘demand, like those, that each individual have *free access* to the production sources, as if each individual lived in a world of his own’. Their motto is ‘do what you want’ and their assumption is that, once everyone will do so, a perfectly organised society will result. In fact, Merlino argues, they claim that no organisation will be necessary, for ‘the individuals will agree, cooperate, distribute tasks, exchange products without a previous understanding ... by *nature’s* secret impulse’.¹⁶

Towards the end of the 1880s, prominent figures in the collectivist camp, such as Ricardo Mella and Fernando Tárriada del Mármol, made efforts to overcome the rift by proposing an unhyphenated form of anarchism, for which Tárriada coined the fortunate phrase ‘anarchism without adjectives’, that tolerated the coexistence of different anarchist schools.¹⁷ Outside of Spain, an effort in the same direction was made by Malatesta. His proposal is all the more significant for our discussion, as it comes from an early proponent of anarchist communism, who redefined the place of communism in anarchist theory without recanting his erstwhile beliefs. While confirming his personal belief in communism as the only full solution to the social question, Malatesta shifted his emphasis on the concept of anarchism as a method, arguing that the coexistence of collectivists and communists in the same party was a logical consequence of that method: ‘If anarchy means spontaneous evolution ... by what right and for what reason might we turn solutions we prefer and advocate into dogmas and impose them? And then again, using what means?’ Anarchists could hold the most diverse ideals about the reconstruction of society, but ‘for the formation of a party it is necessary and sufficient that there should be a shared method. And the method ... is shared by all, communists and collectivists alike’.¹⁸ To emphasise this new stance, Malatesta and his associates preferred to inclusively call themselves ‘anarchist socialists’, while retaining their communist beliefs.

By the 1890s communism had virtually won the battle with collectivism. Declarations of anarchist communist faith tended now to argue more for socialism in general, while arguments for communism in particular were often left implicit. For example, John Most’s 1892 article ‘Why I am a Communist’, after

criticising capitalism and private property, simply urged that the means of production ‘be transferred into the possession of the community’: ‘And such a transfer’ he claimed ‘means nothing short of abolishing private property, and of establishing the collectivism of wealth, of Communism’.¹⁹ As a result of these parallel trends following the decline of the communist–collectivist controversy, the ‘anarchist communist’ and ‘anarchist socialist’ labels could often refer interchangeably to the same programmes. An illustration of the permeability of labels is the long-lived bilingual Swiss periodical *Réveil-Risveglio* (Awakening), which was founded in 1900 as *Le Réveil Socialiste-Anarchiste*, changed its qualification to ‘anarchist-communist’ in 1913, and became simply ‘anarchist’ in 1926 to avoid any confusion with authoritarian communism, with no change in its editorial line.

At the same time, anarchist communism came increasingly to be contrasted, no longer with anarchist collectivism but with anarchist individualism. In this contrast we can grasp the substance of the anarchist communist label in this phase. The most influential anarchist individualist writer, Benjamin Tucker, defined anarchism as ‘the doctrine that all the affairs of men should be managed by individuals or voluntary associations’. Influenced by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s mutualism, he rejected the common ownership of the means of production, but wanted to give everyone access to them by abolishing all forms of monopoly. He thus claimed that communists were not anarchists, ‘on the ground that Anarchism means a protest against every form of invasion’.²⁰ Anarchist communists believed the individualists started from a false premise. As Malatesta argued in 1897, they looked upon society ‘as an aggregate of autonomous individuals ... who have no reason to be together other than their own advantage and who might part ways once they find that the benefits that society has to offer are not worth the sacrifices in personal freedom that it demands’. However, he added, the individual cannot exist independently of society. In society a man may be free or a slave, but in society he must remain because that is the context of his being a man. Therefore, the point was not to safeguard a fictitious individual autonomy from invasion but to seek the most equitable conditions in which associated life could take place.²¹

At any rate, the future society was not the key issue, for all agreed on the principle of freedom as its basic rule, after all. Above all—as in the communist–collectivist controversy—it was a matter of different tactics advocated in the present. As the American anarchist Alexander Berkman remarked, communist anarchists believed in social revolution, while individualists and mutualists thought that present society would gradually develop out of government into a non-governmental condition. Moreover, Malatesta wrote in 1926, there were dissensions about the anarchists’ attitude towards the labour movement, about organisation, and about the anarchists’ relationships with other subversive parties.²² In this shift from the communist–collectivist to the communist–individualist contrast, the tactical continuity of latter communism is more with collectivism than with former communism. As we have seen, the link between

individualism and early versions of communism had already been pointed out by Merlino. In his abovementioned 1897 article, Malatesta concurred with Merlino's analysis, arguing that 'individualist anarchists of the communist school' shared with individualists of Tucker's type the complementary and equally faulty beliefs in the individual's absolute autonomy and in a principle of 'harmony by natural law', whereby—in the communists' version of the principle—'with everybody doing as he pleases, it will turn out that, quite unknowingly and unintentionally, he will have done precisely what the rest wanted him to'.²³ Moreover, Malatesta's later reference to the communists' tactical dissensions with individualists shows that the communists were the heirs of the organisationist current that in Spain was represented by the collectivists, while the individualists adopted an anti-organisationist stance. In brief, in its evolution, the anarchist communist current had come to stand for that associationist tradition based on workers' collective action that in Spain went by the name of *societarismo*. At the same time—especially in contrast with early twentieth-century syndicalism and its reliance on the general strike as a revolutionary weapon—it retained the advocacy of armed insurrection and of specific anarchist organisations to promote it.

Among the many anarchist communist programmes that furthered this tradition worldwide after its first half a century of existence, two deserve mention for their historical significance, as they were linked to two major European revolutionary experiences, the Russian revolution of 1917 and the Spanish revolution of 1936. The first is the *Organisational Platform of the Libertarian Communists*, a programme published in 1926 by *Dielo Trouda*, a group of exiled Russian anarchists including Nestor Makhno and Peter Arshinov. The document aimed to draw a lesson from the Russian revolution, where, in the authors' view, divisions hindered anarchist action. Accordingly, unity of action was their watchword. The document urged all anarchists to gather under a single organisation characterised by theoretical and tactical unity. 'The executive organ of the general anarchist movement' it was stated 'introduces in its rank the principle of collective responsibility', according to which the entire organisation was responsible for the activity of each member and each member was responsible for the activity of the organisation as a whole. The organisation was to be structured federally, but it demanded 'execution of communal decisions' from its members. This spirit of integration is also discernible in the document's 'constructive section', where the post-revolutionary path to building a communist society is traced. The country's diverse branches of industry, it is argued, are tightly bound together; hence all actual production is considered 'as a single workshop of producers'. Accordingly, 'the productive mechanism of the country is global and belongs to the whole working class'. Though all industrial products would belong to all from the outset, it was acknowledged that individuals may not have unlimited liberty to satisfy their needs from the first day of the revolution, hence insufficient goods would be divided 'according to the principle of the greatest urgency'.²⁴

A different view of the future communist society was taken in the historical resolution about ‘the confederal concept of libertarian communism’ passed at the 1936 Saragossa congress of the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT), on the eve of the Spanish revolution. The resolution, which was inspired by Isaac Puente’s popular pamphlet *El comunismo libertario* and drafted by Federica Montseny, Puente himself, and others, was not just a statement of a distant goal but also a plan for the aftermath of a revolution that was felt to be imminent.²⁵ After stating, as a founding principle of the revolution, ‘that the needs of each human being be met with no limitations other than those imposed by the economy’s capabilities’, the organisation of the post-revolutionary society is described, in a bottom-up fashion, as resting on a triple base: individual, commune, and federation. Great emphasis is placed on the ‘free commune’ as the basic political and administrative entity. Communes are to be autonomous and ‘are to federate at county and regional levels, and set their own geographical limits, whenever it may be found convenient to group small towns, hamlets and townlands into a single commune. Amalgamated, these communes are to make up an Iberian Confederation of Autonomous Libertarian Communes’. Characteristically, it is claimed that ‘the new society will eventually equip every commune with all the agricultural and industrial accoutrements required for it to be autonomous, according to the biological principle that the man—in this case the commune—is most free who needs least from the others’.²⁶

These two programmes illustrate alternate visions of the anarchist communist society, one based on large, interdependent industrial networks, the other on local, autonomous communities. In pre-revolutionary Spain, the former view was upheld by the foremost anarchist Diego Abad de Santillán. He expressed his views in a book published only months before the Saragossa congress, with the intent of ‘out-growing the puerility of a libertarian communism based on supposedly free independent communes, as peddled by Kropotkin’.²⁷ ‘The “free commune” Santillán argued ‘is the logical product of the concept of group affinity, but there are no free communes in economy, because that freedom would presuppose independence, and there are no independent communes’. Instead, Santillán’s ideal was ‘the federated commune, integrated in the economic total network of the country or countries in revolution’.²⁸ As for the best economic system, Santillán favoured communism, but this, he argued, was not coterminous with anarchy, which can be realised in a multiformity of economic arrangements, individual and collective. Why dictate rules, then? ‘We who make freedom our banner, cannot deny it in economy. Therefore there must be free experimentation ... Without *a priori* rejecting other solutions, let us spread ours to reach more easily abundance in economy’. After the revolution, as a majority anarchists would have to acknowledge the minorities’ right to organise their life as they wish, just like as a minority they would demand freedom of experimentation and defend it by all means.²⁹

Santillán's pluralist and experimentalist views were the same as Malatesta's, whose anarchist communism had come a long way since his early advocacy of 1876. His pluralism and experimentalism had their root in the concept of anarchism as a method that he expounded in 1889. Malatesta agreed with the individualists that individual freedom was the cornerstone of anarchy and with the communists that communism was the best form of society. However, he did not believe in harmony by natural law. The outcome of applying the method of freedom was open. Communism was only one of the options, which had to be consciously willed. The possibility of alternate economic arrangements was not just a concession imposed by circumstances during a transition period, but it was to be a permanent feature of the anarchist society: 'I am a communist only so long as I do not have to be one', Malatesta claimed in 1896.³⁰

Finally, the outcome of Malatesta's trajectory throws into relief the distinctive traits that differentiate the anarchist version of communism from the Marxist. 'Communism' Marx and Engels claimed 'is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things'. Accordingly, 'the communists do not preach morality at all ... They do not put to people the moral demand: love one another, do not be egoists'.³¹ Malatesta's views were the polar opposite: communism was an ideal and history had no line of march. 'Communism, like anything else that depends on human will, will not come to pass until men want it to', he wrote in 1898.³² Communism, for him, was indeed a matter of morality: 'To be anarchist it is not enough to wish one's own individual emancipation; it is necessary to wish everyone's emancipation'.³³ Communism, like anarchy, could only be realised gradually, to the extent that such moral consciousness spread: 'Communism is an ideal ... In order to be truly possible, communism ... must arise locally, among like-minded groups ... In brief, communism must be a sentiment, before it becomes a thing'.³⁴ Marxists conflated the descriptive and normative domains and rejected any distinction between 'is' and 'ought'. In contrast, that distinction was the cornerstone of Malatesta's voluntarism. For him, society could go in any direction in which the interaction of individual wills would take it. Anarchist communists were just one component in this interplay. As anarchists, they demanded the interplay to be uncoerced. As communists, they spread their ideal and put it in practice wherever they got enough support. In the moral basis of communism was the reconciliation between the individual dimension of freedom and the collective dimension of equality. The name of that moral basis was 'solidarity'.

In conclusion, the history of the anarchist communist current shows—in contrast with the persistent stereotype that depicts anarchists as utopians detached from reality—that the substance of anarchist controversies was more about the means to be used in the present than about the future society. Thus, on the one hand, anarchist communism came to represent an associationist

tradition that was characterised more in terms of tactics (collective action, involvement in unions, insurrection) than of ultimate goals. On the other hand, the ultimate goal of communism evolved from being a *sine qua non* of anarchism to being one among different options, to be realised to the extent that it received support. It would be ironic, and not very flattering, if mainstream historiography let this pluralist, experimentalist, gradualist, solidaristic, libertarian version of communism go down in history in the company of that uppercase ‘Communism’ whose disastrous implications anarchists foresaw a hundred and fifty years ago.

NOTES

1. M. Bakunin, ‘Deuxième discours au deuxième Congrès de la Paix et de la Liberté,’ 23 September 1868, in *Oeuvres complètes* (Amsterdam: IISG, 2000, CD-ROM).
2. M. Nettelau, ‘Internazionale collettivista e comunismo anarchico,’ in E. Malatesta, *Scritti*, 3 vols. (rpt, Carrara, 1975), vol. 3, 255.
3. See, for example: C. Cafiero, ‘Anarchy and Communism,’ in R. Graham (Ed), *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas*, vol. 1 (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2005), 112–113; [E. Malatesta], *Programma e organizzazione della Associazione Internazionale dei Lavoratori* (Florence: Tipografia C. Toni, 1884), 30–34.
4. P. Kropotkin, ‘Anarchist Communism: Its Basis and Principles,’ in R. N. Baldwin (Ed), *Kropotkin’s Revolutionary Pamphlets* (New York: Dover, 1927), 47.
5. P. Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread* (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 62, 65.
6. P. Kropotkin, *Fields, Factories and Workshops* (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1913), 22–23, 350, 413.
7. We have translated from the following Italian edition: E. Reclus, *I prodotti della terra e dell’industria* (Geneva: L. Bertoni, 1901), 29. The original pamphlets were published anonymously. Though Reclus was instrumental in bringing them about, the attribution to him is incorrect.
8. ‘Goals and Methods of the Anarchist Communist Party,’ in Graham, 349.
9. J. Piqué i Padró, *Anarco-col·lectivisme i anarco-communisme* (Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1989), 15.
10. M. Nettelau, *La Première Internationale en Espagne (1868–1888)* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), 353–354.
11. G. R. Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain, 1868–1898* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 82.
12. ‘Proyecto de reglamento de la Federación Regional Española,’ *La Federación Igualadina*, 17 (1 June 1883).
13. ‘Nuestros propósitos,’ *La Justicia Humana* (Barcelona), 1:1 (18 April 1886).
14. Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology*, 108–109.
15. On the cross-national character of this debate, see my ‘European Anarchism in the 1890s: Why Labour Matters in Categorizing Anarchism,’ *Working USA*, 12:4 (September 2009), 451–466.

16. S. Merlino, *L'Individualisme dans l'Anarchisme* (Brussels: Edition de la Société nouvelle, 1893), 8–9.
17. See Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology*, Chapter 8.
18. 'Our Plans,' in D. Turcato (Ed) *The Method of Freedom: An Errico Malatesta Reader* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2014), 98.
19. *The Commonweal* (London) 7: 302 (20 February 1892).
20. C. L. S[wartz] (Ed), *Individual Liberty: Selection from the Writings of Benjamin R. Tucker* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1926), 7–9, 32.
21. E. Malatesta, 'Individualism in Anarchism,' in D. Turcato (Ed), *Complete Works of Errico Malatesta*, vol. 3 (Chico, CA: AK Press, 2016), 79–80.
22. A. Berkman, *What is Anarchism?* (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2003), 169; E. Malatesta, 'Comunismo e individualismo,' in *Scritti*, vol. 3, 227.
23. Malatesta, 'Individualism,' in *Method of Freedom*, 79–80.
24. Dielo Trouda, *The Organisational Platform of the Libertarian Communists* (Workers Solidarity Movement, 2001).
25. Isaac Puente's pamphlet was translated in English as 'Libertarian Communism,' *Anarchist Review* (Orkney), 1:6 (Summer 1982), 27–35.
26. José Peirats, *The CNT in the Spanish Revolution*, vol. 1 (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2011), 202–205. We have slightly amended the resolution's translation on the basis of the source Spanish text.
27. D. Abad de Santillán to unknown recipient, Buenos Aires, 10 July 1965, in D. Guérin (Ed), *No Gods, No Masters* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2005), 469.
28. D. A. de Santillán, *El organismo económico de la revolución* (Barcelona: Ediciones 'Tierra y Libertad,' 1936), 189.
29. Santillán, *ibid.*, 182–185, 196–197.
30. E. Malatesta to A. Hamon, London, 20 July 1896, Hamon Papers, file 109, IISG, Amsterdam.
31. K. Marx and F. Engels, 'The German Ideology,' in D. McLellan (Ed), *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2000), 187, 199.
32. E. Malatesta, 'In Defense of Communism,' in *Complete Works*, vol. 3, 421.
33. Malatesta, 'Comunismo,' in *Scritti*, vol. 3, 224.
34. E. Malatesta, 'Ancora su comunismo e anarchia,' in *Scritti*, vol. 1, 144–145.



Syndicalism

Lucien van der Walt

INTRODUCTION

Syndicalism centres on the claim that labour unions, built through daily struggles, radically democratic practices and popular education, provide an irreplaceable force for defending and extending gains and rights for the working class and crucial levers for social revolution. Direct action and solidarity, self-activity and the development of political and technical knowledge are means to enable the accumulation of individual and organisational capacities for a revolutionary general strike (or ‘general lockout’ of the capitalist class) in which working people occupy workplaces, take control of the means of production and construct a free, socialist order based upon self-management, participatory planning interlinked assemblies and councils and production for need, rather than the profits or power of a ruling minority.

Syndicalism envisages a radically democratic unionism, which aims to organise across and against economic and social inequalities and prejudices and sectionalism within the working class and across the borders of states. Syndicalism rejects bureaucratic and centralised styles of unionism, which view the membership as a passive group to be led, or provided with services; economic business unionism, which focuses solely on wages, working conditions and orderly bargaining; and ‘political unionism’, in the sense of unions allying to political parties seeking state power.

Rather, it promotes a militant class struggle unionism that stresses the importance of autonomous, revolutionary action, based upon solidarity, internationalism and direct action, as inclusive as possible: one big union. It opposes divisions in the ‘working class’, normally understood as including all waged employees lacking power (not just industrial workers), urban and rural,

L. van der Walt (✉)

Sociology Department, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

e-mail: l.vanderwalt@ru.ac.za

including informal workers, workers' families and the unemployed. Syndicalism aims at popular unity across jobs, industries and countries. Instead it fosters polarisation between the working class and the 'ruling class'—normally taken to include both capitalists and top state officials—and solidarity with the peasantry, meaning small farmers subject to control and exploitation by other classes, including tenant farmers.

The outlook is internationalist and solidaristic, stressing common class interests globally, the necessity of uniting the vast majority of humanity—the working class and peasantry—and opposing all forms of oppression. This is captured by the slogan 'An Injury to One is an Injury to All', coined by syndicalists in the United States. Capitalism and states help generate and reinforce a wide range of oppressions, for example, war and national oppression. The creation of a new, egalitarian social system based upon a massive redistribution of power and wealth is essential to uprooting various oppressions and their legacies.

For syndicalism, such transformation is inconceivable without organising what Karl Marx called the 'hidden abode of capitalist production', for the direct takeover of means of production, meaning union struggle is *irreplaceable*. Class is not the only form of oppression, and sometimes not the worst in terms of suffering, but class struggle and unity are essential to defeating all forms of oppression. The syndicalist stress on class struggle does not, therefore, mean a narrow 'economistic' or 'workerist' focus but a revolutionary project of solidarity and globalisation from below.

Syndicalism adopts a possibilist approach to revolutionary work: it views immediate reforms as possible, and actively struggles to improve the daily conditions and fighting capacities of workers; it is *not* reformist, as it does not confine itself to reforms. While reforms—economic *and* political *and* social—are valuable in themselves, fighting for reforms is a means of systematically accumulating power and capacity for a class war. Reforms are important, but always limited and continually eroded, unable to end the exploitation, domination and inequities inherent in capitalist society.

The structures of the syndicalist union, developed in conflict with capitalism and the state, are to form the core of the new society: local union structures of the union provide the means for workers' assemblies to govern democratically, and to mandate committees of delegates; the larger structures of the union, which link local workplaces across territories, and within and across industries, provide the means of coordinating workplace operations into a larger, bottom-up economic plan, linked through delegate systems.

PREFIGURATION, SOLIDARITY AND POLITICS

The syndicalist conception of revolution is, therefore, a prefigurative one: syndicalist unions build a revolutionary counter-power, opposed to the institutions of the ruling class and counter-culture, both forged in daily struggles, that is able to engage in resistance in the present, then carry out a revolutionary overthrow of the ruling class and constitute the nexus of a new social system.

Rather than rest hopes on, for example, the more-or-less spontaneous emergence of workers' councils or factory committees to carry out a revolution, syndicalism deliberately constructs similar structures in its daily union work. In the formulation of the 1906 Charter of Amiens, adopted by the French *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT), ('General Confederation of Labour', formed 1895), 'the trade union, today an organisation of resistance, will in the future be the organisation of production and distribution, the basis of social reorganisation'.¹

In the final revolutionary assault, there is rupture—forcible expropriation of the ruling class—and continuity; the revolutionary unions already embody the basic framework of the new society. Revolution involves their radically democratic structures expanding their scope from workers' control in the union and of elements of daily life, to workers' control of the workplace and the larger economy. The moral, political and organisational infrastructure and daily practices developed in the daily life of the revolutionary unions under capitalism foreshadow the new order.

Since means must match ends, syndicalism cannot involve bureaucratic and centralised unionism, business unionism, or 'political unionism'. There is a basic contradiction between using the state—which is hierarchical and run by political elites closely allied to economic elites, the ruling classes—and the syndicalist project of a bottom-up, autonomous, revolutionary and internationalist working-class movement.

While some syndicalists have participated in state elections, syndicalism is anti-statist and anti-electoral: statist political parties are criticised for being elite-dominated, multi-class organisations that treat workers and unions as passive voters, that hoist politicians into the ruling class, and entangle the labour movement in the (hostile) capitalist state. Syndicalism thus rejects 'political unionism' and building workers' or socialists' parties, to capture state power. Some syndicalist unions have had friendly relations with socialist parties, but all have rejected the statism of classical Marxism, anti-imperialist nationalism and social-democracy, and the subordination to parties built into 'political unionism'.

Marxist, including Leninist, discussions have generally misunderstood syndicalist anti-statism, presenting syndicalism as a militant but narrow economism that ignores struggles beyond the workplace, and pays no attention to the state. This is profoundly inaccurate.

The project of syndicalism is revolutionary, expansive and counter-hegemonic. Rather than ignoring the state, syndicalist anti-statism is based on a profound class analysis. Rather than refusing to engage in politics, syndicalism insists that revolutionary unions raise questions of power and rights at the workplace, and in the larger economy and society; they reject notions that politics is the preserve of parties, or of any neat division between economics and politics.

Thus, Rudolph Rocker (1873–1958) insisted that syndicalism fights for 'political rights and liberties', and against prejudice, imperialism and oppression; however, it does so *outside* of, and *against*, the state, on the terrain where revolutionary unions, 'toughened by daily combat and permeated by Socialist

spirit' can bring to bear workers' structural power.² Its methods of 'warfare by the workers against their economic and political oppressors' include, in revolutionary situations, 'armed resistance'. Likewise, the 'principles' of the syndicalist International Workers' Association (IWA), an international federation in 1922, recognised 'violence ... as a means of defence against the methods of violence of the ruling classes, in the struggle of the revolutionary people for the expropriation of the means of production and of the land'.³ This would be undertaken by democratic and popular armed forces controlled by unions, not outsourced to a state dubbing itself the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'.

DEMOCRACY AND OLIGARCHY IN UNIONS

Syndicalists emphatically do not claim that all unions can, or will, carry such monumental tasks: centralised and bureaucratic unions throttle workers' capacities and self-activity; business unions narrow workers' horizons and accept the basic features of an exploitative status quo; and 'political unionism' leads to confusion, co-option and goal displacement.

Syndicalism evidently rejects the claim—popularised by Robert Michels, a former syndicalist sympathiser—of an 'iron law of oligarchy'. This holds that mass organisations require full-time specialist leadership, which then uses them for its own sectional interests. It also rejects the related notion that unions are basically instruments for negotiating the sale of labour power and cannot therefore end capitalism—and that union bureaucracy always emerges as the brokers.

Syndicalists view such claims as excessively pessimistic and deterministic. Union oligarchies are generated by hierarchical models of organising, entanglement with statist parties, and the deliberate construction of bureaucracies, in place of members' self-activity. As bulwarks against union oligarchies and bureaucracies, syndicalists have championed decentralised and democratic structures, based on strict mandating and report-backs; entrenchment of democratic culture and self-activity amongst the rank-and-file; minimising the number of full-time union staff, in favour of volunteerism and self-sacrifice; and placing all paid staff under strict democratic controls, limiting powers and incomes to the maximum. There is no reason why negotiations cannot proceed on the basis of mass meetings, democratic deliberation and strict mandates—rather than handed over to specialists.

There is in fact extensive evidence of unions and other mass organisations avoiding—and even overthrowing—internal oligarchies. The notion that unions are always confined to collective bargaining within capitalism is also false, as shown by the history of syndicalist (and some other) unions (see below).

ORIGINS, INFLUENCES AND RELATIONSHIP TO ANARCHISM

The lineage of syndicalism has been the subject of some controversy. Werner Sombart is credited with the claim that the French philosopher Georges Sorel (1847–1922) was the main theorist of syndicalism, a position that converges

with the notion that syndicalism was current born of the French CGT in the 1890s. Syndicalism, the argument proceeds, new and distinct ideology, despite some influences from the older Marxist and anarchist traditions. Scholarship in this tradition presents syndicalism and anarchism as separate, even competing, movements. Since Sorel subsequently moved to the radical right, as did a number of syndicalists (and Marxists), this scholarship sometimes locates syndicalism in the rightist and fascist—rather than leftist and socialist—milieu, an argument championed by David Roberts.⁴

However, while the term ‘syndicalism’ dates to the 1890s French CGT—derived from *syndicalisme révolutionnaire*, ‘revolutionary unionism’—as a movement ‘syndicalism’ precedes the term by decades. Sorel commented as an outsider and a latecomer; his ideas—often at odds with CGT positions—had negligible influence upon it; this means it is nonsensical to project Sorel’s later rightist affinities onto syndicalism. Sorel was influenced by syndicalism, rather than the reverse.

The core syndicalist positions and practices emerged in the anarchist wing of the International Workingmen’s Association (the ‘First International’, formed 1864), identified with Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876). Bakunin was influenced by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865)’s stress on class-based self-organisation to create a self-managed society, as well as by Marxist economics. Unlike Proudhon, Bakunin stressed mass struggle and social revolution; unlike Karl Marx, he advocated mass, revolutionary unions that ‘bear in themselves the living germs of the new social order, which is to replace the bourgeois world’⁵—rather than constructing political parties to capture state power. His syndicalism was condemned by Friedrich Engels’ 1873 tract, *The Bakuninists at Work*. Syndicalism continued in the International’s anarchist-led majority wing after the 1872 split, delegates at the 1873 congress, for example, stressing the revolutionary general strike.

The first syndicalist unions emerged in the 1870s, not the 1890s: the *Federación de la Región Española* (FRE, Spanish Regional Federation, 1870); the *Congreso General de Obreros Mexicanos* (General Congress of Mexican Workers, 1876); the United States’ Central Labour Union (CLU, 1884); and Cuba’s *Círculo de Trabajadores de la Habana* (1885, followed by the *Alianza Obrera*, Workers’ Alliance, 1887). These were integral to the rapidly rising anarchist movement: FRE was the largest section of the First International, at 60,000 members (1873); the Mexican *Congreso*, at 50,000 members in 1882, was affiliated to the Anti-Authoritarian (‘Black’) International (formed 1881); the CLU was linked to this International through the affiliation of the United States’ anarchist International Working People’s Association, the main force in the CLU; Cuba’s *Círculo* was born of rising anarchist influence in unions and anarchist-led. None of these formations called themselves ‘syndicalist’, but their politics was indistinguishable from that of the 1890s CGT and its contemporaries.

Syndicalist ascendancy in the 1890s French CGT is best understood as spurring a *revival* of syndicalism globally, not its genesis, a second wave. Syndicalism’s key theorist was Bakunin, not Marx or Sorel, and it was part of the tradition of

‘mass’ anarchism, which favoured prefigurative mass organising and immediate struggle, to build revolutionary counter-power and counter-culture. Not all anarchists supported syndicalism—notably, the insurrectionist wing, which rejected reforms and large formal organisations—but syndicalism was an anarchist *strategy*, not a distinct ideology.

This is not altered by the fact that some anarchists criticised syndicalism, or that some syndicalists rejected the anarchist label, presented syndicalism as new, invented spurious Marxist genealogies for it, or labelled it ‘revolutionary syndicalism’, ‘anarcho-syndicalism’, ‘revolutionary industrial unionism’, or De Leonism. Syndicalism, as movement, thus includes the tradition of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW): emerging in 1905 in the United States, and spreading worldwide, it was inspired and influenced by syndicalism.

Syndicalism is also not, as sometimes suggested, at odds with anarchist-communism. Leaving aside that it is very difficult to identify a distinct anarchist-communist strategy or current, for a range of reasons, the vast majority of people identified in the literature identified as anarchist-communists, including Piotr Kropotkin (1842–1921), championed syndicalism, while most syndicalists endorsed the goal of anarchist-communism, a democratic and stateless socialist society, based on distribution according to need.

SIZE AND IMPACT

The influence and historical role of syndicalism has been substantial, especially in the 1890s–1920s. In this period, anarchists and syndicalists established, led, or influenced, unions in countries as varied as Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Spanish syndicalist unions, notably the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT, National Confederation of Labour, 1910), have tended to dominate accounts. With around 1.5 million members in the 1930s (in a population of 24 million), the CNT was numerically the largest syndicalist union ever. However, Spain’s CNT was proportionately *smaller* than the many other mass syndicalist unions, as it included half of organised labour, facing social-democratic rival of almost equal numbers, *Unión General de Trabajadores* (UGT, General Union of Worker).

By contrast, syndicalism dominated the labour movements of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, France, Mexico, Peru, Portugal and Uruguay, where it was adopted by the largest union centres, and faced no significant rivals. For example, the *Federación Obrera Regional Argentina* (FORA, Argentine Regional Workers’ Federation, 1901) was the main union centre in Argentina, and the main division within organised labour in the late 1910s was between two rival FORAs, one of 70,000 in 1920, the other 180,000. Given the class structure

and union density in Argentina, and a population of eight million (1914), these numbers were relatively enormous—and the pattern was similar in the other countries listed here. The syndicalist *Confederação Operária Brasileira* (Confederation of Brazilian Workers, 1906) dominated the union movement, with between 100,000 and 125,000 members in Rio de Janeiro alone by mid-1919. The Netherlands' *Nationaal Arbeids-Secretariaat* (NAS, 'National Labour Secretariat, formed 1893, syndicalist from 1901) was that country's main labour centre. In Cuba, syndicalism led the main centres, the *Confederación Cubana del Trabajo* ('Cuban Labour Confederation', 1895) and the *Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba* 'National Workers Confederation of Cuba, 1925).

There were also substantial syndicalist minority unions elsewhere, notably in Canada, China, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States. Amongst the largest was the *Unione Sindacale Italiana* (USI; often translated as 'Italian Syndicalist Union', 1912), a breakaway from the social-democratic *Confederazione Generale del Lavoro* (General Confederation of Labour, CGL). It reached 800,000 in 1920—against over 3.5 million in CGL and Catholic unions, and the Spanish CNT's 1.5 million.

Minority syndicalist currents were often concentrated in specific regions, industries or layers, and within these, were often the dominant unions, and exerted a powerful influence on others. For example, the CLU was Chicago's main union centre, its 24 affiliates including the city's 11 largest unions. Perhaps half the 100,000 members of the United States' IWW (at its 1917 peak) were in its Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union, a power in the wheat-belt. In 1921, syndicalism dominated the cities of Guangzhou and Changsha, the leading force in both cities' labour movements until 1925. Bolivia's *Federación Obrera Local* (FOL, Local Workers' Federation, formed 1927) was the largest union centre in La Paz, also establishing a powerful presence in the rural areas. In 1910s Japan, syndicalism was especially important amongst printers. In South Africa, the Industrial Workers of Africa (founded 1917) was the first (for a time, only) union amongst black African workers, and, in 1919, the main union amongst black African dockworkers in Cape Town.

There were recurrent efforts to find ways to link syndicalists, especially syndicalist unions, internationally. Although the short-lived Black International has been associated with insurrectionist approaches, its two largest affiliates, Mexico's *Congreso* and the United States' IWPA, were embedded in syndicalism. Anarchists, including syndicalists, fought to remain in the Socialist International (so-called Second International, formed 1889), despite Marxist and social-democratic hostility. An international syndicalist bulletin from 1907, a world congress in 1913, and a battle for space within the Communist International (Comintern, 1919) were followed by a syndicalist International Workers' Association (IWA) in 1922, which included a ten-country Latin American *Asociación Continental Americana de Trabajadores* (American Continental Workers' Association) from 1929. Meanwhile the IWW had a separate international IWW network, with unions and supporters worldwide, including Africa, Asia, Australia and Latin America.

Syndicalists have also been active within orthodox unions, sometimes allied with other currents, sometimes as organised factions. Initially Argentina's FORA and Spain's *Solidaridad Obrera*, immediate predecessor of the CNT, united anarchists and social-democrats. In Puerto Rico, anarchists and syndicalists were an influential minority in *Federación Libre de Trabajadores* (Free Federation of Workers, formed 1899). In the late 1910s, before the USI (re-)emerged in industrial Turin, Italy, in 1920, syndicalists worked inside the CGL's *Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici* (FIOM, Federation of Metal Workers Employees).

The United States' Syndicalist League of North America (SLNA, 1912) promoted 'boring-from-within' the American Federation of Labour. It was inspired by Tom Mann's (1856–1941) radical network in the orthodox unions, the Industrial Syndicalist Education League (1910), itself modelled on the *noy-aux* syndicalist cells that won the 1890s French CGT. While United States' IWW rejected 'boring-from-within', it was practised by the Australian IWW. In South Africa, the syndicalist International Socialist League (ISL, 1915) and its sometime rival, the Industrial Socialist League (1918), formed new syndicalist unions *and* worked within orthodox unions. The former undertook propaganda and promoted a semi-autonomous Workers' Committee movement within existing movement; the latter won key positions in the Cape Federation of Labour. The ISL's committee movement was modelled on the syndicalist-influenced Shop Stewards and Workers' Committee Movement, a rank-and-file movement in British unions that started with the Clyde Workers' Committee.

Syndicalists have even worked within unions closely integrated linked into authoritarian party-states. For example, syndicalists became a leading force in the Polish *Central Wydział Zawodny* (ZZZ, Union of Trade Unions), formed in 1931 as a nationalist, state-aligned federation. In Bolivia, most FOL unions joined the *Central Obrera Boliviana* (Bolivian Workers' Centre, COB) formed in 1952 and tightly linked to the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria* (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, MNR) government.

Syndicalism repeatedly emerged in Second International parties—examples include Australasia, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United States—and the allied International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centres (formed 1901). A vocal syndicalist current emerged in the Socialist Party of America. The United States' Socialist Labour Party (SLP) meanwhile moved from Marxist orthodoxy to a form of syndicalism around 1904: De Leonism. De Leonism had influence in Australia, Ireland (through figures like James Connolly (1868–1916)), Scotland (notably on the Workers' Committee movement), and South Africa (including in the ISL).

Syndicalist unions were amongst the largest non-Russian affiliates of the early Comintern, something has been obscured by their sequestration in the Comintern's union wing, the Red International of Labour Unions (Profintern, 1921). At the time, few Marxist parties linked to the Comintern were anywhere near the credibility, experience, numbers and *élan* of movements like the CNT, FORA and IWW. Disaffection with Bolshevik manipulation of the Comintern to silence syndicalists led to the IWA.

CLASS COMPOSITION

Syndicalism has played an enormous role in the history of workers and the larger working class. Syndicalist unions were the largest formal organisations in the history of anarchism. This has posed serious problems for orthodox Marxist analyses, which present anarchism as a minority current generated by declining petty bourgeois (including peasant) and/or ruined *déclassé* elements. One Marxist approach breaks with this orthodoxy, presenting syndicalism as a sincerely revolutionary (but inadequate) movement with proletarian support: for example, Leon Trotsky conceded that syndicalists ‘not only wish to fight against the bourgeoisie’ but also ‘tear its head off’.⁶ This approach was especially popular when the early Comintern/Profintern sought to win syndicalists over.

Most, however, seek to square Marxist orthodoxy with syndicalist reality, either insisting that syndicalist workers were based in artisan crafts or small industry, or (like Antonio Gramsci) drawing a neat distinction between ‘petty bourgeois’ syndicalist leaders and ordinary syndicalist workers. The evidence is, however, clear that the syndicalist base comprised casual and seasonal labourers, including construction workers, dockworkers and farmworkers; workers in light, mass and heavy industry, such as factory workers, miners and railway workers; and drew in, to a lesser degree, white-collar workers, plus professionals like doctors, nurses and teachers.

Most syndicalist ideologues and militants were working class. People with more middle-class backgrounds certainly played an important role in organising or promoting the movement—examples include Emma Goldman (1869–1940), France’s Fernand Pelloutier (1867–1901) and Japan’s Ōsugi Sakae (1885–1923)—but no more than their Marxist counterparts like Engels, Gramsci, Lenin, Marx or Trotsky. Peasant anarchism was significant, notably in China, Korea, Mexico, Spain and Ukraine, but syndicalist organising amongst farmworkers was as crucial in rural areas, if not more so: notable examples include Bolivia, Cuba, France, Italy, Peru, Spain and the United States.

INFLUENCE, POLITICS, ALLIANCES AND UPRISINGS

Syndicalism—and through it, anarchism—had a diffuse impact in other ways. The importance of the United States’ IWW, for example, lay less in numbers and formal structures, than in developing a radical working-class counter-culture through imagery, music, union halls and propaganda.⁷ It published thousands of pamphlets, dozens of periodicals and operated innumerable local halls, libraries and classes, mass meetings and tours. The Spanish CNT, similarly, was immersed in a rich, dense network of community centres, schools, and libraries in every district and village of anarchist strength, also supporting 35-plus periodicals (including two dailies), radio and film.

Syndicalist unions were hardly ‘economistic,’ being involved in struggles well beyond wages and working conditions. Industrial action often raised issues

around control, rather than income. For example, in the 1880s, Cuba's *Alianza Obrera* opposed racial discrimination at the workplace; in the 1900s and 1910s, Argentina's FORA and the United States' IWW sought union control over dockside hiring; British syndicalists in mining and railway unions championed workers' control, in place of nationalisation—getting this position adopted by the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants in 1912.

Active efforts were made to fight, not just prejudices in the working class, but oppression on the lines of race, nationality and gender generally. Cuba's *Círculo* and *Alianza* and their associated press, for example, fought racial discrimination by employers, officials and shopkeepers and the oppression of women. The IWPA demanded 'equal rights for all without distinction of race and sex'.⁸ Bolivian and Peruvian syndicalists worked with the Indian movement and organised Indian peasants.

Almost all syndicalist formations—bar the French CGT, which had however previously struggled against imperialism and militarism—opposed the First World War, in sharp contrast to most Second International Marxists. This was part of a larger tradition of opposing militarism and imperialism. For example, in Mexico, the syndicalist *Casa del Obrero Mundial* (House of the World Worker, 1912), and its successor, the *Confederación General de Trabajadores* (General Confederation of Labour, 1921), opposed United States' domination. France's *Confédération Générale du Travail-Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire* (CGT-SR, formed 1926) condemned French colonialism, and campaigned against the 1930 celebrations of the centenary of the conquest of Algeria.

The United States' IWW rejected racial segregation and Asian exclusion, building powerful interracial unions in agriculture, waterfronts and shipping. Australia's IWW opposed the White Australia policy and racist unionism, also promoting the rights of immigrants and Aborigines. In Egypt, syndicalists formed 'international' unions across racial and cultural lines. In South Africa, syndicalists pioneered socialism and unionism amongst workers of colour, fought racist laws and practices, and generated a cadre of people of colour like Johnny Gomas (1901–1979) and T.W. Thibedi (1888–1960)—also influencing anti-colonial nationalists.

There were important syndicalist unions amongst women, and notable strikes, like the 1912 Lawrence textiles strike in the United States, the famed 'bread and roses' strike by the IWW. Syndicalist general strikes brought the unwaged, including housewives, as well as the unemployed, into mass protests, as in the United States and Spain. Local union centres, workers' halls and schools also provided important spaces for women's participation.

Syndicalism sought to unite men and women in the same unions, but there were examples of women's sections within syndicalist unions, or even unions for women. A notable example was the Bolivian FOL's *Federación Obrera Femenina* (FOF, Federation of Women Workers): with 60 unions at its peak, it organised child care, literacy and cultural events. Key women syndicalists include Goldman, Petronila Infantes (1920–, Bolivia's FOL), Lucy Parsons

(c.1853–1942, United States' IWPA and IWW), María Hernandez Zarco (1889–1967, Mexican *Casa*), and Violet Clarke Wilkins (Australian IWW).

Syndicalism was relatively successful in organising waged workers but faced challenges dealing with other popular sectors. One solution was to establish alliances. Spain's CNT developed links to large anarchist youth, women's and peasant movements. Another solution was to expand the organising scope of the syndicalist union. France's CGT formed a peasant wing, Portugal's syndicalist *Confederação Geral do Trabalho* (General Confederation of Labour, CGT, 1919) included tenants' groups and cooperatives, and sections for artists and academics. Bolivia's FOF organised street traders, and a *Unión Feminina de Floristas* (Flower Vendors' Union). Syndicalists also proved remarkably flexible in forming alliances with non-syndicalist (or non-anarchist) forces around specific issues, including with Marxists, social Catholics, social-democrats and nationalists.

It is important to reiterate here that syndicalists campaigned, organised and supported struggles that went well beyond workplace issues: the American and Canadian IWWs organised unemployed demonstrations; the Clyde Workers Committee was central to Glasgow's 1915 rent strike; the *Federación Obrera Regional Peru* (Workers' Regional Federation of Peru, 1919) championed Indian rights; the *Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai Jiyu Rengokai* (Free General Association of Trade Unions, formed 1926) opposed Japan's 1927 invasion of Manchuria; Spain's CNT initiated rent strikes in Barcelona.

Other impacts are less obvious. Filipino anti-colonialist Isabelo de los Reyes founded the islands' first union in 1902: the *Unión Obrera Democrática* (Democratic Workers' Union), influenced by both anarchism and Marxism, reached 150,000 members. The Irish Transport and General Workers' Union (ITGWU, 1908) was influenced by syndicalism and led by syndicalists, but was not syndicalist. Har Dayal (1884–1939), Indian radical (and IWW leader) based in California, founded the Ghadar Party in 1913, which organised armed revolt in British India in 1915. The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU, formed 1919, Cape Town), a mass movement that spread from South Africa into Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, was influenced by IWW-style syndicalism (among other currents). Syndicalism influenced Sorel, and Sorel influenced figures like José Carlos Mariátegui of Peru and the young Gramsci in Italy—the latter, in turn, influenced the 'workerist' Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU, 1979) decades later. Meanwhile, elements of the radical right have tried to appropriate elements of syndicalism, notably in France and Italy.

It must be emphasised here that such influences do not mean the persons or groups thus influenced can be categorised as 'syndicalist'; they were part of a larger mixture, and not always predominant. De los Reyes was a small capitalist and religious leader, not a fiery anarchist. Ghadar melded anarchist, Indian nationalist and other ideas. Mariátegui and Gramsci were impressed by Sorel, but became leading Communists, not syndicalists. ICU ideas were eclectic,

including large doses of Christianity, Garveyism and liberalism. FOSATU was not a syndicalist union, its 'workerism' a complex and unique mix. The radical right-wing nationalists that emerged in the USI (and in the Italian Socialist Party) rejected foundational syndicalist principles: pushed out during a fierce struggle in the First World War, they linked up with fascists, clashing with Italian anarchists and syndicalists, including USI, who played a heroic role in anti-fascist struggle.

Syndicalist participation in Italy's anti-fascist *Arditi del Popolo* militias formed part of a larger pattern. The IWPA organised militias in the 1880s, two of them affiliated to CLU unions; ITGWU organised an Irish Citizens' Army during the 1913 Dublin Lockout, which joined Connolly in the 1916 Easter Rising; Mexico's *Casa* formed Red Battalions in 1916; FORA demonstrations in 1919 had armed guards; in Upper Silesia (now Poland), syndicalists formed the anti-fascist *Schwarze Schar* (Black Cohort); Spain's CNT established a network of clandestine 'defence committees' in the 1930s; Polish ZZZ syndicalists fielded units against the Nazis in the occupation.

Rather than shy away from insurrection, syndicalist unions were involved in general strikes of insurrectionary character: Mexico 1916, Spain 1917 and 1919, Brazil and Portugal 1918, Argentina 1919 and 1922, and Italy 1920. Following a cycle of anarchist/syndicalist insurrections from 1932, Spain's CNT led a social revolution in 1936, involving massive factory and land occupations, and a 100,000-strong militia.

KEY DEBATES WITHIN SYNDICALISM

Major debates within syndicalism do not correspond neatly to labels (e.g. anarcho-syndicalism, revolutionary industrial unionism etc.), periods, countries or internationals. Strategy and tactics around alliances were one area: notably, some aimed at alliances with peasants, others—including a strand within the IWW and SLP—dismissing the issue on the supposition that small farmers would be swept away by modern industry. Should syndicalism involve craft- or occupational unions, as some in FORA insisted? Organise by industry, as the IWW stressed, or territory, as CNT tended to do? Or a combination of industrial and territorial federations, as Rocker argued? Participation in statutory industrial relations systems and in state welfare was also heavily debated, and has been key to splits since the 1950s. Other debates, notably in the 1930s IWA, considered whether Fordist and Taylorist mass production should be abolished.

Dual organisationalism was another issue: did (revolutionary) unions suffice, or did they need to be complemented by specific 'political' organisations, like Bakunin's Alliance in FRE; IWPA in CLU; *La Social* in Mexico's *Congreso* (and *Luz* in *Casa*); the ISL, SLNA and SLP; or *Federación Anarquista Ibérica* (FAI, Iberian Anarchist Federation) in CNT? If so, how should these 'political' organisations, based on ideology, be structured, what were their functions, and the relationship with syndicalist unions? Could they use state elections for propaganda or disruption?

This raised whether efforts should be made at ‘boring-from-within’ existing unions, as happened successfully in France (CGT), Argentina (FORA), Spain (*Solidaridad Obrera*) and Poland (ZZZ). Or should the focus be building semi-autonomous oppositional movements within orthodox unions, like the Workers’ Committee movement in Britain and South Africa? Or on forming new (‘dual’) unions, something forced on the Italians who formed USI, but championed from the start by the IWW?

Militarily defending revolution was also contentious. Some believed in a peaceful revolution, hoping the state would be paralysed (or asphyxiated) by a revolutionary strike. Others believed armed clashes with the ousted ruling class would occur, but be swiftly and victoriously won. A third group envisaged the need for a sustained, coordinated war effort—a scenario outlined in the didactic 1909 novel by French CGT militants Emile Pouget and Emile Pataud, *How We Shall Bring About the Revolution: Syndicalism and the Cooperative Commonwealth*.⁹

SYNDICALISM TODAY

Rather than decline rapidly after 1914 or 1917, as commonly argued in the literature, syndicalist unions and influences peaked after the First World War, including in Argentina, China, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, the United States and South Africa. There was also significant growth in some territories from the late 1920s, notably Bolivia, Poland and Spain. But the steady growth of Marxist-Leninist parties—notably during the Second World War—helped erode syndicalist influence, as did the rise of national-populist movements, like Bolivia’s MNR, sustained social-democratic reforms in Western countries and dictatorships of the right and left. By the end of the 1930s, significant (legal) syndicalist unions only existed in Chile, Bolivia, Sweden and Uruguay; French, Polish and Spanish syndicalists, for example, went underground from 1939.

However, strategic and tactical decisions have also had profound consequences for movement survival and revival. This helps explain cases of renewed or continuous influence *despite* rivals and repression: a major (if short-lived) renaissance in 1940s France; ongoing FOL predominance in La Paz, syndicalist influence in Bolivia’s state-run COB and FOF’s survival into 1964; a major role in Cuban transport, catering, construction and electric unions into the 1960s; and ongoing influences in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, New Zealand and Uruguay. The 1960s struggles and New Left helped promote syndicalist themes, with, for example, the United States’ Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) advocating ‘student syndicalism’.

The 1960s struggles and New Left helped promote syndicalist themes, with, for example, the United States’ Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) advocating ‘student syndicalism’. The 1970s collapse of dictatorship in Spain led to a rapid CNT rebirth and IWA revival, followed by major fracturing. The 1980s and 1990s saw further revivals, notably in East Europe and Africa: for example, a large IWA affiliate in Nigeria, and an IWW miners’ union in Sierra Leone, and strong groups in South Africa.

Initiatives exist in many countries today, but the main syndicalist unions currently are in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Siberia, and the United States. By far the largest is Spain's *Confederacion General del Trabajo* ('General Confederation of Workers', CGT) in Spain, in 2004 representing nearly two million workers through workplace elections, and with 60,000–100,000 members. Syndicalism has some influence on alternative unions like *Fédération des Syndicats Solidaires, Unitaires et Démocratiques* in France and Switzerland. There are also many individuals within orthodox unions who promote syndicalism.

Overall, the syndicalist movement is small and fragmented: most syndicalist unions are outside the IWA major splits; large formations, like those of in Nigeria and Serra Leone, have all but collapsed. However, there are encouraging signs of growth, and rapprochement. For example, a 2007 syndicalist union summit in Paris, France, drew 250 delegates from dozens of left-wing and independent unions worldwide, with African unions by far the largest continental presence.¹⁰

In its 150-year history, syndicalism has shown both a capacity for massive influence, vitality and creativity—and destructive purism and sectarianism. If ever, however, a time has come for it to show its mettle, it is in today's world, marked by capitalist crisis, rampant inequality and prejudice, massive disillusionment in party politics and the collapse of the old class compromises.

NOTES

1. W. Thorpe, *'The Workers Themselves': Revolutionary Syndicalism and International Labour, 1913–23* (Dordrecht, Boston, London/Amsterdam: Kulwer/IISG), 319–320.
2. R. Rocker, *Anarcho-syndicalism* (London: Pluto Press, [1938] 1989), 88–89, 111–113.
3. W. Thorpe, *'The Workers Themselves'*, 324.
4. D. Roberts, *The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979).
5. Key texts include P. Cole, D. Struthers & K. Zimmer (Eds), *Wobblies of the World: A Global History of the IWW* (London: Pluto, 2017); S.J. Hirsch & L. van der Walt, *Anarchism and Syndicalism in the Colonial and Postcolonial World, 1870–1940* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014); V. Damier, *Anarcho-Syndicalism in the Twentieth Century* (Edmonton: Black Cat Press, 2009); Thorpe, *op. cit.*, Ref. 1; W. Thorpe & M. van der Linden (Eds), *Revolutionary Syndicalism: An International Perspective* (Otterup/Aldershot: Scholar/Gower, 1990); D. Berry & C. Bantman (Eds), *New Perspectives on Anarchism, Labour and Syndicalism: The Individual, The National and the Transnational* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010); R. Darlington, *Radical Unionism. The Rise and Fall of Revolutionary Syndicalism* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013).
6. L. Trotsky, 'Speech on Comrade Zinoviev's Report on the Role of the Party', in L. Trotsky (Ed), *The First Five Years of the Communist International*, volume 1 (New York: Pioneer, [1920] 1945), 97–99.
7. S. Salerno, *Red November, Black November: Culture and Community in the Industrial Workers of the World* (New York: SUNY, 1989), 6.

8. 1883 Pittsburgh Manifesto, in P. Avrich (Ed), *The Haymarket Tragedy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 75.
9. E. Pouget & E. Pataud, *How We Shall Bring About the Revolution: Syndicalism and the Co-operative Commonwealth* (London: Pluto, [1909] 1990).
10. On recent developments, see *Alternative Libertaire*, 'Espagne': *La CGT s'affirme Comme la Troisième Organisation Syndicale* (November 2004); I. Ness (Ed), *New Forms of Worker Organization: The Syndicalist and Autonomist Restoration of Class Struggle Unionism* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2014).



Anarcha-Feminism

Donna M. Kowal

Within the anarchist political and intellectual milieu of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, anarcha-feminism emerged as a distinct, albeit loosely formed, ‘school of thought’ that was reflected in the transnational activism of anarchist women, especially in Europe and the United States. Anarchist women tended to interpret the anarchist critique of authority through the lens of their experiences *as women*, especially constraints resulting from sexual double standards and the gendered division of labour—in ways that anarchist men were less inclined to recognise. Some were especially outspoken about social ills that limited women’s autonomy and personal happiness, such as compulsory marriage and motherhood, lack of access to birth control, and sex trafficking. As this chapter will demonstrate, in the process of supporting the wider cause of the anarchist movement which centred on class struggle, anarcha-feminists presented an alternative model of womanhood that challenged norms of feminine docility and propriety—if not explicitly through their argumentation and activism, then implicitly through their unconventional lifestyles. In turn, they exerted pressure on the male-dominated anarchist movement to recognise the ways in which women are subjugated differently from men, and on the women’s movement to acknowledge the limitations of political enfranchisement as a viable solution to inequality.¹

In what follows, I provide an overview of the historical events, central ideas, and *praxis* of anarcha-feminism as it was reflected in the activism of female anarchists in Europe and the United States. In addition to describing the sociopolitical conditions from which anarcha-feminism arose, I highlight the contributions of several noteworthy activists: Louise Michel (1830–1905), Charlotte Wilson (1854–1944), Lucía Sánchez Saornil (1895–1970), Lucy

D. M. Kowal (✉)

The College at Brockport, State University of New York, New York, NY, USA

Parsons (1853–1942), Voltairine de Cleyre (1866–1912), and Emma Goldman (1869–1940). Although these women did not call themselves ‘feminists’ or ‘anarcha-feminists’—as these labels were adopted by scholars and activists in later years—their political leanings clearly blended anarchist and feminist goals. The purpose of this essay is to illustrate how their political activism and unconventional lifestyles—understood in concert as a loosely assembled network of female anarchists—constituted anarcha-feminism as a core tradition of anarchism.

Anarcha-feminism emerged as a branch of anarchism during a period when women’s exclusion from public affairs was systemically enforced through legal, political, economic, familial, and religious institutions. In the main, the sphere of women’s influence was rooted in the home, obliging them to dutifully perform the domestic roles of mother and wife even as economic conditions may have necessitated they earn wages to support the livelihood of their families. Indeed, while white, middle-class women were not expected to work outside the home, poor and immigrant women were impelled to work in factories and on farms, in unregulated industries that exploited them as cheap labour. Insofar as working women often lacked the freedom to control their wages and own property (in addition to being politically disenfranchised) and were typically excluded or marginalised by labour unions, they were far more likely to be drawn to socialist, communist, and anarchist solutions to inequality—solutions that squarely addressed class division and labour exploitation—in comparison to women who enjoyed economic security (who were more likely drawn to reform efforts focused on women’s suffrage).² Moreover, as Glenna Matthews argues, working-class women were ‘less bound by decorous norms of appropriate female behaviour’,³ which perhaps legitimised their participation in public affairs and empowered them to engage in more militant forms of activism. In any case, the incongruity between having the relative freedom to work and not having the freedom to control when they had sex and how many (if any) children they would bear—reproductive decisions that influence women’s ability to pursue work and participate in public life—was all the more striking for working-class women. These are among the conditions that shaped anarcha-feminism into a political ideology and lifestyle that recognised the socio-economic imperative of women’s sexual freedom (or free love, as it was called) in the greater cause of human liberation. In this regard, the arguments of anarcha-feminists exposed the deeper roots of gender/sexual inequality in a way that called into question suffrage movement claims that granting women the right to vote would improve the quality of their lives. By uniting anarchist and feminist ideas, argues Margaret Marsh, anarchist women’s ‘attacks on marriage and the family, set in the context of a liberated female sexuality, alienated them not only from most feminists but also from many of their male comrades’.⁴

Indeed, male anarchists enjoyed a priori as men the freedom to assert their voices in public affairs, to secure gainful employment, and to execute power over the household. Occupying a position of male privilege, for the most part, they tended to dispute or appear indifferent to arguments for women’s equality.

For example, French anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon theorised the conventional family unit to be foundational to the natural order of a free society, and Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin prioritised the interests of working-class men above women.⁵ On this latter point, American anarchist Benjamin Tucker went as far as to question the notion of equal pay for women when he argued in a *Liberty* editorial in 1891 that ‘the average woman’s lack of ambition, of self-reliance, of sense of business responsibility, and of interest in her employer’s undertakings’ made her inferior to men—at least until ‘these deficiencies be overcome’.⁶ In addition to sociopolitical and economic power, it should be recognised that male anarchists undoubtedly enjoyed the pleasures of free love in their romantic relationships with women—without the risks of unwanted pregnancy and the scorn of promiscuity that female anarchists likely experienced. The inconsistency between advocating human liberation while continuing to uphold patriarchal norms must have been all too apparent for anarchist women.

Beyond the systemic subjugation of women and the lack of attention to women’s equality within the masculine leadership of the anarchist movement, anarchist women were influenced by a variety of events that garnered international attention. In fact, these events influenced radicals of a variety of backgrounds and political associations: the Haymarket Square bombing, trial, and executions (1886–1887); the Paris Commune (1871); the Bolshevik Revolution (1917); the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); and labour uprisings throughout Europe and the United States. Taken together, the above sociopolitical conditions and events gave rise to what became a dynamic, transnational counterpublic of anarchist women. Counterpublics, as defined by Nancy Fraser, are ‘parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourse to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs’.⁷ In addition to positioning themselves against capitalism and institutionalised authority, anarchist women were united in their commitment to empowering women as autonomous agents. They arose from diverse socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds, which were reflected in their differing and sometimes conflicting ideas on how to create a free society, as well as their participation in internal debates over anarchist ideology and tactics (for example, some were willing to resort to violent methods of resistance, others less so). They were fiercely independent. Although they occasionally clashed in argumentation, rhetorical style, or personality,⁸ they also supported and were inspired by one another, and had a shared understanding of the intersection of the causes for human liberation and women’s liberation.

Just as anarchist philosophy reflects a wide range of perspectives—as L. Susan Brown points out, ‘within the anarchist “family” there are mutualists, collectivists, communists, federalists, individualists, socialists, syndicalists, feminists, as well as many others’⁹—anarcha-feminist thought is not uniform. In general, though, there are several intersecting points of emphasis that shape anarcha-feminism into a distinct category of anarchism: the liberating potential of

autonomy for women, the precondition of sexual freedom in order for women to realise autonomy, and the inseparability of women's liberation from the larger schema of human liberation.¹⁰ As the profiles of anarchist women below demonstrate, even when they did not address each of these ideas explicitly in their argumentation, the way they lived their lives in pursuit of personal and political autonomy embodied them in spirit. Moreover, they were often perceived by social conservatives as asserting a new model of womanhood that defied Victorian norms of feminine behaviour, which began to be uprooted during their lifetimes.

Some of the anarchist women profiled here had sexual relationships outside of marriage (either with men or women) and demanded the abolition of the patriarchal institution itself. Still, despite their radical politics, for the most part they also tended to reinforce heteronormativity by addressing sexual freedom implicitly in the context of relationships *between* women and men. As the discussion below demonstrates, there were exceptions to this pattern of thinking, which reflected the reality that homosexuality was largely treated at the turn-of-the-century as an illness, a crime, or immoral behaviour—after all, the emerging discipline of sexology had just begun to challenge sexual taboos and the fallacious notion that there were only two sexes.¹¹

Beginning with the European context, the following paragraphs provide a brief sketch of the life and activism of Louise Michel, Charlotte Wilson, and Lucía Sánchez Saornil, immediately followed by several women from the American context, Lucy Parsons, Voltairine de Cleyre, and Emma Goldman. While some of their paths crossed and some did not, taken together as representative examples, these women reflect the diversity of backgrounds, arguments, and personalities that constituted the anarcha-feminist counterpublic.

Louise Michel: Widely regarded as a forerunner of French radicalism, Louise Michel earned notoriety for her role in the Paris Commune of 1871. As an 'illegitimate' child raised by her mother, who was a maidservant, and her paternal grandparents, who sympathised with the French Revolution, Michel's early years were shaped by both economic hardship and the spirit of revolution. As an adult, she worked as an elementary school teacher before devoting herself fully to the cause of liberation.¹² In the events leading up to the Commune, Michel provided support for families by supplying food and allowing refugee children to attend her school.¹³ Beyond caring for the victims of war, she arose as one of the leaders of the armed resistance, fighting in uniform alongside men, delivering aid to the wounded, and, most famously, joining other women in the act of brazenly preventing the seizure of cannons by covering the chase with their bodies.¹⁴ When the bloody conflict ended, Michel was sentenced to seven years of prison and exile for attempting to overthrow the government—a life-changing experience that drew her to anarchism. When she resumed her activism upon being released, now as an avowed anarchist, she endured additional prison time for disturbing the peace, delivering inflammatory speeches, and inciting to riot.

On the matter of women's emancipation, Michel rejected marriage and challenged the double standards that allowed men to enjoy greater freedom. In her memoir *The Red Virgin*, she ridiculed the perception that maternity limited women's role in the revolution: 'How marvelous it would be if only the equality of the sexes were recognised, but while we wait women are still, as Molière said, "the soup of man" ... We women are not bad revolutionaries. Without begging anyone, we are taking our place in the struggle; otherwise, we could go ahead and pass motions until the world ends and gain nothing. For my part, comrades, I have refused to be any man's "soup"'.¹⁵ She also questioned the moral and educational codes sustained 'under the pretext of preserving the innocence of little girls' and the economic disenfranchisement which renders women 'slaves' to men, and drives some to prostitution.¹⁶ Directing her message explicitly to male activists, she further declared, 'We know what our rights are, and we demand them. Are we not standing next to you fighting the supreme fight? Are we not strong enough, men, to make part of that supreme fight a struggle for the rights of women? And then men and women together will gain the rights of all humanity'.¹⁷

Michel's social circle extended to the wider milieu of European and American anarchists, including Kropotkin, Wilson, and Goldman. Michel also developed political rivals, and Goldman was among those who came to her defence. In addition to being subject to a failed assassination attempt in 1888, conservative critics sought to damage Michel's reputation by spreading rumours about her alleged sexual relationships with other women—'an innuendo hurled at women who refused to follow and adopt traditional feminine roles'.¹⁸ Her public persona as 'The Red Virgin of Monteparte', argues Marie Marmo Mullaney, was a product of her record of militant activism and the stories of her alleged sexual deviance, which cast her 'as a kind of anarchist vestal virgin, a priestess of piety and vengeance, and embodiment of revolutionary virtue and pristine, unsullied ideals'.¹⁹

Charlotte Wilson: Charlotte Wilson (née Martin) was an English anarchist who is most known for co-founding with Kropotkin the London-based journal *Freedom* in 1886, which included Michel among its contributing writers. Two years earlier she engaged in her first political act, publishing a letter defending female workers in the March 8, 1884, issue of *Justice*, the paper of the Social Democratic Federation (SDF).²⁰ In her letter 'To the Editor of *Justice*', Wilson refuted the SDF chair's argument that women threatened to displace men in the labour force and advocated that women should rise up and demand equal pay.

Compared to the other women profiled here, Wilson came from a notably privileged background as the daughter of a physician and a student at Newman College, Cambridge University's elite women's college. This was not entirely unusual insofar as some middle-class women gravitated toward anarchism through intellectual interests and associations. Wilson's family was devoted to the Anglican Church, and, as Susan Hinley notes, there is consequently a distinct 'evangelical moral accountancy' in her approach to anarchism,

particularly in the way she transferred the ‘values of charity and improvement into secular and radical terms’.²¹ Upon leaving Cambridge, Wilson married a stockbroker and moved to north London where she became immersed in the local culture of middle-class, intellectual, and social activism. She attended anarchist meetings aimed at rallying support against tsarist Russia and produced lectures and articles advocating nihilism.²² She also participated in the Men and Women’s Club created by Karl Pearson, which was intended to provide a forum for discussing social problems concerning marriage, sexuality, and prostitution.²³ She was especially effective as an organiser of the Freedom Group, a network of activists associated with *Freedom*, and the Fabian Society, a group of socialist-leaning thinkers that included sexologists, poets, and other intellectuals. Committed to putting anarchist ideas into practice, she supported a cooperatively created international anarchist school that would ‘fit children for freedom’—led by none other than Michel as headmistress.²⁴ Beyond this, Wilson promoted university education for women through the London Society for the Extension of University Teaching as well as philanthropic giving through the Christian-identified Metropolitan Association for Befriending Young Servants. Concerning her philanthropic activity, Hinley points out that ‘Wilson was publicly advocating secularism and anarchist revolution at the same time that she was volunteering and organising in this [evangelical] organisation’.²⁵

Wilson’s engagement in anarchist activism faded after 1895 when she shifted her attention to caring for her daughter and ailing parents.²⁶ Eventually she returned to activism, this time advocating for women’s suffrage, a position that contradicted her former anarchist sensibilities²⁷ (incidentally, a fluid politics that adapts to changing circumstances is another phenomenon that is not unusual among anarcho-feminists). At the age of 52 in 1906, yet another stage of political activism emerged as she got involved in the Independent Labour Party and reconnected with the Fabian Society as a spokesperson for the Women’s Group, among other organisations, all the while maintaining a focus on women’s suffrage and social emancipation.²⁸

Lucía Sánchez Saornil: During the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), anarchist women formed local, regional, and national anti-fascist, libertarian organisations to oppose the aristocratic, conservative-leaning Nationalists but also to add women’s voices to the Spanish anarcho-sindicalist movement. In 1936, Lucía Sánchez Saornil co-founded *Mujeres Libres* (Free Women), an anarchist organisation ‘with the clearly articulated feminist goal of female liberation from the “triple enslavement to which (women) have been subject: enslavement to ignorance, enslavement as women and enslavement as workers”’.²⁹ She and two comrades, Mercedes Comaposada and Dr. Amparo Poch y Gascon, also collaborated in creating a school to educate working-class urban and rural women, teaching both literacy and technical skills. Furthermore, as part of the mission of *Mujeres Libres*, they instituted programmes aimed at educating women about sexuality and midwifery.³⁰

‘For the women of *Mujeres Libres*’, writes Temma E. Kaplan, ‘the Civil War became synonymous with the struggle of women’s liberation from menial jobs, from ignorance, from exploitation at work, and from unjust treatment by fathers and husbands’.³¹ However, as Mary Nash argues, *Mujeres Libres* ‘tended to exalt motherhood ... and never openly broached the subject of abortion or dealt with such issues as family planning and birth control’.³² For the most part, Sánchez Saornil did not consider sexuality as a political issue, and therefore, despite being openly lesbian, she did not use *Mujeres Libres* as a medium to advocate sexual freedom.³³ The distinction she made between sexuality and politics differed from other anarchist women—particularly de Cleyre and Goldman, who viewed sexual freedom as a psychosocial imperative for women’s vitality and quality of life, which of course made the sexual—in other words, the personal—political.

Beyond her prominence as one of the leaders of *Mujeres Libres*, Sánchez Saornil is recognised for her poetry, and some of these works did explore sexuality. Under the masculine pseudonym Luciano de San Saor, in her early years as a poet, she published her work in journals that featured avant-garde ‘ultra-ismo’ literature. Her pen name reportedly freed her to write about sexuality, including homoerotic themes. Her writings also appeared in a variety of Spanish anarchist publications such as *Tierra y Libertad*, *Solidaridad Obrera*, and *Estudios*.³⁴ One of the pieces she is most known for is titled *Romancero de Mujeres Libres* (*Free Women’s Balladeer*), a collection of poems which she edited and published in 1937 (in her own name) in the *Mujeres Libres* journal.³⁵ In the poem titled ‘*Mujeres Libres* Anthem’, she proclaimed, ‘Let the past vanish into nothingness! What do we care for yesterday! We want to write anew the word WOMAN’.³⁶ In another poem about the hardship of a laundress’ life, she employed imagery of the drudgery of her work and pleaded ‘Poor of the world, come to her! Let the battle horn sound! Down with all codes, Let the flames run swiftly!’³⁷ Sánchez Saornil’s writings about women thus invoked vivid images of subjugation combined with calls to militant action. Her prominence as a writer, publisher, and activist placed her on the radar of Goldman, who saw great promise in the anarchist struggle in Spain. In addition to publishing an essay in *Mujeres Libres* in 1936³⁸ and corresponding with Sánchez Saornil and other Spanish comrades, Goldman visited Spain and led an English language promotional campaign in support of the revolution there.³⁹

Lucy Parsons: As a fixture in the Chicago anarchist community that captured international attention following the Haymarket square affair on 4th May, 1886, Lucy Parsons (née Gonzales) is an important national figure, although there is somewhat limited information available about her early life. Her husband Albert was among the four anarchists sentenced to death for allegedly igniting a bomb during a labour demonstration despite inconclusive evidence.⁴⁰ In addition to being an outspoken critic of the injustices against the so-called Haymarket martyrs, Parson’s activism called attention to the connection

between the exploitation of workers and racial inequality and violence. According to Carolyn Ashbaugh, Parsons was raised on a plantation in Texas by parents of mixed ancestry—most likely African-American, Native-American, and Mexican—but she had publicly denied any African ancestry, perhaps so that she and her white husband could evade anti-miscegenation laws.⁴¹ As a multiracial woman, writes Lauren Basson, it is important to recognise that Parsons ‘assumed the same authority and exercised as much power as white men in certain political contexts’.⁴²

Militant class struggle was at the heart of Parsons’ understanding of anarchism. (A reporter once described her as ‘a veritable Louise Michel’.⁴³) She had organised and led public meetings of workers while raising two children and working as a seamstress to support her family. She also co-founded *The Alarm*, the journal of the International Working People’s Association, served as editor of *The Liberator* and *Freedom*, and published articles in a variety of other journals. In 1879, she was among a group of women who established Chicago’s Working Women’s Union. In 1905, as one of the founding members of and the only woman to speak at the founding convention of the Industrial Workers of the World, she demanded that the organisation be open to all men and women regardless of ‘such differences as nationality, religion and politics’ and promoted the active participation of women for they are ‘the slaves of slaves ... [and] are exploited more ruthlessly than men’.⁴⁴ Parsons considered the organisation of workers as important to class struggle, but she also believed in the necessity of individual action—including the use of violence, if necessary—which she applied to combating both class and racial injustices. For example, in ‘To Tramps, the Unemployed, the Disinherited, and the Miserable’ she proclaimed ‘*Learn to use explosives!*’⁴⁵ and in ‘The Negro’ she recommended ‘As to those local, periodical, damnable massacres to which you are at all times liable, these you must revenge in your own way’.⁴⁶

Regarding sexual freedom, although Parsons critiqued marriage as an exploitative institution, she stands out among other anarchist women for questioning the notion that free love is a viable alternative. Although she critiqued the subjugation of women in a variety of contexts that included compulsory marriage and motherhood, prostitution, and industrial labour, she believed that the practice of free love had ‘nothing in common’ with anarchism. Furthermore, she critiqued the practice of ‘sexual varietiem’ for its associated risks of pregnancy and venereal disease and, consequently, argued that monogamy without marriage was the more pragmatic approach to sexual relationships.⁴⁷ On this point, her argumentation notably differed from de Cleyre and Goldman, both of whom explicitly asserted women’s sexual freedom as essential to the anarchist cause. Additionally, Parsons and Goldman were known to have a bitter political rivalry—perhaps on account of their equally strong personalities—with Goldman accusing Parsons of exploiting her husband’s notoriety for personal gain and Parsons accusing Goldman of being excessively self-centred at the expense of the greater cause.⁴⁸

Voltaireine de Cleyre: Born in rural Michigan to parents who struggled to provide for their family, Voltairine de Cleyre was transferred to a Catholic convent at a young age. Her father reportedly named her after the freethinker Voltaire, which turned out to be a fitting label to describe her education (she was largely self-educated) and her approach to anarchism (she declared herself to be an ‘anarchist without adjectives’).⁴⁹ Among the experiences that propelled her toward anarchism were the austerity of convent life, which she rebelled against, and the injustice of the Haymarket Square executions. Upon moving to Philadelphia in 1889, de Cleyre increased her activism and began teaching English in the Jewish immigrant community. In 1893 she met Goldman, who had heard about de Cleyre’s ‘exceptional ability as a lecturer’ and was eager to meet her.⁵⁰ Unlike Goldman, who uncompromisingly rejected private property, de Cleyre saw the possession of property as a dimension of individual autonomy—‘the true right in that which is proper to the individual’.⁵¹ Although the two women held differing views on this matter, they shared a deep commitment to making women’s liberation fundamental to the cause of anarchism and supported one another in times of need. Additionally, de Cleyre and Parsons’ activism intertwined through their attendance at some of the same political rallies and meetings.⁵² A trip to Britain and France in 1897 further expanded de Cleyre’s intellectual circle when she met Michel, Kropotkin, and others.

In her essay ‘Why I Am An Anarchist’, de Cleyre defined anarchism as the only logical solution to human oppression, especially ‘the subordinated cramped circle prescribed for women in daily life, whether in the field of material production, or in domestic arrangement, or in educational work’.⁵³ She viewed marriage, in particular, as an inherently dependent relationship that oppressed women economically, intellectually, emotionally, and physically—thus she advised ‘every woman contemplating sexual union of any kind, never to live with the man you love’.⁵⁴ Over the years, de Cleyre had many lovers and came to form a close bond with a man whom she had a son with, though the boy was raised by the father and extended family—due to a combination of chronic health issues and an unwillingness to accept the responsibilities of motherhood.⁵⁵

Another noteworthy aspect of de Cleyre’s contribution to anarchism is the lucid thinking reflected in her written works—her prose is characterised by a methodical treatment of subjects ‘interrupted by flashes of poetry and radical intuition’.⁵⁶ She served as both an editor and writer for *The Progressive Age* and made frequent contributions to *Mother Earth*, the journal published by Goldman. As her thinking evolved, her later works identified the competing perspectives of anarchism—such as communist, individualist, and syndicalist—as an obstacle to the movement’s success and encouraged greater cooperation among anarchists.

Emma Goldman: Born in Lithuania, Emma Goldman was raised in a household that abided strictly by Russian-Jewish customs. At the age of 17, she immigrated to the United States in 1886 to flee a restrictive Orthodox life that

would have involved an arranged marriage. While living with her sister in Rochester, New York, and working at a textile factory, she was subject to sweat-shop work conditions and exposed to the world of labour organising. In 1889, following a brief failed marriage to a fellow factory worker, she moved to New York City, where she immersed herself in the anarchist community. The combination of the injustice of the Haymarket executions and the mentoring she received from fellow activist Johann Most, whom she met at a Lower East Side café, inspired her to devote herself fulltime to lecturing and writing.⁵⁷ For much of her career, she worked alongside fellow anarchist and devoted friend Alexander Berkman, supporting him through his brushes with the law—including his attempted assassination of steel industry mogul Henry Clay Frick.⁵⁸ According to Marsh, taking into consideration the longevity of her career as an agitator and the sensational media attention that she attracted, Goldman ‘personified anarchism to Americans’.⁵⁹

As a self-proclaimed agitator determined to awaken the masses, Goldman’s lecture tours had her travelling across the United States as well as Canada and Europe, speaking on various topics such as capitalism, atheism, conscription, education, marriage, free love, and modern drama. The sarcasm she directed at her audiences, whom she defined as woefully ignorant, combined with her rejection of the agenda of the socialist movement at times placed her at odds with the day-to-day reality of working-class struggle and gave the impression of elitism.⁶⁰ Vilified in the press as the ‘High Priestess of Anarchy’ and ‘The Most Dangerous Woman in the World’, she encountered ongoing free speech struggles and was repeatedly arrested and imprisoned for delivering inflammatory speeches, inciting to riot, interfering with conscription, and distributing information about birth control. One of the most publicised stories about Goldman was fuelled by false allegations that she inspired Leon Czolgosz’s attempted assassination of President McKinley in 1901.⁶¹ For her own part, she was a prolific writer and editor, as she published the anarchist journal *Mother Earth*, a variety of pamphlets, a bound collection of her selected works titled *Anarchism and Other Essays*, as well as several other books.

Goldman’s approach to anarchism emphasised the economic and psychosocial necessity of emancipating women, which she believed could only be accomplished through anarchism’s ability to transcend artificial differences and class divisions between women and men. She identified women’s ‘internal tyrants, whether they be in the form of public opinion or what mother will say, or brother, father, ... busybodies, moral detectives, jailers of the human spirit’ as obstacles to freedom⁶²—which only women themselves could overcome by courageously exercising autonomy. She argued that free love and access to birth control were necessary to empower women to live productive, creative, and healthy lives. (Interestingly, Goldman’s personal correspondence with longtime lover, Ben Reitman, revealed that she was filled with jealousy over his relationships with other women. Yet, Alice Wexler notes ‘to her free love was not indiscriminate sex, nor Reitman’s casual encounters, nor sex divorced from love’.⁶³) All the same, having worked as a nurse-midwife for poor immigrant

women in the 1890s, Goldman saw firsthand the painful consequences that arose when women lacked the ability to care for their reproductive health.⁶⁴ Additionally, on this matter of sexual freedom, it should be noted that Goldman extended her arguments in public defence of the rights of homosexuals (even though her published essays largely reflected heteronormative views). Some scholars also speculate that she herself had a one-time romantic relationship with a female friend, reflected in a series of vivid personal letters.⁶⁵

After years of being tracked by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Goldman was deported to Russia in 1919 in a nationalistic political climate that targeted immigrant radicals as government threats. In 1925, despite her prior calls for the abolition of marriage, she wedded a Canadian man, which she described as a convenient relationship that enabled her to live in Toronto in close proximity to her American comrades.⁶⁶ Upon her death, she was buried along with de Cleyre, Parsons, and the Haymarket martyrs in Chicago's Waldheim Cemetery.

Although the above brief sketches of turn-of-the-century anarcha-feminists admittedly cannot do justice in capturing each activist's individual life and influence, taken together my hope is that they illustrate the diversity of women who constituted the anarcha-feminist counterpublic. In this essay, I have sought to demonstrate how anarcha-feminism emerged as a core tradition of anarchism out of the activism, lifestyle, and writings of an eclectic mix of radical women in Europe and the United States. The women discussed here—Michel, Wilson, Sánchez Saornil, Parsons, de Cleyre, and Goldman—represent some of the more prominent figures that shaped anarcha-feminism; however, there are many others who contributed to the anarcha-feminist counterpublic—Kate Austin, Milly Witkop, Florence Finch Kelly, and Mollie Steimer, to name a few. For the most part, their call to anarchism was shaped by the same sociopolitical forces that male anarchists were responding to—economic inequality, political violence, abuse of authority, censorship, and so on. Yet, their political leanings were equally motivated by the marginalisation of women within society at large and the male-dominated anarchist movement.

Unlike their male comrades, who largely lived their lives free from gender/sex discrimination, anarcha-feminists perceived the ways in which inequality was deeply rooted in social relationships and structures, especially the patriarchal family unit. That said, their beliefs were not uniform. As illustrated by the biographies of the women described above, anarcha-feminists came from different backgrounds in terms of nationality, class, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, and to some extent espoused different, even competing ideas. What they had in common was a brazen rejection of feminine norms, an awareness that political enfranchisement was incapable of (or insufficient in) creating gender/sexual equality, and a feminist perspective which demanded that anarchism account for the experiences of women. Rejecting compulsory marriage and motherhood, they sought to enact their unconventional ideas of autonomous living and sexual agency. They also joined their female and male comrades at home and abroad in rejecting the state and its functions (especially marriage) and the exploitation of the working class—a few engaging in combat

or direct action. Through both their public activism and their personal relationships (whether multiple relationships outside of marriage and/or same-sex partners), they challenged the institutional structures that prevented women from realising vocational and personal fulfilment.

While we may be tempted to debate about which anarchy-feminist represents the ‘true’ anarchist ideal of womanhood—for example, by scrutinising their records on marriage—that intellectual exercise would miss the point. Michel, Wilson, Sánchez Saornil, Parsons, de Cleyre, and Goldman each sought to lead a nonconformist life—with the anarchist aspiration of experiencing more fully the freedom that comes with self-determination—in a sociopolitical order that defined women as inherently inferior to men and largely limited their influence to the domestic sphere. Each had to navigate the possibilities and constraints available to them in a historical moment when women’s engagement in public affairs (let alone advocating anarchism) was itself disruptive behaviour. They faced imprisonment and public ridicule, and they compromised their highest ideals in order to manoeuvre through restrictive circumstances.

As Martha Hewitt has argued, anarchy-feminism ‘forces us to re-think the nature of revolution as process, as transformative *praxis* of thought, feeling, and collective social activity’.⁶⁷ In the process of attempting to enact their ideas, anarchist women helped pave the way for an economically and sexually independent ‘New Woman’ that decades later would become foundational to second-wave and third-wave feminism. Indeed, the legacy of turn-of-the-century anarchy-feminism exists in these activists’ foresight that gender/sexual equality must be lived, not granted.

NOTES

1. This essay reinforces and extends two of my prior publications: Donna M. Kowal, *Tongue of Fire: Emma Goldman, Public Womanhood, and the Sex Question* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2016) and Linda D. Horwitz, Donna M. Kowal, and Catherine H. Palczweski, ‘Anarchist Women and the Feminine Ideal: Sex, Class, and Style in the Rhetoric of Voltairine de Cleyre, Emma Goldman, and Lucy Parsons’, in Martha Watson and Thomas Burkholder (Eds), *The Rhetoric of Nineteenth Century Reform and the Perfecting of American Society*, vol. 5 *Rhetorical History of the United States* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2008), 309–353.
2. Sara Evans, *Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America* (New York: Free Press, 1989), 68–69; Margaret Marsh, *Anarchist Women, 1870–1920* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), 20–21.
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4. Marsh, *Anarchist Women*, 72.
5. Marsh, *Anarchist Women*, 19.

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19. *Ibid.*, 13.
20. Nicolas Walter, 'Charlotte M. Wilson, 1854–1944', *The Raven Anarchist Quarterly*, 6:1 (January–March 1993), 71.
21. Hinley, 'Charlotte Wilson, the "Woman Question", and the Meanings of Anarchist Socialism in Late Victorian Radicalism', *International Review of Social History*, 57:1 (2012), 9.
22. *Ibid.*, 12–13.
23. Walter, 'Charlotte M. Wilson', 70.
24. Hinley, 'Charlotte Wilson', 27.
25. *Ibid.*, 10.
26. *Ibid.*, 32.
27. *Ibid.*, 33.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Mary Nash, *Defying Male Civilization: Women in the Spanish Civil War* (Denver: Arden Press, 1995), 76.
30. Martha A. Ackelsberg, *Free Women of Spain: Anarchism and the Struggle for the Emancipation of Women* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 138.
31. Temma E. Kaplan, 'Spanish Anarchism and Women's Liberation', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 6:2 (1971), 105.
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53. de Cleyre, 'Why I Am An Anarchist,' in *Exquisite Rebel*, 56.
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63. Wexler, *Emma Goldman: An Intimate Life* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 155.
64. Goldman, *Living My Life*, vol. 1, 137–138, 185–186.
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Green Anarchism

Andy Price

INTRODUCTION

As a theory of decentralised, non-hierarchical, and complementary forms of social practice, it should come as no surprise that anarchism, from its inception as a political and social theory, would reflect as well as draw upon ideas from within the study of the ‘green’—the study of the natural world. From the outset, the systematic study of the natural world—which would eventually become the science of ecology—had a lot to say to political movements about the organisation of life, both natural and social: after all, this was a realm that seemed to point to the very origins of human society from within the wider biosphere. To varying degrees, the classical anarchists of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century would all turn to examine and draw upon the natural: Peter Kropotkin most fully of course—‘combine’, he tells us in *Mutual Aid*, ‘this is what Nature teach us’¹—but so too Proudhon and Bakunin, all conceptualised a human *nature*, an ecologically given set of *essential* characteristics, that would form the basis of their views on social justice and the conditions of anarchism.²

However, it would take the long march of the twentieth century, the social carnage of its mid-century nadir, the breath-taking display of the destructive capabilities of human beings that would follow in the nuclear age—and the post-war burgeoning of new social movements in response to these developments—for the emergence of what we could accurately call a green anarchism. These troubling developments, as George Woodcock noted in his 1962 history of anarchism,³ represented ‘the real social revolution of the modern age’, that of a ‘process of [state] centralisation’. Therefore, anarchists, already predisposed to resisting state centralisation on libertarian grounds—anarchist who,

A. Price (✉)
Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK
e-mail: A.Price@shu.ac.uk

for Woodcock, had already posed the ‘counter-ideal’⁴ to state centralisation—could not help but notice that alongside the social ills that the modern centralised state had brought forth, there were now also pressing ecological ills.

Indeed, by the middle of the 1960s, it was clear that the environmental damage from the rise of the centralised state was as severe as the social consequences. Pollution, environmental degradation, the impact of chemicals and pesticides on large-scale industrial agriculture, and nuclear accidents: as a threat to human habitat, the ecological ills in fact now seemed far more serious. As such, it should be no surprise that mid-century anarchist thinkers should turn to look at social-natural dynamics. Most importantly for our understanding of green anarchism today, is that when they did, inadvertently or otherwise, they highlighted the shared characteristics of anarchist projects of social decentralisation and diversity with the natural conditions of successful and flourishing ecosystems.

SOCIAL ECOLOGY

The pioneer in this field, unquestionably, was the radical American social and political theorist, Murray Bookchin (1921–2006). Bookchin founded the school of social ecology, which, as its name suggests, focused explicitly on the relationship between society and the natural world, as a way to both explain the present ecological malaise in which society found itself *and* as a way to propose a new social and political settlement that would ameliorate that very destructiveness. In order to do this, the central problematic Bookchin attempted to examine was this: how can we understand ecology and evolution, and humanity’s emergence from within it, alongside trying to understand how and why human society finds itself in the present destructive of that very same ecology.

Bookchin had been addressing this problematic from the early 1950s onward. In 1952, he published a lengthy treatise on the problems of pesticide use in farming,⁵ and by 1962, he had published his first book-length exposition of ecological problems.⁶ Alongside this, he produced many articles and pamphlets on radical politics and treatises for the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s.⁷ Later still, in his two major works,⁸ Bookchin would produce a distinct strand of green anarchism, based on a fully developed eco- and social philosophy that centred around the following claim: that ‘the natural world and the social are interlinked by evolution into *one nature that consists of two differentiations: first*, or biotic nature, and *second* or social nature’.⁹

As noted above, it was clear by the end of the twentieth century that this *second* nature had become ecologically destructive of the biosphere as a whole. However, by placing this second nature—human society—explicitly *as part of* the one nature whilst still conceding its destructive elements (in essence, conceding that human society is destructive of *itself*) Bookchin’s distinction plays a pivotal role in the framing of his green anarchism. Rather than reduce the explanation of the ecological crisis to the idea that human society was a priori destructive of the biosphere—somehow *unnatural*—the Bookchin position

allowed for the *exceptionalism* of human society to remain as a central part of the explanation of ecological degradation, and—more importantly still—allowed for that exceptionalism to remain a central part of the solution.

That is to say, Bookchin's claim that one evolution had produced two different natures—a first nature, which was nature as a whole; but also, a second nature, that was human society as separate and distinct entity—allowed for the possibility that we could identify human society as the cause of the ecological crisis, whilst still retaining human society as the only place from where a solution would emerge. As we will see shortly, this would prove a key sticking point for other contemporary versions of green anarchism. Staying with Bookchin for now, however, two immediate tasks stemmed from his central claim. First, with human society now identified as the cause *and* the cure of ecological degradation, the primary task was to explain what it is about human society that had become so destructive. However, equally as important, the second task was to explain what is it about human society that remains natural, part of evolution, part of the environment in which it lives—and how in that essential part of human society lay the key to a rational, ecological society.

SOCIETY AS NATURE RENDERED SELF-CONSCIOUS

To start with this latter point, Bookchin saw second nature, human society, as so much a natural part of evolution as a whole that it was in fact the ultimate expression of rational, ecological principles, in the form of evolution's most complex, developed life form. In this sense, second nature was the epitome, the very expression of evolutionary principles, and as such, not only had a responsibility to express, somehow, the interests of nature as a whole but it also had rich, revolutionary potential to become the consciousness of nature as a whole as 'nature rendered self-conscious'.¹⁰ In essence, human society had the potential to recognise itself as a product of ecological values and principles, to recognise the materials of its own creation, and to fold those values back into its own social forms for the benefit of nature as a whole.

Human society was thus for Bookchin because it was the product of an evolutionary striving that drove forward his view of nature as a whole: a striving complexification, a thrust for ever-increasing forms of complexity. As Bookchin explains, '[t]he universe bears witness to an ever-striving, developing ... substance, whose most dynamic and creative attribute is an unceasing capacity for self-organisation into increasingly complex forms.'¹¹ Again, the most complex form—certainly in terms of its place in and impact on nature as a whole—was human society.

This self-organised striving for increasing complexity, in turn, is based on two further central characteristics. The first is *participation*—Bookchin claims that all life forms within an ecosystem do, to some degree, participate in their own life and evolution of the genus. No matter how faint this might be—for example, the plant in the shade that strives to reach the light—nor how complex—the genome sequencing of human science labs—all of these different

forms of differentiation are just different stages on a ‘graded continuum’ of this striving for complexity, with human society at the far end of that continuum’.¹²

The second characteristic of this striving, and itself a direct by-product of the first, is that of *differentiation*. That is, that in individual ecosystems, and in evolution as a whole, the countless different forms of life, all involved in the striving described above, lead, quite naturally, to increasing diversity of life forms within an ecosystem. Life becomes more diverse, and, in a positive feedback mechanism, the more diverse an ecosystem, the more options each individual life form has—through interaction with evermore and evermore complex forms—in ensuring its own survival and continuation. There are infinitely more ‘pathways’ for each life form to ‘choose’ to take, not matter how dim that choice is in the plant which strives for the light. Again, in evolution as a whole, this produces the most complex life form of them all: human beings and the social structures they create. The key for Bookchin here is if human society can become aware of this, the potential for them to become ecological stewards of the very values and principles that produced (and sustained) them.

ON POTENTIALITY

However, this was no simple reductionism for Bookchin, of evolution as a whole to some desired social outcome. This *potential* for human society to become nature rendered self-conscious remained, clearly, exactly that: solely a potentiality. That is, the essence of human society had somehow been supplanted by something altogether different: a highly ecologically destructive society. How had this happened and how had society developed into the ‘highly aberrant forms’,¹³ which had led human society away from its ecological essence? For Bookchin, it was in the concepts of hierarchy and domination where the social ills of our time lay. More pernicious and ingrained than economic classes, these two concepts had denuded the individual of any meaningful participation in social and political life.

Bookchin traced the long historical development of the emergence of hierarchy and domination—and their ultimate expression in the centralised power of the modern nation state—in *The Ecology of Freedom*. There, he described not just the physical, material effects of the emergence of domination and centralisation but also the psychological effects, the emergence of a new mind-set of domination, a new ‘epistemology of rule’, that presented the concept of domination and hierarchy as somehow natural, an accepted facet of social life.¹⁴ Crucially, it was these developments that led directly to the attempt on behalf of human society to dominate the natural world: once domination is set as a characteristic of human-to-human relationships, society begins to view its relationships to the natural world through the prism of domination, a realm to control, master, and exploit.

Importantly, Bookchin notes that this control, this mastery, is always illusionary: it is as impossible to dominate the natural world for humans, as it is for sheep to dominate the field in which they graze. However, the mind-set is the problem: once hierarchy and domination are set as natural parts of social and political life, elites led the way in attempts by society as a whole to ‘escape’ from a wild nature, to tame it, and to exploit it in the process of assuring mastery over it, all in the name of progress and growth. This becomes a mutually reinforcing phenomenon: the more centralisation and hierarchy there is in society, the bigger the projects of mastery and domination become, and in turn, the more centralisation, hierarchy, and domination there is in social and political life.

Ultimately, against the self-organising principles of diversification and participation in ecology as a whole—principles that should have carried through from the natural to the social realm—hierarchy and domination lead to what we have now: the top-down, simplified, non-diverse, and directive form of social organisation that is the nation state in the era of advanced capitalism. All of the characteristics of the state cut against the grain of natural evolution lead to the social ills we are all too familiar with, and ultimately produce a human society destructive of its own habitat. It is no accident then that the central leitmotif of Bookchin’s social ecology is that *all ecological problems are first and foremost social problems*.¹⁵ That is, to resolve the ecological crisis, we must first solve the problems of social hierarchy and domination. As such, the central aim of Bookchin’s political programme is twofold: to oppose and replace the nation state *and* to build a society that is more fully aligned to green principles he had identified in his ‘eco-philosophy’.

MUNICIPALISM

So how does Bookchin propose to do this? The very first thing Bookchin points to is the need for a new conception of politics. Against the politics of the state, of politicians and centralised parties, of bureaucracies and representative democracy—what he calls ‘politics as Statecraft’—Bookchin called for a reconceptualisation of politics as ‘politics as originally conceived’.¹⁶ By this, Bookchin meant a return to the face-to-face, directly democratic politics of the Athenian city state. Essentially, this was a call for a *devolved* politics, based in the first instance on the participation of the people of a devolved area in the decisions that would affect their community.

The location of these devolved communities, for Bookchin, was the municipality, a location he saw as the most immediate realm of every day existence.¹⁷ By municipality, he meant the smallest, most local realm of politics in large nation states. Of course, these differ markedly across different states, but they could be anything from the French commune to the Swiss canton. Where the municipal has no developed political structure—in unitary political systems like the UK (and, despite its federalist structure, the de facto centralism of the

states of the US)—it was important for Bookchin that people realised that the municipal itself still existed. This was the realm where people lived and worked, shared public transport systems and amenities, where they socialised and raised families. If there were no political structures already extant in a municipality, then they should be created, from scratch, outside the structures of the nation state.¹⁸

For Bookchin, in his home city of New York, this could be at the level of the neighbourhood, or the block, or whatever suited whichever city. The important thing is that assemblies should be created to discuss the issues a neighbourhood faced. Direct, face-to-face assemblies should be created in any form or format—they could be neighbourhood watch groups, a local action group to resist a particular state policy, or a more general discussion group on the issues a particular neighbourhood faces. That they would be self-constituted, and thus bear no legal or state power should not be a concern: the most important point for Bookchin, at this late stage of advanced capitalism, is that the individuals that made up any particular municipality were reintroduced to the experience of being an active citizen.

Indeed, the central target of the early stages of this municipal project was not, in fact, the overthrow of the nation state. Rather, the target of these first steps was the participants themselves: in order to move towards a new politics, the denuded individual of advanced capitalism had to be re-schooled in the art of social and political collectivism and cooperation, in the art of citizenship. And it was in these early steps towards assemblies that may be devoid of any legal-constitutional power that this re-schooling could begin. ‘No one who participates in a struggle for social restructuring’, Bookchin claims, ‘emerges from that struggle with the prejudices, habits, and sensibilities with which he or she entered it’.¹⁹

Of course, the ultimate, more long-term aim of this re-schooling would be a much bigger aim. It would be a re-schooling of, ultimately, the ecological citizen—the individual who is socially and ecologically aware of the importance in evolution as a whole of complementarity, of diversity, and of participation. Crucially, once an individual is aware of this, they would be aware too that the nation state and capitalism in its advanced, neoliberal form cuts against the grain of all of these principles and that doing so threatens the continued existence of human society itself. As this awareness spreads, as different municipal forms spread, confederated into larger political units, Bookchin argued that a new ‘dual power’ would emerge, a power which rested on the fact that people could see clearly that the nation state was *contra* to their own social and ecological interests. In this moment of political *and* ecological awakening, legitimacy would drain from the nation state and its centralised forms.²⁰

Finally then, we see in Bookchin’s conceptualisation of social ecology a clear example of green anarchism: green in the sense that it is based on a thorough, systemised eco-philosophy that attempts to place human society in an evolutionary process that helps us to see humanity’s natural part and role therein and anarchist in the sense it provides a project of devolved, participatory, and

horizontal political forms that has the ultimate aim of challenging the nation state, replacing the epistemology of rule that has emerged from millennia of the centralisation of power, and instilling in newly active citizens a sense of the importance of their own participation in the continuation of human social and political forms.

DEEP ECOLOGY AND PRIMITIVISM

At the same time Bookchin was formulating his theory of social ecology, another version of green anarchism emerged and offered a different analysis of the problem of ecological degradation; and as we will see below, a radically different set of solutions. Deep ecology emerged from the work of Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, who in 1973 argued that, in light of the growing ecological crisis, there was a need for ecological understanding of the relationship of society to nature based on ‘a rejection of the man-in-environment image in favour of a relational, total field image’.²¹ This ‘total field image’, in short, was premised on a rejection of humanity as the marker of value in the human and nonhuman world: in this new image, Naess argued, the deep ecologist views the world of life not as a human being at the centre but as one part of a wider community, stemming principally from ‘an awareness of the equal right of all things to live and blossom into their own unique forms of self-realization’.²²

This for Naess was a call for a ‘biospherical egalitarianism’ between society and nature, where the ‘inherent value’ of all life would be acknowledged, irrespective of the use of these life forms to humanity.²³ As he would later write, ‘[e]very living being has a right to live’, and ‘nature does not belong to man’. Not only was the intrinsic value of all beings to be drawn out in defiance of whether or not they were useful to humanity or not: they were valuable even if harmful to humanity. ‘Nature is worth defending’ wrote Naess, ‘whatever the fate of humans’.²⁴

If we substitute Naess’s use of ‘image’ for ‘mind-set’, to match the terminology we used with Bookchin, we see that in philosophical terms, these two forms of green anarchism share the same starting point: to rethink human society’s sense of itself and its place in the wider ecology. For Naess, human society’s sense of itself thus far in the history of civilisation had been framed around an acute *anthropocentrism*. It was this mind-set that had led human society to its destructive apogee. Under this view, the natural world had forever been seen as a store cupboard, there to satisfy human needs, allowing ecological degradation to persist as a natural consequence of human progress. Naess called for a rethinking of this approach a move towards a mind-set of *biocentrism* or *ecocentrism* which would create the basis for his ‘biospherical egalitarianism’.

In 1985’s *Deep Ecology*²⁵ two US academics, Bill Devall and George Sessions—in conjunction with Naess—would develop this philosophy further. Here, they outlined the ‘platform principles’ of deep ecology in an attempt to

provide a base for a politics programme of deep ecology. Again, there was much here in common with Bookchin's social ecology: as Devall-Sessions-Naess argued, the '[r]ichness and diversity of life forms [in the biosphere] contribute to the realisation of these values and are also values in themselves', and, in line with social ecology, human society was now reducing this richness and diversity.²⁶ However, where deep ecology would differ from social ecology was in its explanation of this negative effect and on the role of human society in reversing this problem.

This would emerge from the fourth platform principle outlined by Devall and Sessions: 'the flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life *requires such a decrease*'.²⁷ As such, the notion of reducing human population became a central one in deep ecology. Indeed, Devall and Session would go on to warn that although 'the stabilization and reduction of the human population will take time ... the extreme seriousness of our current situation must be realised', and 'the longer we wait' in dealing with the population problem, 'the more drastic will be the measures needed'.²⁸

It would be left to other deep ecologists to suggest those drastic measures, and though they were often problematic, we can see that in their initial form, they certainly constituted a form of green anarchism. Warwick Fox, for example, called for the creation of small, devolved, and ecologically rational 'bioregions', defined as 'areas possessing common characteristics of soils, watersheds, plants and animals'. These should eventually 'replace the nation state'²⁹—again, not unlike Bookchin's dual power. Devall and Sessions also called for a move towards bioregions, and whilst it was never made entirely clear what these would look like, they do point to devolved, anarchist forms. 'Hunter gatherer communities do seem the best model', they argued, as 'a natural way to organize'.³⁰ In this sense, this would return humanity to the position of the ecologically integrated hunter gatherer, who had a knowledge of wildlife in a region, of where food and water comes from, of what your region needs—essentially, a return to a 'rich ecological awareness' evident in tribes people, which engendered a knowledge of the 'the spirit' of lakes, trees, and animals.

However, there were two further developments of this approach, in both anarchist thought and practice. In terms of the latter, the radical direct action group *Earth First! (EF!)* would constitute themselves explicitly on the principles of deep ecology and advocate radical action to oppose the state and capitalism and to address the population problem. For the former, they called for 'monkey-wrenching', a term taken from the Edward Abbey novel, *The Monkey Wrench Gang*, 1984,³¹ which referred to direct physical resistance to tree felling, road building, and so on—spiking trees to stop them being felled by the logging company's chainsaw, lying down in front of road building equipment, destroying farming and industrial machinery. In short, it was a distinct strand of anarchist, direct action.³²

And on the ‘population problem’ that Devall and Sessions had highlighted earlier, *EF!*—like deep ecology generally—strayed into some highly problematic territory, which included welcoming diseases like AIDS, and championing the rights of malarial mosquitoes, and calling for the mid-1980s famine in Ethiopia to be allowed to ‘run its course’—all in the name of population control.³³ We need not delve too far into these matters from our present vantage point, but when we look back at the history of green anarchism, we should note this late twentieth-century foray into dangerous territory as a salutary reminder of the sensitivity and care required when thinking of ecological concerns.

In terms of further *theoretical* developments in green anarchism post the emergence of deep ecology, the foremost of these was the emergence of anarcho-primitivism. Stemming in large part from the writings of John Zerzan,³⁴ primitivism was a claim for the superiority of pre-civilisation society. For primitivists, the move to agriculture, and later to a civilisation based on technology, had ultimately been one long process of self-alienation and self-enslavement on the part of humanity.

At the core of this development—and of the development of technology as such—was the emergence of the division of labour in late tribal/early agricultural society. The emergence of specialisation, separation, and competition, between the sexes originally, and ultimately between different groups in society—coalescing around changing technologies—would lead to private property, greed, and expansion. Ultimately, they would lead to the most developed form of this alienation and self-enslavement: the large-scale industrial technology of twenty-first-century society.

The ecologically destructive side effects are plain to see, but for Zerzan, this *division* of society into competing factions, and the technology and growth this has brought, only serves to increase that division the more it develops, creating what Zerzan calls the ‘symbolic life’. The incredible, productive power of technology makes the corporeal world seem real: however, the rise of unhappiness, of depression, and of mental illness generally points to the fact that something is badly amiss, and underneath the seeming irreplaceability of life under advanced capitalism non-symbolic life—non-fragmented, united—is making itself felt.

In response to this, Zerzan calls to a return to society before the division of labour: technology and the division of labour needs to be rethought. Of course, this means the breakdown of society into small, gatherer-hunter formations. This may necessitate the forceful reduction of technology: for attacks on technology, on machinery, often through violent means, a position the primitivists shared with the deep ecologists. Science, too, had to be rethought; for Zerzan, science is a ‘symbolic’ form of language, a way of understanding civilisation, but not of understanding the true needs of the human community, which are rooted, for primitivists, in the pre-division of labour prehistoric world.³⁵

CONCLUSION

It is clear then that as an increased ecological awareness came into contact with radical politics throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, it would be the anarchists that would turn to examine the links between politics and ecology: thinkers and activists within anarchism saw the affinities in the study of the natural world with their own approaches to politics. Thinkers like Bookchin, Naess, and Zerzan explored the links between ecological knowledge and political knowledge and produced some fascinating insights into the nature of societal development out of the natural world, and attempted to explain why the relationship between both realms had become antagonistic. And yet, there remains much to be done here: this is still, historically speaking, a young area of philosophical and political exploration—the mid-1980s’ wrong-turn on behalf of some within deep ecology showed just how young it is. But as green anarchism matures, we can expect many more insights into the relationship of nature to society and insights into how anarchism can work at making this relationship *non*-antagonistic.

NOTES

1. Peter Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution* (London: Freedom Press, 1993), 73.
2. See, for example, Michel Bakunin, ‘The Paris Commune and the Idea of the State’, in *Writings on the Paris Commune* (St. Petersburg: Red and Black Publishers, 2008), JP Proudhon, *La Guerre et la Paix* (Antony: Éditions Tops, 1998). An important early contribution also came from Élisée Reclus, a French geographer and anarchist, who’s *L’Homme et La Terre* (1905) was one of the first radical works to address society’s relationship to and conception of the natural world. For a detailed introduction to his contribution, see John Clarke, *Anarchy, Geography, Modernity: Selected Writings of Elisée Reclus*, 2nd ed. (Oakland: PM Press, 2013).
3. George Woodcock, *Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements* (New York and Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1962), 469.
4. *Ibid.*, 475.
5. Murray Bookchin [under the pseudonym, Lewis Herber], ‘The Problem of Chemicals in Food’, *Contemporary Issues*, June–August, 3:12 (1952).
6. Murray Bookchin, *Our Synthetic Environment* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1962).
7. See, for example, Murray Bookchin, ‘Listen, Marxist!’, *Anarchos*, May 1969; Murray Bookchin, ‘Spring Offensives & Summer Vacations’, *Anarchos*, 4 (1972).
8. Murray Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy*, 2nd ed. (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1982); Murray Bookchin, *From Urbanization to Cities: Towards a New Politics of Citizenship*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cassell, 1995).
9. Murray Bookchin, *Social Ecology and Anarchism* (Oakland: AK Press, 2009), 29, my emphases.

10. Murray Bookchin, 'Thinking Ecologically: A Dialectical Approach', *Our Generation*, 18, Spring/Summer (1987): 35–36.
11. Murray Bookchin, 'Towards a Philosophy of Nature: The Bases for an Ecological Ethics', in Tobias, M. (Ed), *Deep Ecology* (San Diego: Avant Books, 1984), 229.
12. Murray Bookchin, 'Freedom and Necessity in Nature: A Problem in Ecological Ethics', *Alternatives*, 13:4, November (1986), 31.
13. Bookchin, 'Thinking Ecologically', 33, emphasis added.
14. Bookchin, *Ecology of Freedom*, *passim*.
15. Andy Price, *Recovering Bookchin: Social Ecology and the Crises of Our Time* (Porsgrunn: New Compass Press, 2012), 158.
16. Bookchin, *Urbanization to Cities*, 260.
17. Bookchin, *ibid.*, 240–241.
18. For discussion of the municipal in social ecology, see: Janet Biehl, *Libertarian Municipalism: The Politics of Social Ecology* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1998).
19. Bookchin, *Urbanization to Cities*, 264.
20. *Ibid.*, 264.
21. Arne Naess, 'The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary', *Inquiry*, 16 (1973), 95.
22. *Ibid.*, 96.
23. *Ibid.*, 96.
24. Arne Naess, 'Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes', in Tobias (Ed), *Deep Ecology* (San Diego: Avant, 1984), 268, emphases added.
25. Bill Devall and George Sessions, *Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered* (Utah: Gibson Smith, 1985).
26. *Ibid.*, 70.
27. *Ibid.*, 70, emphasis added.
28. *Ibid.*, 71, 72.
29. Warwick Fox, 'Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of our Time?', in *Philosophical Dialogues, Arne Naess and the Progress of Philosophy* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1984), 155.
30. Devall and Sessions, *Deep Ecology*, 187.
31. Edward Abbey, *The Monkey Wrench Gang* (London: Penguin, 2004).
32. For a good discussion of one example of this direct action, see Jeff Shantz, *Green Syndicalism: An Alternative Red/Green Vision* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2012).
33. See Price, *Recovering Bookchin*, for a detailed discussion of some of the more problematic elements of deep ecology.
34. See John Zerzan, *Elements of Refusal* (New York: Left Bank Books, 1998); *Questioning Technology* (New York: Freedom Books, 1998); *Future Primitive and Other Essays* (New York: Autonomedia, 1994).
35. See John Zerzan, 'Author Index', at <http://www.primitivism.com/author-index.htm>, Accessed 11 August 2017.



Postanarchism

Saul Newman

Postanarchism has emerged over the last decade as a central genre in contemporary anarchist thought. While it has followed different paths and trajectories, it can generally be seen as a reformulation of anarchism through an encounter with poststructuralist theory. Postanarchism adopts key insights from a range of theorists like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan as well as figures in the post-Heideggerian continental tradition like Giorgio Agamben and Reiner Schürmann. Postanarchism is thus shorthand for ‘post-structuralist anarchism’ rather than, as is sometimes alleged by its critics, a theoretical approach that claims to supersede anarchism. On the contrary, as I¹ and other ‘postanarchist’ thinkers like Todd May² and Lewis Call³ have argued, poststructuralist theory has important consequences for contemporary anarchism. While it presents a serious theoretical challenge to what might be termed the revolutionary meta-narrative of anarchism, and raises questions concerning its central assumptions about human nature and spontaneous rational order, when applied to anarchism’s core ethos of anti-authoritarianism, poststructuralism has allowed a reinvention of anarchism in ways that make it much more relevant to the struggles of the present day. Rather than signalling a break with anarchism, postanarchism can therefore be seen as part of the heterodox tradition of anarchist thought.

Postanarchism, as I see it, has involved two main theoretical moves. *Firstly*, it is a critical deconstruction of some of the epistemological limits of what I call classical anarchism—the anarchism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, associated with Proudhon, Godwin, Kropotkin, Bakunin and others. This was an anarchism borne of the revolutionary optimism of Enlightenment modernity.

S. Newman (✉)
Dept. of Politics and International Relations,
University of London, London, UK
e-mail: S.newman@gold.ac.uk

It was an anarchism that believed that the coming revolution would liberate the whole of humanity and transform the entirety of social relations, ushering in harmonious and cooperative forms of coexistence; that what would be revealed would be the latent truth of sociability—long buried under layers of political and economic oppression and ideological mystification—a truth which provided the ontological foundation and conditions of possibility for the emergence of a self-governing community on the other side of state power. This is why the sovereign state was seen by anarchists as an unnecessary and destructive intrusion upon an otherwise rationally ordered society and why it was regarded as such an obstacle to human progress and flourishing. In the words of William Godwin, governments ‘lay their hand on the spring there is in society, and put a stop to its motion’.⁴ There is the metaphor of social relations as a self-functioning, autonomous mechanism whose steady motion is disturbed by the clumsy hands of government. In a similar sense, although in more violent terms, Bakunin described the state as ‘a vast slaughterhouse and an enormous cemetery, where under the shadow and the pretext of this abstraction (the common good) all the best aspirations, all the living forces of a country, are sanctimoniously immolated and interred’.⁵

Bakunin and the other anarchists of the nineteenth century were of course right in pointing to the growing centralisation and accumulation of power in the modern state apparatus. Indeed, one of the key insights of anarchist theory lay in identifying the specific problem of institutionalised political power—something that it was much more attuned to than Marxism, for instance. However, what is central to classical anarchism is what I have referred to as a Manichean logic that assumes an ontological separation between humanity and power. Power, embodied in the state and in other social institutions, was seen as an alien coercive force that limits and distorts people’s natural rational and moral capacities for freedom, development and what Kropotkin called ‘mutual aid’—an evolutionary and biological instinct that he believed was latent within human societies and would form the basis for a cooperative society.⁶

Postanarchism casts some doubt on the epistemological assumptions that underpin this revolutionary metanarrative. Indeed, as Jean-François Lyotard claimed in the 1970s, we no longer live in the age of the metanarrative—the transformations of knowledge under conditions of late modern capitalism have meant a certain fragmentation and pluralisation of perspectives and the impossibility of a totalising, positivist representation of social relations; scientific knowledge and universal ideals have experienced a crisis of legitimacy.⁷ While we should be a little sceptical about the ‘postmodern condition’ that Lyotard’s work famously diagnosed, the standpoint of the ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ that characterises this condition means that we have to call into question many of the ontological foundations of anarchism—such as the positivistic idea of a rational truth of social relations, or the natural tendency towards cooperation between individuals, or the faith in the social revolution that would sweep away power relations and redeem humanity. Anarchism could no longer adequately see itself as a science of society, and no longer found its moral and political claims upon a natural order that only science could

reveal. Of course, amongst anarchists themselves there was a certain ambivalence towards scientific authority: Malatesta was critical of Kropotkin's scientific approach to anarchism; and Bakunin himself warned about the risks of a dictatorship of scientists and technocrats. The questioning of the universal rational and moral norms of anarchism emerges from within the anarchist tradition itself in the nineteenth century, principally with Max Stirner and his assault on the ideological 'spooks' of humanism that he saw as a hangover from Christianity.⁸

To some extent poststructuralist theory sharpens a kind of auto-critique already immanent within anarchism itself. Indeed, poststructuralism, as I have suggested, might be seen as a kind of continuation of the anti-authoritarian impulse of anarchism itself, but turns its critique on discursive and epistemological authority and fixed identities. For Derrida, poststructuralism is an attempt to break with the 'chain of substitutions' that reaffirms the authority and determining power of a centre—whether it is God, man, consciousness, or even the structure of language itself.⁹ In this sense, what unites the diverse strands of poststructuralism—to the extent that this label has any real intelligibility—is the rejection of essentialism, or what Derrida refers to as the metaphysics of presence: the idea that there is a fixed, determined and determining identity (whether it is power, man, truth, the Good) behind or at the origin of the play of signifiers and social forces.

In light of this deconstructive approach, we must ask ourselves whether we can make the same assumptions about subjectivity held by the anarchists of the nineteenth century. Starting with Stirner, who argued that human essence was an ideological illusion, through to Foucault, who rejected any idea of a universal Subject behind the various historically specific ways in which subjectivity is constituted by power and discursive regimes of truth, the unity of the subject as a transhistorical entity has been placed in doubt. One of the key points to be taken from Foucault and other poststructuralist thinkers is that there can be no ontological separation between the subject and external social forces, including power—the subject who resists power is also in part constituted by it. As Foucault put it: 'The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself'.¹⁰ The decentering of the subject is also present in Lacan, who claimed that the subject, as the subject of language, is founded on a fundamental lack, an incompleteness that propels the dialectic of desire without fulfilment, or Deleuze and Guattari, for whom desire itself is a multiplicity of social forces that cut across and fragment the individual.

Added to this is the question of whether there are privileged revolutionary identities today, and indeed whether radical politics can or should be based on identity. The anarchism of the nineteenth century generally had a much more heterogeneous understanding of revolutionary agency than the Marxian notion of the proletariat—it included also peasants, artisans, the lumpenproletariat. Yet, in late modernity, the revolutionary subject is even more opaque and we can no longer have much faith in the idea of a revolution of the whole of the

working class against capitalism. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to seek an alternative to this in the politics of recognition of certain marginalised identities, even in a so-called politics of ‘intersectionality’. Poststructuralism has, in my view, wrongly come to be associated with a politics of difference and identity—which is nothing more than a liberal or neoliberal biopolitics that does little to challenge structures of domination. Instead, and I shall return to this point later, poststructuralism is a refusal of any kind of identity politics and is better thought of in terms of a politics of singularity and becoming. As Foucault put it, ‘maybe the target nowadays is not to discover who we are but to refuse who we are’.¹¹

The second area of investigation is the nature and functioning of power itself. Revolutionary theory has had to come to terms with the fact that the operation of power has radically changed in late modernity. It is no longer possible to see power relations as centralised and localised within the state, and, moreover, it is no longer possible to see power as functioning only in terms of law, prohibition and repression. The transition from the old sovereign paradigm of law, constraint and violence to the modern paradigms of disciplinary and biopolitical power has been well charted by Foucault, who said famously that ‘in political thought and analysis we have still not cut off the head of the king’.¹² Not only are power relations coextensive with society and dispersed throughout everyday relations and social institutions and practices, but power also has to be seen in its productive positivity. Overturning the ‘repressive hypothesis’—a model of power derived largely from Reichian psychoanalysis in which power is seen as a repressive force that limits and constrains an essential desire—Foucault argued that power ‘produces and incites’. It produces desires, affects, knowledge, subjectivity itself as well as freedom and resistance to it.

Moreover, poststructuralism puts in doubt the very idea of revolution itself, if by revolution we understand a total transformation of social, political and economic relations and the liberation from power. Where and how a revolution can emerge from a field saturated and power relations, and what it is able to achieve, is a question we must ask ourselves today. Perhaps it is more productive, as Foucault claimed, to think in terms of localised forms of resistance and practices of freedom, rather than the great revolutionary event: ‘Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case’.¹³ Even if it is possible for these localised forms of resistance to converge with one another to affect changes on a broader social level, the idea of a liberated society that would emerge on the other side of power was a utopian fantasy. Power is coextensive with society; there will always be power relations in any post-revolutionary society, which is why it is better to think in terms, not of liberation, but of ongoing practices of freedom that maintained a kind of agonistic relation to power.¹⁴ Indeed, the concept of freedom itself cannot be seen as ontologically different to power, but is only intelligible in relation to power and exists as part of a strategic ‘game’ conducted on the field of power relations.

We can see, then, that the encounter with poststructuralist theory poses certain problems for anarchism, particularly regarding the epistemological and ontological limits that it was initially framed within. However, contrary to what some have claimed,¹⁵ it does not disable it. Rather, it opens up to us the challenge of thinking what anarchism might mean, politically and ethically, without the ontological certainties and moral and rational foundations it once relied upon. Therefore, the *second* move central to postanarchism is a ‘reconstructive’ one—an understanding of postanarchism as a positive political and ethical strategy or series of strategies that can inform contemporary radical struggles and movements.

We have to concede that the horizon of radical politics is much more opaque today; and that, despite impressive forms of political experimentation—as we have seen in recent times with the Occupy movement, which in many ways took its inspiration from anarchism—these have been unable to create any viable or sustainable alternative. Yet, in response to the assault on all forms of social life and the natural environment by neoliberal rationality, there has been a re-intensification of political life—whether in renewed forms of activism against environmental destruction, police violence, border controls and anti-immigrant measures, or in more reactive forms, as we have seen in the resurgence of violent fundamentalisms and authoritarian, racist and neofascist populism. This is surely a dangerous and uncertain time for radical politics. Moreover, resistance to domination can always be colonised by the power it opposes. Radical politics, including anarchism, therefore has to be seen in terms of multiple struggles, strategies, localised tactics, temporary setbacks and betrayals—an ongoing antagonism or ‘agonism’¹⁶—without the promise of a final victory. As Deleuze says: ‘the world and its States are no more masters of their plane than revolutionaries are condemned to a deformation of theirs. Everything is played in uncertain games’.¹⁷

In my more recent work on postanarchism, I have sought to stake out a number of key political and ethical coordinates for thinking about these new modes of radical political engagement.

THE NON-ACCEPTABILITY OF POWER

Postanarchist politics always starts from the assumption that no relation of power can be naturalised or taken for granted, that power is never automatically legitimate, that it is, on the contrary, always contingent, uncertain and therefore contestable. We should refuse to see power as being grounded in anything other than its own historical contingency. This divests power of any claim to universal right, truth or inevitability. As Foucault says when describing his ‘anarchaeological’ approach, ‘there is no universal, immediate, and obvious right that can everywhere and always support any kind of relation of power’.¹⁸ This is not the same as saying that all power is bad; rather it means that no form of power is *automatically* admissible. This ethico-political standpoint is one that is largely consistent with most forms of anarchism. However, where it dif-

fers is in making the non-acceptability of power one's *point of departure* rather than where one finishes up. In other words, perhaps we need to think of anarchism today not so much as a specific project determined by a certain end goal—a fully liberated, non-alienated society without power relations—but rather as an open and contingent enterprise that takes the non-acceptance of power as its starting point. Perhaps we can understand anarchism as an enterprise that starts, rather than (necessarily) ends up, with anarchy. To quote Foucault: 'it is not a question of having in view, at the end of a project, a society without power relations. It is rather a matter of putting non-power or the non-acceptability of power, not at the end of the enterprise, but rather at the beginning of the work in the form a questioning of all the ways in which power is in actual fact accepted'.¹⁹

We have here the idea of an anarchist politics not determined by fixed objectives, or a rational *telos*, or universal normative criteria—but rather founded on a certain contingency, open-endedness and freedom of thought and action. This means that it does not have a specific ideological shape and may take different forms and follow different courses of action at different moments. It might resist and contest specific relations of power at localised points of intensity, on the basis of their illegitimacy and violence; it might work against certain institutions and institutional practices by either working within and in support of other kinds of institutions, or through creating alternative practices and forms of organisation. In other words, taking anarchy or non-power as its starting point, postanarchism as a form of autonomous thinking and acting, can work on multiple fronts, in a variety of different settings, institutional and non-institutional, producing reversals and interruptions of existing relations of domination.

So rather than thinking of postanarchism as a distinct project, it seems more useful today to see it in terms of a certain mode of thought and action through which relations of domination, in their specificity, are interrogated, contested and, where possible, overturned. What is central for me in anarchism is the idea of autonomous thinking and acting which transforms contemporary social spaces in the present sense, but which is at the same time contingent in the sense of not being subject to pre-determined logics and goals. This does not of course mean that anarchism should not have ethical principles—but rather that it should not, and perhaps any longer *cannot*, see itself as a specific programme of revolution and political organisation.

VOLUNTARY INSERVITUDE

Central to postanarchism is the ethical and political problem of what Étienne de La Boétie termed long ago *servitude volontaire* or voluntary servitude—the phenomenon of voluntary obedience to tyrannical power. This is an obedience that was not coerced, but freely given, and it was this, which for La Boétie in the sixteenth century, as it is still for us today, was the central enigma

of politics and one of the greatest obstacles to any kind of radical action. The curious condition of our time is one in which the decline of traditional structures of authority and the growing invisibility of power are accompanied by ever-greater levels of conformity, docility and obedience. However, the key insight to be taken from the problematic of voluntary servitude is that power—even tyrannical power—has no consistency or stability of its own but is something entirely dependent on, indeed constituted by, our free obedience to it. Power would not exist if we did not choose to obey it, if we did not freely abandon our own mastery over ourselves and render ourselves up to power. Put more radically, power is an illusion constituted by our own identification with it; power, on its own, does not exist. This means that just as the constitution of power is a matter of will and free volition, so is its undoing. As La Boétie put it, ‘Resolve to serve no more, and you are at once freed’.²⁰ We overcome power, not by destroying it as such but by simply refusing to recognise and obey it, by turning our backs on it; the reflexive illusion of power, constituted by our own obedience, is thus dispelled. We can speak here—as Foucault did²¹—of a ‘voluntary inservitude’, the reclamation of our own will.

OWNNESS

Voluntary servitude, and its flipside voluntary inservitude, reveals something that we have all forgotten: we are *already* free and we need only to realise it. As thinkers from La Boétie to Arendt have argued, people always and in every situation have the power if only they choose to act upon it. We can think of freedom, then, not as a goal to be achieved, but rather as the ontological ground upon which we can act. Postanarchist theory understands freedom as thinking and acting *as if* power does not exist. This would be how Stirner understands freedom, or what he calls ‘ownness’.²² Already in the nineteenth century, Stirner had come to the realisation that the accepted notions of freedom and liberation had reached a dead end, that they were idealist illusions that had no real meaning and which led to an alienation of individuals at the hands of external social relations and institutions. Today, freedom seems even more ambiguous and opaque, especially as the idea has been contorted under neoliberalism, where it has become precisely the threshold upon which we are governed according to the rationality of the market. Stirner’s notion of ‘ownness’ should be taken, then, as an invitation to think freedom differently—to see it not as an ideal to be pursued but rather as a kind of ontological reality, a presupposition of the singular individual. Ownness is also associated with notions of self-mastery, with an ethical sensitivity about our dependency on power, the temptations of self-abdication and the dangers of ‘possessedness’ as well as the anarchic self-constitution embodied in Stirner’s notion of the ego, which is an open space of flux and becoming rather than any kind of fixed or essential identity.

FROM REVOLUTION TO INSURRECTION

We must think about political action in new ways, and this is where the notion of the insurrection becomes central to postanarchism. Following on from a number of themes outlined above, the insurrection might be seen as a kind of revolt not so much against the external world of power—although that might be a consequence of it—but more so as a kind of ethical form of self-transformation, a revolt against fixed identities, modes of action and forms of life that power imposes upon us or which we have freely internalised. Again, I am indebted to Stirner here and his idea of the *Empörung* (*Uprising*):

Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. The former consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established condition or *status*, the state or society, and is accordingly a *political* or *social* act; the latter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from it but from men's discontent with themselves, is not an armed rising but a rising of individuals, a getting up without regard to the *arrangements* that spring from it. The Revolution aimed at new arrangements; insurrection leads us no longer to *let* ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on 'institutions'. It is not a fight against the established, since, if it prospers, the established collapses of itself; it is only a working forth of me out of the established.²³

The revolution works to transform external social and political conditions and institutions, whereas the insurrection is aimed at one's own self-transformation. To engage in an insurrection means placing oneself *above* external conditions and constraints, whereupon these constraints simply disintegrate. It starts from the affirmation of the self, and the political consequences flow from this. The insurrection, unlike the revolution, is radically anti-institutional—not necessarily in the sense of seeking to get rid of all institutions, as this would lead simply to different kinds of institutions emerging in their place—but rather in the sense of asserting one's power over institutions, and indeed, one's indifference to them, as if to say: 'power exists but it is not my concern; I refuse to let it constrain me or have any effect on me; I refuse power's *power* over me'. This notion of insurrection is radically different from most understandings of radical political action. It eschews the idea of an overarching project of emancipation or social transformation; freedom is not the end goal of the insurrection but, rather, it's the starting point. What Stirner's notion of insurrection alerts us to is the extent to which we are often complicit—through our own self-abdication—with the systems of power that we see as dominating. Perhaps we need to understand power not as a substance or a thing, but as a relationship which we forge and renew everyday through our actions and our relations with others. As the anarchist, Gustav Landauer, put it: 'The state is a social relationship; a certain way of people relating to one another. It can be destroyed by creating new social relationships; i.e., by people relating to one another differently'.²⁴ He places the emphasis not so much on

the revolutionary seizure or destruction of the external system of power, but rather on a micro-political transformation of the self and its relation to others, and the creation of alternative and more autonomous relations—the result of which is the transcendence of state power.

ONTOLOGICAL ANARCHISM

Many of the ideas and themes I have been outlining here are reflective of a central condition that can be referred to as *ontological anarchy*. The Heideggerian thinker, Reiner Schürmann, defines anarchy as the withering away of the epochal first principles, the *arché* that defined metaphysical thinking:

The anarchy that will be at issue here is the name of a history affecting the ground or foundation of action, a history where the bedrock yields and where it becomes obvious that the principle of cohesion, be it authoritarian or ‘rational’, is no longer anything more than a blank space deprived of legislative, normative, power.²⁵

For Schürmann, this is an experience of freedom: it frees action from its *telos*, from fixed normative frameworks, from the rule of ends that hitherto sought to determine it. Action becomes ‘anarchic’—that is to say, groundless and without a pre-determined end.

However, it seems to me that the implications of ontological anarchy for anarchism and radical politics in general are somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, as I have tried to show, anarchism must embrace this experience of anarchy and no longer rely on firm ontological foundations that formed the basis of classical anarchism. Postanarchism is an anarchist politics and ethics that embodies the contingent openness of the present moment. Our experience of the world today suggests that the tectonic plates of our age are shifting, that familiar and once hegemonic institutions and principles—both economic and political—appear increasingly empty and lifeless to us, that the great secret of power’s nonexistence is being exposed. Never has political and financial power been in a more precarious position, never has the ‘establishment’ been under greater threat and held in greater disdain, having completely lost its symbolic legitimacy. This makes possible new and more autonomous forms of political action, communication, economic exchange and being in common. On the other hand, this sense we all have of an increasingly dislocated world, spinning off its hinges, confronts us with immense and unparalleled dangers—the empty nihilism of the global capitalist machine and the appearance of apocalyptic and fascistic forms of politics that seem intent on hastening the coming disorder. The condition of ontological anarchy is always accompanied by the temptation to restore the principle of authority, to fill in its empty place with new and terrifying proliferations of power. We confront the realisation that power itself has become dangerously anarchic; that, deprived of any sort of consistent legitimation, power suffers paroxysm after paroxysm as the emptiness at its core is

revealed. The functioning of state and governmental power is increasingly nihilistic in that it is no longer driven towards any general project for social improvement or human fulfilment; it is simply the blind and contingent operation of power, which seeks merely to manage, with ever-greater levels of incompetence and ineffectiveness, the crises (of security, economy, ecology) that it itself generates.

Against this blind and nihilistic drive, anarchism today must affirm a kind of ethical care or even conservation for what already exists, for a natural world faced with ecological collapse, as well as cultivate and affirm new forms of life, community and autonomy which are already being made possible by the ontological rift opening before us.

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PART III

Key Events/History



The French Revolution and 1848

C. Alexander McKinley

The nineteenth century is considered to be the Age of Ideologies, a period when many contemporary political and social philosophies of the modern era came into being. During this century, anarchism developed into a fully formed political ideology alongside liberalism, conservatism, nationalism, and socialism. However, one can trace its intellectual and revolutionary roots back to the century that preceded it. Beginning with the radical assault on authority launched by Enlightenment *philosophes* and continuing through the struggles of working-class peoples during the French Revolution and 1848, anarchism came into being as a distinct and coherent revolutionary movement in Europe and beyond. Although some scholars argue that anarchism can really only be understood as a response to social problems brought on by industrialisation and modernisation, the intellectual roots of the movement developed earlier.¹ The Enlightenment attacks upon secular and religious intellectual authority at the beginning of the eighteenth century proved to be the catalyst of the anarchist ideology in the nineteenth century and beyond. In addition, the experience of the revolutions in 1789–93 and 1848 contributed significantly to the development of the ideology and movement as well. It is this combination of theory and practice that created the foundation for the classical anarchism of the nineteenth and twentieth century.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Broadly speaking, the Enlightenment built upon the Scientific Revolution of the previous centuries by refining the tools of empiricism and rationalism in an attempt to understand the subjectivity of the human world within the

C. A. McKinley (✉)
Department of History, St. Ambrose University,
Davenport, IA, USA
e-mail: mckinleycharles@sau.edu

objectivity of the natural world. Such Enlightenment thinkers posited the idea that all humans were innately capable of reason, and through this rationalism, they are capable of understanding not only the natural laws of the universe but could also utilise these tools to grasp fully the laws that governed the human world. Once such natural laws were discovered, many believed that people and societies should be free to reform themselves and live in conformity with those natural laws. In fact, many believed that the problems of the modern world could be attributed to custom, tradition, superstition, and oppressive authority that stood in the way of reform. If individuals could break free of these fetters, the result would be deeper understanding and progress. The lynchpin of reason was key, but equally important was the concept of freedom. The individual could only exercise their reason once free to do so. However, those who benefited from the status quo, be they religious or political authorities, often stood in the way. As Immanuel Kant famously wrote in his short work *What is Enlightenment?*:

All that is required for this enlightenment is freedom; and particularly the least harmful of all that may be called freedom, namely, the freedom for man to make public use of his reason in all matters. But I hear people clamor on all sides: Don't argue! The officer says: Don't argue, drill! The tax collector: Don't argue, pay! The pastor: Don't argue, believe! ... Here we have restrictions on freedom everywhere. Which restriction is hampering enlightenment, and which does not, or even promotes it? I answer: The public use of a man's reason must be free at all times, and this alone can bring enlightenment among men.²

It should not then be surprising that such ideas later spawned a movement that took the motto: 'No Gods, No Masters'.

By the end of the Enlightenment era, William Godwin developed the first truly anarchist ideas, of which built upon concepts developed in previous decades. The first sign of incipient anarchist thought can though arguably be found in the obscure writing of Jean Meslier, a Catholic priest who worked out a revolutionary philosophy of atheism and promoted a world without law or inequality. His *Testament of Jean Meslier*, published posthumously in 1729, laid out a rationalist critique of organised religion. In a series of proofs attacking the contradictions and logical errors he saw in Christianity, he argued for a natural religion, without texts, authority or doctrine beyond 'do unto other what we want to have done to us'.³ He focused upon religion as source of error and oppression, and he argued that economic inequality was the prime source of evil in the world. He believed that there were enough resources for all, and spreading those goods equally would yield peace and happiness, obviating the need for coercive law.⁴

Meslier's works were rediscovered by the French *philosophes* later in the century. They provided a basis for their own critiques of religious authority and a foundation for more robust atheist arguments. Voltaire published an edited abridgment of the Meslier's *Testament* and built upon his criticisms of the

Catholic Church and arguments for ‘natural religion’.⁵ Voltaire influenced later anarchist thinkers, who used his anti-clerical arguments put forth in his *Philosophical Dictionary* and anti-authoritarian sentiments seen in *Candide*, which described the irrationality of contemporary power structures.⁶ But Voltaire’s discouragement of radical change and associations with European monarchs, such as Frederick the Great, limited his appeal to anarchists in the following century.

Echoing Meslier in sentiment, Baron d’Holbach’s religious and political writings strongly resonated with later anarchist thinkers. In his *System of Nature*, Holbach crafted an entirely materialistic world-view by asserting that reason alone should rule, rejecting religion entirely. By using experience and reason, individuals could completely understand nature and its irrefutable ties to the laws of physics and chemistry. With this materialist understanding, he argued that humankind’s chief desire is to achieve happiness through the presence of pleasure and absence of pain. He speculated that misery is the result of misunderstanding one’s own nature and the larger natural laws of the physical and social world.⁷ He believed the primary causes of this misunderstanding were religious and secular authorities that abused their power for gain. He extended his rationalist and materialist arguments into the political sphere. In his *Social System*, *Natural Politics*, and the *Universal Morality*, he sought to reduce government to its naturalistic principles. He believed the goal of social association was simply based on utility. He endorsed a form of social contract theory where individuals contracted with each other to secure social existence and then extended it to create government to protect the benefits of social living. And while not making an explicit anarchist argument for the elimination of government, he believed that if governments cease to provide for the common welfare, then citizens had the right to remove that government through revolution.⁸

The most famous of the social contract thinkers of the Enlightenment was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau’s influence on later anarchists was complex. His embrace of the natural goodness of humankind and his critiques that all forms of misery were the result of manmade exploitation and oppression, particularly as articulated in the *Discourse on Inequality*, resonated strongly in anarchist thought. His analysis that all governments were little more than oppressive institutions created by the wealthy to protect and extend their property could have easily appeared in later anarchist works. As could the opening of his *Social Contract* ‘Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains’.⁹ While Rousseau’s criticism of the emerging modern civilisation had clear appeal, his solution to the problem was more vexing to many anarchists. Rousseau’s arguments for a form of small-scale, direct, participatory democracy in a relatively economically egalitarian society has led some scholars to see him as a proto-anarchist.¹⁰ For many anarchists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries though, Rousseau was too closely associated with the Jacobins of the French Revolution. Beginning with Proudhon, many rejected

Rousseau as promoting solely political solutions to all problems. Though much of Rousseau's work influenced Proudhon, the latter would rely on economic contracts between people, rather than political associations.

Rousseau's colleague Denis Diderot more typically appealed to later anarchists. In his *Encyclopédie* entry on 'Political Authority', he argued that the true sovereign was the nation itself, and the only legitimate legislature could be the people. But, like Voltaire, his wariness of revolutionary change, and his association with Catherine the Great would dampen his appeal. For anarchists, particularly at the turn of the twentieth century, his most influential work was *The Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville*, a fictional description of life among indigenous peoples in the South Pacific. He described a simple naturalistic society, without government or central state. Here the people, guided by natural law, free love, and association, lived a contented life based on natural sociability. Diderot's work, republished by anarchists in France, provided a blueprint for a kind of anarchist civilisation.¹¹

While elements of future anarchist thought can be found among Enlightenment thinkers, the English philosopher William Godwin stands out as the first clear anarchist. Godwin's *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* built on the rationalist ideas of the preceding century and made the first complete statement of anarchist philosophy.¹² Godwin argued that government was the source of humankind's ills and that individual understanding was the only legitimate form of imposition. As Jared McGeough points out, at the heart of Godwin's philosophy were the dual convictions that humans are perfectible and the 'universal principle of reason supersedes the "shrine of positive law and political institution"'.¹³ He believed individual reason could replace positive law, allowing the creation of a system of political simplicity. His ideal vision was of political association governed by public opinion, which would encourage virtue and discourage vice through a system of public inspection and what he termed 'positive sincerity'.¹⁴ As John Clarke asserts, this association would take the form of a federation of small-scale, decentralised direct democracies,¹⁵ an idea embraced by later anarchists. The goal of this association was to make individuals free, virtuous, and wise, eliminating any need for political coercion. As he wrote in the second book of the *Enquiry*: 'There will be no war, no crimes, no administration of justice, as it is called, and no government'.¹⁶

His belief in a discoverable and uniform code of rational truth can be found in granting the maximum amount of intellectual freedom and engagement between citizens. Maximum political liberty had to be coupled with economic equality, as inequality produced vice and class conflict requiring the need of repressive government. Poverty, he argued, was the root cause of social strife.¹⁷ Godwin flirted with communist views in the earliest edition of the *Enquiry*, but he later retreated from that position. Like Rousseau before and Proudhon after, Godwin envisioned a world of relatively equal but independent property ownership. He believed that property was necessary to maintain individual independence, but such property had to be distributed evenly enough to

prevent exploitation.¹⁸ Writing during the tumult of the French Revolution, Godwin avoided any endorsement of political revolution. In his opinion, violent revolution unleashed the passions and, in fact, hinders the development of reason. He put his faith in education rather than revolution as the key to progress.¹⁹ Godwin's influence on future anarchists was significant. Later thinkers like Proudhon, Tolstoy, and Kropotkin would echo his ideas. In his entry on 'Anarchism' for the *Encyclopedia Britannica* of 1910 Kropotkin wrote:

It was Godwin, in his *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (2 vols., 1793), who was the first to formulate the political and economical conceptions of anarchism, even though he did not give that name to the ideas developed in his remarkable work. Laws, he wrote, are not a product of the wisdom of our ancestors: they are the product of their passions, their timidity, their jealousies and their ambition. The remedy they offer is worse than the evils they pretend to cure. If and only if all laws and courts were abolished, and the decisions in the arising contests were left to reasonable men chosen for that purpose, real justice would gradually be evolved. As to the state, Godwin frankly claimed its abolition. A society, he wrote, can perfectly well exist without any government: only the communities should be small and perfectly autonomous. Speaking of property, he stated that the rights of every one 'to every substance capable of contributing to the benefit of a human being' must be regulated by justice alone: the substance must go 'to him who most wants it'. His conclusion was communism. Godwin, however, had not the courage to maintain his opinions. He entirely rewrote later on his chapter on property and mitigated his communist views in the second edition of *Political Justice* (8 vols., 1796).²⁰

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

At the end of the eighteenth century, the French Revolution exploded, radically altering the political landscape of Europe. As the era of mass politics developed, anarchism developed within a Europe shaped by the forces unleashed by the Revolution. For the anarchists of the following century, the French Revolution was profoundly influential. The legacy of the Revolution contributed key ideas to the movement including the primacy of revolutionary action and violence, the importance of social and economic revolution over the political conquest of power, the centrality of radicalised mass working-class populations, and the role played by revolutionary minorities. Additionally, in their understandings of the Revolution, they saw their movement's predecessors among the working-class *sans-culottes* and peasants and the *enragés*, the ultra-revolutionary agitators.

The French Revolution offered the anarchists a model in which to build their own revolutionary movement. When nineteenth century anarchists such as Kropotkin, among others, looked back at the French Revolution, they saw much that appealed to them. For them, the French Revolution was primarily a social revolution, which aimed to create a form of popular direct democracy and a primitive form of socialism.²¹

Anarchists believed a crucial factor in the beginning of the Revolution was less the political and fiscal crisis of the *ancien régime*, than the growing economic crisis. The failed agricultural reforms of Turgot unleashed considerable unrest in the French countryside. This unrest, organised by anonymous agitators, collectively called the *jacques* and waged a campaign of violence and intimidation against the noble and clerical landlords in the hopes of recovering their lost communes. These revolts and the breakdown of law and order did much to undermine the legitimacy of Louis XVI's monarchy. For anarchists, the *jacquerie* fulfilled a number of important criteria. The movement appeared to be largely spontaneous and leaderless. The goal was economic and social, the destruction of feudalism and the restoration of the communes, which Kropotkin and others believed to be an early form of socialism. The means employed to achieve these goals was revolutionary violence. To many anarchists, one of the first great achievements of the Revolution, the formal abolition of feudalism on August 4, 1789 was directly attributable to these revolutionary peasants.

This model of spontaneous, leaderless masses using revolutionary violence to achieve a social and economic revolution influenced their general understanding of the Revolution and its major accomplishments. When looking at the early events of the Revolution, the anarchists often ignored the drama playing out in the Estates General and the National Assembly. Rather than focus on the Tennis Court Oath or the proclamation of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen*, anarchist discussion of the French Revolution concentrated on seemingly obscure events in the early summer of 1789, such as the riot at the Réveillon paper manufactory, the looting of grain from the St. Lazare monastery, and the destruction of the *octroi* (the custom houses taxing goods entering Paris). Like the *jacquerie*, these were events of spontaneous revolutionary violence emanating directly from the lower classes without elite leadership. The more prominent revolutionary events, like the storming of the Bastille and Women's March on Versailles, were described in similar terms. In anarchist histories, the taking of the Bastille had little to do with events in government at Versailles, but instead were carried out to secure the grain and gunpowder in the fortress. The March on Versailles follows in a similar vein, as revolutionary masses, mainly market women angry about the high prices of bread, invaded the King's palace and forced his return to Paris, with no concern for the trepidation and even opposition of moderate, elite reformist aristocrats and bourgeois politicians.²²

This narrative of the Revolution continued throughout their descriptions of the most revolutionary years, 1792–94. The overthrow of the monarchy on August 10, 1792, was the work of the radicalised Parisian workers and soldiers in the sections, local neighbourhood administrative bodies that served as a kind of proto-anarchist political institution of participatory direct democracy. Through the sections, the people acted on their own. While bourgeois politicians eventually supported their actions, they only joined late, if at all. Succeeding revolutionary events are described in the same vein. The September Massacres, while worrisome due to its excesses, were explained as an attempt

by the people to save their revolution from counter-revolutionary threats. Later anarchists viewed the purging of the Girondins and the continual push for extending the revolution into economic and social areas as the workings of a revolutionary people, often in opposition to the bourgeois politicians in the Jacobin-dominated Convention.

While anarchists admired, celebrated, and viewed the grand *journées* as models for future anarchist action, they rejected the Terror as a means to secure the Revolution. Among most anarchists, the Terror symbolised a failure of the Revolution. Not because it utilised political violence to achieve its goals, but because it was political violence organised and directed by a centralised state. Anarchists routinely denied the ability to create social revolution through such a state. They saw the Convention and Committee of Public Safety as repressive institutions, dedicated to pursuing a centralising, statist Revolution, and one that in fact was outright opposed to any socialist reform. While the radicalised sections were able to achieve some temporary reform (the return of the communes and the Maximum), the Convention increasingly focused on thwarting and eventually eliminating those seeking to push the revolution to the left. As the revolutionary people attempted to continue the Revolution, the Jacobins sought solely to secure their own power, even at the expense of turning on their *sans-culotte* allies. It is, in fact, during the Terror, that the term anarchist first entered the political lexicon. Jacobin and Girondin legislators used the term to denounce the *enragés* and *sans-culottes* in the sections whose push for social revolution, they claimed, undermined the indivisible republic.

This was one of the important lessons anarchists learned from the Revolution. Once power is concentrated, the government is cut off from the revolutionary light and heat of the masses. It is only a matter of time until the revolution will slow and move towards conservatism. As a result, a core of anarchist ideology became the refusal to take political power or seek a revolutionary dictatorship to achieve social revolution. From this point forward, anarchists, saw dictatorships as incapable of creating liberation and socialism. For anarchists like Kropotkin and Bookchin, the end of the Revolution came not on the ninth of Thermidor but with the execution of the *enragés* and the destruction of the sections, which preceded the fall of Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety.

The anarchists of the nineteenth century learned much from their study of the French Revolution beyond their opposition to dictatorship. As they found their intellectual roots in the Enlightenment, in the Revolution they discovered the tactic revolutionary violence and their activist forefathers. The *sans-culottes*, they argued, created a political culture of progressive equality, including sexual equality. In the sections, they saw an experiment in radical, participatory direct democracy, a model for future forms of self-governance.²³

Anarchists found the *sans-culottes'* early expressions of socialism appealing as well. While *sans-culottes* pushed the Convention to restore briefly the communes, take action to punish monopolists, and reduce the cost of bread, they

also sought to build a form of socialism among themselves through mutual aid and social insurance. Unlike the Jacobins, the *sans-culottes* were convinced, similarly to the Enlightenment thinkers discussed above, that liberty could only come with economic equality. In calling for government intervention to reduce the cost of bread, the *sans-culottes* addressed the Convention and its commitment to the free market:

You will doubtless object that this goes against the system of liberty you have established. On the contrary, we are going to prove that in not doing this you will forever annihilate liberty and equality. In fact, a hundred individuals who will monopolize all production of the empire could very easily put the nation again in the yoke by giving or refusing it food. Only that portion of men would be free.²⁴

As the *sans-culottes* served as the revolutionary people, the sections and Commune as the forms of anarchist self-governance, among the leaders of these, the *enragés*, anarchists found their direct antecedents. From Bakunin onwards, anarchists stressed the importance of revolutionary minorities to bring about social revolution. Bakunin called them ‘invisible pilots of the revolution’ who inspired a revolutionary people but never ruled them, as the revolution should always remain the work of the people themselves. During the French Revolution, Jacques Roux, Jacques Hébert, Jean Varlet, Pierre Chaumette, Sylvain Maréchal, Anacharsis Clootz, and others played this role.²⁵ These agitators and journalists sought to radicalise the people and inspire them to push the Revolution in ever more progressive directions. They articulated popular demands for economic equality and social revolution, but never attempted to seize and hold power for themselves. Their continual demands for social revolution, economic equality, class warfare, international solidarity, atheism, direct democracy, and resistance to state terror pushed the revolution further and formed the nucleus of anarchist ideology and tactics in the decades that followed.

The proto-anarchist revolution of the *sans-culottes* and the *enragés* failed and met its end on the scaffold of the Terror in 1794. But during their relatively brief, but intense, period of activity, the anarchists found much to admire, inspiring their own movement.²⁶ Their ideas may have been only partially formed, but the anarchists who followed built upon them to create a more complete and systematic ideology in the decades after the French Revolution.

The French Revolution radically changed European politics, launching a host of new movements and political ideas. For many on the left, the Revolution achieved mythic status, with many working towards its re-creation, embracing the Jacobin ideal of creating a republican government based on universal suffrage. In the newly emerging socialist camp, some sought to use that centralised democratic republic as a means to create social and economic equality. In addition, an alternative narrative began to develop among socialists in the 1840s. This counter-narrative learned different lessons from the French Revolution, rejecting the model of political revolution and dictatorship. This

new movement centred on the ideas of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the first thinker to embrace openly the title of anarchist, and Max Stirner, an influential young left Hegelian who laid the groundwork for anarcho-individualism.

PROUDHON AND STIRNER

In 1840, Proudhon published his first and most influential book, *What is Property? or, an Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government*. In this work, Proudhon made a biting and direct assault on the morality and contradictions of private ownership of the means of production—this private ownership of the means of production, Proudhon termed ‘property’, differentiating it from ownership of produced goods which he term ‘possession’. In his analysis, all people had a right to occupation and existence and a right to the means to do so. But under the current property arrangements, workers exchange their labour with the owner of the means of production (the proprietor) in exchange for wages. Since the product of labour is necessarily collective and profits generated are social property, the workers should receive a right to the portion he produces, but this is siphoned off by the proprietor in the form of profits, who contributes nothing to production beyond capital.²⁷ In a pre-Marxist version of surplus labour value, Proudhon concluded that workers are thus exploited. He concluded famously, ‘WHAT IS PROPERTY! May I not likewise answer, IT IS ROBBERY’.²⁸ This exploitation inevitably leads to social conflict and, sounding like much the thinkers discussed earlier, he argued: ‘The right of property was the origin of evil on the earth, the first link in the long chain of crimes and misfortunes which the human race has endured since its birth. The delusion of prescription is the fatal charm thrown over the intellect, the death sentence breathed into the conscience, to arrest man’s progress towards truth, and bolster up the worship of error’.²⁹

According to Proudhon, social conflict that is the inevitable result of property leads to the creation of government, whose main function is to protect the property of the proprietors, deny the rights of individuals to support themselves, and protect economic exploitation. This form of oppression exists whatever form the government happens to take, be it monarchy or representative democracy. As long as inequality reigned and exploitative property arrangements existed, even in the most perfect democracy, individuals will still not be free. The state is always tyranny.³⁰ Proudhon thus broke with many of his fellow radicals on the left in regard to the French Revolution and the Jacobin tradition. While he believed in the Revolution’s goals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, the Jacobins’ defence of private property made it impossible. Private property ensured inequality and thus denied liberty and fraternity.³¹ Additionally, the centralised bureaucratic republic created by the Jacobins simply refined and increased the oppressive nature of the state.

Since property led directly to social conflict, it directly undermined society. Proudhon believed that humans were naturally social beings and required society to produce the means of existence. In order for society to function without

conflict, it required mutual recognition of equality. Thus society required the creation of a just social system. But just as Proudhon rejected the Jacobin tradition, he rejected the communist solution as well. Communists, like Gracchus Babeuf, sought to deal with the problem of economic inequality, but their solution proved to be just as damaging as capitalism. Using a bit of Hegelian analysis, Proudhon argued that capitalism, as thesis, through its creation of radical inequality and exploitation created communism as its antithesis. But the communist system through its absolute equal division of property and all the goods of society, enforced by a centralised state would create a tyrannical system of deadening uniformity. As the state, by taking over the economy, would grow ever more powerful, the individual would be lost. Humans may be social beings, but they also love independence and freedom. If capitalism sacrificed equality in the name of liberty achieving neither, communism sacrificed liberty in the name of equality and achieved the same result.³² Proudhon thus provided what he saw as the Hegelian synthesis between the systems of property and communism and declared, 'I am an anarchist'.³³

Proudhon argued that his anarchism (or mutualism as he termed it) preserved both liberty and equality and allowed for true fraternity. Building on the social contract thinkers of the Enlightenment, Proudhon envisioned a new form of social contract, not a political contract between citizens or between people and rulers but economic contracts between free individuals. These contracts, he believed, are the only form of non-coercive contract possible. Rather than a system of state-enforced private or government-controlled property ownership, Proudhon proposed a society where worker associations, similar to those he had witnessed in Lyon, owned the means of production. These associations would produce and engage in trade with other associations through the form of free contracts. Workers in each association would then receive a share of the profits of the social products that they contributed to producing. This would ensure enough equality for all to be able to produce and prevent the use of property in leading to exploitation. The role of the state was then reduced to providing free or low interest credit to the associations and helping maintain contracts. These small-scale associations would federate together and create a decentralised and radically democratic state.³⁴

Free association, liberty—whose sole function is to maintain equality in the means of production and equivalence in exchanges—is the only possible, the only just, the only true form of society. Politics is the science of liberty. The government of man by man (under whatever name it be disguised) is oppression. Society finds its highest perfection in the union of order with anarchy.³⁵

Like Godwin before him, Proudhon remained wary of using violent revolution to achieve social reforms. His understanding of the French Revolution and his experience in the revolution of 1848, which will be discussed below, led him to conclude that social change could only happen through non-coercive

means. His vision was of ever-expanding networks of worker-owned cooperatives that would gradually replace the state and achieve his mutualist society. As Robert Hoffman argues, following the disaster of 1848, Proudhon shifted to become a more serious moral philosopher, and his vision of revolution increasingly looked to use mutualist relations to create a free organic community and moral regeneration.³⁶

Proudhon became responsible for helping to create the anarchist school of socialism. His followers, clustered in France, Spain, Switzerland, Russia and Italy developed his ideas of workers' self-organisation, free association, and anti-statist politics. These ideas were refined by Bakunin and his anarcho-collectivism in the First International, Kropotkin's anarcho-communism at the turn of the century, as well as the development of anarcho-syndicalism in the twentieth century. But another school of anarchism, like Proudhon's, emerged in response to the French Revolution and Hegelian philosophy. This anarcho-individualist school of thought is most closely associated with Max Stirner and his *The Ego and Its Own*, published in 1844.

Stirner's abstract and philosophical work made several early anarchist arguments. Like Proudhon, Stirner rejected the Jacobin tradition of the French Revolution. The Republic, created by the Convention, created a state even more absolute than the monarchy it had overthrown and replaced. In fact, it was the inevitable outgrowth of the Christian monarchical tradition. As the state grew in power over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, its oppressive power only grew with its transformation into a more democratic institution. The only difference he saw between the subservience demanded by clerics and those demanded by the Jacobins was simply the degree. While the church only demanded your faith, the liberal state demanded your complete dedication. Liberalism, he argued, dissolved the individual into simply a servant of the state, eliminating all mediating bodies and institutions. Political liberty, as defined after the Revolution, meant no more than absolute subjection to the state. Thus liberalism had become the ultimate form of absolutism. For Stirner, the overriding goal was to protect the individual from all authority. To allow the individuals to create themselves as freely as possible, he rejected all claims to authority over the individual, be they religious, political, or economic.

Stirner, building on Hegel, critiqued the alienation of labour caused by the emerging industrial capitalist system. Like Proudhon, he argued the system created an oppressive dependence between the poor and rich, one that inevitably leads to class warfare and the creation of the state to maintain the dominance of the wealthy.³⁷ While Proudhon and Godwin had been leery of violent revolution to effect social change, Stirner was much less reticent. 'In short, the property question cannot be solved so amicably as the socialists, yes, even the communists, dream. It is solved only by the war of all against all. The poor will become free from proprietors only when they—rebel, rise up'.³⁸ Seeing a coalition of the industrial proletariat and intellectual vagabonds like himself, he believed that true revolution could set them free. 'The state' he wrote, 'rests on

the slavery of labor. If labor becomes free, the state is lost'. Stirner, like Proudhon, rejected political participation or a strategy for seizing control of the state. Sacrificing one's individuality in service to God and the state, or even a revolutionary party, made no difference, they all claimed you and oppressed your individuality. Parties are simply states within the state. He wrote: 'All parties are shattered not against the state, but against the ego'.³⁹ Individual rebellion became the ultimate solution. 'I am the deadly enemy of the state, which always hovers between the alternatives, it or I'.⁴⁰

As Proudhon did, Stirner rejected the communist solution. He believed that communism simply placed the power currently in the hands of the proprietors into the hands of the collectivity. While communism addressed the problem of inequality and exploitation, it relied on the ever-increasing power of the state. As liberalism had increased the power of the state, communism would grow it ever further. The state could claim both political and economic life, leaving little room, if any at all, to the individual. His revolution was pure insurrection, not aimed at creating new institutions or new constitutions, but to create a world that is institution-less and constitution-less.⁴¹

Therefore we two, the state and I, are enemies. I, the egoist, have not a heart for the welfare of this 'human society.' I sacrifice nothing to it, I utilise it, but to be able to utilise it completely I transform it into my property and my creature; that is, I annihilate it, and form in its place the *Union of Egoists*.⁴²

Stirner's absolute rejection of any kind of collectivism has led some scholars, like R.W.K. Paterson, to reject him as part of the anarchist school of thought.⁴³ In recent decades with the development of post-anarchism, Stirner's relevance and influence has seen some revival. Andrew Koch agrees that he is outside of the classical anarchist tradition of Godwin, Proudhon, and Kropotkin but that his attacks on the 'fixed idea' would set the stage for the twentieth-century development of post-structuralism.⁴⁴ While Iain Mackay embraces Stirner's egoism, as its gives a totalising understanding of freedom, one that Mackay argues can only be achieved through libertarian communism.⁴⁵

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848

Only several years after the publication of Proudhon and Stirner's foundational works on anarchism, Europe was rocked by another revolutionary outburst, the largest since the French Revolution. Beginning in France in February 1848 and spreading across the continent, the conservative order established by Metternich after the end of the French Revolution collapsed with astonishing rapidity. In urban centres across Europe, coalitions of liberals, democrats, nationalists, socialists, and others took to the streets against absolutist and liberal monarchies. The revolutions achieved rapid, but fleeting, success. The opposition to monarchy might have brought this disparate opposition together

into coalition, but it was not long before the coalitions frayed and then collapsed. By and large, within a few short years, the revolutions were stopped and the revolutionary forces sent into disarray. This experience of failed revolution reinforced the basic conceptions of the anarchist movement. Both Proudhon and Bakunin were participants, in various degrees, in the revolutions, and both came to the same conclusion: attempts at coalition building between the working classes and bourgeoisie were doomed, as were any attempts at achieving revolutionary change through a government mechanism. If anything, the failure of 1848 strengthened these anarchist convictions.

In France, where the revolutions began, the Parisian working class and their radical clubs were instrumental in the street fighting that brought down July Monarchy in February. Quickly, a democratic republic was declared and a provisional government formed. As a result of the large role played by the working class, the provisional government, made up mostly of middle-class Jacobin-inspired republicans, promised a series of social reforms (primarily dealing with the problems of unemployment) and even brought in a Parisian worker as a member. While the government balked at creating a Ministry of Labor, they allowed the creation of a 'Commission for the Workers' at the Luxembourg palace. The Commission became a centre for working-class self-organisation. Described by Woodcock as a kind of soviet, the Luxembourg Commission saw the election of delegates from the various trades, who organised for social and economic reform, as opposed to the political reform championed in the radical clubs. The Commission aided in the creation of trade unions and freely associated producer co-operatives, proposing a kind of Proudhonian mutualist, worker-controlled socialism.⁴⁶

The provisional government trimmed workdays by an hour from 11 to 10 hours in Paris and created the National Workshops to address the problem of unemployment. The National Workshops, a concept developed by the Commission President Louis Blanc, was supposed to be a mechanism of government employment, which Blanc believed could eventually prove to be more productive and efficient than capitalist production. But it was not to be. The radical nature of the Luxembourg Commission led to a reaction from the more conservative members of the bourgeois-dominated provisional government. The government appointed a director of the National Workshops whose hostility to socialism was well known. Rather than provide productive work, the workshops became a form of meagre welfare and means to keep workers off the streets and away from the radicals in the Luxembourg Commission.⁴⁷

As the promised social reforms failed to materialise in the spring of 1848, frustrations began to mount among the working class and the radical clubs. Increasing worker militancy led to a break between the more radical workers and the more moderate leadership in the newly elected Chamber of Deputies. In April, workers and radicals from the clubs organised large demonstrations demanding immediate social reforms. However, they were suppressed. On May 13, the government closed the Luxembourg Commission, and the radicals

made a half-hearted attempt to take over the Hôtel de Ville and instal a socialist-oriented government. The government responded by closing the National Workshops. This act proved to be the final straw and unleashed what became known as the June Days. Three days of street fighting raged and resulted in the death of 10,000 mostly working-class insurgents and 4000 deported to Algeria. The split in the coalition between the working-class socialists and middle-class republicans was complete, and the dream of social revolution in 1848 died.

Proudhon, who had not been an active member of the radical clubs and to a certain extent been caught off guard by events in February, initially came out in support of the Revolution. He began as a journalist, promoting his mutualist ideas, but, surprisingly for a self-proclaimed anarchist, was elected to the Chamber of Deputies. Similar to other radicals though, his support for the revolution soured over the course of the spring, and following the June Days, he turned his back on the whole endeavour. However, the insight Proudhon gained in 1848 served to bolster his and later anarchists' positions.

In his *Confessions of a Revolutionary*, published in 1849, Proudhon reflected on the failure of the social revolution in 1848. The root cause of the failure was the belief that political action and government power could be used to carry out meaningful social reform. Rather than seizing power and using the state to pursue socialism, he argued that social revolution ought to have been used to destroy all authority, writing: '*The political revolution, the abolition of authority among men is the goal; the social revolution is the means*'.⁴⁸ Over the course of the work, he argued that the failure of capitalism had led to revolution in 1848, but the revolutionaries failed when they attempted to establish a new government, rather than securing liberty. While he was a sharp critic of the July Monarchy's increasingly undemocratic government, the solution was not simply a more democratic republic. The real problem, he believed, was the social problem of capitalism and that required economic action. The revolution failed because it only pursued political solutions. Proudhon also drew a distinction between his anarchist socialism and that of Blanc and Blanqui, whom he referred to as 'state socialists'. Their attempts to create socialism from above, through the use of a centralised republic or dictatorship, had led to fears of tyranny and turning people against the idea of socialism. For Proudhon, socialism could only be achieved through free and voluntary association of the workers themselves. Proudhon, foreshadowing the later debates between anarchists and Marxists in the coming decades, argued: 'Louis Blanc represents governmental socialism, revolution by power, as I represent democratic socialism, revolution by the people. An abyss exists between us'.⁴⁹ Proudhon's brief participation in revolutionary politics had simply reinforced his belief in using voluntary worker associations as the only effective means to bring social progress.

The Russian born, international revolutionary Mikhail Bakunin cut his teeth and developed his anarchist convictions during the 1848 revolutions. Born to an aristocratic family in Tsarist Russia, Bakunin served in the Russian army

where his anti-authoritarian inclinations began after witnessing the suppression of the Polish revolt of 1830. Resigning his commission, he studied the *encyclopédists*, Fichte, and Hegel, developing into a social revolutionary. In 1842, under a French pseudonym, Bakunin published his first essay 'The Reaction in Germany'. The short but rather abstract and philosophical work is notable for its revolutionary tone, including calls for social revolution and the idea that human freedom was the supreme end to history. The work concluded with one of his most famous statements, blending Hegelian dialectics and anarchist sentiment: 'The passion for destruction is a creative passion, too!'.⁵⁰

Following the outbreak of revolution in February, Bakunin first travelled to France, but believing the revolution to be finished, he travelled east, fighting on the barricades in Prague and Dresden, eventually getting himself imprisoned and in exile for the rest of his life. The revolutions of 1848 though had a profound influence on his life. Their brief victories and ultimate failure began the long process, which turned Bakunin into an anarchist. The outlines of his future, more fully formed anarchist ideology can be seen in his 'Appeal to the Slavs' written while imprisoned for his revolutionary activity during 1848. In this essay, Bakunin denounced any form of reformism or compromise. The world was divided into two competing camps, those of revolution and counter-revolution. The forces of revolution he identified as the working classes and the peasantry. The ranks of counter-revolution included not only the autocratic monarchies and the nobility but also the bourgeoisie, who he believed had betrayed the people in 1848. In addition to the betrayal by the bourgeoisie, the failure of 1848 was a failure not of revolution but of solely political revolution. He argued that:

Liberty was merely a lie where the great majority of the population is reduced to a miserable existence, where, deprived of education, of leisure, and of bread, it is fated to serve as an underprop for the powerful and the rich. The social revolution, therefore, appears as a natural, necessary corollary of the political revolution.... The social question thus appears to be first and foremost the question of the complete overturn of society.⁵¹

In the second half of the nineteenth century, starting with Bakunin, anarchism came into being as a mature and fully formed ideology. Its roots though lie in the century that preceded. Its intellectual roots can be found in the Enlightenment concepts of rationalism, freedom, and progress. Moreover, its revolutionary strategies and organising principles developed as a result of the experiences of the French Revolution and the revolutions of 1848. It was this combination of theory and action that built the modern ideology. With the stresses caused by the social transformation of the industrial revolution, the ideology found a receptive audience among the impoverished masses of workers and peasants, particularly in Southern and Eastern Europe.

NOTES

1. Michael Schmidt and Lucien van der Walt argue in *Black Flame: the Revolutionary Class Politics of Anarchism and Syndicalism* (Oakland, Edinburg: AK Press, 2009) that anarchism as a coherent political tradition can only be understood as a response of modern capitalism, beginning with Bakunin. Thus they preclude not only the Enlightenment, but also Stirner and Proudhon whom they do view as insufficiently anti-capitalist. Paul McLaughlin though makes a compelling contemporary case for Enlightenment roots of anarchism in his *Anarchism and Authority: a Philosophical Introduction to Classical Anarchism* (Ashgate: Burlington, 2007).
2. Marvin Perry, et al., *Sources of the Western Tradition*, Volume II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), 56–57.
3. Jean Meslier, ‘Testament of Jean Meslier’, in *The Great Anger: Ultra-Revolutionary Writing in France from the Atheist Priest to the Bonnot Gang*, ed. and trans. Mitchell Abidor (Pacifica, CA: Marxists Internet Archive Publications, 2013), 995–999, Kindle Edition.
4. Meslier, ‘On the Great Good at Advantage for Men if They all lived Peaceably, Enjoying in Common the Goods and Conveniences of Life’, in *The Great Anger*, 1001–1092.
5. Abidor, *The Great Anger*, 230–236.
6. C. Alexander McKinley, *Illegitimate Children, of the Enlightenment: Anarchists and the French Revolution, 1880–1914* (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 87–90.
7. Max Pearson Cushing, *Baron d’Holbach, a Study of Eighteenth Century Radicalism in France* (Lancaster: The New Era Printing Company, 1914), 65–68.
8. Michael LeBuffé, ‘Paul-Henri Thiry (Baron) d’Holbach’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/holbach/>.
9. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses*, ed. and trans. G. D. H. Cole (London: Everyman, 1993), 181.
10. See Stephen Ellenburg, *Rousseau’s Political Philosophy: an Interpretation from Within* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976) and Robert Graham, ‘Anarchy and Democracy’. *Anarcho – Syndicalist Review*, 69 (Winter 2017), 18–20, 35. <https://proxy.sau.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1858084701?accountid=28567>.
11. McKinley, *Illegitimate Children of the Enlightenment*, 107–110.
12. James Joll, *The Anarchists* (London: Eye and Spottiswoode, 1964), 31.
13. Jared McGeough, “‘So Variable and Inconstant a System’: Rereading the Anarchism of Godwin’s Political Justice,” *Studies in Romanticism*, 52:2 (Summer 2013), 276. See also Peter Marshall, *William Godwin* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1984), 96.
14. William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Modern Morals and Happiness* (New York: Penguin, 1985), 312–313, 551–552, 593–603, 610.
15. John P. Clark, *The Philosophical Anarchism of William Godwin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 191–194.
16. As quoted in Don Locke, *A Fantasy of Reason: The Life and Thought of William Godwin* (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 7–8.

17. William Godwin, *Caleb Williams* (London, 1794), II, 30.
18. Godwin, *Enquiry*, 710, 744.
19. *Ibid.*, 251–252, 262, 294.
20. Peter Kropotkin, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th edition, ‘Anarchism’ (Cambridge: University Press, 1911), Vol. 1, 915.
21. Kropotkin’s *The Great French Revolution, 1789–1793* is the most thorough anarchist history of the Revolution. Murray Bookchin echoed a great many of his ideas a century later in his history of the Revolution. See Peter Kropotkin, *The Great French Revolution, 1789–1793*, trans. N. F. Dryhurst (New York: Schocken Books, 1971) and Murray Bookchin, *The Third Revolution: Popular Movements in the Revolutionary Era* (New York: Cassels, 1998), Vol. 1.
22. McKinley, *Illegitimate Children of the Enlightenment*, 13–36.
23. See Kropotkin, *The Great French Revolution*, 180–188; Bookchin, *The Third Revolution*, 312–327; Graham, “Anarchy and Democracy.”
24. Anonymous, *Vous foutez-vous de nous*. Paris, l’Imprimerie des Sans-Culottes, 1792. Trans. Mitchell Abidor, last modified 2007, accessed 12 July 2017, <https://www.marxists.org/history/france/revolution/1792/sans-culottes.htm>.
25. Bookchin sees Jean Varlet as the key figure in the drive for sectional direct democracy and social revolution. See Bookchin, *The Third Revolution*, 326.
26. See McKinley, *Illegitimate Children of the Enlightenment*, 13–82.
27. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *What is Property? An Inquiry in the Principle and Right of Government*, trans. J. A. Langlois (2015), 72–80, 91–92, 115. Kindle.
28. *Ibid.*, 38.
29. *Ibid.*, 102.
30. *Ibid.*, 53, 86.
31. *Ibid.*, 157. See also Robert Hoffman, *Revolutionary Justice: the Political and Social Thought of P.J. Proudhon* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972).
32. Proudhon, *What is Property?*, 210–223, 227–228.
33. *Ibid.*, 237.
34. *Ibid.*, 243–246.
35. *Ibid.*, 246.
36. Hoffman, *Revolutionary Justice*.
37. Max Stirner, *The Ego and Its Own*, ed. and trans. David Leopold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 90–91, 96, 105.
38. *Ibid.*, 230.
39. *Ibid.*, 209.
40. *Ibid.*, 227.
41. *Ibid.*, 107, 228, 280.
42. *Ibid.*, 161.
43. R. W. K. Paterson, *The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirner* (London, New York Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1971).
44. Andrew Koch, “Max Stirner: the Last Hegelian or the First Poststructuralist?”, *Anarchist Studies*, 5:2 (1997), 95–107.
45. Iain McKay, “Individualism Versus Egoism”, *Anarcho-Syndicalist Review*, 68 (Fall, 2016), 31–34. <https://proxy.sau.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1826428559?accountid=28567>.
46. See George Woodcock, *A Hundred Years of Revolution: 1848 and After* (London: Porcupine Press, 1948), 18.

47. Edward Berensen, 'Organization and "modernization" in the Revolutions of 1848', in *Europe in 1848: Revolution and Reform*, ed. Dieter Down, Heinz-Gerhardt Haupt, Dieter Langewische and Jonathan Sperber, trans. David Higgins (New York: Bergen Books, 2001), 563.
48. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *Confessions of a Revolutionary, to Serve as a History of the February Revolution*, last accessed 31 July 2017 https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Translation:Confessions_of_a_Revolutionary/3.
49. Proudhon, *Confessions of a Revolutionary*, last accessed 31 July 2017 https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Translation:Confessions_of_a_Revolutionary/12.
50. Michael Bakunin, "The Reaction in Germany", in *Bakunin on Anarchy, Selected Works by the Activist-Founder of World Anarchism*, ed. and trans. Sam Dolgoff (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 56–57.
51. Michael Bakunin, "The Reaction in Germany", in *Bakunin on Anarchy*, 68.



Anarchism and the First International

Robert Graham

INTRODUCTION

The International Workingmen's Association (the so-called First International), which lasted from 1864 until around 1880, marked a watershed moment in the history of anarchist movements and ideas. For it was through the debates and struggles within the International regarding the proper direction of working-class movements that the first anarchist movements emerged in Europe. But it was also through these debates and struggles that the principles of modern anarchism were first clearly articulated. This chapter will describe this emergence, with an emphasis on the development of anarchist ideas.

Anarchists were at the forefront of the debates within the International regarding collective property, the family and education, the role of the state, trade unions, cooperatives and mutual aid societies, political participation and the structure and purpose of the International itself as an organisation dedicated to the emancipation of the workers by the workers themselves. The anarchists articulated a revolutionary socialist alternative to both the social democratic supporters of participation in parliamentary politics, and the advocates of revolutionary dictatorship, rejecting the use of the state and its institutions either on a transitional or more permanent basis.

Although the struggles between the various currents within the International are often reduced to a personal conflict between Karl Marx and Michael Bakunin, the real debate was over the internal structure of the International, its role in the revolutionary struggle and the ends that the International was meant to achieve. After the International was split in two by Marx's orchestration of the expulsion of Bakunin at the Hague Congress in 1872, the debates within the anti-authoritarian wing of the International gave expression to

R. Graham (✉)
Independent Scholar, Vancouver, BC, Canada

virtually every anarchist tendency that was to follow, as anarchism emerged as a distinct force on the revolutionary left, from anarcho-syndicalism, to anarchist communism, communalism, insurrectionism, anti-organisationalism, platformism and illegalism.

ANARCHISM AT THE FOUNDING OF THE INTERNATIONAL

Before the founding of the International Workingmen's Association in London in September 1864, there were no anarchist movements to speak of in Europe or elsewhere, but there were individuals and groups that embraced anarchy as their ultimate goal. For them, 'anarchy' was broadly conceived as a society without the state, domination or exploitation, based on voluntary association, freedom and equality.

The French anarchist exiles who had taken refuge in England and the United States from the dictatorship of Louis Bonaparte (Napoleon III) comprised the most noteworthy anarchist group. Based on their experiences of the 1848 Revolution, they developed a critique of bourgeois republicanism and parliamentary reformism. They pointed to the June massacre of working-class insurgents in Paris in 1848 as proof of the counter-revolutionary role of the republicans. One of their more prominent members, Joseph Déjacque, summed up their views when he wrote that their 'common enemy' was 'all who, in London and Paris, dream of governing to better guarantee their social privileges against proletarian demands, one in the name of Empire, the other in the name of the Republic'.¹

The best known and most influential anarchist at the time of the founding of the International was Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Although Proudhon had proclaimed himself an anarchist back in 1840, by 1864 he was promoting a conception of economic and political organisation that he called 'federalism'. It was this aspect of Proudhon's later thought that was to have the most influence within the International and the anarchist movements that sprang from that organisation.

At the heart of Proudhon's conception of federalism was a notion of direct democracy, organised from 'the bottom upward'. In the economic sphere, people would freely associate into functional groups for production, distribution and consumption, with each group being organised on a directly democratic basis. These groups would then form larger groups that would coordinate the activities of the base units and liaise with other federated groups. But instead of electing 'representatives' to act on their behalf at the different levels of federation, each group would mandate delegates to communicate its positions to the other federal groups, with these delegates being subject to recall if they did not honour their mandates.

Working alongside and with the federated functional groups would be political federations based on geographical units, such as municipalities and communes, federated into regional, national and, ultimately, international organisations. The role of these more 'political' federations was to coordinate

and facilitate relations between the functional and geographical units at the base of the federations and between the federations themselves. The highest levels of political organisation would be the 'federated state', and above that, an international federation of federal states. The federated 'state' would supervise compliance with federative principles and adherence to the various agreements between and within the federated groups.²

The two main groups behind the founding of the International were English and French workers. The English workers were most interested in creating an international trade union federation to coordinate working-class solidarity across national borders to better their economic conditions. The largest group of French delegates at the founding of the International were Proudhonian federalists, not anarchists. But their commitment to Proudhon's federalist principles was one of the main roots from which the anarchist tendencies in the International were to grow. From the outset, the Proudhonian federalists insisted that the International should be a federation of workers' organisations that would send mandated and recallable delegates to the International's congresses in order to debate and determine the policies and role of the organisation.

The other main root of anarchism in the International was Proudhon's critique of participation in parliamentary politics and his advocacy of 'abstentionism'. Proudhon argued that French workers should neither run their own candidates in parliamentary elections nor vote for so-called representatives, but should instead create their own autonomous working-class organisations. These organisations would facilitate the 'equivalent exchange' of products and services between individuals and larger productive units, creating the basis for a kind of market socialism, or workers' self-management, something which Proudhon called 'mutualism'.

Proudhon recapitulated his mutualist and federalist ideas in his book, *On the Political Capacity of the Working Classes*. Published in 1865, a few months after his death, this book added an important clarification to Proudhon's federalist ideas, insisting that for federations to be truly voluntary organisations, each member of a federation, whether at the individual or group level, must be free both to join and to leave the organisation.³ This was later to become a central component of anarchist conceptions of federalism.

ROOTS OF ANARCHISM IN THE INTERNATIONAL

The 1866 Geneva Congress of the International was the first at which policy issues were the subject of debate by delegates from the International's various sections. In their presentation, the French delegates cited several passages from Proudhon's 1851 publication, *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century*, one of his most explicitly anarchist books. The most important, from an anarchist perspective, were the passages calling for a worker-controlled education system and those rejecting the state being given the role of a 'superior authority'.⁴ Instead, the French delegates proposed a mutualist form of

federalism based on contracts freely entered into by individuals and federated groups. However, the French Internationalists did not openly call for the abolition of the state, and had they have done so the International likely would have been banned by the French authorities.

A more radical minority of the French delegates challenged the majority's position that the patriarchal family should be primarily responsible for deciding on their children's education, arguing that education was a social responsibility to be undertaken by 'truly democratic' communes.⁵ One of the authors of the minority memorandum, Eugène Varlin, was later to adopt a position very close to that of the anarchists in the International, something he described as 'non-authoritarian communism'.⁶ That education should be provided freely to children of both sexes was a position shared by Bakunin and other people later associated with the anarchist tendencies in the International, such as the Belgian, Eugène Hins, and the libertarian educator, Paul Robin.

Varlin, along with several other French Internationalists, was active in the nascent French trade union movement, which looked to the International to help coordinate financial and political support for striking, locked out, precariously employed and unemployed workers. To alleviate the economic hardship faced by French workers, Internationalists such as Varlin, and many of the Proudhonists, also participated in the French cooperative movement, which they hoped would provide the basis for an economy managed by the workers themselves, with each cooperative being organised on a directly democratic basis, federating with other cooperatives.

Debates about education raised the issue of the role of women in society, an issue that received more attention at the next congress of the International, held in Lausanne, Switzerland in 1867. Hins and Robin, on behalf of a minority of the Belgian delegates, argued that women were entitled to the same independence and dignity as male workers, a position shared by Bakunin.⁷

Other noteworthy issues debated at the Lausanne Congress included whether the workers should create their own financial institutions to provide credit and a means of exchange of goods and services between the workers themselves without any capitalist intermediaries. Although Marx's ally, J.G. Eccarius, argued that the workers would have to achieve state power in order to successfully implement such a scheme, he proposed a compromise resolution that the workers pool their money to create credit unions that would provide funding for cooperative enterprises, which was passed unanimously.⁸

The French delegates were alert to the risk of successful cooperatives ultimately functioning more like capitalist enterprises, with the original members forming a 'fourth estate' of cooperative shareholders who would exploit the labour of other workers hired as employees of the cooperative, unable to afford shares in the cooperative or simply excluded from membership.⁹ The issues of social stratification and divisions within the working class itself were to assume greater importance during the subsequent debates regarding the composition, and the role, of the International.

It was at the Lausanne Congress that issues regarding individual and collective property were first debated. There was general agreement, even among the more conservative Proudhonists, that larger enterprises, such as railways and mines, should be considered common or collective property. The only real disagreement was over whether land should be included as collective property, or whether it should belong to the people who worked it. No consensus emerged on this issue, with further debate deferred until the next congress.¹⁰

Bakunin joined the Geneva section of the International in July 1868. A written statement was presented on his behalf at the Brussels Congress in September 1868. He called for equal rights for women and men, for an end to the right of inheritance and the legal and religious institution of marriage, and for the free federation of agricultural and industrial associations of peasants and workers. On the question of land, Bakunin took the position that the land should be worked by free associations of agricultural workers while being considered the collective property of all.¹¹

One of the Belgian delegates, César De Paepe, argued not only for collective ownership of land but that the workers' 'resistance societies', or trade unions, in organising the struggle against the capitalists, formed the 'embryo' of those 'great companies of workers' that would replace 'the companies of the capitalists'. Through the International, the workers of the world would ultimately create the 'universal organisation of work and exchange'.¹² This was essentially an anarcho-syndicalist conception of the role of the International that was to be endorsed by the delegates to the Basel Congress the following year.

Also noteworthy at the Brussels Congress was the debate and resolution regarding war. De Paepe and Henri Tolain, although one of the more conservative of the Proudhonists, argued that war was the product of class-divided societies, pitting worker against worker. In Tolain's words, war was 'nothing other than a means, employed by the privileged classes or the governments that represent them, to subordinate the people'.¹³ In the short term, the workers could help prevent wars through a general strike. In the long term, the Brussels Congress delegates resolved, they could put an end to all wars only by way of 'the emancipation of the working class and its liberation from the power and influence of capital' and through 'the formation of a confederation of free states across all of Europe'.¹⁴

ENTER BAKUNIN

It was therefore an opportune time for Bakunin to take a more active part in the International. Bakunin himself was only then beginning to identify himself as an anarchist. After the Brussels Congress, a group that Bakunin had been instrumental in organising, the Alliance of Socialist Democracy, applied for membership of the International. The Alliance was a public organisation, and probably only a few of its members could be considered anarchists. But its

programme was fairly widely distributed, and in fact formed one of the founding documents, together with the Statutes of the International, of the Spanish Federation of the International, which in turn formed the basis of the Spanish anarchist movement.

The Alliance was supposed to work in tandem with the International, providing a 'really revolutionary direction' to the working masses.¹⁵ The Alliance supported the positions of the more radical members of the International, including collective ownership of the land and other means of production, to be managed by the workers themselves, equality of the sexes, opposition to national rivalries and war, and the reduction of the state's functions 'to the simple administration of the public services', with the state ultimately being absorbed 'into the universal union of free Associations, both agricultural and industrial'.¹⁶

Bakunin took a more radical approach in his correspondence with potential allies across Europe, whom he hoped to recruit into a loose knit 'International Brotherhood' of socialist revolutionaries that would act as a kind of 'revolutionary general staff'. The Brotherhood would guide the insurgent people through 'the thick of popular anarchy which will constitute the very life and all the energy of the revolution', acting 'as intermediaries between the revolutionary idea and the popular instinct' for freedom and equality.¹⁷

Noteworthy here are Bakunin's conception of 'anarchy' and the role of radical minorities in the revolutionary process. Bakunin conceived of anarchy in both negative and positive forms. The destructive force of anarchy would sweep away existing institutions based on exploitation and domination. The creative force of anarchy, the now 'unrestricted manifestation of the liberated life of the people', would result in a free federation of workers and peasants organised 'from the bottom up'.¹⁸

With respect to the role of revolutionary minorities, Bakunin advocated 'dual organisation', or 'organisational dualism' (now associated with the platformist tradition in anarchist thought).¹⁹ In order to ensure that any revolutionary upheaval achieved the liberation of the people, without any new 'revolutionary' authority asserting control from above, Bakunin thought it was necessary for anarchists to organise their own groups, dedicated to the anarchist cause.

These groups of committed revolutionaries would coordinate their actions in order to incite rebellion, to encourage the workers and peasants through their own organisations and direct action to expropriate the capitalists and to abolish the state, creating a federation of industrial, agricultural and communal associations in their place, and to prevent the state from being reconstituted by any political party, from either the left or the right. Bakunin argued that the reconstitution of the state in any form would mark the end of the social revolution and the triumph of reaction. Consequently, Bakunin denounced the Blanquists and other like-minded revolutionaries who dreamt of 'a powerfully centralised revolutionary State', for this 'would inevitably result in military dictatorship and a new master', condemning the masses 'to slavery and exploitation by a new pseudo-revolutionary aristocracy'.²⁰

Thus, when Bakunin joined the International in 1868, he was already beginning to develop an anarchist conception of state power and revolutionary change wary of a 'new class' of party functionaries using popular unrest to achieve power. He was later to level this charge against Marx and his allies. But his conception of 'dual organisation' raised its own concerns regarding the role of revolutionary minorities.

Bakunin also sketched out his ideas regarding the 'revolutionary communes' that would provide the real impetus for the social revolution. At the municipal or communal level, revolutionaries would incite the people to 'destroy the State and all State institutions', replacing them with revolutionary communal (or municipal) councils composed of delegates from each barricade or neighbourhood 'with plenary but accountable and removable mandates'.²¹ The means of production would be managed by the workers' associations for the benefit of all. The revolutionary communes would federate with each other as the revolution spread, sending emissaries into the countryside to win over farmers and peasants to the revolutionary cause.

In 1869, Bakunin took a more active role in the International. In articles for various publications associated with the International, he dealt with such issues as the usefulness and limits of the cooperative movement, the role of trade unions, the general strike, patriotism, education, political action, bourgeois republicanism, the alliance between the church and state, and the organisation and role of the International itself.

From Bakunin's perspective, the bourgeoisie, even among its 'reddest' republicans, had exhausted itself as a revolutionary class. Having achieved economic ascendancy, the bourgeoisie's interests were now inalterably opposed to those of the working masses. As the experience of 1848 had demonstrated, in order to protect its wealth, the bourgeoisie was willing to sacrifice its own political liberties (and the liberties of others), abandoning its support for parliamentary democracy and submitting itself 'to military protectors' and dictators, like Napoleon III.²² Bakunin was one of the first to highlight the tendency of capitalist democracies to degenerate into fascism in order to suppress class conflict.

Bakunin's response was to advocate taking class conflict to a higher level through the associations of workers, under the umbrella of the International, which would seek the 'radical transformation of society', resulting 'in the abolition of classes from the political as well as the economic standpoint'.²³ Bakunin believed that classes could not be conceived purely as economic categories arising from capitalist social relationships. Classes also have a political component, such that one could abolish capitalism without achieving the abolition of classes.

In an address to the Swiss members of the International, Bakunin affirmed that the 'State has always been the patrimony of some privileged class: the priesthood, the nobility, the bourgeoisie, and finally, after every other class has been exhausted, the bureaucratic class'.²⁴ Bakunin was therefore opposed to government by so-called 'experts'. Instead, he advocated equal education for

all, regardless of sex, so that ‘the masses, ceasing to be flocks led and shorn by privileged priests, may take into their own hands the direction of their destinies’.²⁵ Within the International, Bakunin argued that every effort should be made to prevent it from being ‘divided into two groups—one comprising the vast majority and composed of members whose only knowledge will be a blind faith in the theoretical and practical wisdom of their commanders, and the other composed only of a few score individual directors’.²⁶

Rejecting participation in bourgeois politics, Bakunin instead argued that the associated workers should seek their emancipation through their own direct action. By forming ‘as many cooperatives for consumption, mutual credit, and production’ as they could, the workers would ‘prepare the precious seeds for the organization of the future’, accustoming the workers ‘to handling their own affairs’, without political intermediaries. The workers would continue to use strikes to improve their situation, fighting for things like shorter work days, but as strikes spread and multiplied, through the International they could be turned into ‘into a general strike’, resulting ‘in a great cataclysm which’ would force ‘society to shed its old skin’.²⁷

The International was therefore the workers’ greatest weapon, organising ‘*the might of the workers*’ through ‘the unification of the proletariat of the entire world across State frontiers’.²⁸ The workers’ trade union organisations would necessarily be at the forefront of the struggle to abolish capitalism and the state, creating in their place an international socialist federation based on workers’ self-management.

THE SYNDICALIST CONSENSUS

That the International and the workers’ organisations that comprised it would provide not only the means for the emancipation of the workers by the workers themselves but the basis for the society of the future was an idea championed by the Belgian section of the International prior to the 1869 Basel Congress. Cooperatives, credit unions and trade union organisations would become responsible for coordinating production and distribution between self-managed enterprises, while the workers’ mutual aid societies would provide sickness, disability and pension benefits. Federal councils of recallable delegates would coordinate the activities of the federated groups, at the local, regional, national and, ultimately, international levels.²⁹

This essentially anarcho-syndicalist programme was adopted by the delegates to the Basel Congress. One of the French delegates, Jean-Louis Pindy, argued that federal councils of the workers’ trade organisations, together with federations of towns or communes, would supplant existing governments, replacing ‘wage slavery ... by the free federation of free producers’. The workers’ current organisations, such as trade unions and mutual aid and resistance societies, should therefore be organised with this end in mind. A resolution to this effect was adopted by the delegates to the Congress.³⁰

Bakunin attended the Basel Congress, where he called for the abolition of the state on the ground that its primary purpose was to provide 'the sanction and guarantee of the means by which a small number of men appropriate to themselves the product of the work of all the others'. If the state were not abolished, one group of exploiters would use that power to take the place of the former exploiters.³¹ With the abolition of the state, private property would no longer have any legal sanction or protection, leaving the workers free to take over the means of production that they had created through their own labour, and to bring to fruition the federalist system of workers' self-management for which they had been striving through their own organisations, including the International.

THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNE

The Franco-Prussian War in 1870 caused Bakunin to return to his idea of the revolutionary commune as the starting point for the social revolution. Bakunin argued that the workers should seek to transform the War from an inter-imperialist conflict into a social revolution by establishing revolutionary communes throughout France, with the hope that the revolution would spread from there to the countryside and from there to other countries. He attempted to put his ideas into action in Lyon in September 1870 but was unsuccessful.³²

Reflecting on the failure of the Lyon uprising, Bakunin argued that it was essential that agricultural workers be won over to the revolutionary cause by providing them with immediate benefits, such as the abolition of debts and land rents. The last thing revolutionaries should do is to try to impose revolutionary change in the countryside 'by official decree or by force of arms'.³³

Bakunin saw peasants and landless agricultural workers as crucial for the success of a revolution. He was concerned that 'the urban and industrial workers', through their political parties, would dominate 'the rural proletariat'. At the time, the urban proletariat formed only a minority of the labouring classes. Consequently, Bakunin did not advocate a purely proletarian revolution but the revolt of the masses. For Bakunin, the *flower of the proletariat* that 'alone [was] powerful enough ... to inaugurate and bring to triumph the Social Revolution' was not the 'upper layer' of workers 'unfortunately only too deeply saturated with all the political and social prejudices and all the narrow aspirations and pretensions of the bourgeoisie'. Rather, it was 'that great mass, those millions of the uncultivated, the disinherited, the miserable, the illiterates ... that eternal "meat" (on which governments thrive), that great *rabble of the people*'.³⁴

The Spanish Internationalists generally agreed with this perspective and sought to organise both agricultural and urban workers. At the founding congress of the Spanish Regional Federation in June 1870, Farga Pellicer summed up the position of the majority of the Spanish Internationalists when he said

that they wanted ‘the end to the domination of capital, the state, and the church. Upon their ruins we will construct anarchy, and the free federation of free associations of workers’.³⁵

Many Internationalists participated in the creation of neighbourhood ‘vigilance’ committees during the Prussian siege of Paris, and then in the Paris Commune when it was proclaimed in March 1871. The vigilance committees came close to an anarchist position when, on the eve of the Commune, they called for the creation of ‘revolutionary Communes’ throughout France and the abolition of classes.³⁶ After the proclamation of the Commune, Parisian Internationalists went a step further, proclaiming the negation of the ‘principle of authority’.³⁷

Observing the events from Switzerland, Bakunin’s associate, James Guillaume, regarded the Commune as a positive form of ‘*anarchy* (in the proper sense of the word)’ because there was no longer a ‘centralised state’. Instead, the Communards had called for a free federation of autonomous communes.³⁸

The bloody suppression of the Commune by French military forces at the end of May 1871 decimated the ranks of the French Internationalists, with Varlin, among others, summarily executed. This led some Internationalists to reject a pacifist approach, and any compromise with the bourgeois republicans, as many Internationalists continued moving towards a revolutionary anarchist position.

Bakunin gave expression to their views, criticising the Jacobin and Blanquist majority in the Commune for putting all their efforts into creating a ‘revolutionary government’ when what was required for the revolution to be successful was to give ‘back their complete freedom to the masses, groups, communes, associations, individuals even’, which would then be able to create federalist socialism through their own initiative, from ‘the bottom upwards’.³⁹

THE SPLIT IN THE INTERNATIONAL

Whether the workers themselves should make the ‘social revolution’ by means of various forms of direct action, or whether they should form political parties with the aim of achieving state power, was an issue that came to a head in September 1871, when Marx pushed through a resolution at the London Conference of the International calling for the creation of working-class political parties. In addition, ‘sects’ and ‘separatist bodies’ were banned, the General Council of the International was given the power ‘to refuse the admittance of any new group or section’, and any proposal for the Council to be composed of delegates from the national federations was rejected.⁴⁰

In Switzerland, the newly created Jura Federation adopted articles of association in marked contrast to the General Council’s approach. The Jura Federation would have a ‘Federal Commission’, rather than a General Council, that would be ‘invested with no authority’, acting merely as ‘an information,

correspondence and statistical bureau'. Each section of the Federation would 'retain their absolute autonomy', with 'every latitude' to 'enter into local or special federations with one another', without having to seek the Commission's approval.⁴¹ Federation congresses would be attended by recallable delegates subject to imperative mandates. This became a model for other sections and federations of the International that supported federalist, or anti-authoritarian, socialism, and later for the anti-authoritarian wing of the International itself and the anarchist movements that emerged from it.

The Jura Federation issued the *Sonvillier Circular*, denouncing the General Council for introducing at the London Conference 'the authority principle into the International', and for making 'the conquest of political power by the working class' a mandatory policy. The *Circular* called for the 'free federation of autonomous groups', rejecting 'centralisation and dictatorship' because it is impossible for 'an egalitarian and free society to emerge from an authoritarian organization'. Echoing the positions advocated by Bakunin and the Belgian Internationalists adopted at the Basel Congress, the *Circular* argued that 'the society of the future should be nothing other than the universalization of the organization with which the International will have endowed itself'. Therefore, the International, 'as the embryo of the human society of the future, is required in the here and now to faithfully mirror our principles of freedom and federation and shun any principle leaning towards authority and dictatorship'.⁴²

The *Sonvillier Circular* reflected the views of not only the Jura Federation, Bakunin and the Belgian Federation but the Italian sections of the International, many of the surviving French Internationalists and the largest Internationalist group, the Spanish Federation. When Marx engineered the expulsion of Bakunin and Guillaume from the International at the 1872 Hague Congress, a majority of the International's member groups repudiated the Marxist dominated Congress and the General Council, reconstituting the International along anti-authoritarian lines.

Guillaume attended the Hague Congress, where he was given limited opportunity to defend the approach of the Jura Federation. He said that within the International 'two great ideas run side by side ... that of centralization of power in the hands of a few, and that of the free federation of those whom the homogeneity of the economic conditions in each country has united behind the idea of common interests in all countries'.⁴³

Guillaume clarified that when the anti-authoritarians advocated 'abstentionism', which he described as 'an ill-chosen phrase of Proudhon's', what they meant was rejection of participation in parliamentary elections, not the rejection of political struggle by other means. For the anti-authoritarians, the political struggle was to be conducted outside of parliaments, by means of 'social revolution' and 'the destruction of bourgeois politics, of the state'. In contrast, the Marxist policy of creating political parties with the object of conquering political power would result, at most, in state socialism, but not the emancipation of the proletariat.⁴⁴

Guillaume agreed with Bakunin that Marx's conception of proletarian political power was a 'sham'. As Bakunin put it, the urban proletariat, consisting of 'tens or hundreds of thousands of men', would never be able 'to wield [political] power effectively'. Instead, power would be wielded over them by 'a group of men elected to represent and govern them', leaving the workers the 'slaves, puppets and victims of a new group of ambitious men'.⁴⁵

THE ANTI-AUTHORITARIAN INTERNATIONAL

In response to the Hague Congress, International delegates from Spain, France, Italy and Switzerland held a congress in St. Imier in Switzerland. They adopted an explicitly federalist structure for the reconstituted International, declaring that 'nobody has the right to deprive autonomous federations and sections of their incontrovertible right to decide for themselves and to follow whatever line of political conduct they deem best'. But they made clear that their ultimate goal was an anarchist one: 'the establishment of an absolutely free economic organization and federation, founded upon the labour and equality of all and absolutely independent of all political government'. Consequently, they argued that 'the destruction of all political power is the first duty of the proletariat'.⁴⁶

At this time, the focus was on maintaining the International as a functioning federation of regional and national groups whose goal remained the 'emancipation of the workers by the workers themselves'. Consequently, the anti-authoritarian International continued to support strikes 'as a product of the antagonism between labour and capital, the necessary consequence of which is to make workers more and more alive to the gulf that exists between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat', while preparing the workers 'for the great and final revolutionary contest which, destroying all privilege and class difference, will bestow upon the worker a right to the enjoyment of the gross product of his labours'.⁴⁷

After the St. Imier Congress, the anti-authoritarian International received additional support from the Belgian Federation, English-speaking sections of the International in the United States, most of the surviving French sections, the recently constituted Slav section based in Zurich, a majority of the Dutch sections and even some of the English sections.⁴⁸ Only some of these groups that affirmed their affiliation with the anti-authoritarian International could be considered anarchist in orientation, but the two largest federations, the Spanish and the Italian, many of the surviving French sections, the Jura Federation, the Slav section and a significant number of the Belgian Internationalists followed an anarchist approach, rejecting participation in parliamentary politics and advocating that the workers achieve their emancipation through their own organisations, creating the 'free federation of the free producers', a positive form of anarchy.

Respect for the autonomy of the anti-authoritarian International's sections and federations was a founding principle of the organisation. But on other issues, even the more anarchist-oriented groups in the anti-authoritarian

International had different ideas regarding the approaches they should take. One of the ongoing debates in the anti-authoritarian International was whether to maintain an anarcho-syndicalist approach, with the International helping to coordinate and to support the actions of the various workers' organisations, with a view to mounting a general strike by which the workers would seize control of the means of production and abolish the state. The Belgian Internationalists regarded the general strike 'as *the* means to the social Revolution'.⁴⁹

Many of the Spanish Internationalists shared this view, but some were also in favour of a more insurrectionary approach. In practice, the two often went hand in hand. In 1873, in the Spanish town of Alcoy, a general strike turned into a communal uprising when the local mayor ordered guards to fire on protesting workers.⁵⁰ The workers took up arms in response and seized the town hall. Although the insurrection was soon put down, in another Spanish town, Sanlúcar, the local council of the Spanish Federation took control and was able to resist government troops for about a month.⁵¹

At the next congress of the anti-authoritarian International in Geneva in September 1873, there was a lengthy debate on the merits of the general strike. The delegates from the more anarchist-oriented federations continued to support the general strike to one degree or another while disagreeing on the efficacy of more limited strike activity. Guillaume, echoing the views that Bakunin had put forward in 1869, argued that more limited strike activity nevertheless constituted 'an effective weapon during the prerevolutionary stages of the struggle', giving the workers practical experience in the class struggle.⁵²

With respect to the internal organisation of the International, the delegates debated whether it should have any central coordinating body. Some of the delegates feared that a central agency would be transformed into a governing body, much like had happened with the General Council (those anarchists who rejected any formal structures later came to be known as 'anti-organisationalists'). The delegates ultimately adopted the 'Jura model', with a 'federal bureau' being established only for the purpose of 'collecting statistics and maintaining international correspondence'. As a further safeguard against the federal bureau usurping power, it was to be 'shifted each year to the country where the next International Congress would be held'.⁵³ In addition, resolutions adopted at International congresses would only be binding on those federations and sections that chose to adopt them.

At the Brussels Congress in 1874, some of the Belgian Internationalists started to move away from an anarcho-syndicalist position. De Paepe argued that a 'non-authoritarian' government would be necessary to establish and maintain public services.⁵⁴ Reversing his earlier syndicalist position, he even went so far as to suggest that 'the reconstitution of society upon the foundation of the industrial group' would only be possible after 'the proletariat of the large towns' established 'a collective dictatorship over the rest of the population, and this for a sufficiently long period to sweep away whatever obstacles there may be to the emancipation of the working class', a view virtually indistinguishable from that of the Marxists.⁵⁵

However, another Belgian delegate, Laurent Verrycken, rejected De Paepe's position, arguing that public services would be organised by a 'free federation of communes', with day-to-day operations being run by the workers.⁵⁶ The Spanish delegates opposed 'any reorganization of public services that would lead to the reconstitution of the state'.⁵⁷ One of the Jura delegates, Adhemar Schwitzguébel, argued that the workers, having 'banded together freely for revolutionary action', would continue to rely on 'such free association when it comes to the organization' of public services.⁵⁸

The next area of debate that emerged among the anti-authoritarian Internationalists was with regard to the kind of economic relations that would be established in a post-revolutionary society. Guillaume helped spur the debate by suggesting that, after the revolution, when 'production comes to outstrip consumption', it would 'no longer be necessary to stingily dole out each workers' share of goods'. Instead, each person would 'draw what he needs from the abundant social reserve of commodities', realising the communist principle of 'from each according to ability, to each according to need'.⁵⁹

In the first months of 1876, French members of the International in Switzerland, including François Dumartheray and Elisée Reclus, began promoting 'anarchist communism'. By the fall of 1876, the Italian Federation had also adopted an anarchist communist position—capitalism and the state would be abolished, social and economic life would be organised on the basis of freely federated voluntary associations, and goods and services would be made freely available to those who needed them.⁶⁰

Another idea that began to gain currency among the anarchists in the International was the concept of 'propaganda by the deed'. As early as 1873, exiled French Internationalists in Spain were describing 'revolutionary action' as the most advanced form of 'revolutionary propaganda'. Even when unsuccessful, revolutionary uprisings like the Paris Commune and Sanlúcar were more effective in spreading revolutionary ideas than the spoken or written word.⁶¹

Paul Brousse, one of the early advocates of anarchist communism in the anti-authoritarian International, came to conceive of propaganda of the deed as exemplary forms of direct action designed to provoke and to inspire the masses to revolutionary action. In 1877 he helped organise a demonstration in Bern, Switzerland, that included carrying the banned red flag of socialism. The police seized one of the flags, street fighting ensued, and some of the demonstrators were arrested, showing to the Swiss workers that, as Brousse put it, 'they do not, as they thought they did, enjoy freedom'.⁶²

A few months later, the Italian Internationalists 'went one better' than the Bern demonstrators, Brousse wrote, by attempting to provoke a peasant uprising in Benevento, Italy. According to Brousse, they 'did not bother to demonstrate just one self-evident fact to the people', as had the Bern demonstrators; instead, 'by burning the archives' in two villages, 'they showed the people how much respect they should have for property'. By returning to the villagers their taxes and 'the weapons that had been confiscated from them' by the authori-

ties, they had 'showed the people the sort of contempt they should have for government'. Even though the Benevento uprising was easily put down by Italian government troops, the 'idea' had 'sprung to life', and would now 'march, in flesh and blood, at the head of the people'.⁶³

The anarchists in the International continued to debate the merits of anarchist communism at the 1877 Verviers Congress in Belgium, which was the last international congress of the anti-authoritarians. Guillaume argued that each group must be free to determine its own solutions.⁶⁴ This position became known, particularly in Spain, as 'anarchism without adjectives', in order to avoid conflict between the advocates of anarchist communism and the majority of the Spanish anarchists, who advocated distribution based on one's labour ('collectivism').

Although the Jura Federation suffered a serious decline in members, due to blacklisting by employers, precarious employment and Guillaume's departure for France, from 1878 to 1880 the Federation remained at the centre of the debates that defined modern anarchism as a revolutionary socialist movement.

By 1878, the remaining anti-authoritarian Internationalists were explicitly identifying themselves as anarchists. As Elisée Reclus argued, since anarchy was their goal, and both their friends and enemies called them anarchists, they might as well embrace the label. In openly identifying themselves as anarchists, they would 'have the advantage of deceiving no one, and especially of not deceiving ourselves'.⁶⁵

The debate regarding anarchist communism continued at the Jura Federation's 1878 congress in Fribourg, but differences were beginning to emerge even among those in favour of it. Brousse now argued that communism was a long-term goal, not something that could be immediately achieved. He still saw the Commune as the primary means for transforming society, but suggested that anarchists participate in communal elections as a form of 'propaganda'. This position was rejected by most of the delegates, with the Russian exile, Peter Kropotkin, arguing that anarchists must reject 'any tactic which could lead to the strengthening of the already tottering idea of the state'.⁶⁶

Most of the Belgian Internationalists had by then opted for the path of parliamentary socialism, as had some of the Italian Internationalists. The Spanish Federation remained committed to an anarchist approach, as did many of the French, most of the Italians, and a minority of the Belgian Internationalists. Kropotkin summed up their position in a paper that he presented at the Jura Federation's 1879 congress. The means of production were to be taken over by the urban and agricultural workers themselves. The role of the anarchists was to 'awaken the spirit of independence and revolt' among the workers by escalating 'the economic struggle' and by spreading anarchist propaganda. The ultimate goal remained the creation of revolutionary communes, 'independent of the State, abolishing the representative system from within [their] ranks and effecting expropriation of raw materials, instruments of labor and capital for the benefit of the community'.⁶⁷

The last major event of the anti-authoritarian International was the Jura Federation's October 1880 congress. It was here that the Italian Internationalist, Carlo Cafiero, persuaded the delegates to endorse anarchist communism. An attempt to revive the International the following year, at the London congress of 'social revolutionaries', was unsuccessful.⁶⁸

The anarchists were subject to harassment and persecution by the authorities, forcing many of them underground. This led to debates regarding how best to respond to state repression. Cafiero, among others, became disillusioned with public organisations like the International, which made the anarchists easy targets for the police. Cafiero argued that anarchists should follow the example of the Russian revolutionaries of forming secret revolutionary cells that would use any means necessary to overthrow capitalism and the state, whether 'by word, by writing, by dagger, by gun, by dynamite, sometimes even by the ballot when it is a case of voting for an ineligible candidate'. This doctrine later came to be identified as anarchist 'illegalism'.⁶⁹ His comrade, Errico Malatesta, argued to the contrary that it was important that anarchists maintain a public presence, supporting the workers in their daily struggles, in order to avoid isolation and to garner public support.

THE INTERNATIONAL AND MODERN ANARCHISM

While the anarchists regarded the International as the 'embryo' of the future libertarian socialist society, a goal it failed to achieve, the anti-authoritarian International carried within itself in embryonic form virtually every anarchist tendency that was to follow, from anarcho-syndicalism, to anarchist communism, insurrectionary anarchism, anti-organisationalism, illegalism, platformism and communalism. Unfortunately, as Malatesta later remarked, this rapid ideological evolution was not 'reflective of any actual and simultaneous evolution in the vast majority' of the International's members.⁷⁰ The danger was that instead of striding ahead with the people, the anarchists were striding ahead alone under 'the illusion that the masses understood and [were] following them'.⁷¹ Nevertheless, as Kropotkin observed, it was as a result of this rapid ideological evolution within the International that 'developed now what may be described as *modern anarchism*,' which began to spread across the globe.⁷²

NOTES

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The Spectre of the Commune and French Anarchism in the 1890s

John Merriman

The Paris Commune of 1871 and particularly the bloody repression of it during Bloody Week, May 21–28, hung over French anarchists throughout the following decades. For this short account of the influence of the Commune on French anarchists in the late nineteenth century, I am more interested in the reality of the mobilisation of militants during the 1890s than in anarchist theory, which has been frequently considered. Joël Delhom considers the case of Michael Bakunin, who was somewhat involved in events in Lyon—five years before his death—and that of Peter Kropotkin. Bakunin, along with Élisée Reclus, insisted that the Commune was the first insurrection that was really of the proletariat. Even if the reality of the Commune was more complicated than that, ordinary people held onto political power in Paris for sixty-six days.¹

However, Bakunin, as others such as Louise Michel—who fought for the Commune—and Kropotkin also sharply criticised the Communards for having left in place capital, property, and particularly the monetary reserves of the Bank of France. Louise Michel would become an anarchist, certainly because of what she saw during Bloody Week—state terror up close. She was also transformed by her life in New Caledonia, to which she was condemned after the Commune, and by her insistence on the importance of helping the poor, and her firm belief in their capacity for insurrection, as had been the case in Paris in 1871. In London, Michel joined the anarchist community of exiles centred on

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J. Merriman (✉)
Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA

the Autonomy Club, Fitzroy Square, and Charlotte Street. She always dressed in black in honour of the Communards massacred by the forces of Adolphe Thiers and the provisional government in 1871.²

The Commune remained a constant source of inspiration and at the same time offered a practical guide for action for the anarchist movement. The crushing victory of the Versaillais and the accompanying massacres—even if the number of victims still remains debated—remained present in the collective memory of the left and particularly anarchists. Again, Bloody Week brought state terrorism into the light. Thus anarchist organisations eagerly celebrated the anniversary of the Commune. Delhom reminds us that Kropotkin insisted that the bloody repression increased the gap that already existed between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Anarchists got it right when they insisted that state centralisation (which has for centuries characterised France, since the time of royal absolutism in the seventeenth century) and the power of capitalism were the two dynamic forces that transformed nineteenth-century France (as Charles Tilly insisted in his work, and I am in complete agreement). The power of the state protected capitalism, with its armies and organised religion propping up the edifice.³

In the Panthéon of the Left, the victims of the murderous state repression were saluted as ‘martyrs’ and in a certain sense as immortal. Anarchists who left bombs here and there and who were executed were also considered martyrs. This is certainly the case of Auguste Vaillant, who tossed a tiny bomb into the Chamber of Deputies to call attention to the plight of the poor. His attack caused no serious injuries, yet he became the first person executed in the century. Ravachol, who had killed, was saluted following his demise as a martyr, executed, like Jesus Christ, at age thirty-three. His proud face was framed by a guillotine in a famous and widely diffused image. Like the Communards, Ravachol, Vaillant, Émile Henry, and Sante Geronimo Caserio (who assassinated French president Sadi Carnot in Lyon in 1894) acquired a type of revolutionary immortality by virtue of being perceived of having been victims of the state. They would be avenged, many anarchists believed. Their sacrifice had brought ‘La Belle’ even closer (although such a view certainly ebbed after the turn of the century). As the Commune itself, the repression that struck anarchists (e.g., the ‘Scoundrel Laws’ which the Chamber of Deputies passed in 1893 following Vaillant’s attack) also demonstrated the power of the modern centralised state, the very image of the Third Republic despite the absence of strong executive authority (for fear of ‘Caesarism’ identified with Napoleon I and Napoleon III). Bakunin put it this way: ‘I am a partisan of the Paris Commune because it was an audacious and clear negation of the state itself’.⁴

The mobilisation of former Communards and of anarchists during the 1890s also reveals continuities in space. Above all, the Paris Commune was the work of the *quartiers populaires* of northern and northeastern Paris that had been annexed to Paris only in 1860, above all the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth arrondissements. As I have argued elsewhere, the sense of not belonging to the centre could increase the social and political solidarity of

those living on the margins of urban life on Parisian periphery.⁵ These neighbourhoods, too, along with the twelfth and thirteenth arrondissements, resisted the Versaillais onslaught, fighting from behind barricades and defending the narrow streets of their neighbourhoods, on which they had fallen back. These same *quartiers* also played a decisive role in the development of anarchist groups in the last decade of the century. Anarchists privileged organisation by neighbourhood and even by street. One finds the same continuity in the organisation of public meetings, just as was the case in the very important organisation of public meetings in Paris—above all on the periphery—that followed the Law of June 6, 1868, which permitted public meetings.⁶

Anarchists insisted on the importance of a revolution by ordinary people, one that would be spontaneous. They had no confidence in any kind of Marxist organisation that privileged the role of a revolutionary elite as leaders of such a movement. Indeed as a result of this, Jean Grave, writing in *La Révolte* on March 17, 1888, explained that during the Commune the people had placed too much confidence in their ‘leaders’. The people had not followed its natural instincts to rise up without awaiting a *mot d’ordre*. Moreover, the very existence of a Communard government contradicted the faith of anarchists in localised action and the action of popularly constituted committees, such as the ‘vigilance committees’ that had been organised by arrondissement in Paris in 1871.

In this way, the Commune remained an omnipresent reference for anarchist militants during the 1890s. We can see this, for example, in the life—a very short one, as it turned out—of Émile Henry, about whom I have written elsewhere. The significance of Henry’s attack in February 1894 comes from the fact that his ‘beau geste’ was—along with the attack in the Liceo Theater in Barcelona in 1893—arguably the first attack which took as its target ‘innocents’—ordinary people—and not representatives of the state. When he threw a bomb into the Café Terminus near the Gare Saint-Lazare in Paris, Henry took bourgeois as his target (in this case, *petits bourgeois*). For his part, Léon-Jules Léauthier had written to Sébastien Faure that rather than die of hunger or killing himself, he was going to kill a rich man: ‘I will not be killing an innocent person in attacking the first bourgeois who comes by’.⁷ He plunged a knife into the throat of the Serb ambassador to France, who was dining in a restaurant.

At the risk of repeating myself, I want to insist on the significance of the Commune in the evolution of Émile Henry. He was born into political militancy, but not into terrorism. His father, Fortuné Henry, had been an important personage in the Commune. Elected as a representative of the tenth arrondissement, Fortuné was one of the men who signed the order leading to the taking of hostages to be taken from the clergy, army, magistrature, or the ‘bourgeoisie’. The order warned that executions could follow for each Parisian civilian killed or wounded by the assailant’s ‘projectiles’.

While the troops of Versailles were shooting Parisians, Fortuné managed to escape, disguised as a painter. He went to Zaragoza, and then to Barcelona, where his wife had already found refuge. The government in May 1873

condemned him to death in absentia for ‘insurrection’.⁸ Fortuné first found work in a copper mine and then in a coal mine. Émile, the second son, was born in Barcelona in 1872, followed by a younger brother, Jules, born in 1879. Fortuné Henry was accused of having participated in the Catalan anarchist movement. After the amnesty for the Communards, the Henry family returned to France, setting up in Brévannes, twelve miles southeast of Paris, where Fortuné wife owned a small property. However, Fortuné Henry had returned from Spain with mercury poisoning. He died in 1882 when Émile was ten years of age. Émile became a ‘pupil of the city of Paris’, receiving a scholarship. He took the examination to enter one of the *écoles supérieures* in Paris. He could be admitted to the prestigious École Polytechnique after a year of preparation in 1888–1889. But after having passed the written exam, Émile failed the oral examination.

When he was nineteen, Émile briefly became interested in spiritism, trying to contact the spirit of his father. Given his strong attachment to the memory of his father, the Communard, we can understand this. But he soon abandoned spiritism, which he believed lacked the precision of the sciences he had discovered.⁹ At the same time, a profound feeling of injustice obsessed the extremely sensible young man. Every hour of every day, the bourgeois state demonstrated contempt and, more than this, treated ordinary people badly, including the poor and the weak, as the Versaillais had mistreated and even executed the poor. The contrast between rich and poor in Paris was truly striking. Towards the end of 1891 or, at the latest, the beginning of 1892, Émile Henry became an anarchist.¹⁰ For the moment he did nothing, but Henry clearly was overwhelmed by the electric atmosphere in fin-de-siècle Paris. The misery of the people was becoming even more accentuated. Henry had read Proudhon and Bakunin and remained obsessed with the Paris Commune. When his younger brother Jules received a school prize in 1892 for his work, he shouted, ‘Long live the Commune!’¹¹

In the late 1870s and at the beginning of the 1880s, anarchist groups began to form in Paris. In 1893, the police counted 2400 anarchists in France, of whom 852 were considered dangerous. Many of these anarchists were ordinary workers, such a metallurgical workers, masons, and printers.¹² In Paris, these groups tended to be found in specific quarters, and were influenced by the anarchist idea that the revolution would ultimately emerge from neighbourhood insurrections. They set up shop street by street. Here, again, the influence of the Commune can be clearly seen.

Anarchists had little problem in finding recruits in northeastern Paris. Here again we find continuities in space with the Commune—thus Montmartre and Belleville. Strong local identities had been formed with the Commune’s presence in neighbourhood collective memory, one very sensitive to the their overwhelming rejection by the fancy neighbourhoods of central and western Paris, many of whose residents detested and feared the poor of the periphery, they, too, remembering the Commune which they associated with the uppity men and women of the arrondissements that had been annexed in 1860.¹³ Belleville

had suffered disproportionately the violent repression that accompanied and followed the destruction of the Commune. For their part, the police also had a memory of the events of spring, 1871, in Belleville. As with Parisian elites, the identification of Belleville with the 'dangerous classes' sealed the reputation of Belleville as the scene of endemic crime.¹⁴

Anarchist groups often took the names of militants they wanted to celebrate. Thus among the anarchist groups in Belleville and the twentieth arrondissement during the late 1890s was 'The Avengers of Ravachol'. The Commune continued to influence anarchist propaganda. Émile Pouget's *Le Père Duchesne* was inspired by the newspaper of the same name during the Commune. Anarchists added new words to the song written in 1866 by Jean-Baptiste Clément, which was henceforth closely associated with the memory of the Commune. In the new version, Clément dedicated in 1871 'Au temps des cerises' to an *une ambulancière* named Louise. Clément is buried near the Wall of the Fédérés in Père Lachaise Cemetery, where much of the last fighting during Bloody Week took place among the tombs.¹⁵

During the Commune, Masses still went on in many of the churches of Paris, although some of the latter had been closed. Thus Masses continued in some churches despite the vigorous anti-clericalism of many Communards. Many of the clubs during that heady spring of 1871 met in churches, which provided the largest spaces in which meetings could be held. More than twenty years later, anarchist meetings were certainly not held in religious establishments. Rather, halls and café back rooms were rented to bring militants together to discuss abstention in elections, organising propaganda to encourage conscripts to avoid military service, and to plan gatherings to commemorate the anniversary of the Commune.

Anarchist newspapers provided a centre for the anarchist cause, while underlining the international nature of anarchism in a time of rapidly expanding travel for political refugees (above all, to London). At the same time, anarchist newspapers reinforced the informal anarchist network, announcing events, while keeping anarchists informed of debates about theory and tactics.¹⁶ Here, too, the memory of the Commune remained quite present. *Père Peinard* could be purchased for a few cents (*cing ronds*). Eight pages in length, 8000 copies, or even more were turned out. *L'almanach pour l'année 107 (Année 1899 du Calendrier crétin)* offered a short account of each month of the original revolutionary calendar (Brumaire, Messidor, Germinal, etc.), as had newspapers during the Commune. *Père Peinard* insisted that the Communards had missed the occasion 'burn down all the old pads where the bandits who govern us live, as all as all the edifices of brutalization: churches, prisons, ministries ... all that junk. It's easy ... a thousand bombs! ... We will again await our deliverance.'¹⁷

It was during this time that Émile became friends with the writer Charles Malato. Here was another link for the young man with the Commune. Malato's father had subsequently been sent in exile to New Caledonia. Fascinated by the experience of Louise Michel in New Caledonia, at age fourteen Malato became

an anarchist.¹⁸ When Henry met him, Malato was already obsessed with the power of the state that he saw around him: a power represented by the army and the police, so detested by the poor, those whose Parisian predecessors had been massacred during and following Bloody Week. Now, the Third Republic had replaced the Second Empire and the Versaillais provisional government as the enemy of anarchists.¹⁹

Confronted with the power and commitment to repression of the state, in the wake of the Commune, anarchists debated strategies of resistance and of revolution. In about 1876, Peter Kropotkin, Paul Brousse (a former Communard living in exile in Geneva), and Errico Malatesta began to speak of ‘propaganda of the deed’. Brousse began to organise militant anarchists ‘under the beloved flag of the Commune’.²⁰ In order to bring about revolution, acts or ‘deeds’ were required.²¹ The anarchist congress held in London in 1881 officially adopted the strategy of ‘propaganda by the deed’.²² Given the fact that European states had become increasingly centralised, there seemed no other choice. Moreover, the savage repression during and after the Commune had clearly demonstrated the power of the state, protector of capitalism, to which it was so closely tied. The result was the continued poverty of ordinary people. States were fully capable of and prepared to perpetuate further massacres.²³

In Paris, Émile Henry lived in *quartiers populaires* in the eighteenth and then the twentieth arrondissement. Here he saw up close the misery in which many if not most ordinary people lived. He also witnessed the repressive power of the state, with its sudden *rafles*—police roundups—in working-class neighbourhoods, again a continuity with the Commune. An English newspaper would later remind readers that

no anarchist could forget the savage repression [that accompanied and followed the Commune] ... Henry was the son of a man who saw thousands of workers brutalized—men, women, and children—while well-dressed Parisian men and women struck the [Communard] prisoners who were chained together with their canes and umbrellas, shouting “Kill them all!”²⁴

Only a new form of revolution could save humanity—‘propaganda by the deed’.

Other former Communards also influenced Henry, including the anarchist Elisée Reclus, who had also been condemned after the Commune. And like his father, Constant Martin, Émile’s friend, a Blanquiste and member of the International, had been forced into exile following the Commune—he had been a member of the Committee of the Twenty Arrondissements—and had returned only after the amnesty.

The tragic events of Haymarket in Chicago in 1886 also served to reinforce the Commune in the collective memory of anarchists. The image of four bodies swinging in the wind after being hanged in the United States, supposedly a progressive state, was burned into the anarchist psyche.²⁵ Following the discovery of dynamite in the late 1860s, the Commune was brought into debates on

regulating its production and transport. Did not the possibility exist that ‘cartridges of dynamite could be added to incendiary or even murderous devices and these should be banned’.²⁶

In 1892, after Ravachol had struck, Henry condemned his ‘deeds’. ‘A “real anarchist” battles the enemy, but he does not dynamite houses in which ordinary people—workers, women, children, and domestics—might be living’.²⁷ Yet he was converted quickly to Ravachol’s tactic, with the ultimate goal of bringing about the revolution. This had become even more urgent as the state reinforced its authority, in order to defend the interests of the rich while the underprivileged struggled to survive. After all, the Commune had demonstrated this truth. And so more recently had the repressive campaign undertaken by the police following Ravachol’s bombs. Police ‘descents’ into working-class neighbourhoods had become more frequent. For Henry, the revolution now required strong, violent acts, to impress ordinary people. Life in the neighbourhoods in which he lived (rue Marcadet and rue Veron in the eighteenth arrondissement) had contributed to transform his vague love for humanity into a ferocious hatred of the rich. As he put it, ‘it’s love that begets hate ... the right of insurrection ... is a right that trumps all the others’, thus ‘the real autonomy’.²⁸ Besides an extremely brief period living in a room on the boulevard Morland near Bastille, in Paris Henry lived only in the eighteenth and later the twentieth arrondissement, besides—later—a police holding cell, the prison of the Conciergerie, and then La Roquette prison.²⁹ In the eighteenth arrondissement, the Basilica of Sacré-Coeur, still under construction as a monument celebrating the destruction of the Commune, towered over him as he walked through his neighbourhoods.

Like Belleville, Montmartre remained essential in the memory of the brutal repression of the Commune. The butte also symbolised the alliance between anarchism and the artistic avant-garde. Maximilien Luce, another Commune, witnessed the repression and thirty years later painted what he remembered (e.g., *Une rue à Paris en mai 1871 ou la Commune*). The anarchist critic Paul Adam described in his memoirs the horrible memories of the events in 1871.³⁰ The symbolists, in particular, but also the impressionists and post-impressionists—a term that the anarchist Félix Fénéon was the first to use—rejected the conventions of the salons, which they judged as ‘bourgeois’. They wanted to express their individuality aesthetically in total revolt. Camille Pissarro supported the Commune and became an anarchist. *La Gazette du Baigne* in 1885 proudly placed Louise Michel on the cover. For his part, Maxime Lisbonne insisted on the link between the avant-garde and the Commune; literary anarchists frequented his bar (see the excellent study by Richard Sonn³¹) and thus the police closely watched his establishment.

The looming presence of Sacré-Cœur on the butte of Montmartre tormented anarchists, who, again, considered religion and the clergy as pillars supporting the state and capitalism, along with the army. Indeed Sacré-Cœur stood as a symbol of counter-revolutionary repression. Again, it was at Montmartre that the Commune began early in the morning on March 18. And it was there that the Versailles executed Varlin and orchestrated a particularly

bloody repression during Bloody Week. The ‘forces of order’ also have a long memory. Now in Montmartre’s cabaret ‘Le Chat Noir’ the public sang, ‘Since a temple has been standing to brutalize us, our old Montmartre has changed, because of that construction on our butte’.³² In 1891, several *compagnons* made it known during a meeting that dynamite would be distributed by the anarchist group ‘The Revenge of the Miners’ with the goal of blowing up Sacré-Coeur.³³

In Émile Zola’s *Paris* (1898), Guillaume Froment wants to undertake an attack on behalf of anarchism. He decides to make Sacré-Coeur his target. He hates the basilica and savours the scene of its destruction: ‘And suddenly, it is lightning and an earthquake which opens it up and engulfs in a torrent of smoke and flames the entire basilica, with its faithful and its believers’.³⁴

In anarchist circles in the 1890s, a passionate debate went on regarding the effectiveness of terrorist attacks. After all, one of the principal originators of the concept of ‘propaganda by the deed’ had been Kropotkin, who himself turned away from the idea, repulsed by its violence. Émile had become obsessed with Ravachol and his courage in face of the guillotine. Henry broke with Malatesta, an ‘associationalist’, to sing the praises of anarchist individualism. On November 8, 1892, Émile left his first bomb at the door of the Carmaux Mining Company, 11, avenue de l’Opéra. After having come upon the bomb, which had been placed in a package, two policemen had the very bad idea of carrying it to the nearest police station, located on the rue des Bons-Enfants.³⁵ Two minutes later, the bomb exploded when placed on a counter, killing five people. The next day, Henry took a train to Dieppe, then a boat to Newhaven in England.

Malato, who had lived in London since his judicial condemnation in France, noted that a dramatic change had suddenly come over Émile. He had been hypnotised by the bomb that had exploded at the Liceo Theater in Barcelona in 1893. He could only think about undertaking a ‘coup’ and then dying. ‘Today is the anniversary of the “dancing lesson”’, making an allusion to the murderous explosion at the police station.³⁶ When Henry left for the last time his room on Rue des Envierges in the twentieth arrondissement in February 1894, on a clear day he could easily see the Eiffel Tower, which had been constructed only four years earlier, as well as the Panthéon, where the remains of the “great men” of France could be found, the cathedral of Notre Dame, and Charles Garnier’s Opera, four symbols of the enemy that he had vowed to destroy. He then went down into the elegant eighth arrondissement and threw his bomb into the Café Terminus.

At the same time, ‘scandalous scenes’ took place at the tomb of Vaillant in the cemetery of Ivry. Demonstrators saluted the Paris Commune. The conservative newspaper *Le Siècle* demanded harsh state action: ‘Confronted by those miserable people who have declared war on society and who kill without paying any attention to the victims they are taking, repression is necessary’.³⁷ The last edition of *Libértaire* in 1896 was devoted to Émile Henry, four years after his execution, in Place de la Roquette, and to the Paris Commune.

NOTES

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Haymarket and the Rise of Syndicalism

Kenyon Zimmer

Anarchism and syndicalism are revolutionary doctrines that seek the abolition of both capitalism and state power. However, while their histories are entangled, the two ideologies and movements were never entirely synonymous. Syndicalism (sometimes known as ‘revolutionary syndicalism’ or ‘revolutionary industrial unionism’) emerged as a coherent doctrine in the 1890s and 1900s, primarily under the influence of anarchist labour activists. Its outlook and tactics were largely rooted in the federalist or ‘anti-authoritarian’ wing of the International Workingmen’s Association (the First International), as well as in the ‘Chicago Idea’ formulated by anarchists and revolutionary socialists associated with the Haymarket Affair of 1886–1887. In the first decades of the twentieth century, syndicalism became a powerful revolutionary force in many parts of the globe, often—but not always—spearheaded by anarchists.

FIRST INTERNATIONAL ROOTS

Many syndicalist ideas and tactics could already be found in early nineteenth-century workers’ movements. Both anarcho-syndicalist theorist Rudolf Rocker and historian E. P. Thompson, for example, identified ‘syndicalist tendencies’ in the English labour movement of the 1830s.¹ However, it was within the radical milieu of the First International (1864–1876), which included trade unionists, radical republicans, and socialists of all stripes, that the foundations of what would become syndicalism and anarcho-syndicalism were laid.

The International united behind the declaration, ‘the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves’. When it came to accomplishing this task, however, it was the anti-authoritarian

K. Zimmer (✉)
University of Texas, Arlington, Arlington, TX, USA
e-mail: kzimmer@uta.edu

faction, most closely associated with anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, that advocated four central elements of what later became syndicalist praxis: the independence of labour unions from political parties; the rejection of parliamentary politics in favour of working-class direct action; the tactic of the revolutionary general strike; and the notion that present-day workers' organisations would provide the structure of post-revolutionary society.²

The Belgian section of the International most forcefully promoted the general strike, as both an anti-militarist tactic to prevent war and the primary means through which to carry out the social revolution.³ Bakunin, too, proclaimed that the general strike 'can result only in a great cataclysm which forces society to shed its old skin'.⁴ After the First International split in 1872, the breakaway 'Anti-Authoritarian International' reiterated its commitment to 'the strike as a precious weapon in the struggle', which prepared workers for 'the great and final revolutionary contest'.⁵

Bakunin had also hoped that the International, as 'an earnest international organization of workers' associations from all countries', would itself become 'capable of replacing this departing political world of States and the bourgeoisie'. Its sections, he argued, therefore 'bear in themselves the living seeds of the new society which is to replace the old world. They are creating not only the ideas, but also the facts of the future itself'.⁶ This anticipated the syndicalist project of 'building the new world within the shell of the old', as a slogan of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) put it.

The Anti-Authoritarian International held its last congress in Belgium in 1877, although there was an attempt to revive it at the 1881 International Social Revolutionary Congress in London. What remained of the Marxist wing of the International, meanwhile, relocated its headquarters to New York City in 1873 and dissolved three years later. Both revolutionary currents subsequently shaped the proto-syndicalism of the Chicago Idea in the United States.

THE CHICAGO IDEA

In 1876, a number of former American sections of the Marxist International were incorporated into the new Workingmen's Party of the United States, which in 1878 became the Socialistic Labor Party (SLP). In 1881, 'social revolutionaries' who opposed the SLP's focus on electoral politics split off, and in 1883 members of this group helped form the International Working People's Association (IWPA). Many of the new organisation's members, including seven of the eight future Haymarket Martyrs, were former SLP members who transitioned to full-fledged anarchists in this period.⁷ The IWPA declared itself to be the American section of the anarchist 'Black International' founded in London in 1881—although no such international organisation actually materialised—which it in turn viewed as a direct continuation of the First International.⁸ One of the authors of the IWPA's declaration of principles, known as the 'Pittsburgh Manifesto', was French anarchist Victor Drury, who had in fact belonged to the International and was also, along with

coauthor Albert Parsons, an influential figure within the national labour union the Knights of Labor.⁹ The IWPA soon had 5000 members nationwide, and dominated Chicago's labour movement.¹⁰

The Pittsburgh Manifesto attempted to reconcile the revolutionary Marxism of the 'social revolutionaries' with the insurrectionary anarchism of German immigrant Johann Most and the labour union-oriented anarchism of anarchists like Drury and Parsons. It boldly called for 'Destruction of the existing class rule, by all means, i.e., by energetic, relentless, revolutionary, and international action', but avoided dictating what such action should look like. The document failed to mention labour unions but did call for 'Establishment of a free society based upon co-operative organization of production' and 'Free exchange of equivalent products by and between the productive organizations without commerce and profit-mongery'.¹¹ For Chicago anarchists like Parsons and German-born editor August Spies, 'productive organisations' were clearly synonymous with labour unions, and in 1884 these two men helped form the Central Labor Union (CLU), a federation of local unions that took the IWPA's anarchist platform as its own. By 1886, the CLU had twenty-four affiliates, 'including the eleven largest unions in the city', and between 28,000 and 40,000 members.¹²

Parsons' conception of revolutionary unionism synthesised Marxist economics with anarchist tactics. His posthumously published book, *Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Scientific Basis as Defined by Some of Its Apostles* (1887), contains extensive passages from Marx's *Capital* and *The Communist Manifesto*, but places these alongside works by anarchists like Peter Kropotkin and Elisée Reclus, and omits Marx's programmatic recommendations. Although Bakunin is barely mentioned, his influence is also clear, particularly in repeated references to labour unions as the 'embryonic' form of the future anarchist society.¹³ Similarly, in an 1885 editorial for his newspaper *The Alarm*, Parsons declared, 'The Trades Union [is] the embryonic group of the future "free society."' Every Trades Union is, *nolens volens*, an autonomous commune in the process of incubation. The Trades Union is a necessity of capitalist production, and will yet take its place by superseding it under the system of universal free co-operation'.¹⁴ Although quite close to syndicalism, the Chicago Idea formulated by Parsons and his comrades did not incorporate one of syndicalist ideology's essential elements: the revolutionary general strike. Instead, its model for revolutionary action was the popular armed insurrection of the Paris Commune of 1871, an event upon which the Chicago anarchists 'bestowed ... an almost holy aura'.¹⁵

Chicago's labour movement had experienced years of violent repression at the hands of police and militiamen, prompting immigrant socialists to form armed workers' militias beginning in 1875. The IWPA and CLU prioritised the arming and drilling of their members in order, as the CLU resolved, to 'be in a position of meeting our foe with his own argument, force'.¹⁶ Having seen both the Paris Commune and the Great Railroad Strike of 1877 violently crushed, the anarchists also seized upon dynamite as a great leveller that would

finally tip the balance of force in favour of the working class. They viewed armed resistance and ‘scientific warfare’ through the use of explosives as necessary compliments to labour organising and strikes and as legitimate forms of self-defence and working-class struggle. The already ongoing war against capital, they believed, would inevitably escalate into armed conflict. They therefore did not abandon the insurrectionary strain within anarchism but instead incorporated it into their proto-syndicalist programme.

The IWPA also contained an ‘Autonomist’ faction that shared Johann Most’s distrust of even radical labour unions, embracing instead the strategy of ‘propaganda by the deed’ then popular in European anarchist circles.¹⁷ Members of this group included Haymarket Martyrs George Engel, Adolph Fischer, and Louis Lingg. Although the latter two were both union members themselves, they doubted the value of strikes and boycotts. As Lingg put it during his trial, ‘the fact is, that ... at every endeavor to combine the efforts of workingmen, you have displayed the brutal violence of the police club, and this is why I have recommended rude force, to combat the ruder force of the police. ... [I]f they use cannons against us, we shall use dynamite against them’.¹⁸ In 1886, both the unionist and insurrectionary wings of Chicago’s IWPA would face the full force of police repression.

THE HAYMARKET AFFAIR

American labour organisations set 1 May 1886 as the date for a nationwide general strike unless employers granted workers the eight-hour workday. Most of Chicago’s anarchists were initially unreceptive to what they viewed as a reformist movement that merely addressed a symptom rather than the deeper problem of capitalist exploitation. Many further believed that even this modest demand was doomed to failure in the face of employers’ political power. Albert Parsons, however, had been involved in the eight-hour movement since before his turn to anarchism, and he continued to endorse it as an important, albeit insufficient, goal in 1886. Eventually most of his fellow IWPA members, often reluctantly, also threw their support behind the movement, if only because they viewed even failed labour struggles as important rehearsals for the coming revolution, and also ‘because we did not choose to stand aloof and be misunderstood by our fellow-workers’. Some of the Autonomists, meanwhile, prepared for the possibility of retaliatory violence in the event that the strike was met with force. Anarchists therefore became the unlikely leaders of the eight-hour movement in Chicago.¹⁹

On the 1 May, 30,000–40,000 Chicago workers, and hundreds of thousands nationwide, walked out on strike. Riding this wave of labour militancy, on 3 May, anarchist August Spies spoke at a rally in support of workers at the McCormick Reaper Works who had been out on strike since February. When a scuffle broke out between strikers and strikebreakers, police opened fire, killing at least three strikers. Outraged anarchists called a protest meeting for the

following day in the city's Haymarket Square, where Spies, Parsons, and Samuel Fielden all addressed the crowd. At around 10:30, as the event was winding down, police marched on the meeting and ordered it to disperse. In response, an unknown individual in the crowd—though in all likelihood someone affiliated with the IWPA—threw a homemade bomb into the police ranks. The explosion and subsequent panicked police gunfire resulted in the deaths of seven policemen and at least four workers, as well as dozens of injuries.

In the following days, Chicago police raided the meeting places and homes of local radicals and union organisers, and eventually charged eight IWPA members with murder for having allegedly conspired with the unidentified bomb thrower. After a sensationalised and deeply flawed trial, all eight defendants were found guilty; one was sentenced to fifteen years, two more had their sentences commuted to life in prison, and the remaining five—Parsons, Spies, Engel, Fielden, and Lingg—were sentenced to death by hanging. Lingg committed suicide in his cell, and the remaining four men were executed on the 11 November 1887. Spies' final words from the gallows proved prophetic: 'The time will come when our silence will be more powerful than the voices you strangle today'.²⁰ Outrage over the executions reverberated around the globe and contributed to the radicalisation of a new generation of anarchists and labour activists. Among them was William 'Big Bill' Haywood, a future founder and leader of the syndicalist IWW.²¹

The dead men's martyrdom was most directly felt through the advent of the global working-class holiday created to honour their memory: May Day. The first congress of the Second International—the self-designated socialist successor of the International Workingmen's Association—called for strikes in favour of the eight-hour workday on the 1 May 1890, to commemorate the Haymarket Martyrs, and in 1891 it officially declared May Day to be International Workers' Day. In many countries, however, it was an anarchist who pioneered May Day as a day of workers' protest—often including strikes and insurrections—and fought to prevent the Haymarket anarchists from being co-opted by social democrats.²² In addition, anarchists all over the world turned the 11 November, the date of the Haymarket executions, into their own, separate holiday in honour of the Chicago anarchists.

Ironically, although the Chicago Idea had not revived the notion of the revolutionary general strike, the Haymarket Martyrs were frequently credited with introducing the idea to European radicals. The Chicago anarchists had embraced the eight-hour strike belatedly and often reluctantly, but the mythology of May Day portrayed them as spearheading both the eight-hour movement and the general strike. In France, for example, the idea of the revolutionary general strike was first championed by anarchist carpenter Joseph Tortelier, who 'had been deeply stirred by the general strike movement in the U.S.A. in 1886–1887'. Thus, the French anarcho-syndicalist leader Émile Pouget claimed, '[from] the United States, the idea of the general strike—fertilized by the blood of anarchists hanged in Chicago, following the events of

May 1st 1886—was imported to France'.²³ In Italy, too, 'anarchists spread the celebration of May Day and associated it with the "syndicalist" general strike', while in Spain, 'with the advent of the eight-hour campaign and the celebration of May Day ... [anarchists] began reassessing the revolutionary potential of strikes'.²⁴ Regardless, the rehabilitation of this tactic from the anti-authoritarian wing of the First International bridged the gap between the Chicago Idea and revolutionary syndicalism. Albert Parsons' widow, anarchist agitator Lucy Parsons, closed the circle in 1905 when she addressed the founding conventions of the Industrial Workers of the World in Chicago and declared, 'my conception of the future method of taking possession of this Earth is that of the general strike [...] My conception of the strike of the future is not to strike and go out and starve, but to strike and remain in and take possession of the necessary property of production'.²⁵

THE RISE OF SYNDICALISM

Recognisably syndicalist ideas and organisations emerged more or less simultaneously throughout the world between the 1890s and 1910s, due to changes in global capitalist production, disillusionment with the social democracy of the Second International, mutual transnational influences, and the migration and exile of leftwing militants.²⁶ However, between 1895 and 1906, it was France's *Confédération Générale du Travail* (General Confederation of Labour, or CGT) that first explicitly articulated a revolutionary syndicalist programme containing all of the hallmarks of syndicalist doctrine: the inevitability of class struggle, working-class autonomy from political parties and the state, the self-sufficiency of labour unions as the agents of revolution and the revolutionary general strike as the means, federated workers' organisations as the organisational basis of post-revolutionary society, and the tactics of direct action—including strikes, boycotts, and sabotage (originally defined as any means through which workers reduce production while on the job)—for workers' everyday struggles to improve conditions.²⁷ These ideas resonated widely. Eric Hobsbawm, a Marxist with little sympathy for either anarchism or syndicalism, admitted that 'in 1905–1914 ... the bulk of the revolutionary left was anarcho-syndicalist, or at least much closer to the ideas and the mood of anarcho-syndicalism than to that of classical Marxism'.²⁸

Spain and Italy, both strongholds of anarchism dating back to the First International, produced sizable syndicalist movements. In the 1880s Spain had already been home to a large anarchist labour federation that closely resembled later anarcho-syndicalist organisations, but repression and internal divisions led to its demise, and a true syndicalist federation did not appear until 1910, with the formation of the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (National Confederation of Labour, or CNT). Only in 1919, however, did the CNT adopt an explicitly anarchist programme.²⁹ In Italy, it was revolutionary Marxists from the Socialist Party who first promoted syndicalism and, in 1912,

formed the syndicalist *Unione Sindacale Italiana* (Italian Syndicalist Union, or USI). Anarchists remained a minority within the USI until the First World War, when pro-war syndicalists broke away, leaving the organisation under anarchist control.³⁰

Earlier, in 1901, Spanish and Italian anarchists founded what became the *Federación Obrera Regional Argentina* (Argentine Regional Workers' Federation, or FORA), which touted an explicitly anarchist programme and was Argentina's largest union federation for three decades. Similarly, anarchist-led syndicalist unions were formed in Uruguay, Brazil, and Paraguay in 1905–1906; Bolivia in 1908 (and again in 1912 and 1926); Peru in 1912; and Chile in 1913.³¹ Anarchists had dominated the labour movements of Mexico and Cuba since the 1870s and 1880s, respectively—well before the advent of syndicalism—and founded national syndicalist federations in those countries in the 1910s and 1920s.³²

In the United States, an uneasy coalition of socialists, anarchists, and militant industrial unionists founded the IWW in 1905, influenced by both European anarcho-syndicalism and the Chicago Idea.³³ Between 1908 and 1912 both the Socialist Labor Party and Socialist Party of America severed their ties to the union, leaving it in the hands of dedicated syndicalists and anarchists. The IWW peaked at over 150,000 members in 1917, and also established branches in at least sixteen other countries between 1906 and 1925, including Australia, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Germany, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, and Uruguay.³⁴

The IWW's 'revolutionary industrial unionism' was second only to the syndicalism of the French CGT in its influence on labour movements abroad, and it provided much of the ideological basis for the Industrial Syndicalist Education League in Britain, the Irish Transport and General Workers Union, the New Zealand Federation of Labour, and South Africa's Industrial Workers of Africa and Industrial and Commercial Workers Union.³⁵ The IWW also strongly influenced the anarchist Union of Russian Workers of the United States and Canada (UORW), which had over 10,000 members at its peak in 1919. Following the February Revolution, a number of UORW leaders returned to Russia where their new Union of Anarcho-Syndicalist Propaganda gained a significant following among the factory committee movement and several unions.³⁶

At the turn of the century, anarchist migrants from southern and eastern Europe took part in the labour movement of Egypt, where, '[b]y the end of the first decade of the [twentieth] century, the anarcho-syndicalist international union had emerged as a significant industrial and indeed moral force'.³⁷ Syndicalist ideas, drawn from both the IWW and the CGT, informed the creation of anarchist-led unions in Japan in the 1910s and 1920s, culminating in the formation of a syndicalist federation in 1926.³⁸ Anarchists also founded China's 'first modern labour unions' in 1917, and the anarchist-led Federation of Shanghai Syndicates created in 1924 'held sway over forty to fifty labor organisations and roughly fifty thousand workers'.³⁹

By the end of the First World War, syndicalism had spread to every inhabited continent. In several countries syndicalist federations were, for a time, the dominant national labour bodies, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, France, Ireland, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, and Spain. More often, syndicalism was a minority current. Nevertheless, secondary syndicalist movements in countries like Australia, China, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, the United States, and Uruguay still played important roles. Although on the decline in most of Europe during the interwar years, syndicalist organisations continued to grow in Asia, Latin America, and southern Africa throughout the 1910s and 1920s, and in Bulgaria, Poland, and Spain throughout the 1930s.⁴⁰

After several false starts, in 1922 syndicalist unions from around the world formed a global federation, the International Working Men's Association (IWMA). Its founding convention included representatives from organisations from fifteen countries and with an estimated combined membership of 1.5 million workers.⁴¹ The IWMA's name was a direct invocation of First International, of which it considered itself the true successor, as the IWMA 'was not a union of political parties, like the Second and Third Internationals, but an international association of revolutionary workers'.⁴²

ANARCHISM, SYNDICALISM, AND ANARCHO-SYNDICALISM

Although anarchists were largely responsible for fashioning syndicalist doctrine, labour radicals belonging to a variety of political currents drew on and modified syndicalism as they saw fit. In some cases, such as Italy and most of the Anglophone world, it was revolutionary Marxists rather than anarchists who took the lead in launching syndicalist movements. Soon a new faction emerged in many countries: 'pure' syndicalists, who insisted that syndicalism as a theory and practice was 'sufficient in itself' and could not be subsumed within either anarchism or Marxism. Some syndicalist unions, including the CGT and IWW, explicitly declared their independence from political ideologies of all kinds, including anarchism. Nowhere was syndicalism purely anarchist nor purely Marxist—nor even purely syndicalist. It was an amalgamation of multiple tendencies which took on different configurations depending on time and place. Inevitably, these differences led to tension and conflict.

A minority of anarchists opposed any form of anarchist organisation above the small affinity group, believing that large bodies like unions are prone to hierarchy and bureaucratisation. Although they supported workers' spontaneous struggles against capital, they criticised the labour functionaries that claimed to speak on workers' behalf. Luigi Galleani, the leading propagandist of the 'antiorganisationist' wing of Italian anarchism, declared that the 'anarchist movement and the labor movement follow two parallel lines, and it has been geometrically proven that parallels never meet'.⁴³ Even many 'organisationist' anarchists who supported syndicalism, such as Emma Goldman and

Peter Kropotkin, were apprehensive about the centralised nature of some syndicalist organisations—and, therefore, those organisations' views of the future order.⁴⁴ Perhaps the most common anarchist stance was one of critical engagement: support for, and even participation in, syndicalist organisations, while continuing to pursue agitation and revolutionary activities outside of them as well. This was the stance of Errico Malatesta during his famous debate with the anarcho-syndicalist Pierre Monatte at the 1907 International Anarchist Congress in Amsterdam, where the delegates adopted resolutions that supported syndicalism, 'without forgetting that Anarchist action cannot be entirely contained within the limits of the Syndicate', and declared, 'The Anarchists consider the Syndicalist movement as a powerful means of revolution, but not as a substitute for revolution ... The Anarchists further think that the destruction of capitalist and authoritarian society can only be realized through armed insurrection and expropriation by force'.⁴⁵ The famous and controversial 'Organizational Platform' written by Nestor Makhno and other Russian exiles in Paris in 1926 similarly urged anarchists to 'be involved in revolutionary syndicalism as one of the forms of the revolutionary workers' movement' and to work to 'anarchise' the syndicalist movement while recognising that syndicalism 'is but one of the forms of the revolutionary class struggle'.⁴⁶

Differences between 'pure' syndicalists, anarcho-syndicalists, and labour-oriented anarchists like Malatesta often rested on the question of the general strike. For syndicalists, the union and the strike were the sufficient and exclusive instruments of revolution. Many anarcho-syndicalists agreed, and argued that the general strike was the exclusive means to bring about anarchism. According to CGT militant Pierre Besnard, anarcho-syndicalism 'draws its doctrine from Anarchism and its organizational format from Revolutionary Syndicalism ... [I]n the revolutionary field, the anarcho-syndicalist movement exhausts, *in the present landscape*, the means of achieving libertarian communism'. The role of independent anarchist groups, he argued, was, '*on an exclusively ideological level*, to carry out propaganda as far as possible ... Anarchism assists the anarcho-syndicalist movement, without supplanting it'.⁴⁷ Many syndicalists also portrayed the general strike as an essentially peaceful alternative to armed revolution, accomplished when workers simply 'fold their arms', as 'Big Bill' Haywood was fond of saying. Rudolf Rocker similarly wrote, 'For the workers the general strike takes the place of the barricades of the political uprising'.⁴⁸

For anarchists like Malatesta, both propositions were reversed: syndicalism represented just one important front of the anarchist struggle, and the general strike was only a first step in a process that must culminate in armed insurrection. The Italian condemned the 'Pacifist conception' of the general strike, whose advocates 'make people think they can do things without fighting, and thus actually spoil the revolutionary spirit of the people'. Instead, a general strike would inevitably be met with violence, and workers must arm themselves in response, 'and that would mean Revolution'.⁴⁹

Some anarcho-syndicalists, however, conceptualised the general strike as much as Malatesta did. The Union of Russian Workers of the United States and Canada, which appears to have been the first organisation to use the label ‘anarcho-syndicalist’, adhered to an IWW-inspired declaration of principle that called for ‘violent (or forcible) social revolution’.⁵⁰ More consequentially, the IWMA’s ‘Declaration of the Principles of Revolutionary Syndicalism’ (1923) describes the general strike as ‘the prelude to the social revolution’, and admits that ‘the decisive struggle between the capitalist present and free communist future will not occur without conflict. [Syndicalists] accordingly recognize violence as a means of defense against the violent methods of the ruling classes in the struggle for the possession of the factories and the fields by the revolutionary people’.⁵¹ Harking back to Chicago’s worker militias of the Haymarket era, the same Chinese anarchists who championed syndicalism in Shanghai also promoted the formation of a ‘people’s militia’ to help carry out and defend the revolution.⁵²

These contradictory visions informed the description of the general strike in the utopian novel *How We Shall Bring About the Revolution* (1909), written by the anarcho-syndicalists Émile Pataud and Émile Pouget of the CGT. Although the revolution they portray is a largely peaceful affair (Peter Kropotkin reproached the authors for having ‘considerably attenuated the resistance that the Social Revolution will probably meet with on its way’), it nevertheless includes the construction of barricades and formation of armed worker militias that are ‘ready for a fight’, if necessary. Eventually, the last vestiges of the ‘governmentalist’ counterrevolutionaries are wiped out by an aerial bombardment of explosives and poisonous gas, and the same weapons are successfully deployed against an invading alliance of capitalist armies.⁵³

Some anarcho-syndicalists’ embrace of armed revolution alongside, rather than in the place of, the general strike complicates the common interpretation of anarchists’ turn to syndicalism as ‘a reaction against the infantile disorder of anarchism that was terrorism’.⁵⁴ Many self-professed anarcho-syndicalists did not entirely abandon ‘propaganda by the deed’, a tactic which was originally conceptualised and practised as small-scale insurrections—not assassinations—intended to be inspiring examples of direct action that might also create the possibility of unleashing a general revolutionary uprising. This is how the doctrine was understood by Malatesta and his fellow Italian insurrectionists of the 1870s, as well as by most of the Haymarket anarchists.⁵⁵ Syndicalism simply replaced, or merged, insurrections with strikes in this formulation. Syndicalists viewed every strike, just as insurrectionists viewed every uprising and riot, as a form of ‘revolutionary gymnastics’ (a term used by the CNT) that helped to radicalise the masses and prepare them for the coming revolution. Thus, Monatte argued in 1907, ‘Every strike is a lesson in revolutionary action. A strike is also the best means of propaganda’.⁵⁶ Syndicalists further believed that any given strike could potentially spread and inaugurate the revolutionary general strike, just as insurrectionists believed that any uprising might likewise become the spark to ignite the social revolution.

The Spanish CNT most fully embraced the anarchists' insurrectionary conception of the general strike and paramilitary action within its conception of anarcho-syndicalism. In the face of fierce conflict with employers and the Spanish state, throughout the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s, the CNT engaged in an intermittent guerilla labour war that included assassinations, bombings, and armed uprisings, as well as general strikes.⁵⁷ In 1927, to ensure that the CNT remained firmly anarchist in its aims, anarchist members and supporters founded the *Federación Anarquista Ibérica* (Iberian Anarchist Federation, or FAI) to informally guide the CNT on an anarcho-syndicalist path.⁵⁸ By the early 1930s the CNT had replaced its clandestine 'action groups' with paramilitary Defence Committees that, when civil war erupted in July 1936, were instrumental in defeating the fascist-backed uprising in Barcelona and then constituted the core of the militias that waged war until the reconstitution of the Republican Army. The street fighting of 1936 was accompanied by a general strike and the expropriation of factories and farms throughout Republican-held Spain, which were operated for much of the war under workers' control by members of the CNT.⁵⁹

In practice, the CNT wedded syndicalism to anarchist tactics of insurrection and armed defence in a manner more reminiscent of Bakunin and the Chicago Idea than of the CGT. Spanish anarcho-syndicalism was at least as much anarchist as it was syndicalist, as was made clear during the civil war when the CNT and FAI came to be simply identified together as the CNT-FAI.⁶⁰ And for a brief moment, these tactics came close to realising the social revolution that both anarchism and syndicalism took as their goal.

THE DECLINE OF REVOLUTIONARY SYNDICALISM

If the CNT represented the climax of revolutionary syndicalism in action, anticlimaxes were far more common. Anarchists usually found it impossible to maintain labour organisations that were both revolutionary and popular. Anarcho-syndicalist fears that 'the political void at the heart of revolutionary syndicalism would inevitably be filled by their political opponents' was all too often well-founded.⁶¹ Almost inevitably, syndicalist movements splintered along ideological lines, usually to the detriment of anarcho-syndicalist factions, while state repression or co-optation devastated most of those organisations that remained.

In the best of circumstances, Socialist, Communist, moderate, pro-war, or 'pure' syndicalist minorities broke away from groups like the CNT and Italy's USI, increasing anarchist influence in these bodies while the dissidents formed their own organisations, many of which deviated from the doctrines of revolutionary syndicalism—including a few extreme cases in which syndicalists transitioned to fascism.⁶² More commonly, anarcho-syndicalist minorities either split off from organisations like the French CGT and the Argentine FORA once these had fallen under the control of moderates and lost their

revolutionary character, or they remained oppositional minorities within syndicalist organisations like the American IWW and Sweden's *Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation* (Central Workers' Organisation of Sweden).⁶³

The Russian Revolution produced one of the largest waves of defections, as Lenin attempted to woo revolutionary syndicalists to join the Communist International or its Red International of Labor Unions. Some organisations, including the Dutch *Nationaal Arbeids-Secretariaat* (National Labour Secretariat), the French *Confédération générale du travail unitaire* (United General Confederation of Labour), and the Argentine anarcho-syndicalist FORA V—the latter two already the results of earlier splits—broke into pro- and anti-Communist factions. Almost nowhere was a majority of syndicalists won over to communism, but many individual militants were.⁶⁴

More damaging was direct state repression and violence, which between 1917 and 1940 crushed or crippled revolutionary syndicalist organisations in Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, the United States, and elsewhere. Syndicalist unions were also co-opted or entered into alliances with national governments, always with disastrous results for their revolutionary goals. Such was the case, for example, with the Mexican anarcho-syndicalist *Casa del Obrero Mundial* (House of the World Worker), which allied with the Carranza regime and took up arms against the followers of Emiliano Zapata on its behalf; the CGT, which joined the *union sacrée* to support the French government during the First World War; the *Federacion Obrera Regional de Uruguay* (Uruguayan Regional Workers' Federation), which supported populist politician José Batlle y Ordóñez in hopes of achieving labour reforms; and the participation of the CNT-FAI in the Spanish government during the civil war, which led to the complete marginalisation of the anarchists who, in 1936, had been in virtual control of much of that country.⁶⁵

Nevertheless, anarchists and syndicalists remained influential within some Latin American unions through the 1960s and 1970s, and the diminished remnants of organisations such as the French CGT, the IWW, and the CNT still exist today.⁶⁶ May Day, too, remains an international workers' holiday, and in the United States it has been reclaimed by immigrant rights activists as an occasion to honour and defend migrant labourers. And although few mass syndicalist unions still exist, the red and black flag of anarcho-syndicalism can still be seen flying at protests—including May Day demonstrations—across the globe.

NOTES

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6. Bakunin, *The Basic Bakunin*, 110; Mikhail Bakunin, *Bakunin on Anarchism*, ed. Sam Dolgoff (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1980), 255.
7. Paul Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), chaps. 4 and 5; Saku Pinta, 'Anarchism, Marxism, and the Ideological Composition of the Chicago Idea', *Working USA* 12, no. 3 (2009), 421–450. Louis Lingg, who arrived in the United States in 1885, was the only Haymarket defendant already a committed anarchist at this time.
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12. *Ibid.*, 91–94; Nelson, *Beyond the Martyrs*, 142, 182, 228.
13. A. R. Parsons, *Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Scientific Basis as Defined by Some of Its Apostles* (Chicago: Mrs. A. R. Parsons, 1887).
14. *The Alarm*, April 4, 1885, quoted in Michael R. Johnson, 'Albert R. Parsons: An American Architect of Syndicalism', *Midwest Quarterly* 9, no. 2 (1968), 204.
15. Philip M. Katz, *From Appomattox to Montmartre: Americans and the Paris Commune* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 186. On the Chicago Idea's similarities to syndicalism, see Johnson, 'Albert R. Parsons'; Pinta, 'Anarchism'.
16. Green, *Death in the Haymarket*; Avrich, *Haymarket Tragedy*, 45–46, 160.
17. See Avrich, *Haymarket Tragedy*, chap. 11; Timothy Messer-Kruse, *The Haymarket Conspiracy: Transatlantic Anarchist Networks* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2012).
18. Parsons, *Anarchism*, 82, 84–85.
19. Parsons, *Life of Albert R. Parsons*, xxxii, 24–26. See also the differing accounts in Green, *Death in the Haymarket*; Messer-Kruse, *Haymarket Conspiracy*.
20. The best accounts of the bombing and trial remain Avrich, *Haymarket Tragedy*; and Green, *Death in the Haymarket*. For a controversial revisionist view see Messer-Kruse, *Haymarket Conspiracy*; Timothy Messer-Kruse, *The Trial of the Haymarket Anarchists: Terrorism and Justice in the Gilded Age* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). On the possible identity of the bomb thrower see Paul Avrich, 'The Bomb-Thrower: A New Candidate,' in Franklin Rosemont and David Roediger (Eds), *Haymarket Scrapbook* (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1986), 71–73.

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49. *International Anarchist Congress*, 17, 19.
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The Era of Propaganda by the Deed

Constance Bantman

INTRODUCTION¹

‘Our action has to be permanent revolt by the spoken and written word, the sword, dynamite or even sometimes the voting paper [...]. We are consistent: we use a weapon the moment we have to strike as rebels. Everything is good for us which is not legality’.² Carlo Cafiero’s statement in the Geneva-based, French-language paper *Le Révolté* in December 1880 counts among the most famous definitions of propaganda by the deed in its nineteenth-century anarchist understanding.³ It captures both the extent of the notion and the numerous misinterpretations to which it has been subjected. It also heralds the *modus operandi* of many attacks during the campaign of anarchist-inspired terrorist ‘outrages’ which swept across the Western world from the 1880s onwards, and stresses the era-defining connection of the anarchist movement with the dynamite patented by Alfred Nobel in 1867.

The very fact that this famous declaration was published following a great deal of debate and discussion over political violence and anarchist strategy in general, in a paper edited by Peter Kropotkin, a militant and theorist who objected to this specific definition and the very term propaganda by the deed,⁴ points to the complex history of the concept, which is one of misinterpretations, radicalisations, appropriations and rewritings. These processes provide the focus of this chapter. Given the extensive scholarly literature generated by propaganda by the deed,⁵ this chapter examines the concept’s history and its implementations but also its contemporary afterlives, charting recent appropriations of the notion in the context of the current terrorist wave.⁶ It traces

C. Bantman (✉)
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
e-mail: c.bantman@surrey.ac.uk

the ideological genesis of the notion of propaganda by the deed, recounts the terrorist ‘epidemic’⁷ which it partly inspired in the 1880s–1920s and highlights the contemporary legacies of the concept and its terrorist ramifications.

Within the anarchist movement, even at the peak of the terrorist phase (which, with some local variations, mostly occurred in the 1880s–1890s), propaganda by the deed was always a minority creed and pursuit. However, its influence in shaping the movement’s fortunes cannot be over-stated: it resulted in a lasting and highly detrimental equation between anarchism and terrorism, leading to the movement’s criminalisation and depoliticisation, resulting in turn in intense repression. It also had a profound impact on the societies affected by terrorism, which underwent not only the traumatic experience of mass terror⁸ but also a host of era-defining changes in policing and immigration strategies as a consequence.⁹ For a brief period in the 1890s, political violence became one of the most polarising issues within the movement, cutting across existing divisions between communist and individualist anarchists, organisationalists and anti-organisationalists, and engaging all quarters of the anarchist movement, from club discussions to the pages of periodicals and influential theoretical works.

This chapter focuses on the ideological genealogy of propaganda by the deed and its reception in the short and long term. The elaboration of propaganda by the deed as an activist strategy in the last years of the First International is charted first, as well as its links with Nihilist violence and subsequent, narrower reinterpretations, which focused on violence as the means to achieve political aims, especially after the 1881 Social Revolutionary Congress in London. The four-decade anarchist terrorist wave and its complex links with theories of propaganda by the deed are then examined, with an emphasis on the tensions between the systematic public characterisation of anarchism as a terrorist movement, and actual divisions regarding the use of political violence among anarchists. The end of the terrorist campaign and the interpretations which have been put forward to explain it are then discussed. The last section provides a critical examination of the recent and ongoing mobilisation of the period of anarchist propaganda by the deed in public and academic discourse, as a perceived historical precedent for the contemporary wave of Islamist terrorism.

PROPAGANDA BY THE DEED: GENESIS AND DEFINITIONS

The theory of propaganda by the deed initially provided ‘a philosophical justification of violence and terrorism’,¹⁰ often backed by a clear vision of how the revolution might be achieved. Far from being a proposition of blind destructive violence, as often surmised in the 1890s, propaganda by the deed was conceptualised by its early exponents as a means to an end; however, its enactment marked a gradual departure from these philosophical and strategic underpinnings.

While some landmarks in the history of the theory and practice of propaganda by the deed are agreed upon, scholars have put forward different ideological geneses. There is a near consensus regarding the fact that the prime influence for propaganda by the deed is to be found in the writings of Russian revolutionaries between 1869 and 1881, who developed a concept of systematic terrorism within revolutionary strategy. In the words of Alexander Sedlmaier, '[o]riginally coined by Sergei Nechaev and Mikhail Bakunin in 1869 and then developed by the Italian anarchists Errico Malatesta, Carlo Cafiero and Emilio Covelli, it dismissed what the two Russian revolutionaries called "pointless propaganda that keeps neither to time nor to space" in favour of concrete insurrectionary activity'.¹¹ Caroline Cahm traces the concept further back, to a statement by Neapolitan revolutionary Carlo Pisacane in 1857, in which he rejected 'the propaganda by the idea' in favour of 'cooperating with the material revolution; therefore, conspiracies, plots, attempts, etc.'.¹² The notion then reappeared in the 1870s, and in the course of the decade it materialised into agitation, insurrections and risings. Most notorious was the failed Benevento insurrection led by Malatesta and Cafiero in Southern Italy in April 1877. A month earlier, another early anarchist exponent of propaganda by the deed, Paul Brousse, had led a demonstration in Berne on the anniversary of the Commune on 18 March, carrying a red flag in a bid to raise popular consciousness.¹³ In April 1879, Tsar Alexander II escaped an assassination attempt by Alexander Soloviev, only to face another failed attack the very same year, in December, from the group Narodnaya Volya—and eventually, a successful attack by the same group in March 1881. Heads of state in Germany, Spain, Italy and other countries also faced attempts in these years.

However, in these early years, analyses centred on identifying the optimal revolutionary pedagogy, with specific reference to the relationship between the individual and the collective as well as 'ways and means'; thus, attacks might be symbolic acts of rebellion against oppression, intended as actual triggers for a large-scale revolt, or indeed constitutional change (which was the focus of the Russian attacks).¹⁴ The relation between various forms of propaganda was discussed at length: the respective importance and interplay of oral and written propaganda and, on the other hand, actions was another key focus. Was propaganda by the deed a supplement or a substitute for oral and written propaganda? Was it intended to exemplify, incite to action, and educate, as stated by Brousse in a famous article published in the August 1877 *Bulletin de la Federation Jurassienne*? Amidst these discussions, the status of violence was neither central nor clearly defined. The Italian theory of the late 1870s, the most influential among anarchists, was, as Garrison points out, 'a method of insurrection not political assassination'.¹⁵ A very broad acceptance of the term, which extended far beyond political violence, prevailed in the early 1880s, as 'any act of revolt, even when the act was not performed consciously to elicit support for the anarchist cause'.¹⁶ It was echoed in the United States in 1883 by the *Pittsburgh Manifesto* calling for the 'destruction of the existing class rule, by all means, i.e., by energetic, relentless, revolutionary and international action'.¹⁷

Propaganda by the deed was also linked with another theory of considerable longevity, relative practical indeterminacy and great contentiousness—illegalism. This concept was subsequently most closely connected with early twentieth century French individualist anarchism,¹⁸ but it was also used earlier to refer to the anarchist tolerance of a wide range of unlawful actions as a way of exacting symbolic revenge upon the capitalist order and its champions, as well as undermining it tangibly. Such actions included, for instance, petty theft (theorised in France as *la reprise individuelle*), which was conceptualised as the ‘taking back’ of possessions of which one had been robbed by the capitalist order. Other, more controversial forms of illegal activities included expropriation and robbery.¹⁹

These premises changed, and other scenarios radicalised propaganda by the deed during the 1880s. The decade, crucially, saw the transfer from theory to action, starting with the attacks of the late 1870s. Referring to these early attempts in his entry on *Attentats* for the *Encyclopedie Anarchiste* (1911) edited by Sébastien Faure, Max Nettlau described this ‘series’ of attacks as belonging to the category of ‘attacks by contagion’²⁰—a dynamic which became ever more pervasive over the next two decades. The year of Tsar Alexander II’s death, 1881, was also the year of the London Social Revolutionary congress, which is often regarded as the moment of the official adoption of propaganda by the deed by anarchists. Kropotkin’s views, and the movement’s mood, had become more radical by then, and the congress famously adopted the resolution that ‘the time has come, to shift from the period of assertion to the period of action, and to add to verbal and written propaganda ... propaganda by the deed and insurrectional action’; it promoted the benefits of ‘technical and chemical sciences’ to achieve this aim.²¹ These ideas made forays into anarchist circles and publications as the movement grew throughout the 1880s and, after further sporadic acts of violence internationally, the 1890s saw an outburst of attacks across the Western world, thus becoming, in Richard Bach Jensen’s words, the ‘decade of regicide’.²² Anarchist-inspired attacks claimed the lives of the French President Carnot (1894), Spanish Prime Minister Cánovas (1897), Austrian Empress Elisabeth of Austria (1898) and Italian King Umberto (1900). In 1901, it was the American president McKinley who died at the hand of the anarchist Leon Czolgosz. Jensen, the author of what is likely to remain the definitive account of propaganda by the deed, has established key facts concerning the actual ‘anarchist outrages’; he usefully highlights the uncertainties of the concept, starting with the considerable difficulties in identifying who among these terrorists was actually an anarchist, the role of provocateurs, as well as the anarchists’ own initial willingness to take credit for acts of propaganda by the deed. With these caveats, Jensen calculates that ‘for the period 1878–1914 (excluding Russia) more than 200 people died and over 750 were injured as a result of real or alleged anarchist attacks throughout the globe’²³—a relatively small figure given its public impact.

In addition to contextual issues such as the availability of dynamite and the logic of contagion highlighted above, the progress of propaganda by the deed stems from complex factors. David Rapoport highlights two key reasons at the origin of this wave of terror: ‘the transformation in communication and transportation patterns’ and ‘doctrine or culture’.²⁴ Examining the latter specifically, Marie Fleming sees the appeal of propaganda by the deed in the fact that ‘it appeared to point the direction of resolving the paradox of a non-authoritarian revolution’ and was also ‘a logical extension of a deep-seated belief in the importance of rebellion’.²⁵ Put very simply, terrorism seemed to promise immediate change. Thus, in her study on Russian Nihilism, Claudia Verhoeven insists on the fact that terrorism is bound up with modernity: it marks

the emergence of a new political subject. True, this is a subject who seeks, via violence, to generate fear and advance change [...] What matters especially in terms of modernity, is that by doing so, this subject desires to act in a historically meaningful manner, and does this without delay and without mediation [...] a subject that directly experiences and seeks to intervene in the historical process.²⁶

As examined below, anarchist terrorism and its reception were indeed intertwined with modernity—the economic modernity of the industrial and urban world, of new communication systems, along with the subjective experience of modernity. It was also rooted in a sense of profound economic injustice, which prompted the demand for radical change: thus, for Sedlmaier, ‘various transnational influences and a keen vision of future relations of production and consumption led to an apology for terror’, in a society where access, or denial of access, to consumption drew sharp social divisions.²⁷ Writing about Emile Henry, who engineered the 1894 Café Terminus attack in Paris, John Merriman summarises the overwhelming sense of alienation behind anarchist terrorism, even though Henry himself was a well-educated young bourgeois rather than a ‘marginal criminal’ or a ‘poor devil’ like many other perpetrators²⁸: ‘He blamed capitalism, religion, the army, and the state for the plight of the underclass, who struggled to get by as the rich lived it up. In the city of lights, Emile Henry felt dislocated, alienated, and angry. It made him a perfect recruit for anarchism’.²⁹

In addition to such recurring characteristics, another point of note is the complexity of motives and local political situations underpinning acts of propaganda by the deed but also determining their public perception and the way authorities tackled them. The example of India points to the widespread tendency to exaggerate the anarchist threat and use it to tarnish other subversive movements. Thus, European anarchism was one source of influence for terrorism in Bengal and elsewhere in colonial India; the movement drew upon ‘indigenous resistance to colonial rule, and Hindu religious imagery, as well as European anarchist, nationalist, and socialist movements’.³⁰ Indian nationalists were part of a diasporic network stretching ‘from London to Calcutta and Paris’,³¹ and were influenced by European movements of national liberation and Kropotkin’s ideas, which contributed to the evolution of militancy into

political violence in the early twentieth century, with ‘a program of targeted assassination, bombings, sabotage, and [...] social banditry to obtain weapons and funds’.³² However, the nationalists of *Swadeshi* were labelled as propagandists by the deed and, inaccurately, as ‘anarchists’—a label they fought because of its criminal and pejorative associations. Propaganda by the deed was also connected with periods of increased labour protest (most notably in Latin American contexts as well as in the United States). In Britain, there was a tendency ‘to confuse the external Fenian threat with internal social protest’,³³ and in turn, to conflate both with anarchism. In the Spanish context, James Yeoman has pointed out that acts of anarchist violence such as rural uprisings were often borrowed from other repertoires, so that while they were interpreted as anarchist gestures, this was not a fully explanatory framework.³⁴ Indeed, ‘[i]n nineteenth-century Spain labour conflict, strikes and protests were often accompanied by attacks on individuals and property and small explosions, almost as a matter of course’.³⁵ The role of provocateurs in instigating attacks, notably in Britain, has also been documented.³⁶ In other words, acts of perceived propaganda by the deed were heavily localised and, to some extent, constructed and manipulated for political purposes.

RESPONSES TO PROPAGANDA BY THE DEED: MORAL PANICS AND THE CRIMINALISATION OF ANARCHISM

Anarchist-inspired terrorist attacks were intended to be spectacular in the most literal sense; this was implicit in the very notion of propaganda by the deed, whichever definition was adopted. As summarised by Karine Salomé in her study on acts of political violence in nineteenth-century France, ‘political attacks always appeared as a sudden irruption of violence ... imply[ing] a profound disruption in the intelligibility of things and contribut[ing] to the dissolution of landmarks, to the confusion of roles and statuses, causing intense reactions mixing uncertainty and apprehension, fear and dread, stupefaction and horror’.³⁷ Neville Bolt, who has written on propaganda by the deed in a wider sense (including acts of Fenian terrorism), has identified three aspects which underpin this spectacular dimension and sees terrorism as situated ‘in a tension between: 1) an operational act of political violence; 2) a performance ritual for individuals or a political group, therefore a spectacle or even merely rite of passage; and 3) an act of communicating a message directed at a local or wider population’.³⁸

This ritualistic and spectacular dimension was remarkable in both the performance of acts of propaganda by the deed and their reception. In addition to the targeting of high-profile or highly symbolical victims, perpetrators capitalised on the shock thus created and sought to extend it further. In the 1890s, it was common for terrorists to publicise their ideological intentions through official declarations during court cases; Emile Henry’s speech or Ravachol’s statements following their arrests were translated and widely circulated in anar-

chist periodicals,³⁹ while faked ‘relics’, which had allegedly belonged to anarchist terrorists, were sold lucratively among international exiles in London.⁴⁰ The dramatic staging of attacks and the punishments they brought about played a significant part in the cult of anarchist terrorists and the martyrdom and emulation that followed. In the more complex 1887 Chicago attack, the eight anarchists who were sentenced and, for four of them, executed for having allegedly thrown a bomb during the May Day demonstration, quickly became known as the ‘Haymarket martyrs’. As Yeoman underlines, terrorism often went hand in hand with martyrdom in anarchist culture, which in turn was a central cultural and identity-defining feature.⁴¹ Gabriel also points out that ‘anarchists [...] were the first nonreligiously grounded group to develop public witnessing and martyrdom into a central means of propagandizing’, seeing this as ‘one of anarchism’s chief legacies to the culture of the radical Left’.⁴² Gabriel analyses how anarchists thus ‘turned the power of punishment to their advantage’, seizing the opportunity ‘to evangelize the masses in their political faith’.⁴³ In return, however, for the crowds terrorised by the irruption of anarchist violence, the sentencing and public execution of perpetrators provided an important form of catharsis.

While they were fervently received by anarchists, at least initially, violent acts and the rituals which accompanied them had a major impact on civilian populations. Thus, alongside the theoretical formulation of propaganda by the deed, the 1881 London congress also witnessed the creation of the so-called Black International, which was the lynchpin of the conspiratorial perception of anarchism for a long time, through the belief in a malevolent international organisation of anarchists. The era of propaganda by the deed and the moral panic associated with it can be construed as symptoms of societies faced with rapid urbanisation, modernisation and growing interconnectedness, with increasingly glaring socioeconomic inequalities.⁴⁴ The moral panic triggered by anarchism was profound and multifaceted; it fed on anxieties caused by technological modernity and the progress of the labour movement, a *fin-de-siècle* obsession with the ideas of decadence, irrationality, immorality and redemptive violence, as well as fears of racial and civilisational decline.⁴⁵ Propaganda by the deed’s connection with modernity and the moral panics it engendered, especially on a new transnational scale, are an essential aspect of the cultural history of anarchism. As pointed out by Sarah Cole, ‘dynamite violence added a potent new element to the modern imaginary’,⁴⁶ and propaganda by the deed and dynamite functioned as metaphors, not only for the perceived madness and explosive temperament of the anarchists but also for ‘unbridled political and cultural chaos’ and their refraction in some aspects of contemporary cultural and literary production.⁴⁷

Migration and the development of faster communications were crucial components in the conspiratorial imagination associated with anarchism. The rise of the yellow, sensationalist press, carried by increased popular literacy rates, fanned public fears. Learned discourses also contributed to the notion of

anarchism as a crime, in particular with Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso's 1894 study *Gli Anarchici*, which claimed to establish the anthropometric bases of the congenital criminality and innate fanaticism which Lombroso saw as inherent in anarchism. Such ideas went on to inform press, legal, political and diplomatic discourses on anarchism. Attacks generated their own lexicon too, and words like 'ravacholiser', 'dynamitard' and 'bombiste', while testifying to the French origins of propaganda by the deed, circulated internationally. A thriving print production both condemned and publicised 'the anarchist peril': the 'dynamite novel' became a genre in its own right, which occasionally presented a nuanced depiction of anarchist circles and ideology.⁴⁸ Essays on anarchism were another genre, ranging from 'scientific' writings such as Lombroso's to sociological explorations of anarchist circles and their crimes, for instance, Michael J. Schaack's *Anarchy and Anarchists: A History of the Red Terror and the Social Revolution in America and Europe* (1889) and Flor O'Squarr's *Les Coulisses de l'anarchie* (1892). This profusion of writings shows the cultural impact of anarchism, and underpinned the lasting if erroneous identification of anarchism with terrorism. It was also 'both commercially and politically motivated. The desire to boost newspaper sales often went hand in hand with the wish to discredit genuine labour movements'.⁴⁹

Among anarchists and their sympathisers, positions on anarchist violence varied widely and changed quickly, as acts of violence appeared to alienate the popular supporters anarchists had sought to win over. The common response to acts of propaganda by the deed among the anarchists was a refusal to condemn popular violence. As we have seen, Kropotkin expressed reservations at a very early stage. For his disciple Jean Grave, the claim that 'the end justifies the means' was dangerous, and ends and means should always be consistent, 'under pain of producing the exact contrary of one's expectations'.⁵⁰ Johann Most in the London- and then New York-based *Freiheit* had been a leading and inflammatory exponent of propaganda by the deed (and was famously sentenced for it in 1881), but by 1888 he 'lamented the anarchist's prevailing image as a knife-wielding bomb thrower though he had helped to create that image'.⁵¹ Instead, Most now advocated print- and oratory-based propaganda.⁵² It was the 1893 Liceo attack in Barcelona which led New York and London-based Jewish organiser Saul Yanovsky to turn his back on individual acts of violence and advocate instead libertarian socialism.⁵³ As late as 1929, while defining anarchism as 'the very reverse of violence', Alexander Berkman stated that '*under certain conditions* a man may have to resort to violence'.⁵⁴ Nonetheless, this was not a mainstream position, as propaganda by the deed was mostly—if not unanimously—rejected by anarchists from the mid-1890s onwards.

The End of the Anarchist Terrorist Wave

The 1890s represented the peak of anarchist-inspired attacks, but acts of propaganda by the deed occurred long after. In 1920, the Italian anarchist Mario Buda was the most likely suspect for the detonation of a bomb in Manhattan's Wall Street, which killed 38 people and injured many more. In Spain alone,

anarchists were responsible for an attempt on Prime Minister Antonio Maura (Barcelona, 1904), several attempts on King Alfonso XIII (Madrid, 1902; Paris 1905; Madrid 1906; Madrid 1913) and the successful assassination of Prime Minister José Canalejas (Madrid, 1912). Those responsible for these attacks briefly attracted the attention of the anarchist press, however none of them gained the notoriety of their predecessors of the 1890s, nor were they martyred.⁵⁵

Anarchist violence gradually subsided. This section surveys the explanations for both the rise and eventual decline of political violence, interrogating in particular the deployment of policing on a variety of scales as a response to terrorism.

As summarised in a recent overview of propaganda by the deed, '[b]etween its emergence in the 1870s and the beginning of the First World War, the public perception of the anarchist movement as well as the theoretical and legal frameworks used to comprehend and control it underwent a dual process of criminalization and internationalization'.⁵⁶ Indeed, the dominant and most visible approach for public authorities to tackle anarchism—and one of the key legacies of the anarchist terrorist campaign—was the development and coordination of sophisticated and increasingly uniform policing systems, on a variety of scales and with various degrees of secrecy. In the wake of Germany's 1878 Anti-Socialist Laws, many countries passed laws to contain anarchism and revolutionary movements; these took the form of controls on immigration and laws allowing the deportation of foreigners perceived as dangerous, bans on the use of explosives and laws censoring radical political groups. Anarchists found themselves under constant surveillance and subject to arbitrary arrest. As early as the 1880s, national police forces implemented increasingly uniform identification and recording methods to keep checks on anarchists, including when they crossed borders. These measures and the broader anti-anarchist legal apparatus often encountered resistance, thus making anarchists become catalysts for debates on civil liberties. In Britain, for instance, proposed restrictions on immigration and asylum which made much of the 'anarchist peril' were repeatedly defeated in the name of the defence of the country's tradition of asylum; it was only in 1905 that an 'Aliens' Act' was adopted.⁵⁷ Other countries, for instance, Germany, promoted all-out repression of anarchist ideas and their proponents, advocating, for instance, the death penalty to punish attacks on heads of state, an idea supported by Russia, Austria and the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁸

International cooperation was a key area of development. In the 1890s, there was much talk of 'anarchist registers' supposedly storing anthropometric data about anarchists, although it seems that methods of communication across national polices were still quite rudimentary, and numerous diplomatic frictions are recorded. The reliance on provocateurs and infiltrated spies resulted in tensions at various levels (including on the streets where these individuals conducted their work) and a few memorable fiascos while occasionally fulfilling the prime objective of disrupting anarchist activism.⁵⁹ International police

cooperation was in place from the 1880s; Bertillon's *portrait parlé* was used to facilitate information exchange, alongside other identification systems, for instance, across Latin America, where Bertillon's methods were hybridised.⁶⁰ Such processes were, however, controversial and not always reliable. The late 1890s saw a further effort towards international coordination and information exchange, with an international conference held in Rome in November–December 1898, and initiated by Italy in the aftermath of the assassination of Elisabeth of Austria. The final report, adopted by 20 of the 21 participating countries—Britain refused to sign—formalised existing practices and planned the creation of a central authority in each country to centralise and exchange information about anarchists.⁶¹ In practice, however, the protocol did not produce significant change, and another international meeting was convened in 1902 by the United States and Russia following the death of President McKinley. In 1904, a confidential Protocol was signed in Saint Petersburg. These two Protocols, despite their practical limitations and failure to engage key countries (Britain and the United States did not sign in 1904), were landmarks since they brought about unprecedented coordination between national police forces which, as a result of the great anarchist scare, underwent a process of modernisation, centralisation and professionalisation. Thus, for instance, a lesser role was devolved to informers in intelligence gathering after 1900, whereas this had been the lynchpin of the surveillance system previously.⁶² Nonetheless, even though these first steps towards cooperation have been identified as precursors of Interpol and subsequent counter-terrorism efforts, Rapoport also points out that they failed because ‘the interests of states pulled them in different directions’, and attributes the end of the anarchist terrorist wave to a ‘dampened enthusiasm for the strategy of assassination’ following the experience of the war, rather than a more profound ideological or socio-political transformation.⁶³

Alongside the transformation of national and international policing, historians have emphasised the second, possibly more effective, approach to ending terrorism, which consisted in addressing the conditions which produced terrorism, through political reform (and the attending development of parliamentary socialism), and the institutionalisation of trade unions. Thus, even as Germany was at the forefront of the repression of terrorism and socialism, Left liberals blamed the 1878 Laws and police repression for creating a German anarchist movement, and argued that a return to the rule of law and respect for the freedom of speech would eliminate anarchist terrorism.⁶⁴ A similar explanation has been given for the failure of anarchism to take root in Britain despite the strengths of exilic anarchism, especially in London, based on the argument that political liberalism and the legal trade union movement prevented the growth of a libertarian movement.⁶⁵ Sedlmaier also points to ‘the defusing potential of “well-being for all”’,⁶⁶ which saw most anarchists turn their backs on individual acts of terrorism and embrace ‘a theory of a more thorough socialisation, which included the distribution of goods’.⁶⁷ Jensen summarises:

Anarchist militancy was intimately tied up with the “social question,” the social problems, injustices and grievances of the nineteenth century working class population, both rural and urban. When a significant amelioration of the social question occurred through a combination of political and economic action and reforms, improvements in the economy, and anarchist absorption into the labor movement, [...] the problem of anarchist terrorism diminished dramatically.⁶⁸

As early as the 1880s, some anarchists started pointing out the risk of marginalisation which resulted from propaganda by the deed; in the following years, two influential alternatives gained ground within the movement internationally, as ways of bringing about revolutionary change without violence, based on the understanding that it would take more than attacks to replace the existing structures of oppression and win over the masses: anarcho-syndicalism and revolutionary syndicalism and educationalism. In terms of militant strategy, this change of direction may first appear as a rejection of anarchist violence, through processes of institutionalisation, unionisation and the commitment to act within the boundaries of legality, although it may also be argued that the endorsement of violence percolated into subsequent political practices, such as sabotage and the general strike, which carried a more militant conception of labour activism, with a clear anarchist legacy.

Propaganda by the Deed and Its Afterlives

On 23 May 2017, in response to the terrorist attack in Manchester, Britain, on the previous night, the bestselling novelist Robert Harris tweeted a photo of the final paragraph of Joseph Conrad’s 1907 novel *The Secret Agent*—itself a fictional rewriting of the 1894 Greenwich anarchist-inspired bomb plot—with the caption “Frail, insignificant, shabby, miserable...” J Conrad’s brilliant description of his fictional suicide bomber, 1907’. The message was retweeted over 400 times in the next 48 hours—a relatively inconsequential figure in view of the surge in Twitter and social media activity typically generated by terrorist events, but nonetheless a telling testimony to the enduring relevance of nineteenth-century events as a lexicon for discussing contemporary terrorism. What has been remarkable in this respect is the currency of this reference across both academic and public discourses, especially in the English-speaking world. The contemporary interest in the era of propaganda by the deed across a wide range of quarters—ranging from TV producers⁶⁹ and the press to academics and policy experts, to name a few—is highlighted in this section, with a focus on the long-running academic debate exploring the possible parallels between anarchist terrorism and the post-2001 wave of Islamist-inspired attacks. Another interesting line of investigation (which cannot be explored in-depth here) has been the study of the mobilisation of the stereotypical tropes attached to anarchists to castigate contemporary activists engaged in alterglobalisation protests and the global justice movement since 1999: thus, Aksel Corlu has

examined the ‘resurrection of an old, well-known image, with the anarchist as the irrational, wild-haired, bearded, bright-eyed bomb-carrier and immediate menace to society’ to portray contemporary anarchist activists.⁷⁰

The discussion and mobilisation of the anarchist reference in mass media and popular culture since September 2001 has been remarkable. Most recently, they have provided the source material for filmic adaptations: a BBC adaptation of Conrad’s *Secret Agent* (2016) and the French film, *Les Anarchistes* (2015), about a provocateur infiltrated in individualist illegalist circles.⁷¹ Within academia, propaganda by the deed and anarchist political violence in general have attracted less attention among scholars specialising in anarchism than among experts from other fields, who have examined the era of propaganda by the deed in the context of more general studies on terrorism.⁷² In other words, the history of anarchist political violence has not been a focal point of interest for scholars of anarchism, although propaganda by the deed and its consequences do remain a central part of most histories of anarchism, for instance, as a cause of exile and long-term disorganisation. Two notable exceptions are Richard Bach Jensen and Timothy Messer-Kruse, who has written two revisionist books on the Haymarket explosion and subsequent trial.⁷³ As a result of perceived similarities with current events, pre-First World War transnational anarchist networks have been studied as an early example of the post-2001 wave of terrorism. In the aftermath of the 2005 London attacks, the history of the city as a destination of refuge for suspected terrorists has generated a great deal of commentary, across the ideological spectrum. Research has also centred on the themes of immigration and asylum in conjunction with terrorism, with some commentators arguing that the main parallels between both terrorist episodes lie less in the perpetrators’ ideology and *modus operandi* than in the reception and instrumentalisation of these events to stigmatise foreigners and bring restrictions on civil liberties.⁷⁴ Another related argument is that anarchist-inspired terrorism was born out of poverty and social exclusion, which provides another parallel between the two waves.⁷⁵

Looking beyond the reception and impact of terrorism, is it appropriate to see any meaningful point of comparison for contemporary acts of terrorism in the anarchist precedent? This has formed the subject of a lively academic debate, which started in 2008, when James Gelvin, a specialist in Middle Eastern studies, published an article ‘situat[ing] al-Qaeda and similar jihadi movements within the category of anarchism’, which ‘challenge[d] the central pillar of the terrorology paradigm: the notion that terrorism is useful as an independent unit of analysis’.⁷⁶ Gelvin argued that anarchism and Jihadi terrorism shared a preference for ‘action over ideology’ that both relied on ‘a highly decentralized structure built upon semi-autonomous cells’ and represented an external, comprehensive treat to ‘the system’. In both cases, according to Gelvin, the terrorists sought to defend a culture perceived to be under attack. This prompted a series of replies, some of which focused on aspects not directly related to anarchism and sought other relevant analogies.⁷⁷ Others, however, scrutinised the validity of the comparison drawn by Gelvin. George Esenwein,

a specialist of Spanish anarchism, pinpointed the vague definition of anarchism put forward by Gelvin, and his failure to contextualise violence within the movement, thus overstating the comparison and downplaying the 'ideological gulf which separates anarchism from militant jihadism'.⁷⁸ Nonetheless Esenwein acknowledged three notable commonalities between anarchist and jihadist terrorists: their disproportionate impact in light of their actual numbers, the fact that they gained notoriety through sensational acts of violence and their reception as 'the harbingers of an era of chaos and uncertainty'. Richard Bach Jensen critiqued the argument from the perspective of the history of anarchist terrorism; he emphasised the anarchists' rejection of religion, which is at the core of the Jihadist project, contrasted Jihadism's 'nostalgia for an idealized past'⁷⁹ with the anarchists' willingness to embrace modernity and challenged the claim that anarchists, like contemporary terrorists, embraced violence for the sake of violence. Nonetheless, Jensen also acknowledged similarities, for instance, in 'the worldwide scope and styles of violence' characterising both movements⁸⁰—two features which do indeed tend to underpin many comparisons.

CONCLUSION

In a 2015 contribution to *The Guardian*, the columnist Jeff Sparrow mused on an explosion carried out by the anarchist Daniel Maloney just outside Melbourne in 1898, and concluded that '[w]hat we would now call the anarchist terrorism of the 1890s has been largely forgotten'.⁸¹ In the light of the present survey, this statement ought to be qualified, as anarchist propaganda by the deed has not only remained a thriving area of research but also emerged as a key historical point of comparison for the contemporary wave of terrorism, spanning a wide ideological and disciplinary spectrum. Contemporary parallels cannot but lurk in the background of any contemporary study on anarchist terrorism, if only because of the central place of propaganda by the deed in the genesis of modern terrorism. Will—and should—the anarchist moment remain such a central historical reference in contemporary discourses on terrorism?

First of all, the efficacy and relevance of the analogy must be questioned. As the current wave of terrorism has continued and claimed more lives in more places through new modes of attacks, it has also developed its own repertoire of response and become its own frame of reference, thus backgrounding the anarchist reference. Discussing the response to terrorist attacks in France, the historian Gilles Ferragu stated that 'every attack replaces the other in memory' which, despite the relevance of historical perspectives in showing the persistence of terrorist attacks in France and the cyclical nature of terrorist campaigns, suggests that the ongoing wave of attacks has now become its own frame of reference. In other words, transnational and translocal identification now prevails over historical recall as the key frame of reference.

Second, the impact of these discourses on the perception of anarchism must also be assessed. This resurrection of the history of propaganda by the deed testifies to the ongoing identification of anarchism with political violence,

especially outside specialised academic debates—a highly damaging and reductionist stereotype. Of course, anarchist political violence is an important strand within the history and theory of anarchism, far beyond the long nineteenth century. As discussed here, it also represents a pivotal moment in the history of modern states and international collaboration. Nonetheless, is also remarkable—and somewhat ironical—that the scholarly and public interest in the history of anarchist-inspired political violence has coincided with a flurry of research activity into anarchist ideas and organisation, brought on by the transnational turn, the emergence of the global justice movement and the appearance of a new generation of anarchist scholars questioning the anarchist canon. This, in contrast, highlights how limited the focus on political violence is. It is also distorted, in light of the tradition of pacifism, resistance to violence and educationalism within anarchism, which is just as much of a red thread in the history of the movement⁸²—albeit perhaps a slightly less sensationalist one.

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Ole Birk Laursen for his explanations regarding the history of nationalist terrorism in India. Potential mistakes are all mine of course.
2. Cited in Caroline Cahm, *Kropotkin and the rise of revolutionary socialism, 1872–1886* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 139–140. Translation as cited in the source. Unless otherwise stated, translations from French cited here are my own.
3. Also often referred to as ‘propaganda of the deed’; to this day, the term has remained predominantly but not exclusively associated with anarchism.
4. Cahm, *Kropotkin*, 103–104.
5. Most notably Richard Bach Jensen, *The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism: An International History 1878–1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
6. The concept of ‘waves of terrorism’ is borrowed from David C. Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves of Terrorism’ in Cronin and Ludes (Eds), *Attacking Terrorism. Elements of a Grand Strategy* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 65.
7. Jean Maitron, *Ravachol et les anarchistes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 12.
8. B. Porter, *Plots and Paranoia: A History of Political Espionage in Britain, 1790–1988* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).
9. R. B. Jensen, ‘The Secret Agent, International Policing, and Anarchist Terrorism: 1900–1914’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29 (2015), 735–771.
10. M. Fleming, ‘Propaganda by the deed’, in Yonah Alexander and Kenneth Myers (Eds), *Terrorism in Europe (RLE: Terrorism & Insurgency)* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015/1982), 10.
11. A. Sedlmaier, ‘The Consuming Visions of Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-century Anarchists: Actualising Political Violence Transnationally’, *European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire*, 14.3 (2007), 283–300. See also Arthur H. Garrison, ‘Defining terrorism: philosophy of the bomb, propaganda by deed and change through fear and violence’, *Criminal Justice Studies: A Critical Journal of Crime, Law and Society*, 17.3, 259–279, 264–265.

12. Cahm, *Kropotkin*, 76.
13. D. Stafford, *From Anarchism to Reformism. A study of the political activities of Paul Brousse within the First International and the French socialist movement 1870–1890* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 76–88.
14. See Cahm, *Kropotkin*, 123–124.
15. Garrison, ‘Defining Terrorism’, 265.
16. Fleming, ‘Propaganda’, 17.
17. Cited by Candace Falk, *Emma Goldman: A Documentary History of the American Years Made for America*, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 15.
18. E. Armand, ‘Illégalisme’ in Sébastien Faure (Ed), *L’Encyclopédie anarchiste*, vol. 1, accessed 6 August 2017, <http://www.encyclopedia-anarchiste.org/Encyclopedie%20Anarchiste.pdf>.
19. P. Di Paola, *The Knights Errant of Anarchy. London and the Italian Anarchist Diaspora (1880–1917)*, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013), 63–78.
20. M. Nettleau, ‘Attentats’, in Faure, *Encyclopédie anarchiste*.
21. Cited in Jean Maitron, *Ravachol*, 11–12.
22. Jensen, *The Battle against anarchist terrorism*, 31.
23. *Ibid.*, 36.
24. Rapoport, ‘Four Waves’, 48–49.
25. Cahm, *Kropotkin*, 12.
26. C. Verhoeven, *The Odd Man Karakozov. Imperial Russia, Modernity, and the Birth of Terrorism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 6.
27. Sedlmaier, ‘Consuming Visions’, 293.
28. J. Merriman, *The Dynamite Club* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2009), 163.
29. *Ibid.*, 4.
30. M. Silvestri, ‘The Bomb, Bhadrakok, Bhagavad Gita, and Dan Breen: Terrorism in Bengal and Its Relation to the European Experience’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21.1–27 (2009).
31. M. Ramnath, *Decolonizing Anarchism: An Antiauthoritarian History of India’s Liberation* (Oakland: AK Press, 2011), 45–47.
32. *Ibid.*, 48.
33. B. Arnett Melchiori, *Terrorism in the Late Victorian Novel* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 6.
34. J. Yeoman, *Print Culture and the Formation of the Anarchist Movement in Spain, 1890–1915* (PhD. Diss., University of Sheffield, 2016).
35. *Ibid.*, 53.
36. Di Paola, *Knights Errant*, 19; Constance Bantman, *The French Anarchists in London, 1880–1914* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013).
37. Karine Salomé, *L’Ouragan homicide, L’attentat politique en France au XIX^e siècle* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 2011), 14.
38. Neville Bolt, ‘Propaganda of the Deed and the Irish Brotherhood. From the Politics of ‘Shock and Awe’ to the ‘Imagined Political Community’’, *RUSI*, vol. 153, n. 1, 48–54, 48.
39. Maitron, *Ravachol et les anarchistes*, 42–73; Merriman, *Dynamite*, 185–188.
40. C. Malato, *Les Joyeusetés de l’exil* (Paris: Acratie, 1985/1897), 133–143.
41. Yeoman, ‘Print Culture’.
42. Elun Gabriel, ‘Performing Persecution: Witnessing and Martyrdom in the Anarchist Tradition’, *Radical History Review* 98 (2007), 34–62, 36.

43. Ibid., 55.
44. Constance Bantman, 'Terrorism and Its Policing: Anarchists and the Era of Propaganda by the Deed, 1870s–1914', in Paul Knepper and Anja Johansen (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Crime and Criminal Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 199.
45. Porter, *Plots and paranoia*; D. Ó Donghaile, *Blasted Literature. Victorian Political Fiction and the Shock of Modernism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 4–11.
46. Sarah Cole, 'Dynamite Violence and Literary Culture', *Modernism/Modernity*, XVI.2 (2009), 301–328, 301.
47. Ó Donghaile, *Blasted Literature*, 7.
48. Melchiori, *Terrorism in the Late-Victorian Novel*.
49. Ibid., 44.
50. J. Grave, 'Means and Ends' (1893), cited in Robert Graham (Ed), *Anarchism. A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas*, vol. 1 (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2005), 156–157.
51. T. Goyens, 'Johann Most and the German Anarchists', in Tom Goyens (Ed), *Radical Gotham. Anarchism in New York City from Schwab's saloon to Occupy Wall Street* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017), 21.
52. Ibid.
53. K. Zimmer, 'Saul Yanovsky and Yiddish Anarchism on the Lower East Side', in *Radical Gotham*, 37.
54. Alexander Berkman, *A. B. C. of Anarchism* (London: Freedom Press, 1977 (1929)), 3.
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Anarchism and the First World War

Matthew S. Adams

On the last day of July 1914, Jean Jaurès, co-founder and leader of the *Parti socialiste, section française de l'internationale ouvrière* (SFIO), took the short walk from the offices of his campaigning newspaper *L'Humanité* with a group of fellow journalists to the Café du Croissant for a late dinner. He had just returned from a meeting of the *Bureau Socialiste International*, the organising committee of the Second International, held in Brussels over the 29th and 30th of July, where socialists from all the major European powers, including Keir Hardie, Rosa Luxemburg, and Karl Kautsky, had met in an atmosphere of mounting international tension. Austria-Hungary had already declared war on Serbia in retaliation for the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, and Russia, keen to increase its power over Serbia at Austria's expense, had started moving a portion of its vast military manpower to the Russian-Austrian border.¹ The comradely greetings exchanged between the delegates in Brussels' Maison du Peuple stood in contrast to the antagonisms that were pushing their national governments to the brink of war, but their public statements reflected the unprecedented nature of the crisis. Issuing an 'Appeal to the British Working Class', Hardie and Arthur Henderson observed that 'for more than 100 hundred years no such danger has confronted civilisation' like the escalating conflict, and closed with an appeal to the virtues of internationalism that socialists had been trumpeting for decades:

Workers!—stand together ... for peace. Combine and conquer the militarist enemy and the self-seeking imperialists today once and for all.

Men and women of Britain, you now have an unexampled opportunity of rendering ... a magnificent service to humanity, and the world.²

M. S. Adams (✉)
Department of Politics, History and International Relations,
Loughborough University, Leicestershire, UK
e-mail: m.s.adams@lboro.ac.uk

With the German declaration of war against France now just days away, Jaurès and his anti-militarist friends were no doubt preoccupied with similar ideas as they dined at the Croissant. But they had been spotted. Raoul Villain, a young French nationalist radicalised by Charles Maurras' monarchist *Action Française*, approached the seated Jaurès, revolver in hand.³ Firing twice, Jaurès, 'the greatest man of the Third Republic', fell dead.⁴

Jaurès was not an anarchist, but his fate highlights both the febrile atmosphere in antebellum radical politics and the potential personal price at stake. Given the time spent by anarchists over the preceding decades outlining the value of international working-class solidarity as an antidote to Europe's imperialist wars, started, they judged, by adventurous politicians and cheered on by avaricious capitalists, it might be expected that the anarchist movement would emerge from the fray bruised by the inevitable domestic restrictions, but confident in its theoretical diagnoses. In 1918, however, with the European landscape bearing witness to the ferocity of the four years of fighting, and with the granite that now memorialises the conflict in the world's cities still lying in unquarried rock, the anarchist movement was in many respects a shell of its former self. It had failed to oppose consistently the war, and once the scourge of the ruling classes, it looked to have been superseded by a successful revolution in Russia in 1917 that offered new models of political organisation and mobilisation at odds with many of anarchism's core values. If the Russian example converted some to Marxism, and more broadly starved competing leftist movements of oxygen, the divisions that had characterised the anarchist movement on the outbreak of war appeared to be a deeper symptom of its senility. If anarchists could not agree on their most fundamental principles at a time of crisis, perhaps it was, as Trotsky pontificated when its ideas were tested once more in the context of the Spanish Civil War, an 'utterly anti-revolutionary doctrine'.⁵

The strain that the war placed on the anarchist movement was very real—as it was for all internationalists—but time would demonstrate its ability to survive and even thrive once more. Indeed, 1914, as a moment of crisis, presents a useful vantage point from which to view the assumptions of key protagonists in the international anarchist movement and the intellectual depth and diversity that characterised anarchism as a political tradition. Seen from one angle as a nadir betraying anarchism's fragile intellectual foundations, from another, the ink and invective pouring forth in these years also demonstrates a lively commitment to exploring the potential of the tactics favoured by anarchists, to elucidating strategies for change that reflected anarchist values, and to reassessing their political tradition in the light of rapidly shifting geopolitical realities.

For many anarchist and non-anarchist onlookers, this was a debate personified in the clash between Peter Kropotkin and Errico Malatesta, two of the tradition's most distinguished thinkers and activists. This is in many ways reductive. Varieties of their argument—over the legitimacy of supporting either side in the war and how it reflected or violated anarchist principles—were played out around the world as national anarchist movements endeavoured to

respond to the conflict in meaningful ways. Moreover, their debate itself was not simply about the legitimacy of the war itself but rested upon intellectual positions they had adumbrated over the course of their political careers, revolving around competing understandings of history, the role of national struggles, and differing conceptions of revolutionary change. Nevertheless, the Kropotkin-Malatesta spat, reconstructed contextually as a clash of competing intellectual visions rather than simply a question of personalities, does offer a useful avenue into the broader issues at stake for anarchists as the world marched to war. From this perspective, it also casts light on the multifarious ways that anarchists grappled with the crisis of the First World War, played out against a backdrop characterised by the faltering light of internationalism and the frequently ferocious governmental suppression of dissident activities.

KROPOTKIN VS. MALATESTA

The evolution of attitudes towards the First World War is captured in the shifting response to a phrase that H.G. Wells used to title a series of essays he published in 1914 to stiffen British resolve in the coming conflict, *The War That Will End War*. In this collection, he laid the blame for the war squarely at Germany's door, describing 'Prussian Imperialism' as an 'intolerable nuisance' that had plagued the earth since German unification, with the country pursuing 'nationally selfish ends' trumpeted by 'little, mean, aggressive statesmen and professors'. But, for all its mendacity, Germany had presented the world with an opportunity. 'The opportunity of Liberalism has come at last', Wells wrote; where once the 'heritage of the Crown Prince of Germany ... seemed as fixed as a constellation', its defeat would augur a 'new age' defined by a confederative Europe, collective disarmament, and thoroughgoing social reconstruction.⁶ These musings showed Wells oscillating between the roles of utopian and hard-headed patriot, but he was quickly disabused of the notion that this was a war of opportunity or that Britain was the valiant defender of liberty⁷:

This "war to end war" of mine was ... no better than a consoling fantasy, and ... the flaming actuality was simply this, that France, Great Britain and their allied Powers were, in pursuance of their established policies, interests, treaties and secret understandings ... engaged in war with the allied central powers, and ... no other war was possible. The World-State of my imaginations and desires was presented hardly more by one side in the conflict than by the other.⁸

The War That Will End War changed from a premonition of a better world, to a 'taunt', a reminder of a 'broken promise'.⁹

Both Kropotkin and Malatesta were sharing the British soil with Wells in 1914 and were similarly preoccupied with events across the Channel. Indeed, for some onlookers, Kropotkin shared more with a figure like Wells than just proximity. In October 1914, as Wells' book entered a third printing, Kropotkin published an open letter in the anarchist newspaper *Freedom*. To the surprise of

many he appeared to break with a lifetime's opposition to the nation state and expressed support for the Entente in terms that echoed Wells' anti-German sentiments:

I consider that the duty of everyone who cherishes the idea of human progress ... is ... to crush down the invasion of the Germans into Western Europe ... Since 1871 Germany has become a standing menace to European progress ... All were living under the menace of sudden invasion. More than that ... Germany was the chief support and protection of reaction.¹⁰

Trotsky, admittedly no friend of anarchism, certainly saw Kropotkin's pro-war, anti-German position as a renunciation of his previous views, later charging him with becoming an ally of Lloyd George and Poincaré in supporting the 'state principle' and repudiating his internationalism.¹¹ But if Trotsky was predisposed not to appreciate Kropotkin's position, Malatesta could not fathom it either.

Responding to Kropotkin in *Freedom*, Malatesta accused 'anarchists of forgetting their principles', and insisted that while he was no pacifist, and saw the worth of fighting 'wars that are necessary, holy wars ... wars of liberation', the current imbroglio was no such thing. Socialists appeared to forget, he continued, that there was a natural antagonism between the 'dominators and dominated' that was both international in nature and made a mockery of the 'bourgeois' concept of 'national agglomerations' such as France or Germany as 'homogeneous ethnographic units, each having its proper interests, aspiration, and mission'. Anarchists had always challenged patriotism, Malatesta added, but now, in a war that was patently the product of 'capitalist and State domination', socialists had aligned themselves 'with the Governments and bourgeoisie of their respective countries', blind to the fact that this was not, as state propaganda declared, a fight for 'general well-being ... against the common danger', but another episode in a long history of exploitation.¹² Countering Kropotkin's pro-Entente screed, he concluded with a different picture:

I have no greater confidence in the bloody Tsar, nor in the English diplomatists who oppress India, who betrayed Persia, who crushed the Boer Republics; nor in the French bourgeoisie, who massacred the natives of Morocco; nor in those of Belgium, who have allowed the Congo atrocities and ... profited by them ... The victory of Germany would certainly mean the triumph of militarism ... but the triumph of the Allies would mean ... Russo-English ... domination in Europe and in Asia.¹³

If Kropotkin was willing to support one state over another, perhaps there was little difference between him and a figure like Wells after all.

Malatesta's reading of the situation has largely been the one inherited by historians of the anarchist movement, spying in Kropotkin an apostasy that either marked a decisive break with anarchism, or the culmination of a longer process that saw him move from a revolutionary to a gradualist theory of social

change.¹⁴ On the surface it seems difficult to view Kropotkin's reading as anything but a decisive step away from his anarchist convictions. Not only did he decry, in 1885, Europe's perpetual instability in an age of imperial rivalry—arguing that war was now less the product of kingly whim than the fruit of the 'Three Powerful Ones ... Rothschild, Schneider, Anzin' thirsty for profits—but he advanced much the same argument in 1914 itself in a pamphlet for *Freedom*. 'The reason for modern war', he declared on the first page, 'is always the competition for markets and the right to exploit nations backward in industry'. This was obvious in Europe's imperialist scrambles but was a logic that promised intra-European conflict too:

In all the wars of the last quarter of a century we can trace the work of the great financial houses. The conquest of Egypt and the Transvaal, the annexation of Tripoli ... the massacres in Manchuria ... the ... looting in China during the Boxer riots ... Everywhere financiers had the casting vote. And if up till now a great European war has not burst out, it is simply because the financiers hesitate. They do not know ... which horse to back with their millions.¹⁵

Kropotkin therefore saw capitalism as fundamentally responsible for the belligerence of the contemporary world, but he indicted the state too. With a subtle gibe at Marxist economism—'those economists who continue to consider economic forces alone'—he insisted that focusing solely on economics was insufficient, and that it was also necessary to comprehend how 'groups of monopolists and privileged men' react to these economic circumstances, and through the agencies of state power protect their financial and political interests.¹⁶ This synchrony was the cause of modern war.

With Kropotkin presenting arguments like this right up until war actually broke out, Malatesta was confident in accusing him of recanting the political theory he had so patiently elaborated. Across the Atlantic, Alexander Berkman agreed with Malatesta, deeming Kropotkin's letter in support of the war 'weak and superficial' and suggested that he had 'fallen victim to the war psychology now dominating Europe'.¹⁷ In reality, however, Kropotkin's position was more complex, had deeper roots in his thought, and amounted to more than simply the product of a patriotic fugue. On one level, his Francophilia—the land of the Revolution and of the Commune and the crucible of modern socialism—was matched by a strident Germanophobia—the home of Bismarck, *Realpolitik*, and Marxism.¹⁸ Not only did Kropotkin hold a preference for French culture common amongst aristocratic nineteenth-century Russians, but this was amplified by an identification with its radical political heritage, and a sense that the revolutionary tradition bequeathed by the French Revolution would be the forebear of any future, successful, revolution.¹⁹

Kropotkin's distaste for Germany may have predisposed him to look askance at its geopolitical manoeuvring, but his support for the Entente war effort revolved around a cluster of more complex issues. Where Malatesta criticised Kropotkin for failing to remember that the most important duty of anarchists

was always to act to weaken the state, and therefore looked upon the war as an opportunity to foment social revolution in the immediate moment, Kropotkin viewed the war as an unpropitious time for mass revolution and feared what German victory would do to the relative freedoms won in Britain and France.²⁰ Indeed, he saw it as a time to revisit anarchist tactics, writing in *Freedom* that the anti-militarist movement had been too wedded to the idea of a panacean general strike. Kropotkin argued, in rather tortured prose, that the idea that the ‘German Social Democrats would not think, even for a single moment, of *not* joining the mobilisation’ made discussion of general strikes moot, adding that if the French had laid down their arms and taken to the streets, the nation would have been gifted to the invaders. Moreover, while he did not think that revolution was imminent, he tied the present war to an understanding of future social revolution, depicting participation as both a moral necessity and a means to furthering revolutionary aims:

If the anti-militarists remain ... onlookers ... they support by their inaction the invaders; they help ... make slaves of the conquered ... they aid them ... be a still stronger obstacle to the Social Revolution in the future ... Men and women of the most varied capacities will find a full scope for the application of their powers in time of war. It must not be forgotten ... that for every million men fighting ... there are at least twice, if not thrice, that number ... engaged in support ... How immense is the number of men and women engaged in this country in freely organised work to aid the nation to pull through the war.²¹

There was little here that would have persuaded Malatesta.

A series of articles followed Kropotkin’s contribution, mostly siding with him, debating the merits and costs of participation that highlighted the scale of the handwringing. Jean Grave echoed Kropotkin’s indictment of Prussian militarism, questioning whether British anarchists would have been so opposed to taking up arms if it was Britain, not France, subject to ‘German invasion’. Inadvertently echoing Wells’ sentiment, he also opined that this indeed must ‘be the last, the end of wars’, but for this to occur the ‘German hordes must be driven back’.²² The Georgian anarchist Varlam Cherkezishvili agreed, echoing the ‘poor little Belgium’ message popular in the British press, denouncing the treatment of this ‘small civilised nation by a huge military brute’. He too censured social democracy, writing that rather than fighting its ‘parasitism’, socialists had mistakenly glorified state power as a worthy end and, as a result, simply delivered greater control to entrenched elites.²³ For Lothrop Withington, in contrast, an American historian and collaborator of the British individualist Henry Seymour, it was obvious that this war was the product of an ‘international band of commercial priests’ and that anarchists must stand firm, ‘in spite of any traitors in our midst who scurry off during the battle to make sure of their own little bag of boodle in rent, usury, or profit’.²⁴ Withington would become a casualty of the war the following year, losing his life on the *Lusitania*.

A distinctive feature of the philosophical edifice that Kropotkin spent his years in Britain developing was a conception of the historical process, but he also frequently looked to historical examples and argument to endow his political claims with greater authority in a more general sense. It was thus a common rhetorical approach of his to begin a work on the merits of anarchist communism with a history of the development of socialist thought; to dissect statist assumptions through a history of medieval communalism; and he crowned a lifelong interest in the French Revolution by writing a 600-page history in 1909.²⁵ Underpinning his support for the war, then, was a sense that there was a discernible pattern to the processes of historical development, and it was this notion that shaped his view on the deleterious impact of German militarism on the trajectory of European history, on the timing of social revolutions, and on appropriate anti-state tactics more broadly.²⁶

As his comments in the *Freedom* letter showed, Kropotkin feared that German victory would inaugurate ‘another half century or more of general reaction’.²⁷ This statement hints at the fact, often overlooked by those who see Kropotkin as advancing a narrowly progressive vision of the historical process with anarchism as its culminating apex, that the constant potential for decline and degeneration was a feature of his understanding of social development.²⁸ In this sense Kropotkin was a characteristically *fin de siècle* thinker.²⁹ Despite frequently being impugned for unrealistic optimism, his historical theory, supported by a particular reading of Darwinian evolutionary theory and reflecting an ontology defined by an ‘ever-changing and fugitive equilibrium’, necessarily recognised the potential for progressive social gains to be lost.³⁰ When, for example, Kropotkin turned to the history of medieval communalism in *Mutual Aid* in order to demonstrate the role of sociability and mutual aid institutions in not only making life bearable for many but also engendering the cultural and scientific achievements of the Renaissance, he nevertheless paid particular attention to the crumbling of these independent city-states. Identifying a number of factors, including the urbanites’ haughty disregard of the peasantry, the rise of petty despots preying on and mobilising the shunned peasants, and the tactical unity between aspiring kings, organised religion, and ambitious lawyers, Kropotkin described the collapse of the commune and the rise of the ‘Roman Caesarism’ of the modern ‘military State’.³¹ With this in mind, rather than representing a break with his anarchism, Kropotkin’s position on the war was congruent with his broader political theory. It may have demonstrated a faltering internationalism and a striking lack of reflectiveness in appreciating the realities of the conflict’s origins in imperialist geopolitics, but his reading of it fundamentally echoed his view of the historical process.³² From Kropotkin’s perspective, both the relative liberties wrested from the state over the last hundred years, and the future possibility of achieving an anarchist society, were imperilled by the prospect of German victory.

Running through Kropotkin and Malatesta's argument was also a disagreement on the tactical implications of the 'national question', a phrase at the heart of socialist discourse in this period. Kropotkin saw national liberation struggles as a potential avenue for anarchist action, with anarchists encouraging rebels to adopt an expansive view, stretching from the narrowly national to the broader 'economic question' of capitalist exploitation and its state support.³³ He urged participation in such movements, cautioning against a 'purity of principle' that informed a self-defeating aloofness amongst revolutionaries, but insisting that anarchists must 'cling to our principles while working with others', and also arguing that:

Each movement should be evaluated separately on its merits ... Needless to say, we want no part of a movement in favour of dictatorship ... [But] ... I see no general yardstick ... There is something better than written prescriptions. There is the sentiment and intuition accrued by every politicised militant and which enable him to get the measure of a movement and divine its secret recesses.³⁴

Kropotkin's position on the war stemmed exactly from this contextual logic, rejecting tactical purism in favour of participation informed by a particular reading of the historical process, and a measure of the failures of anti-militarism.³⁵

Malatesta, in contrast, rejected the 'lesser evil' argument and suggested that anarchists see, in Davide Turcato's words, 'that the worst government is their own government'. He therefore had little use for historical reasoning of the kind that Kropotkin devoted himself to, and, indeed, tended to see this historical perspective as further evidence of his debilitating commitment to a 'mechanistic fatalism'.³⁶ True, Malatesta believed, these anti-state struggles would be influenced by context too, but, he felt, his prescription left little room for anarchists to desert their principles by losing a sense of perspective and seeing present conflicts as the work of ineluctable historical forces immune to the actions of individuals. As he wrote, German victory 'would certainly mean the triumph of militarism', but the 'triumph of the Allies' would result in much the same: both guaranteed the victory of the state principle.³⁷ With statism delivered in both cases, and the tensions that caused the war remaining unresolved, Malatesta perspicaciously warned that with 'both sides ... exhausted some kind of peace will be patched up, leaving all questions open, thus preparing for a new war more murderous than the present'.³⁸

The Kropotkin-Malatesta debate, while not encompassing all the points of contention between anarchists as the long-awaited world war finally broke out, captures many of the core principles at stake and hints at the range of possible responses. What is apparent is that the familiar representation of Malatesta as the conscience of anarchism, remaining committed to anarchist principles as those around him lost their heads, and Kropotkin as the apostate, renouncing his politics and exposing his declining intellectual prowess, is simplistic. Kropotkin explicitly justified his position as an expression of his anarchist

politics just as much as Malatesta did. In the early days of the war to end war, anarchists were fighting to define their principles just as much as they were fighting to influence the unfolding events.

MANIFESTOS AND INTERNATIONAL DIVISIONS

The articles competing for space in the November 1914 edition of *Freedom* demonstrated the unsurprising fact that the impact of the war was felt worldwide throughout the anarchist movement. Perhaps more surprising were the continuing shockwaves of the Kropotkin-Malatesta debate, a conflict in a sense codified in early 1916 when Kropotkin and fourteen allies issued their *Manifesto of the Sixteen*, gaining its misleading name after 'Husseinday', a suburb of Algiers that was home to the signatory Antoine Orfila, was mistaken for an additional contributor. The fifteen who endorsed the statement subscribed to Kropotkin's vision of Germany as the aggressor.³⁹ The Zimmerwald Conference, held in Switzerland in September 1915, which firmly denounced the failures of the Second International in preventing the war, gained a mention in the *Manifesto*, but this anti-militarist venture was dismissed as toothless. Its lack of 'representation of the German workers' was taken as a measure of its obsolescence, while German calls for peace were presented as duplicitous efforts to make the Allies drop their guard, mirroring, it accused, the machinations of men like German ambassador Bernhard von Bülow who 'spread the rumour of an imminent peace'.⁴⁰

Cherkezishvili and Grave reaffirmed the positions they had taken in *Freedom* by joining Kropotkin in endorsing these claims, and the *Manifesto* also bore the imprimatur of the Dutch syndicalist Christiaan Cornelissen and the Japanese anarchist Ishikawa Sanshirō, signing as Tchikawa. It was principally a Francophone affair, however, with the 'mathematician and former Boulangist deputy turned anarchist militant' Charles-Ange Laisant; the propagandist and 'controversialist' Charles Malato; the direct actionist Jules Moineau; and Elie Réclus' son Paul amongst those also adding their names.⁴¹ The *Manifesto of the Sixteen* was partly inspired by the momentary lift Zimmerwald gave European radicals, but a more direct inspiration was the *International Anarchist Manifesto on the War* published in *Freedom* in March 1915. It boasted a longer, more international, and arguably more impressive list of names. Émigrés and indigenous anarchists including Emma Goldman, Alexander Berkman, Harry Kelly, Hippolyte Havel, Saul Yanovsky, and Leonard Abbott were amongst the signatories from the United States, as were Italian anarchists including Luigi Bertoni, Malatesta, and Emidio Recchioni; the Spanish anarchist Pedro Vallina; the Russian Alexander Schapiro; British anarchists Lilian Wolfe, George Barrett, and Thomas Keell; and the Dutch activists Gerhard Rijnders and Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis. Portraying the present war, in rather overwrought terms, as an 'inevitable' product of the 'ceaseless increase in the budgets of death', it saw war as an eternal product of

a social system ‘founded on the exploitation of the workers’. It also chided those siding with Kropotkin in seeing the war as the responsibility of any one power:

It is foolish and childish, after having multiplied the causes and occasions of conflict, to seek to fix the responsibility on this or that Government. No possible distinction can be drawn between offensive and defensive wars. In the present conflict, the Government of Berlin and Vienna have sought to justify themselves by documents not less authentic than those of the Governments of Paris, London, and Petrograd ... None of the belligerents is entitled to invoke the name of civilisation, or to declare itself in a state of legitimate defence.⁴²

It was foolish too, the statement continued, for anarchists to do anything but maintain their long-held belief that ‘there is but one war of liberation’, and throw themselves into the enduring struggle against the state.⁴³

When the *Manifesto of the Sixteen* appeared in *Freedom* in April 1916, reprinted from the French syndicalist newspaper *La Bataille*, it was followed by a rejoinder from Malatesta restating his position and that of the *International Manifesto*. The title of his article—‘Pro-Government Anarchists’—captured both what he felt was at stake for the anarchist movement and was a stinging insult for those it arraigned. Writing in the context of Britain’s move from the ultimately unworkable notion that the war could be pursued while conducting ‘business as usual’, to the militarisation of the state to meet the demands of total war, Malatesta argued that:

In the problematical hope of crushing Prussian militarism, they have renounced all the spirit and all the traditions of Liberty; they have Prussianised England and France; they have submitted themselves to Tsarism; they have restored the prestige of the tottering throne of Italy. Can anarchists accept this state of things for a single moment without renouncing all right to call themselves Anarchists?⁴⁴

This was a position with which other anarchists, viewing the war from further afield, agreed. For Berkman for instance, writing before the United States had joined the battle, one of Kropotkin’s key faults had been to equate states with peoples, seeing ‘the German people ... at war with the French, the Russian or English people, when as a matter of fact it is only the ruling capitalist cliques of those countries that are ... responsible’.⁴⁵ Rather than merely a question of theoretical posturing, Berkman, along with Goldman, Abbott, and others, coupled anti-war agitation in *The Blast* and *Mother Earth* with the formation of organisations to actively oppose the draft shortly after the United States entered the war in April 1917. Having been able to watch events unfold in Europe, they recognised the impending threat posed to civil liberties by the amplification of state power as countries assumed a war footing. ‘We believe’, Goldman

wrote in *Mother Earth*, describing the platform of the No Conscription League, ‘that the militarization of America is an evil that far outweighs, in its antisocial and antilibertarian effects, any good that may come from America’s participation in the war’.⁴⁶

Both Berkman and Goldman would suffer as their anti-war agitation clashed with the interests of a state preparing for European mobilisation, first being arrested, and then, after the war had ended, deported to an uncertain fate in revolutionary Russia. The late entry of the United States into the war did grant a period of relative calm for American radicals, however, whereas in the European belligerents the opportunity, not to mention the desire, for active opposition was often more limited. In Germany, where, much to Kropotkin’s dismay, anarchism had always been comparatively weak, a tough pre-war climate for dissident socialists became much more inhospitable once war broke out. Otto von Bismarck’s warning that ‘crowned heads, wealth and privilege may well tremble should ever again the Black and Red unite’, purportedly uttered in the wake of the split of the First International, betrayed a fear of socialism gaining ground that led to draconian ‘anti-socialist laws’ which inhibited the growth of anarchism in the final two decades of the nineteenth century.⁴⁷ Once these laws were relaxed, anti-militarism became a cornerstone of the nascent German anarchist movement, reflecting antipathy to the important role that the military played in German political culture.⁴⁸ With this in mind it might have been expected that German anarchists, however modest their practical strength, would have taken a principled stance against the war. Yet here too the divisions apparent in the Kropotkin-Malatesta debate were visible. Erich Mühsam, for example, next only to Gustav Landauer in terms of influence amongst German anarchists, famously suspended his journal *Kain* in 1914, concluding with the statement that ‘I am united with all Germans in the wish to keep foreign hordes away from our women and children’.⁴⁹ Regardless of whether or not Mühsam’s subsequent comment that these words were written under duress is true, it highlights the weight of pressure—both moral and practical—applied to dissidents who might have been expected to maintain an anti-war position. Landauer’s *Sozialist* managed to stumble on, albeit appearing erratically, before it too fell victim of practical pressure: Landauer’s typesetter was conscripted and his replacement arrested and deported.⁵⁰

Questions of nationality and internationalism were at the heart of the internal debates that troubled the anarchist movement at the outbreak of the war. There was a good degree of embarrassment in this too, for anarchism had made a particular virtue of its internationalism, with its major and minor theorists all adopting as a shibboleth the notion that international working-class solidarity was the natural antidote to the exploitation that capitalism fed upon, and a solution to the unnatural divisions it sowed. This internationalism in theory also informed an internationalism in practice. Partly this was the product of the inevitable disparateness of communities of activists dispersed across the globe by official repression, but it was also an active commitment to

spreading anarchist ideas through complex international networks of communication and exchange.⁵¹ It is ironic, therefore, that if anarchism was synonymous in the popular imagination in this period with candescent sticks of dynamite clutched by terrorists hiding in the shadows, a more accurate, if less sensational corpus of symbolism might include the writing desk, the fountain pen, and the penny post. But inevitably the war challenged these international connections. Disputes over the legitimacy of supporting national governments or the rights of oppressed minorities in occupied territories posed troubling theoretical questions, but wartime restrictions also had more quotidian effects: communication channels—lifeblood for geographically scattered rebels—were disrupted, further hobbling an already suffering movement. William C. Owen, an advocate of Kropotkin's pro-war position, went on the run in the United States after being indicted for sending seditious material about the Mexican Revolution through the post; multiple American periodicals including *The Blast*, *Mother Earth*, *The Alarm*, *L'Èra Nuova*, and *Regeneración* were delayed or confiscated when they entered the postal system; and both Malatesta in Britain and Domela Nieuwenhuis in the neutral Netherlands found that their personal letters were delayed, tampered with, or simply disappeared.⁵²

In this context, in a period when state control over every facet of economic and social life reached proportions beyond even the most dystopian of anarchist premonitions, it is perhaps unsurprising that when strategic opportunities did arise, the hand of governmental guidance could sometimes be discerned in the background. After all, despite Lenin's ridiculing of 'anarcho-trenchists' like Kropotkin, it should be remembered that his passage to the Finland station was through, and at the behest of, Germany.⁵³ Both Lenin and the German government hoped that the ultimate destination for this journey was a Russia gripped by revolution, but the strategic vision of each obviously rested on radically different hopes for where this would ultimately lead: Lenin to a viable workers' state and a resolution of the dialectic; Germany to a crippled Russia incapable of continuing the carnage on the Eastern front. The anarchist tradition was buffeted in similar ways by the ethical predicaments posed by these tactical opportunities and also by the possibilities afforded by revolution in 1917. On his reasoning, Kropotkin's apparent anger at being too old to enlist in the French army would have been concordant with an anarchist vision that saw the triumph of Germany as an obstacle to any future internationalist revolution.⁵⁴ The collaboration between a group of Indian anti-colonial activists, Italian anarchists, and the German government in 1915, similarly points to the awkward strategic options presented to aspirant revolutionaries in these years.⁵⁵ From a different perspective, Malatesta's commitment to maintaining the revolutionary momentum by replacing international war with class war and forming a new, truly internationalist, international amounted to 'mobilising [the] counter-dynamics of imperialism and militarism to craft insurrectionary alliances'.⁵⁶ Malatesta remained convinced that the special circumstances of the era did not legitimise acting in tandem with nation states—as his debate with

the ‘pro-government anarchists’ made clear—but it remained in his view a period ripe for novel tactical fusions to occur. Therefore despite overweening state interference, and indeed, for some anarchists, *because* of the opportunities this presented in terms of finance and weaponry, debates over the validity of certain tactical actions continued apace in the war years.

When Trotsky spoke of the ‘locomotive of history’, he was not thinking of the sealed German train that sped Lenin through the Germany countryside *en route* to St Petersburg’s Finland Station, regardless of how fateful that journey was for the future course of European history. Instead, he had in mind the transformative power of the war: its impact in rattling the confidence, power, and resilience of the capitalist democracies, and in hastening the advent of world communism. But the First World War acted as a locomotive force in other senses: it betrayed both the hubris and quixotism of much left thinking on the eve of war; it sparked, partly in response to these failures, but also under the impact of revolution in Russia in 1917, a rethinking of strategic possibilities; and it accelerated the reassessment of core ideological values across the political spectrum.⁵⁷ The economic and political upheavals occasioned by the war also, inevitably, had an impact on political thinkers and activists endeavouring to maintain the relevance of their respective political traditions and carve out opportunities for action. In Spain, for example, it was soon apparent that the country’s neutrality did not shield it from the economic turbulence of the period. Booming exports to the combatants led to wage rises, but the ‘pre-industrial outlook’ of successive cabinets failed to create an environment ripe for sustained economic growth, while inflation, and a crumbling infrastructure, ultimately hit wage packets. The ensuing political volatility these issues created encouraged various interest groups to press their claims; in the military, but also in the trade unions, where the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT), the anarcho-sindicalist union, cooperated with the socialist *Unión General de Trabajadores* (UGT), in organising two general strikes. The second, in March 1917, made up for the quick defeat of the first and gained energy from news of revolution in Russia.⁵⁸ Suffering the economic uncertainties of war without the ‘spirit of unity that a common military danger might have aroused’, sectional interests in Spain were therefore exacerbated, sowing, in the long term, the seeds of revolution.⁵⁹

As in Spain and Russia, instability sometimes served to promote opportunities for concerted revolutionary action, but this was also partly a product of both countries’ antediluvian state structures, where green shoots of resistance could thrive between the toes of monolithic but unwieldy systems of control. Elsewhere, the intensification of state power that was the result of economic and political changes forced by the exigencies of fighting total war tended to not only inhibit opportunities for action but also encouraged ideological repositioning on the left. Britain, as the intellectual, if not linguistic, home of *laissez-faire* political economy stands as an obvious example of these changes. Consider, for instance, the case of Labour Party leader Arthur Henderson, thrust into the limelight following Ramsay MacDonald’s exit to the wings in

protest at the Party's willingness to act in concert with its parliamentary rivals during the war. Henderson had always been on the liberal wing of the Labour Party—betraying the Party's dual origins in liberalism and socialism—but his experience at the fore of wartime politics encouraged him to see 'Methods of State control' previously regarded as 'intolerable infringements' as amounting to a positive 'revolution ... of economic evolution'.⁶⁰ In this context, and allied to what looked for many on the radical left like the clear achievements of Bolshevism in forging a new model of revolutionary organisation, anarchists, humbled by their pre-war failures, faced a stern challenge.

Yet the emergence of the warfare state and the triumph of Bolshevism were only expressions of one side of the war's impact on radical politics. Where instability was an opportunity, processes of political innovation were possible that demonstrated both the enduring presence of anarchist ideas in the debates spurred by moments of social crisis and an appetite for intellectual and political experimentation. From the wreck of the *Kaiserreich*, for instance, rose revolution in 1918. Müsham and Landauer both leapt into action to support a Bavarian Republic that, they hoped, might be one component of a broader German council republic, with the Revolution's disparate groups uniting behind the slogan *Alle Macht den Räten!*⁶¹ The German Revolution was a brief but bright flame, yet its glow illuminated the presence of a political movement—council communism—that was either a 'powerful anti-bureaucratic Marxist alternative' to Leninism, or a conceptual sibling of anarchism, the product of 'convergent perspectives between councilism and class struggle anarchisms'.⁶² Either way, the hegemony of state socialist models on the left was not assured. So too the Kronstadt Rebellion of 1921 demonstrated that even in the heart of the Bolshevik experiment, an anarchistic commitment to the 'free soviet', liberated from the "nightmare rule" of the Communist dictatorship', could momentarily flourish.⁶³ Indeed Kronstadt highlighted the continuing, if increasingly threatened, presence of anarchist groups in Russia, fighting what the anarchist revolutionary and intellectual Volin termed the 'statization' of the soviets.⁶⁴

In calmer waters, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) also demonstrated that concentration of power in the hands of the state need not necessarily mean the obliteration of anti-state political actors. With a pre-war progressivist agenda increasingly finding expression in a state readied for war, the results of this concatenation of progressivism and state agency could produce contradictory results. Emma Goldman and Eugene Debs suffered as a result of governmental anxiety concerning dissenters and fifth columnists, but the IWW grew rapidly, with the booming wartime economy giving the organisation the chance to wrest improvements from employers conscious of both labour shortages and a steady demand for their goods. The war was then 'both a threat and an opportunity', and the IWW's focus on addressing working conditions rather than opposing state militarisation tended to incubate it from the restrictions that affected more outspoken participants in the US's labour struggles.⁶⁵ This would soon change, but it highlights the Janus-faced nature

of the conditions sowed by the war. Where nationalism, the maximalisation of the nation state, and the triumph of centralising models of radical politics served to undermine the libertarian left, they could also pose new opportunities: lending credence to the anarchist critique of the state, engendering an economic chaos that appeared to confirm anarchist perceptions of capitalism's instability, and, in practical terms, destroying existing state structures. Confronting this legacy would be the duty of a new generation of radicals.

CONCLUSION

For Leszek Kołakowski the 31st July 1914, the date of Jaurès' death, was 'the last day of the nineteenth century'.⁶⁶ This sense that the First World War marked a radical rupture with the past, seen in fields as diverse as the state's role in industry and modernist diction, is a common motif in explorations of the war, emphasising the unprecedented scale of the conflict; its shattering impact upon the verities of the pre-war era; and the fact that nothing would be the same again.

It might seem that the fortunes of the anarchist movement sit particularly comfortably with this narrative. The picture that the foregoing pages have painted of international anarchism is in many ways a doleful one: a threatening movement reduced to impotence; its greatest thinkers engaged in internecine warfare and seemingly renouncing the political positions they had devoted their lives to developing; and, just when it was at its weakest, long-awaited revolutionary opportunities finally emerged that were quickly captured by anarchism's political rivals. And, as Malatesta had predicted, the First World War was not the war to end war. Herbert Read, a veteran of 1914, politicised in the inter-war years, returned to his experiences in verse as the noise of the Dunkirk evacuation in May 1940 travelled across the English Channel to reach him in the British countryside. 'No longer apt in war', he could not 'distinguish between bombs and shells', but he was clear that the lessons of 1914 had not been learned:

... we drifted twenty years
down the stream of time
feeling that such a storm could not break again

Feeling that our little house-boat was safe
until the last lock was reached.⁶⁷

With the First World War not only failing to address the geopolitical issues that were its cause, but creating fresh ones that would inform an even more sanguinary conflict, there seemed little room for optimism, and anarchism shared in these failures.

The First World War was obviously a serious test for anarchists, and one that they, in many respects, failed to meet. Yet such prelapsarian narratives do not reflect the reality of the situation. For one, the idea that there was widespread

apostasy, epitomised by Kropotkin's defence of the Entente, usually neglects both the complexity of his theoretical position, and the extent to which it emerged through a conversation with the contemporary peace movement rather than being simply a product of nationalist sentiment.⁶⁸ Moreover, it is important to remember that while the weight of anarchist opinion gathered behind the anti-militarists, Kropotkin was far from being alone in seeing the war as an act of German aggression that had to be opposed in the name of libertarian understandings of freedom. As Malatesta, Berkman, and others recognised, the accuracy of this reading is certainly open to question, but to portray it as an abandonment of principle simplifies tactical, organisational, and intellectual positions that were ultimately multifaceted.

Viewed from this perspective, anarchists' handwringing on the eve of war points to something else entirely. Instead of a moribund movement attached to a cluster of unrealistic ideas, it shows a vibrant political tradition defined by a commitment to tactical plurality and passionate internal contestation. Moments of stress provide an opportunity to see these processes of decontestation with particular clarity, and although the debates caused by the war may often have produced more heat than light, the fight to define a logical position on the conflict congruent with anarchist premises points to anarchism's status as a living ideology.⁶⁹ After all, even those commentators prone to see anarchism's response to the war as the start of a journey that ended with its obliteration in the Spanish Civil War are struck by the tradition's 'strikingly protean fluidity', by its ability to reinvent, to innovate, to draw inspiration from diverse currents of practical and intellectual dissent.⁷⁰ This was not something that even the war to end war could defeat.

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Anarchism and Marxism in the Russian Revolution

Anthony D'Agostino

The revolutionary events that shook Russia and the world in 1917 had already been germinating in the minds of several generations of Russian intellectuals, at least since the time of the Decembrist revolt against the Tsardom in 1825. Like their revolutionary counterparts in Western Europe, much of the Russian intelligentsia often thought like anarchists. They advocated direct action and denounced parliamentarism of the Western type as a dangerous diversion by Western liberalism that would further ensnare the Russia masses, even if it might succeed in overthrowing absolute monarchy. So one can say that anarchism was a lively intellectual force among Russian revolutionaries, as it was in the West. But in Russia unorthodox ideas had to be thought in private, in a conspiracy over the kitchen table, in bed under the covers, or in exile. Russia never had a proper platform for politics, radical or otherwise. No reform bills as in England in 1832 and 1867, no universal suffrage as in France after 1848, no parliamentary influence on monarchy as in Prussia and united Germany after 1871, no legal trade unions, and no legal social democracy. Anarchists joined in the criticism of Western 'opportunism' and of the mere idea of it in Russia. Perhaps their extremism owes to a peculiarly quarrelsome Russian nature, as Western radicals at the time often thought, fairly or unfairly. At any rate, in view of the above, it may not be so odd that Russians like Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin were such extremists and so prominent as international theorists of the anarchist idea.

In its earlier voicings and in the writings of Bakunin, Kropotkin and their successors anarchism presented a sophisticated and multifaceted theory of the

A. D'Agostino (✉)

San Francisco State University, San Francisco, Oakland, CA, USA

e-mail: dagostin@sfu.edu

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state, a ruthless, 'scientific' (in that it was based on economics) critique, one that exhibited even more enthusiasm for class analysis than the Marxists were accustomed to entertain, in fact including Marxists themselves on the list of enemies as current misleaders and potential future tyrants and bureaucrats. It was a philosophy of power logically suited for an age of revolution, if one thinks that way of the period that connects the French revolution, through the revolutions of 1848 to the Paris Commune to the Russian revolution, including in one's purview the Italian Risorgimento, the revolution in Iran in 1906, the revolution of the Young Turks in 1908, and the Chinese and Mexican revolutions of 1911, up to the arrival of Lenin at Petrograd's Finland Station in April 1917. The role of the anarchists in the world upheaval, as they saw it, was not merely to make propaganda for revolution but to organise the labour movement to abolish capitalism.

Why were Russians like Bakunin and Kropotkin so prominent? What was so special about Russia? Bakunin thought that Russians and other Slavs, along with Latin peoples, loved freedom instinctively and therefore fought the state, whereas the Germans saw everything through the lens of the state, and indeed defined freedom as harmony within the state. We do not take Bakunin's remarks very seriously today. But there remains the related question: why did anarchism succeed in winning the trade unions in France, Spain, and to a lesser extent, Italy, while Marxism won in Germany? Is this not roughly Bakunin's schema? Max Nomad once told me that agitators of his generation often asked the same question and answered it simply by saying that anarchists got to the working class first in Spain, for example, and Marxists in Germany. This is intuitive: workers value their trade unions so much that they follow their union leaders into politics. Or: formation of a union is at once an economic act and an ideological one, an act of rebellion that must be accompanied by a transvaluation of values, an entirely new outlook on society.

Yet, also buried in Bakunin's remark about the European 'races' is the factor of religion. In the parts of Europe where there had been no Reformation, or where the Reformation had been defeated, the first step in any act of any sinful defiance to authority was to denounce the priest as a hangman in a cassock. Anticlericalism thus plays an outsized role in anarchist propaganda and succeeds best where the church is still seemingly unchallenged, in Spain of the Counter-Reformation legacy or Russia with its Byzantine Caesaro-Papism, that is, its sense of the holy role of political power.

European radicals of Bakunin's day would have made this point more strongly. Russia was generally regarded by them as Europe's most grinding tyranny. In a discussion in Paris of the 1830s among café types like Marx, Proudhon, Bakunin, and other interpreters of the Hegelian contribution to revolutionary ideas, Russia would have been judged according to a Whig analysis like that of Alexis de Tocqueville. No Renaissance, no Reformation, no real Enlightenment, no free city states, no charters of the nobility, no real limits on the power of the crown. In fact, the Russian monarchy turned the nobility into

a servitor class and even a kind of bureaucracy. Russia was an anti-model in terms of Tocqueville's notion of freedom residing in the nobility and its legal distance from the crown. This was more or less also the Whig interpretation of British freedom dating from the Magna Carta, against which other European states were found to be sadly lacking. It was shared in the discourse on the relative development of the European states by most radicals and especially by Marxists, down to Georgi Plekhanov in the 1880s, Lenin and Peter Struve at the turn of the century, and even Trotsky, whose theory of the Permanent Revolution assumes that Russia, lacking the free nobility and bourgeoisie to have won freedom for the Russian society, would have to be liberated by the working class.¹

Russia was, in addition, the most reactionary European state when anarchism and Marxism were emerging, the victor over the French revolution, the mainstay of a 'balance of power' that, according to Prince Clemens von Metternich of Austria, had the Christian duty to intervene all over Europe against any aftershocks of the French revolution that might threaten the legitimacy of a sitting monarch. Russia played this role up to the point of its intervention in 1849 to crush Hungarian separatism and save the Habsburg monarchy. For the radicals of Europe, as well as many liberals and progressives, news of a revolution in Russia would have fallen like a caress on their ears. That is, one did not have to be an anarchist to hope for the smashing of the Russian state.

A discussion of the role of anarchism in the Russian revolution has this necessary setting as its presupposition. Marxists, or rather a special and new kind of Marxists, the Bolsheviks, in the end set up the revolutionary power after October 1917 and this ultimately resulted in the crushing of the anarchist idea in Russia. A reflexive conclusion would suggest that we should think of anarchism and Bolshevism as two opposed idea systems locked in combat since their inception and having it out during the Russian civil war of 1918–1921. One does indeed encounter this interpretation in many historical accounts, especially in those where the historian is engaged in an attempt to save the reputation of the anarchists. The story of anarchism and Bolshevism is, however, not quite like that and is worth considering without the customary blinders.

The relationship was more intimate. Alongside the inherent antagonism, there was also more of an exchange of conceptions, usually a confused one, than is often recognised. The Bolshevism that emerged from the events of the Russian civil war was to be cut off from its moorings in nineteenth-century social democracy, moorings to which it never succeeded in returning even in the Gorbachev era. Russian Communism of the Soviet era was of course *sui generis*, but if one wonders about its continuity with the past, it was perhaps more the heir of the anarchism of the nineteenth century than of social democracy. The intellectual history of the two doctrines, anarchism and Marxism, while it contains two stories, really should be understood historically as one.

GERMANY AND RUSSIA

Marxism and anarchism grew up under similar influences in the period between the defeat of Napoleon and the revolutions of 1848. Engels, in his *Socialism Utopian and Scientific*, suggested three sources and component parts for the Marxist 'synthesis': French socialism, British political economy, and German philosophy. This would be equally true for anarchism. Proudhon, and after him, Bakunin were engaged in the same intellectual encounter as Marx. All accepted French socialism in the form that Gracchus Babeuf had given it in the 1790s, revolutionary democracy returning with collectivist conceptions of property. Marx overcame Proudhon's interpretation of British political economy, even while a number of Proudhon's notions continue to resound today, for example, the idea of 'constituted value' as the basis of money, that all money is basically temple money, established by political authority in the sense of Quantitative Easing, or Bitcoin. This might be called the Hegemony Theory of Money, according to which the nation with the military and political hegemony in the world is alone permitted to enjoy the advantages of a seigniorial money, the status the dollar currently enjoys. Marx's political economy prevailed not because of his presumed 'victory' over Proudhon, whose philosophy still retained its hold over the French trade unions. Bakunin accepted Marx's political economy, at least in its general outlines. As to Hegelian dialectic, Bakunin originally shared the view that it was the algebra of revolution but later dismissed Marx's logic as hopelessly enmeshed with German metaphysics.

This critique and counter-critique makes for an exercise in intellectual history of relevance to the story of anarchism and Marxism. Instead of pursuing it here for its own sake, however, it may also be useful to consider the aspect of the anarchism-Marxism relationship that is not a literary debate between competing theoretical models but which relates to what anarchists and Marxists said about contemporary states and their alignment in war and peace.

Not to suggest that revolutionaries were really at bottom analysts of international politics and the balance of power. On the contrary they seemed to regard these as aspects of the general crisis of society to which revolution would presumably put an end. All the radicals who were to experience the revolutions of 1848 in their youth, saw the French revolution as a more or less permanent condition to which society was returning after its recovery from the events of the Napoleonic era. They thought themselves part of a kind of international fraternity with revolutionaries from every country bringing their own expectations about what their country would contribute. They thought, for example, that a revolutionary unification of the Germanies would be immediately followed by a German declaration of war on reactionary Russia in order to permit a new Polish state to emerge, this in the spirit of internationalist duty. Destruction of Russian power would put an end to the alliance of the three eastern absolutisms, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, powers that had partitioned Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. France would be liberated from

the deadly European coalition of monarchies and would resume its role in furthering the revolution. They viewed the failure of the revolutions of 1848, and especially the action of Russia in helping the eastern monarchies to survive, as the deepest tragedy.

Were they right about that? Most of the history that was assigned in my student days referred to 1848 as a 'turning point that failed to turn', in A. J. P. Taylor's ringing phrase.² But what about Napoleon the Third who came to power as a result of the revolution, which he helped partially to suppress? Was Bonapartism not a part of the French revolution? Not the most radical part, to be sure, yet the return of Bonapartism, even in its new form, this time abjectly tailing Britain, was to turn Europe upside down in the next twenty years, defeating Russia in Crimea, enabling the Risorgimento in Italy, striking such blows to conservative Austria as would prove to weaken her fatally, and permitting in an indirect way the unification of Germany that failed in 1848. Was this not a conservative way of fulfilling the dreams of 1848?

The answer, at the time, was no. Radicals universally rejected all these thoughts and denounced Louis Bonaparte as a miserable tyrant. Marx was in the front rank. Even so, he loved the Crimean war against Russia (started by Louis Napoleon) and told the British workers that their cause would be served by support for the British state (allied with France) in the war effort. He denounced Palmerston as a Russian agent, claiming he had been too soft on Russia. Marx and Engels opposed the Risorgimento because it was initiated by a French war against Austria in 1859. Engels wrote in a pamphlet, *The Rhine and the Po*, that Napoleon the Third endangered Prussia by his war with Austria. Looking at it from the standpoint of what he called 'our cause', that is, the cause of German nationalism, he defended Austria as an extension of German power. This was the Austria of the 'Vienna System', the force defending monarchism throughout Europe. Gladstone once asked whether one could put one's finger on a spot on the map and say, 'there Austria did good', and concluded that one could not. Yet Engels saw Austrian defeat in the Italian revolution as a hindrance to German nationalism.

In the days when Marxism was taking shape as a dense critique of political economy that would establish Marx's intellectual authority with the German and British workers, Marx viewed the rise of German power in Bismarck's wars of national liberation as a relatively positive development for the workers of the world. One of its features, he told Engels, was that, in the victory of the North German Confederation over France in 1871, the German proletariat would have in a sense got the upper hand over the French proletariat. It would constitute on a world scale 'the predominance of our theory over Proudhon's.'³

These were the same days when Bakunin was elaborating his theory of anarchism. He had not been an anarchist in 1848. He shared the assumptions of the rest of the radicals of the time, including those of Marx. The liberation of Poland from the clutches of Russia would serve, thought Bakunin, as a point of departure for the formation of a Slavic federation made up of new states separating from Russia and Austria. After his arrest and imprisonment for tak-

ing part in a rising in Dresden, he was to spend the next eleven years in Russian prison and exile. In his famous *Confession*, he tries to convince the Tsar that his ideas about Slavic federation could be made flesh in the policy of a liberal and benevolent Russian monarchy.⁴ Sent into exile after the death of Nicholas the First and the succession of Aleksandr the Second, who was to free the Russian serfs in 1861, Bakunin found himself in the Russian Far East in the custody of General Nikita Muraviëv, his cousin, the freebooting governor who annexed the Amur Valley for Russia. Bakunin massaged the ego and built up the pretensions of his host, Muraviëv Amursky.

Perhaps he was dissimulating in order to find a way to slip out and make an escape, as he later did. Still, together with the *Confession*, the episode probably shows that people will say almost anything to get out of prison. We have today the example of the hapless Abdullah Öcalan, leader and theorist of Kurdish nationalism, who writes from a Turkish jail, as he has for the last seventeen years, that Kurdish nationalists should adopt the anarchist ideas of Murray Bookchin. The Bakunin-Muraviëv episode also shows that even revolutionary thought can be construed in various ways as it relates to national causes and interests. So, just as Marxism could be thought compatible with a powerful rising Germany, so Bakuninism, at least in its pre-anarchist form, could also be thought compatible with a rising Russia.

On Bakunin's escape in 1861, he tried to resume his revolutionary activities in Europe. For him the causes of 1848 were still alive. When the Tsar Liberator Aleksandr the Second freed the serfs in 1861, Polish landlords of the eastern provinces rose in revolt in 1863. This time they were suppressed by an agreement between Russia and neighbouring Prussia, the Convention of Alvensleben that coordinated police and troop action against the Polish revolt and crushed it completely. The convention was, as it turned out, a godsend for Prince Bismarck of Prussia, in that it laid a basis for Russian cooperation and permitted him to win Russian neutrality in his wars against Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870. Without these wars, he could not have unified the Germans. Without Russian willingness to localise his wars, Bismarck might have failed in the face of a hostile coalition. Watching this unfold, Bakunin saw clearly the rebirth of a new Holy Alliance against revolution, or as his later book title had it, *The Knouto-Germanic Empire*. He also concluded that the cause of Polish nationalism was not as it had been supposed and was in fact really the cause of the Polish nobility. So much for the grand illusion of national revolt of 1848 and the 'springtime of the peoples'.

Out of Bakunin's disillusionment came a series of deeper and more thoroughgoing reflections about the nature of the state, reflections that formed a theory of anarchism. Bakunin became a kind of radical realist. He said that Machiavelli had been right after all. The Florentine was the first philosopher to properly understand the state and its need for a transcendent morality, 'reason of state' divorced from normal human ethics. To strengthen its hold over the people, the sovereign state needed a religion with a sovereign, inscrutable God, holding wicked sinners in thrall. Every state hoped to use these devices to

achieve mastery over the other states. But no one had succeeded thus far. There was no universal state. The dream of Popes Gregory the Seventh and Boniface the Eighth, of the Emperor Charles the Fifth and of Napoleon had come to nothing. When one spoke of the world of international affairs, one necessarily spoke, as Carl Schmitt would put it sixty years later, 'not of a universe but of a pluriverse'.⁵ The fragmented state system created a condition where the most powerful state would have no recourse but to pursue a policy of balance of power toward the others, to set them at odds, supporting now one side and now another the better to advance its own sacred interests. So states strive for mastery, not for stability and equilibrium. Their device is constant war.

The contemporary student of international relations theory will quickly recognise what is nowadays usually called offensive realism. International affairs is a realm 'where the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must'. Sometimes the realist starts with Thucydides's famous phrase as a given. The way Bakunin stated it, there is even a kind of implicit correction of Marx and the idea of class struggle, where for Marx the state is the exact official summary of class relations and national interest is reducible to the interest of the ruling class, while for Bakunin classes arise within the state and internal situations in the life of the state necessarily flow from its external situation.⁶ The state is autonomous from the standpoint of the ruling elite and takes its shape mainly as a result of its conflicts with other states. Bakunin's formulae have a certain filiation with ideas of Proudhon, such as, for example, money as 'Constituted value'. The logic is state logic not economic logic.

Were Bakunin's ideas a response to the rise of the *Dreikaiserbund*, a League of the Three Emperors of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, joined in 1872 in a kind of conservative Holy Alliance? This while Marx thought in terms of Germany evolving toward British ideas? Not to doubt that they were sincere revolutionaries. At any rate, neither Bakunin nor today's offensive realists really offer insights beyond the ABCs about international alignments of the period before the First World War. Bakunin's thoughts about statism do correspond to some of the German ideas about the superiority of force that Engels criticised at length in his *Anti-Dühring*. Marx himself allowed, in the *Grundrisse*, that some elements of Eurasian history suggested the autonomy of the state. 'There is a prevalent tradition that in certain periods, robbery constituted the only source of living. But in order to be able to plunder, there must first be something to plunder'. Still, occasionally, Marx allowed, there is 'determination of production by distribution'.⁷

Bakunin, on his side, accepted Marx's critique of British Political Economy. That is, he accepted it, as did the Russian populist radicals, as a cautionary tale about capitalism to which revolution would provide an alternative. The debate between Bakunin and Marx was a debate among socialists. Bakunin fully accepted that class struggle was fundamental. He concentrated on the urban workers and their unions and promised that they would run the society of the future. He was a forerunner, with Proudhon, of the anarcho-syndicalism that emerged in the 1890s. But he also looked beyond the proletariat. He could be

equally impressed by insurgent peasants, radical students, sincerely indignant liberals, *déclassés* of all classes, proletarians and lumpenproletarians. His Machiavellian view of power, he thought, did not have to be taught to any of these. They would feel it instinctively.

There is a passage in Machiavelli's *History of Florence*, in a chapter on the revolt of 1378, in which Machiavelli imagines a poor worker attempting to rouse a crowd in rebellion. 'Those who conquer never incur shame for having done so', the agitator says, 'and of conscience we ought to take no account'. Nor should we fear Hell, he goes on to say. The rich have got what they have 'by force and fraud'. We ought therefore to use force when opportunity offers. None ever escape servitude 'but the faithless and the bold'. The course is dangerous, but where they threaten us with prison, torture, and death, 'boldness becomes prudence'. Machiavelli was only using his imagination to guess about the plight of the uneducated plebeians. But this is Bakunin's kind of revolutionism. One can imagine 'the modern Satan', addressing the crowd in front of the Dresden City Hall in 1849 in just this way. Bakunin was the exponent of a kind of Machiavellianism from below.⁸

Even revolutionary democrats, said Bakunin, were not entirely to be trusted. In the French revolution, the Jacobins had tried to set up a dictatorship over the masses, had broken their nascent trade unions, and had made the preparations for a state religion. Democrats were statist at bottom. Marxists followed the same rubric as democrats. They were willing to make all the compromises necessary for a bourgeois democratic state. And this was not the last of the betrayals of Marxism. Even should they ever actually get the power, they would move toward a centralised regime directed in the final analysis by state managers, superintendents, engineers, and the like, a regime of 'savants' employing all the most efficient methods to regiment the masses, under the rubric of science. It would be a dictatorship of science.

Bakunin was attacking Marxist 'scientific socialism' as if it were Saint-Simonian socialism. Henri de Saint-Simon and his followers had talked this way, calling for the rule of scientific intellect. Saint-Simonians were prominent in the French government of Napoleon the Third, a regime that was modernising Paris as Bakunin wrote by a vast programme of public works, very much to the approval of French construction unions, some of them ideologically Proudhonist. It is often thought that Bakunin had identified some secret in Marxism, and perhaps he had, but not the secret of the later crimes of Stalinism in Russia. If there was a secret, it was that of the role of the savants. Anarchists were to expand on the critique of Marxist social democracy as the potential threat of dictatorship by a Saint-Simonian bureaucracy of white collar workers and managers. But any trade unionists, that is, trade unionists led by any ideology, Marxist, Proudhonist, or otherwise, would have been delighted with a regime of ambitious public works such as Napoleon the Third provided with the advice and approval of the same savants.

The Second Empire was not to last. This was not the fault of any presumed economic failures but of its foreign policy and the wars it could not win. The economic ideas of Louis Bonaparte were no less sound than Roosevelt's New Deal. However, Napoleon could not find an alliance to oppose Bismarck in the German wars nor to protect the monarchy of Maximilian in Mexico from Lincoln and Seward. The Russians had already made their peace with Bismarck over the corpse of Poland in 1863. The British could not see advantage in opposing Bismarck, and were even led by Bismarck to think that France posed more of a threat. A few years after the French defeat, Britain outraged France by buying up the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal. Even the United States developed a civil relationship with Russia during the American civil war and was permitted to buy Alaska as a result. French defeat, however, meant revolution and a desperate attempt to organise resistance to the German conqueror in the Paris Commune. This demonstrated that, despite the hopes of revolutionaries for another 1848, revolution in Europe was unlikely except in the case of national defeat in war. That would be shown with special clarity in 1917.

The Paris Commune, which Engels later called the first case of the dictatorship of the proletariat, went down to defeat. What were its lessons for the left? Whose ideas were vindicated by it? Did it illustrate anarchist ideas as Bakunin and his co-thinkers asserted? Did it prove that extra-parliamentary means were ultimately futile, as Marxists seemed to think? Who wanted the Paris Commune? Bakunin of course. But Marx fooled them all with his enthusiastic endorsement of the Commune in his pamphlet *The Civil War in France*. Marxism was rescued for Lenin to write its defence in *The State and Revolution* in 1917. Commenting on this, Lenin's contemporary, the anarchist G. P. Maksimov, remarked that, had Marx not endorsed the Commune, Marxism would have faded away 'in the remote byways' of the labour movement.⁹ Marx remained enough of an anarchist to make Lenin a Marxist revolutionary in 1917.

THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

As it left the Paris Commune behind, mainstream Social Democracy became a party of parliamentary advance for the trade unions in Germany, Britain, and other countries, right up to the point where war broke out in 1914, while anarchists and even some Social Democrats of the left maintained a criticism of the Social Democratic parliamentary path. Lenin, Trotsky, and the Bolsheviks who made revolution in 1917 had not been critics of mainstream German Social Democracy. However they broke with their mentors over support for the war. They said that 'social patriotism' had been prepared for a generation by the 'opportunism' of its leaders, Karl Kautsky at their head. The logic of this argument was that the anarchists had been right in their criticism. Lenin suggested as much in various utterings. But Lenin himself was never an opponent of Social Democratic 'opportunism' before 1914. The German Social

Democrats had never done him a bad turn. They had refused to intervene in the Russian dispute over Lenin's 'Jacobin' organisational ideas, despite the fact that Georgi Plekhanov, Pavel Akselrod, and others who eventually went with the Mensheviks had urged the International to rein Lenin in. For his part, Lenin supported Kautsky and the German leaders. He challenged one critic to find a single case where he had gone against Kautsky. There was no opposition between the two until Kautsky advised support for the war credits in 1914 and became, for Lenin, 'the renegade Kautsky'.

Between the Paris Commune and the world war, anarchists and Marxists did not share any political space. Marx and Engels continued to expect that Germany would rise among the powers and their idea with it. A victory for Germany was a victory for German Marxism.

The First International expelled the Bakuninists at its Hague Conference of 1872. When the Second International was formed in 1889, it was an international of Marxist Social Democratic parties. It excluded the anarchists. Would things have been different if the anarchists and Social Democrats had been in the same international, as in 1864–1872? No doubt anarchists might have got a better hearing for some of their ideas. Even so, it is hard to imagine the Social Democrats encouraging and supporting the tactics of the Bakuninists as a permanent policy. And vice versa. In the 1890s, revolutionary syndicalism arose in France, agitating around economic strikes and the slogan of the general strike. French and Spanish anarchists, heirs of Bakunin and Proudhon, fell in with the trend as 'anarcho-syndicalists'. The Marxists of the Second International were not going for this. Ignaz Auer, speaking for the German Social Democrats, said openly that 'the general strike is general nonsense'.¹⁰ It was a chasm between two tactical slogans and also a chasm between France and Germany.

Intellectual leadership of the anarchist movement after Bakunin's death in 1876 passed to Peter Kropotkin, from Bakunin's anarchist collectivism to Kropotkin's anarchist communism, according to the histories. Kropotkin wrote widely about an array of subjects.¹¹ His books in defence of the idea of mutual aid against Social Darwinism are still worth reading today. He took a more or less favourable view of *narodnichestvo* (populism) in Russia and wrote sympathetically about the movements to the people in which radical students attempted to go the countryside, into the areas along the Volga where the vast peasant jacqueries of Stenka Razin and Emelian Pugachëv had broken out in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. *Narodniki* looked to these regions for the peasant war that would deliver Russia from the Tsar and instil an agrarian socialism based on the repartitional commune. They failed in their movements to the people but implanted themselves politically among the peasants so that, when the latter got the franchise in 1905, the Socialist Revolutionary Party, based on the ideas of the *narodnichestvo*, emerged as the party of the peasantry. Under normal conditions with a Western-style democracy in an agrarian country, this party would have had more than enough votes to rule Russia. But there were not to be any such normal conditions.

Kropotkin did not write much against Marxism, although he continued the anarchist perspectives of his predecessors. Kropotkinist theorists relied instead on the work of Kropotkin's collaborator in British exile, Varlaam Cherkezov, who took the critique of Marxism to a new level. Marx and Engels, he said, had plagiarised *The Communist Manifesto* from the *Manifesto of Democracy* of Victor Considérant. Engels had lifted passages for his book of 1844, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, from a French book of 1840 by Eugène Buret.¹² Cherkezov asserted that Marxist economic theory was simplistic, unoriginal, and empirically mistaken. The Marxist expectation about the monopoly tendency in capital and the effect of competition winnowing out the weaker capitalists had been demonstrated to be wrong. Instead of the idea that one capitalist kills many, Cherkezov maintained that the number of property owners always and everywhere augments. This was Eduard Bernstein's main economic idea in the revisionist controversy that engulfed the German Social Democracy at the turn of the century. The Social Democrats would not restrain Germany, thought Kropotkin and Cherkezov, as their doctrine teaches them that they are the inheritors of everything that the capitalist builds or, in this case, seizes.

Could one say any more against Marxism than this? Well perhaps even a bit more. A Polish revolutionary, Jan Waclaw Machajski, disillusioned, like Bakunin, with Polish patriotism, concluded that all the existing revolutionary ideas, including Marxism, anarchism, and the rest, were designed, with their utopias, to pave the way for one new elite or another, under conditions that would perpetuate the wage slavery of the worker. Marxism, the most sophisticated doctrine, was the worst offender. It was the ideology, argued Machajski in his magnum opus, *Umstvennyi Rabochi* (the intellectual worker), not of the manual worker but of the intellectual worker, the constantly growing class that one saw on the streets of the biggest cities—professional people, white collar workers, managers, directors, wearing suits and neckties rather than overalls, neither meeting a payroll nor punching a time clock. Where did they fit in the struggle of classes? No doubt the capitalist thought of intellectual workers as expensive proletarians, perhaps reducible to the status of proletarians under certain conditions. They solidarised with the proletariat under the rubric of democracy and especially social democracy. But they had no interest in the emancipation of the workers from wage labour, only in the rationalisation of the economic system of capitalism in such a way that the workers might enjoy the benefits of a free press, trade union rights, and a voice in choosing their rulers in democratic elections. Yet, in countries where the workers had the vote, wage slavery proceeded as under the most absolute of monarchies. There was a distinct difference in social reward to the two classes, the educated and the uneducated, as a result of democracy. Education, thought Machajski, must therefore be seen as a kind of capital. Until the workers were able to seize this citadel by the 'socialisation of knowledge' which would give them the same education as the intellectual workers, all struggle for democracy would be a cruel joke.¹³

The social democracy, under Marxist parliamentary ideology, thus presented a formula for the perpetual enslavement of the working class, peacefully and legally marching through its election campaigns toward a regime which benefited only the intellectual workers. Marxism was the ideology of the intellectual worker, designed through a confidence trick to mobilise a proletarian constituency as its main support. The economic doctrine in Marx's *Capital* presented in elaborate logic formulae demonstrating the impossibility, even under the dictatorship of the proletariat, of a distribution of social product to the producers. There must always be a stock of capital put aside, presumably for future growth, but in fact, he argued, for the intellectual workers and their progeny, designated by them as national capital. It must be defended as a fundamental national interest. Patriotism, with its manifold deceptions, was to be applied to the realm of political economy. Machajski made an elaborate, almost impenetrable, argument for this proposition in the second part of *The Intellectual Worker*. Trotsky tells us that the manuscript made a powerful impression on the minds of the exiles in Siberia when he was there in 1900–1901. 'It gave me a strong inoculation against anarchism, a theory bold in its verbal negations, but lifeless and cowardly in its practical conclusions'.¹⁴

When I first read Machajski for the substantial chapter on him in my dissertation, I was taken with the verbal negations, as were some other colleagues, Paul Avrich, who went on to devote his life to study of the history of anarchism, and Marshall Shatz, who later wrote a Machajski biography. We had been introduced to Machajski and advised at length by Max Nomad, who had been his disciple in Poland and had written a number of sprightly studies on leftist foibles, which he called utopian, self-delusional, and even deceptively self-interested. Intellectuals were apparently infected by an intense lust for power. Because of Nomad, Machajski had been well known to intellectuals in the 1930s, had influenced some academics in a small way, and may have encouraged James Burnham to write *The Managerial Revolution*. And perhaps this further inspired Milovan Djilas's 'New Class' and Mikhail Voslenskii's 'Nomenklatura'.¹⁵ Machajski offered a kind of key to an ideology of disillusionment. One could not fail to see the application to Soviet Russia, and in general to Communism in power, and here it seemed to offer another key. Or, better yet, why not call public employees of the modern state a 'new class' and see them as an enemy?

Perhaps one can see the allure, perhaps a dangerous allure, for the intellectual historian. Was Machajski such an eye-opener as he seemed in the early 1970s? Does the perspective of the uneducated Polish or Russian 'horny-handed' worker of the turn of the twentieth century offer such a brilliant insight into the very soul of bureaucracy? I have since concluded that Machajski was broadly right to view socialism generally as a system in which salaried intellectuals, which Machajski called the intelligentsia (giving the Russian term an economic definition), pretty much run things. Can one suppose modern society to be able to dispense with this class? Is the most damning indictment of Marxism the claim that it does not intend to distribute the GDP to the

people equally? From the point of view of the Makhaevist (Soviet pamphlets usually attacked him using a Russianised version of his name, Makhaisky or Makhaev), can one say that the state in Communism, for example, in China or Cuba, is really the instrument of the intelligentsia? When we talk about Communist state interests in a world of competing states, are they reducible to the interests of its officials?

Some of us wanted to make Machajski a hero of opposition to Bolshevism as a kind of 'intelligentsia counter-revolution'.¹⁶ But this was not accurate. Machajski was a critic of the social democracy but not really of Lenin's Bolshevism which he greeted as violent break for Marxists from the grip of the social democracy. The intelligentsia counter-revolution of which Machajski wrote was actually a strike against the Bolsheviks after they took power. Government employees withheld keys to offices and tried to bring the new Soviet government to its knees by refusing their services. The intelligentsia acted against the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks broke this strike quickly to the approval of Machajski, who had returned to Russia a few weeks before. Machajski urged that Soviet Power be supported despite all he might have said about Marxism. Not that the Bolsheviks had become anarchists, as many of the anarchists actually thought, but because they were true, he said, to the Communism of the *Communist Manifesto*, which had been diluted by decades of Social Democratic parliamentarism. That was pretty close to the argument that Lenin eventually came up with about the history of Social Democratic opportunism. According to this, as we have seen, Kautsky and the German Social Democratic leadership had suppressed the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. That was the presumed reason for its 'opportunism'. Lenin knew of Machajski's rendering and may indeed have been inspired by it. Bolshevism and Makhaevism ended up marching together. At any rate, Machajski worked faithfully in the Soviet State apparatus as an economist for a Soviet periodical until his death in 1926.

WAR AND MUTINY

Machajski's reconciliation with Bolshevism was repeated in various ways by a large number of anarchist militants, some well known, such as William 'Bill' Shatov, Aleksandr Ge, Daniil Novomirsky, and Aleksandr Shapiro, some less so. I was unprepared for this when I first plunged into the boxes of anarchist correspondence at the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam. I fully expected anarchist reflexes about statism, Jacobinism, Marxism, all the forebodings of Bakunin and Kropotkin; instead I found a series of confused assessments about Bolshevik motives alongside the conviction that the enemies of the Bolsheviks were the enemies of the human race, enemies on whom the responsibility for all the sufferings of Bolshevik rule must ultimately be laid. The 1914–1918 war had apparently changed all the signs, and the revolution in Russia was being perceived by those who were in the thick of it, not as a vast social experiment, but as a revolt against the imperialist war.

I suppose this should not have been such a surprise. Even for those who chose to make war in 1914, the war came to consume all their other interests and perspectives. They had not supposed that war would produce such a profound change. They had expected it to be rather like the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 or the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, with bitter fighting and great loss of life, until finally one side caved in. This was the short war that was expected. The Long War that unfolded was different, a desperate fight for survival with every conceivable weapon, including the weapon of pacifism and revolution among the enemy powers. Thus did the Entente intelligence foment national revolution among the component states of the Habsburg empire. The Germans tried to assist Irish nationalists and Russian pacifist Bolsheviks. The war turned its belligerents into revolutionaries.

Kropotkin supported the Entente enthusiastically from the start and urged French and Russians to arms. This does not need a lot of explaining after all that he and his comrades had written about German militarism and its threat to republican France. Only the churlish could point out, as Trotsky did, that it meant going against everything Kropotkin had written for fifty years. On the other side of the ‘chasm’ between anarchism and social democracy, Georgii Plekhanov argued for the Entente in almost identical terms, except that he was able to invoke Marxist precedence. Marxists, he insisted, were not pacifists. In the Franco-Prussian war, Marx had been unhappy with the wavering of his German followers toward a pacifist position. Wars had consequences for the proletariat and one had to base political action on this. So, as Marx had in effect supported German nationalism against French Bonapartism in 1870–1871, Plekhanov urged that the Russian worker support the Tsar’s Russia because of the Franco-Russian alliance.

It is not difficult to understand why these militants of the left should fear the victory of German militarism.¹⁷ Difficult to square with their old ideas, but not difficult to understand. Kropotkin was temporarily forsaking the struggle against the state. Plekhanov, on the other hand, was rigidly adhering to the principle that war is war. But neither of them could convince the younger generation, who, closer to the age of those who would have to fight, treated the war as something *sui generis*. In the Spring of 1915, at about the time when the powers were running out of ammunition and calling upon their governments to prepare more of it for a long war, Errico Malatesta urged the younger anarchists to break with Kropotkin’s war line. He and the signatories of his International Anarchist Manifesto on the War, issued in March 1915, Aleksandr Berkman, Emma Goldman, Domela Nieuwenhuis, Iuda Grossman-Roshchin, Aleksandr Shapiro, Bill Shatov, and others, issued a call for the workers of the belligerent countries to turn the war into a civil war. That is more or less the same call that was issued by Lenin and the Zimmerwald left.

Bolshevism was bound therefore to attract the attention of Ludendorff and the German General Staff, in much the same way that Mussolini’s pro-war

position was bound to attract the attention of the French. Both powers provided support to what they thought and hoped were new clients. The French got a man with a key influence on Italian opinion whom they supplied with funds for a daily paper. The Germans helped send Lenin to Russia in the hope that his party might somehow take Russia out of the war. It was as easy for their opponents to claim that Mussolini was bought with French gold as to say that Lenin was a German agent. Those who led the powers quickly came to understand that only men of the left could lead the troops.

The desperation of the Long War made revolution possible. Russia scholars of my generation seemed to realise this as they took note of the radicalisation of the workers and peasants in the war years. They defended the spontaneity of the Russian revolution against rightist historians who clung to the thesis of an October coup against the popular will. They also said that the radicalisation was proceeding before the war. The social crisis of the Tsarist regime was such, they came to think, that a revolution would have resulted, war or no war. It is easy to see the vast crisis, but more difficult to see how the Tsarist regime could have been overthrown in peacetime. The war, on the other hand, armed the working class and much of the peasantry and failed to take them to victory. A fatal conjuncture. Just as the workers had built the Saint Petersburg Soviet of Workers Deputies in 1905, they built the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' *and Soldiers'* deputies in 1917. The fall of the Tsar came out of the defeat of the war effort. The proletariat of the capital created an institution which already had in its very nature distinctly semi-governmental pretensions and drew into it a huge body of armed men.

Anarchists correctly saw the soviet as an institution around which to reorient all their conceptions about social organisation. Whereas trade unions now seemed to lead naturally to parliaments—this was a reproach commonly aimed at anarcho-syndicalists prior to the war—a soviet, a workers' council, now seemed to be the ideal instrument to lead the workers to the revolution, or rather the completion of the revolution that had overthrown the Tsar. The trade union was eclipsed by the factory committee, and parliament was eclipsed by the soviet. It was a new and dynamic idea for anarchism to embrace, especially of those disappointed in the role of pre-war anarchism and its patriotic betrayals.

The Bolsheviks called for 'All Power to the Soviets' after Lenin fought for the slogan in April 1917. They also combined to vote with anarchists for workers control, instead of the Menshevik line for state control of industry, at a conference of factory committees. Were the Bolsheviks really departing from social democracy and going over to anarchist ideas? One can discuss this into the night, and consider all the implications of the wavering among the anarchists on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Some anarchists, such as Aleksandr Shapiro, pronounced themselves in favour of a 'transitional dictatorship of labour'. This whole discussion would seem, however, to miss the essential

point: the war. Bolsheviks were the only party in the Petrograd Soviet that was steadfastly opposed to the war and willing to take power in order to make a separate peace with Germany and Austria. Lenin's people proclaimed this every day to all who would listen. This was the main reason that they were able to bid for power. Anarchists who were also against the war had to make common cause. The only way for Kerensky to save the regime and to hope for some kind of democracy in the future, an enormous stretch to be sure, was to win the war. Kerensky was almost driven out of power when the offensive of June–July, 'the Kerensky offensive', failed as had the others before it. He was hanging on as a war leader as it was thought only a socialist and a man of the left could get the soldiers to fight.

Lenin, Trotsky, and the Bolsheviks could see the logic. As Lenin had provided a theory to oppose the war as a Marxist in his essay of 1916, *Imperialism*, he wrote *The State and Revolution* in the summer of 1917 to justify in theory the taking of power. He called for a regime like the Paris Commune. That recalled for anarchists the essential agreement between Marx and Bakunin on the Paris Commune. It left open once again the possibility that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were breaking with social democracy. Lenin allowed them to think exactly that. He succeeded because it was true. But where was the essential break, the clinching moment for the 'conversion' of Lenin to anarchism? Once again, the historians invite us to consider all the ramifications of the encounter of two historically opposed ideologies. However, the point was the war. Social Democracy was committed to the cause of the Entente. That was the issue of life and death, they thought, for the future of democracy and progress for humanity. Kerensky had to get the troops to fight. And, they ultimately decided, if Kerensky could not do it, someone else must.

At the end of the summer, at a Democratic Conference, all the leading lights of the patriotic effort, including Kropotkin himself, made a desperate, plaintive appeal to put some life into the war effort. Out of this conference came the conviction that it was only because of the Soviet that the troops could not be made to fight. The war was being lost in the rear. It was necessary to close the Soviet, arrest its remaining leaders (Lenin was already in hiding, and Trotsky under arrest). The man for the job was General Lavr Kornilov. There followed Kornilov's attempt to take power, first alongside Kerensky, then against Kerensky. Resisting Kornilov, Kerensky freed the imprisoned Bolsheviks and allowed them to arm the Red Guard. After Kornilov was stopped, it was only a short step for the Bolsheviks to the winning of power, legitimised by majorities in the Soviet and 126 other soviets. Could Kornilov's military dictatorship have got the soldiers to fight? Perhaps for a while, but only if it possessed power such as no regime, even the fascist regimes of Mussolini in Italy or Primo Rivera in Spain, were to be able to exercise. Would this have been a long-run solution for Russia? Could such a regime have collectivised agriculture, industrialised the country, and defeated Hitler?

It was fear of a Kornilov military dictatorship that caused the Petrograd Soviet and the other soviets to rally around Bolshevism. Without this majority

position in the Soviet Power Lenin and Trotsky could scarcely have thought about arresting the Kerensky government. Kornilov might have made himself the first fascist dictator in Europe and a model for another country continuing the war effort against popular pacifistic protest. This was the mortal threat he posed to all the garrison and the Soviet. Thinking about this, the German parliamentarian and council communist Otto Rühle called the October events that brought the Bolsheviks to power ‘a pacifist putsch’.¹⁸

The first decrees said nothing about the Bolshevik party but declared a series of measures in the name of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. The very first was the decree on peace in the name of which negotiations were begun with Germany and Austria. This met with the approval of many, but not all, of the anarchist leaders. There were many who, like Kropotkin, considered a separate peace treason to the French and a capitulation to Germany—which, of course, it was. Yet the separate peace, which materialised as the peace of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, was at bottom the reason for the revolution in Russia.

The onerous peace gave up Russian control over the Baltic provinces, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus. It gave a certain credibility to the charge that the Bolsheviks were German agents. Yet to defend it and get Russia out of the war, the anarchists and Bolsheviks closed the Constituent Assembly after it had sat for one day. The elections to this body had been considered the only real legitimation of power by groups across the spectrum—pro-war or anti-war, including the Bolsheviks. Returns showed a Socialist Revolutionary plurality of around 40% and a 25% city vote for the Bolsheviks. The pro-war Mensheviks were destroyed as a party. Who knows how this would have turned out if the voting lists had reflected the split in the ranks of the SRs? The left SRs, who had just broken with the SR party and the war effort, had essentially embraced the Bolshevik programme on the land and the peace. Lenin cited this fact but did not call for a new poll.

Finally the anarchists of the Assembly’s guard, led by Anatoli Zhelezniakov, took the initiative and closed it after one day—thus ended the only experiment of Soviet Russia, at least until the Gorbachev years, with Western-style parliamentary democracy. But the real point was that the Assembly with its pro-war SR leadership had emphatically declared that under no circumstances could the negotiations that had been opened by the Bolsheviks be allowed to result in a separate peace. The leaders of the Constituent Assembly, if they were to continue the fight, would have had to do what Kornilov had already tried to do, close down the Soviet. The anarchists and the Bolsheviks, in closing the Constituent Assembly, were continuing their fight against Kornilov, a fight to get Russia out of the war.

Many historians of the Russian revolution do not usually stress the war as much as the radical programmes of the Bolsheviks. In their accounts, it often seems odd that the Russian masses could have become so radicalised so fast by a series of extreme slogans. This view fits oddly with the notion that the Bolsheviks never really had popular support and, in some cases, also accords

with the idea that the Bolsheviks took power by a coup which, of course, they did. That it was a coup backed by the Soviet Power seems a troublesome footnote. When one considers the impact of the mutiny and the truly desperate attempts to get the troops to fight, their radicalisation does not seem so odd. But even if one goes this far with the mutiny thesis, it becomes even more astounding that the mutinous troops could subsequently be got to fight to defend the revolutionary regime.

But that is what happened. No sooner had the pacifist putsch unfolded than it faced armed opposition by the allied powers and the Whites in their forlorn effort to get Russia back in the fight. And Trotsky proved capable of raising a Red Army to take them on in the Urals. In the Ukraine, surrendered to the Germans by Brest-Litovsk, Nestor Makhno raised his own division-sized army to deny a large section of the south to German forces. Makhno did this as an anarchist, drawing to his side some of the most prominent of the anarchist intellectuals. He held off the Germans, to Lenin's congratulations, and after the armistice that ended the war, also managed to hold off the French-supported Whites. Fighting for the revolution and the exit of Russia from the war he was never defeated. After the war, his Bolshevik allies even offered him a chance to stay with them by ordering his army away from its home base. Makhno could see that this would have meant subordinating his fight for freedom to the national and statist leadership of the Soviet Power.

The break of Bolshevism with Makhno's movement thus occurred at a moment of victory for the 'coalition' that had somehow kept the anarchists and the Bolsheviks in the same column fighting for revolution and peace. The victory over the Whites and the Allied intervention brought home to the Soviet leaders that their relationship with the peasants was only good for the period of the civil war and intervention and the regime of War Communism. In peace, the peasants could not be controlled as in war against the counter-revolution, unless one supposed that Russian agriculture could be organised permanently by troops carrying out compulsory grain requisitions. This idea, which came to fruition in the collectivisation a decade later, could not be taken seriously in the aftermath of war.

As peace broke out, peasants all over Russia strained against the demands of the War Communist regime as did Makhno's peasants in the southern Ukraine. South of Moscow, the Tambov revolt went on for months and sent its inchoate but powerful message to the peasants and ex-peasants serving in the Soviet armed forces. This affected the ex-peasants drawn into the cities by the war. The population of Petrograd rose up in a general strike against the suppression of the black market in food, and the ex-peasant city workers drew the sympathy of the sailors of the Kronstadt garrison in the Gulf of Finland. The rising of the peasants against War Communism turned into the Kronstadt revolt against Soviet power. At least, that was how the Russian anarchists viewed the struggle for 'soviets without Communists'.

In the name of Soviet Power, the Bolsheviks crushed the Kronstadt revolt as they suppressed Makhno's army. From the standpoint of some prominent anar-

chists, but not all anarchists, this was the great defeat of the Russian revolution that came at the very moment of its great victory. Could it have been any different with state power? Would the Bolsheviks cede power to agrarian Russia, a federative polity without any state compulsion, and without any state to defend its borders against other states in a big bad world? In discussing the cause of anarchism in the Russian revolution have we been assuming too much for the sake of our sympathy for these lovers of freedom? Was it all not impossible from the beginning? Who says it was possible? Should they not have thought it through and forgotten the whole thing? Would the anarchists not have done better as Hamlets paralysed by reasoning and frozen into inaction? Or was it their very illusions that made possible the fascinating story that we are here pondering for posterity?

We have to bear in mind that it is not a tragic story, although the story of anarchism might be considered a story of deep tragedy. The larger story ends somehow a quarter century later in the defeat of Hitler together with the United States in what is perhaps the latter's most progressive and dynamic moment. A story full of irony, but not a tragedy.

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The Spanish Civil War

James Michael Yeoman

The Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939 was one of the most significant moments in the history of anarchism. The outbreak of the conflict sparked a revolution, in which women and men inspired by anarchist ideas took control of the streets of Barcelona and the fields of Aragon. For perhaps the first, and last, time in history, libertarian communism appeared to be imminent, if not already in effect. In under a year, however, the revolution was over, and the anarchist movement was fractured and in the process of being crushed in the wake of the Nationalist advance across the country. Franco's final victory and the decades of repression which followed marked the end of anarchism as a mass movement in Spain.

These events were only possible because of the depth and longevity of support for the Spanish movement. Anarchist principles of grassroots, revolutionary unionism underpinned the national branch of the First International (FRE, 1870–1874) and its successors the FTRE (1880–1888) and FSOE (1900–1907).¹ These organisations were prone to cycles of enthusiasm and action, followed by paralysis and collapse. Difficulties were particularly acute during periods of repression, such as that which followed the upsurge of anarchist terrorist attacks in the 1890s.² Yet the movement was broader than its organisations and was sustained at the turn of the century by its cultural foundations in working-class communities, above all in Barcelona and its surrounding towns.³ The movement was also strong in south-west Andalusia (particularly Seville and Cádiz provinces), western Aragon, and the Levante (Valencia and Murcia), along with pockets of support in the north-eastern ports (La Coruña, Vigo, and Gijón), the Basque regions, and Madrid.⁴

J. M. Yeoman (✉)

Department of History, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK

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In the first decades of the twentieth century, the movement aligned itself with syndicalist ideas, leading to the creation of the anarcho-syndicalist *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT) in 1910–1911.⁵ The CNT grew dramatically during the First World War, in which neutral Spain experienced an economic boom and then crash, and was a major force in general strikes which erupted towards the end of the conflict. Almost 850,000 affiliates were represented at the CNT's 1919 Congress, which also affirmed the movement's ultimate goal to be a libertarian communist society, to be secured through direct action, without political or economic mediation.⁶ This high-point was not maintained for long, as the entanglement of CNT activists in bloody street battles with employers and police in Barcelona prompted the military coup of General Primo de Rivera in September 1923 and the repression of the movement.⁷ Within this period of illegality a new anarchist organisation was formed: the *Federación Anarquista Ibérica* (FAI), which sought to maintain the CNT's revolutionary direction against syndicalist 'adaptation'.⁸

The declaration of the Spanish Second Republic in 1931 brought to power a Republican–Socialist alliance, which promised agrarian and industrial reform, greater civil liberties, secularisation, and an expanded education system. This programme was welcomed by 'gradualists' in the CNT's leadership, who regarded legality and building organisational strength as vital to the revolution. Within months, however, frustrations at the extent and speed of reforms sparked a wave of strikes and protests, which were violently repressed by the Republican state and its supporters in the socialist *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) and its national union, the *Unión General de Trabajo* (UGT). With legalism having seemingly failed, gradualists were replaced by 'purist' figures from within the FAI through 1931–1933, prompting a large sector of the CNT's membership to leave the organisation.⁹

During this schism, a series of insurrections took place across Spain, most infamously on 11 January 1933, when revolution was declared in the small town of Casas Viejas (Cádiz). Upon their arrival, Republican security forces massacred the villagers, killing nineteen men, two women, and a child.¹⁰ A further uprising took place the following December in Aragon, La Rioja, and Barcelona, in response to the victory of the right in the November general election.¹¹ Once again the uprising was a disaster, which prompted regional federations of the CNT to begin looking for alternative models of collective action. Anarchist participation in the Asturian uprising of October 1934 was thus the product of local alliances with socialist and communist groups, against the wishes of the CNT's national leadership and the powerful Catalan regional federation, which refused its support.¹² The severe repression which followed all of these events paralysed the movement: CNT membership crashed, strikes virtually ceased, anarchist publications were banned, and hundreds of workers' centres were closed.¹³

The victory of the Popular Front in the February 1936 general election provided an opportunity for the movement to regroup. Eighty-five unions returned to the confederation at the CNT's Zaragoza Congress in May,

boosting membership to around 550,000. This reconciliation was given impetus by the growing threat of a rightist military coup against the Republic. By the early summer, anarchist militants were set on a 'war footing' in preparation for the expected rising, which began in Spain's Moroccan colonies on 17 July and spread to garrisons on the mainland the following day.¹⁴

CIVIL WAR AND REVOLUTION

The coup of July 1936 shattered the Republican state. Military garrisons rose in every city in Spain, alongside 50 per cent of Civil Guards and 30 per cent of Assault Guards, who together attempted to seize the country for the right. While the central government prevaricated and collapsed, in most large populations the uprising was defeated by a combination of popular mobilisation and loyal security forces.¹⁵ In Barcelona, rebel troops left their barracks on 19 July, but were overwhelmed by militants of the CNT and the *Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista* (POUM: a small, dissident-communist organisation highly critical of the Soviet Union) and police units after hours of street fighting.¹⁶ The final rebel position—the Ataranzanas barracks—fell the following day after an assault by anarchist militias, which to one eyewitness 'overshadowed the capture of the Bastille'.¹⁷ Leaders of the CNT–FAI met that afternoon with the head of the Catalan regional government (Generalitat), Luis Companys, who informed them that 'today you are masters of the city and of Catalonia [...] you have conquered everything in your power'.¹⁸ In Madrid, popular resistance was led by the PSOE–UGT with support from the CNT, Communist Party (PCE), and Assault Guards, who together stormed the city's Montaña barracks on 20 July.¹⁹ Similar combinations of forces overcame the rebellion in Málaga, San Sebastián, Jaen, and Badajoz, while in Valencia and Gijón, rebels were held in their barracks for a fortnight and a month, respectively, until overcome by militias.

A number of areas of anarchist strength fell to the military within days, including Seville, Cádiz, and Córdoba in the south-west, Zaragoza and western Aragon, and the Galician ports of Vigo and La Coruña.²⁰ These areas, added to northern Castile and Navarre (where the CNT had little presence), formed the initial territory of the Nationalist forces, where anarchists, alongside others of the left, soon felt the full impact of repression. As the Nationalist Army advanced towards Madrid from its positions in the north and cut through Andalusia and Extremadura from the south, it implemented a systematic plan of extermination designed to 'purify' Spanish society, assisted by paramilitaries of the ultra-reactionary Carlists and the fascist Falange. Rape, torture, imprisonment, enslavement, and summary execution were meted out on thousands of trade unionists, Republican politicians, non-church goers, and any who had resisted the rebellion.²¹

In the Republican zone, a wave of violence, iconoclasm, and church-burning erupted in the early months of the war. Landlords, military figures, right-wing activists, and—above all—thousands of members of the clergy were denounced,

imprisoned, humiliated, and killed.²² Some anarchists who participated in this violence regarded it as necessary in securing their zones of control, enacting ‘proletarian justice’ and bringing forth the revolution.²³ While he lamented this violence, Joan Peiró, a moderate anarcho-syndicalist and former CNT General Secretary, also perceived its rationale: ‘revolution is revolution [...] logically, then, the blood of those who for many centuries maintained their power and privilege by means of organised violence, unnecessary pain and unhappiness and death, will be spilt’.²⁴ Some operating in the name of the CNT–FAI also used the turmoil as a means to ‘satisfy their selfish whims and vengeful instincts’, engaging in looting and settling scores with former employers, policemen, and strike-breakers.²⁵

Republican violence was not, however, conducted solely by its most revolutionary sectors or ‘uncontrollables’.²⁶ In the fragmented Republic, violence became a source of legitimacy and power for Republicans, socialists, communists, and anarchists alike, all of whom could find justifications for their actions in the ideology and history of their movements. What took place in the early months of the war thus included some sections of the anarchist movement and was broader than it: a reflection of the ‘patterns of violence deeply embedded’ in communities across Spain, driven by a range of ideologies, and catalysed by the outbreak of the Civil War, in which both state and union authorities had only limited control.²⁷

The dislocation of state power in July 1936 spurred a huge mobilisation and politicisation across Republican Spain, and a context in which this was channelled towards revolutionary change. The extent this revolution differed between areas, according to the pre-Civil War strength and outlook of local political groups, and the proximity of the front. In Madrid, the CNT had always been a minority to the PSOE–UGT, and had generally been open to inter-union alliances. The city’s anarchist leadership was thus willing to participate in joint committees and complied with the return of state power, particularly as the Nationalists advanced towards the capital.²⁸ The CNT dominated Gijón following the defeat of the coup, yet revolutionary changes in the area were not sustained, in part due to the local movement’s history of collaboration with its UGT counterpart and local Republican groups.²⁹ In Valencia region, the CNT was involved in collectivisations of industry in some mid-sized towns, yet the movement’s gradualist leadership in Valencia city joined a mixed Popular Executive Committee at the start of the war, which permitted and facilitated the return of Republican state power.³⁰

Barcelona, in contrast, witnessed ‘the greatest revolutionary festival in the history of contemporary Europe’.³¹ Rather than a ‘spontaneous’ reaction to the absence of state power, as is often depicted, the revolution in Barcelona was spearheaded by the CNT’s local committees, in advance of—and at times in conflict with—the confederation’s national and regional leadership.³² These groups mobilised the movement’s grassroots, ensuring that working-class power was manifest in the streets: barricades and checkpoints criss-crossed the city; anarchist committees filled the void left by central and regional

government; and surveillance groups and patrols took over from the police. The revolution was seen, heard, and felt: bourgeois clothes disappeared from public, replaced by workers' overalls; formal forms of address became redundant when all were comrades; streets were renamed after revolutionary heroes, such as Kropotkin and the Chicago martyrs; black and red CNT–FAI banners were everywhere.³³ International observers recall the tangible sense of revolution when they arrived in the city in the summer of 1936.³⁴ To Franz Borkenau, an Austrian academic and former member of the German Communist Party, 'it was as if we had been landed on a continent different from anything I had seen before'.³⁵ Mary Low, a 24-year-old POUM volunteer, found it

extraordinarily exciting [...] a feeling of new strength and activity seemed to radiate from the crowds of people in the streets [...] Housefronts were alive with waving flags in a long avenue of dazzling red. Splashes of black and white cut through the colour from place to place. The air was filled with an intense din of loud-speakers [...] Between the pauses, snatches of the "Internationale" burst out over the crowd.³⁶

A similar impression was made on George Orwell—another British volunteer for the POUM—when he arrived some months later: 'Barcelona was something startling and overwhelming. It was the first time that I had ever been in a town where the working class was in the saddle'.³⁷

A clear example of the new social relations brought about by the revolution was its unsettling of gender hierarchy. Uniquely amongst the Spanish left, the anarchist movement had incorporated gender liberation as a central element of its outlook and strategy since the late nineteenth century. The outbreak of the war gave anarchist women an opportunity to act on these principles. Many took up arms and joined popular militias during the defeat of the uprising. Images of these *milicianas* appeared regularly in the early revolution as a symbol of the liberation underway in anarchist-controlled zones.³⁸ A broader sense of female empowerment—a 'feeling that together we could really do something'—was tangible in Barcelona.³⁹ Women became visible in a highly patriarchal public sphere, and gained decision-making positions on revolutionary committees. They also organised to maintain the possibilities opened up by the revolution, above all through the 20,000 strong anarcho-feminist group *Mujeres Libres* (MMLL), founded in May 1936 as a means to fight for equal pay and employment rights, advance gender liberation, and confront sexism within the movement.⁴⁰ MMLL also played a central role—alongside the anarchist youth organisation, FIJJ (in Catalonia known as *Juventudes Libertarias*, JJLL)—in the dissemination of anarchist culture and propaganda. This was accompanied by a massive expansion of education provision in Catalonia which promoted literacy, technical training, and political instruction as the tools with which women, men, and children could empower themselves. Anarchist social centres also proliferated, providing night classes, public lectures, and spaces of

socialisation for workers.⁴¹ The revolution also provided a context in which the longstanding anarchist attention to public and sexual health could be enacted. A programme of 'eugenic reform' in Catalonia, led by the anarchist health minister Dr Martí Ibáñez, expanded maternity care and the prevention of venereal disease, and in December 1936 legalised abortion for the first time in the history of Spain.⁴²

The revolution was also manifest in economics and production. Around 3000 enterprises were collectivised in Barcelona in the first months of the war, as worker committees took control of the city's factories, communication, public services, and transport.⁴³ A number of sectors benefitted from consolidation into larger plants and new machinery, and maintained or exceeded the production levels of the poorly-organised pre-war system.⁴⁴ In many firms, salaries were levelled and workers' rights and conditions improved dramatically: 'it was amazing'—recalled one CNT textile worker—'everyone [...] felt themselves in charge now and with the right to speak for themselves'.⁴⁵ Despite these gains, collectivised industries faced a range of problems, including an acute lack of raw materials and difficulty accessing foreign markets. Many also operated with far less enthusiasm from their workforce than their committees envisaged. In Catalonia, membership of CNT unions had soared in the early months of the war, up from a reported 150–175,000 prior to the revolution to around a million. As well as revolutionary enthusiasm, expediency was a significant factor in this surge, as union membership became a prerequisite for employment, accessing goods and services and ensuring personal safety. Throughout the war, CNT officials lamented the lack of engagement from newer members with the principles of the movement and the workings of its collectives, which hamstrung their operation and led to increasing coercive regulations, 'bourgeois' practices and disillusionment.⁴⁶

Urban collectivisation also faced hostility both from radical anarchists and from former owners and their political supporters. For the former, collectivisation had not gone far enough and needed to be accelerated into full socialisation, with complete bottom-up union control of the economy.⁴⁷ For critics outside the movement, collectivisation was an ill-disciplined, inadequate way to organise a war economy and needed to be reversed or displaced by top-down nationalisation. As state power began to return in Barcelona in the autumn of 1936, the initial wave of collectivisations was legalised, as the Generalitat—with support from the CNT leadership—sought to pull back control over the process and limit future worker-led initiatives.⁴⁸

Similar dynamics were at play in rural Republican Spain, where many communities took control of agricultural production following the outbreak of war. Rural collectivisation was not an exclusively anarchist project and varied dramatically across the country.⁴⁹ In what remained of the Republican south (Jaén, Almería, Murcia), and centre (areas of New Castile), collective practices had 'deep roots' which were older and broader than any specific ideological position.⁵⁰ Many of the collectives which formed in these areas thus did so in advance of union directives, which arrived later to give post-hoc justification to

processes already in motion. A number of anarchist-led collectives were established in rural Valencia and Catalonia, and efforts made to orientate collectivised agriculture towards feeding the cities and re-establishing export markets. In both of these areas, however, collectivisation was less extensive than other agricultural regions—both in scale and in revolutionary character—and was met with greater and/or more organised resistance.⁵¹

The clearest expression of the anarchist revolution in rural Spain took place in eastern Aragon, where in some areas all land, tools, livestock, and produce was collectivised, alongside other sectors of the village economy, such as barbers, masons, and furniture-makers.⁵² Money was abolished, education provision was increased, vices—gambling, alcohol, and prostitution—were suppressed, and the freedoms of women were extended. Collectivisation was popular with poorer sections of the peasantry and rural proletariat, giving them an unprecedented degree of ‘power and dignity’ and bringing substantial improvements in their material conditions. It also provoked resentment and violence, particularly in areas where the land was poor.⁵³ The origins of rural collectivisation in this region have long been the source of debate between those who regard it as a ‘foreign imposition’ of the Barcelona CNT, and those who see it as a grassroots initiative of the peasantry.⁵⁴ There is no simple answer to this question.⁵⁵ Many collectives were encouraged, directed, and defended by CNT–FAI militias and militants from Barcelona, which at times involved bloody repression against local opposition. In areas of CNT strength and high pre-war social conflict, however, collectivisation had been underway long before the militia arrived.⁵⁶ This debate also masks the dynamism of the rural sphere, in which the movement of ‘local’ activists between communities catalysed revolutionary changes and violence.⁵⁷

In October 1936, the CNT formed the Regional Defence Council of Aragon to coordinate the fragmented collectives and administer justice in the region. The Council was initially an entirely anarchist body, headed by Francisco Ascaso, a former member of the *Los Solidarios* action group and head of the Zaragoza CNT construction workers.⁵⁸ The movement’s influence in the Council was diluted prior to its legal ratification, as the central government and Generalitat brought in Republican, socialist and communist representatives.⁵⁹ While it was hamstrung by internal disputes, the Council did manage to give a greater coherency to Aragon’s collectives and made considerable efforts to increase production by providing credit and purchasing machinery.⁶⁰

As in urban areas, rural collectivisation faced strong criticism. Radicals within the anarchist movement saw it as a compromise and the Council of Aragon as a concession to the state.⁶¹ More damaging were attacks by protagonists of state reconstruction, who saw anarchist collectivisation as an impediment to a functioning war economy and centralised political control. The latter position was supported by small proprietors—particularly in Catalonia and Valencia (less so in the rural south and Aragon, where they were much fewer)—who found political expression in the communist PCE and its Catalan equivalent PSUC. Pressure from these groups ensured that in the majority of

Republican territory, radical collectivisation was stalled and/or reversed from autumn 1936 onwards, even if collectivisation per se was allowed to continue on land expropriated from Nationalists.⁶²

War had provoked the revolution, and then shaped it as it developed, placing demands on collectivised industry and agriculture which orientated production towards the war effort. The revolution also shaped the war, most directly in the creation and contribution of anarchist militia columns, such as *Del Rosal*, *Águilas de Libertad*, and *España Libre* which were active in the defence of Toledo and Madrid, and the infamous *Columna de Hierro* (Iron Column) formed from ‘extremist’ elements of the Valencia CNT–FAI and prisoners released from San Miguel de los Reyes prison, which besieged Teruel from the summer of 1936.⁶³ The majority of anarchist columns were formed in Barcelona and sent to the Aragon front as soon as the coup had been defeated. Many were headed by former members of the *Nosotros* group, which had been at the forefront of the insurrectionist section of the movement during the Second Republic. These included *Ortiz* (led by Antonio Ortiz), *Ascaso* (named after Francisco Ascaso, who had been killed during the assault on the Ataranzanas barracks and led by his brother Domingo), and *Los Aguiluchos* (initially headed by Juan García Oliver). Figures for these columns vary dramatically: contemporary anarchist sources claimed that up to 20–30,000 joined the militias, while more recent works estimate that most were around a tenth of that size.⁶⁴ Anarchist columns operated without martial discipline and military rank. Arms, ammunition, vehicles, and supplies were limited, and most volunteers had no training or experience in open battle. Nevertheless, they took almost a third of Aragon in the early weeks of the war, ‘a greater achievement than any other [Republican] militia forces’.⁶⁵

The first, largest, and most famous of the columns to leave for the Aragon front was headed by Buenaventura Durruti, which raced through the region before being halted on the outskirts of Zaragoza.⁶⁶ Durruti was then called on to assist the defence of Madrid, where he arrived on 14 November, followed by 1400 of his column the following evening. They were immediately thrown into a counter-attack against Nationalist units which had broken the city’s frontlines, alongside other Republican forces and the XI International Brigade. In the following days of intense fighting, all sides suffered horrendous casualties—one report suggesting that three-quarters of the International Brigade and half the Durruti Column died—but, eventually, the Nationalist advance was halted.

On 19 November, Durruti was shot in the chest while reviewing the front and died the following morning. Speculation that he had been assassinated—by either a fascist, one of his own men angered by suspicions that he was joining the communists, or by the PCE and/or Soviet NKVD to silence a prominent critic—emerged almost immediately, which challenged official reports that the shot came from an accidental discharge of his weapon. Thousands came to watch and pay tribute to Durruti as his body was carried aloft through the streets of Barcelona at his funeral four days later.⁶⁷ One British attendee at this

procession remarked that 'it was like seeing a God or a statue killed [...] the Anarchists did everything they could to refuse [his] mortality'.⁶⁸

Durruti's death had occurred amid pressure upon the anarchist militias to join the regular Republican army and accept military discipline, rank, and a tempering of the revolution. Both critics and supporters of militarisation within the movement looked to the words of the 'heroic martyr' Durruti to legitimise their position.⁶⁹ While he had appeared to become more favourable to some aspects of militarisation as the war progressed, Durruti had also shown unease at the compromises being made by the movement's leadership, including its attitude to the militias.⁷⁰ Many members of his column left the front as militarisation intensified in early 1937, returning to Barcelona and forming groups such as the *Amigos de Durruti* (ADD) which sought to maintain the revolution against compromise and Republican encroachment.⁷¹

COUNTER-REVOLUTION

On 3 May 1937, Generalitat security forces attempted to seize the telephone exchange (*Telefónica*) in Barcelona's Plaza de Catalunya, which the CNT had held since the start of the war. Anger at this assault on the symbolic centre of revolutionary power sparked the mobilisation of around 7000 anarchists across the city.⁷² By the following day, Barcelona was divided by barricades. Government forces were restricted to the central city, surrounded by working-class districts defended by armed workers and militants from the CNT, FAI, MMLL, JJLL, ADD, and POUM, with considerable support from foreign revolutionaries and civilian non-combatants. Street fighting across the 'May Days' which followed left scores of casualties on both sides, while the positions remained largely static. Like the July revolution, this was not a wholly 'spontaneous' mobilisation, rather it was coordinated by neighbourhood defence committees, acting in accordance with local-level decisions made in previous months.⁷³ It was not, however, sanctioned by the CNT-FAI leadership, many of whom spent the following days in the Generalitat attempting to calm the situation.⁷⁴ After being flown in from Valencia, Juan García Oliver spoke to his erstwhile comrades over the radio, infamously referring to both the police and anarchists as his 'brothers', which brought incredulity and derision from the barricades.⁷⁵

The deadlock was broken by the arrival of thousands of Assault Guards from Valencia on 6 May. Barricades were abandoned, anarchist cadres and patrols were disarmed, CNT premises were torched, and hundreds of revolutionaries were arrested, imprisoned, and shot.⁷⁶ Alongside revolutionary anarchists, the POUM was identified as the source of the insurrection and subject to a wave of slander and violence. The POUM's executive committee was arrested on 16 June, and its leader, Andreu Nin, was kidnapped, tortured, and murdered.⁷⁷ While the CNT-FAI could not be scapegoated and crushed as easily as the POUM (which received little support from the CNT), state forces took the opportunity provided by the May Days to end the urban revolution and quell

the movement. With Barcelona subdued, the central government turned to Aragon, where it sent the Republican army to dismantle hundreds of collectives and dissolve the regional Council through the summer of 1937. Hundreds were arrested, including Joaquín Ascaso, and some killed as central state control was reasserted over the region.⁷⁸

The disarming of the rearguard in May 1937 was a crucial—also the final—act in the reassertion of ‘social order’ over ‘revolutionary order’ in Republican Spain.⁷⁹ By the time the insurrection took place, most urban and rural collectives had been legalised and brought under state control, and the majority of militias had been militarised, including the Durruti and Iron Columns.⁸⁰ Even the streets of Barcelona had largely returned to their pre-war appearance. In early 1937, Borckenau remarked how completely the city had changed since the previous summer: ‘no more barricades [...] no more cars covered with revolutionary initials and filled with men in red neckties rushing through the town [...] the red banners and inscriptions, so shining in August, had faded’.⁸¹

Many anarchist and *poumista* participants, along with sympathetic historians, have long identified the PCE–PSUC as the main counter-revolutionary force in Republican Spain.⁸² The presence of Soviet NKVD agents in the post-May Days repression—including their role in Nin’s death and the assignation of Italian anarchist Camillo Berneri on 5 May—is often cited as proof of a ‘foreign’, Stalinist agenda in their actions.⁸³ Some of this position undoubtedly holds truth. Indeed, from July 1936, the PCE and PSUC had maintained that the war was a clash between democracy and fascism, and openly sought to limit the social revolution which they regarded as damaging to the Republic’s stability and its credibility with Western democracies.⁸⁴ Yet while the communists were arguably the most dynamic of Republican parties during the war, they were only one part of a much broader and more complex process of state reconstruction, which also included Republicans, Catalan Nationalists, and socialists, as well as power-holders in the military and judiciary. Instead of searching for blame amongst these groups—which were always going to seek a return of state power, with violence if necessary—a more pertinent question is why the anarchist movement was unable, or unwilling, to prevent the counter-revolution, which began only days after the coup had been defeated.

In July 1936, senior figures in the CNT and FAI recall finding themselves facing a choice: either they could destroy the remaining state apparatus in Barcelona—characterised as the creation of an anarchist ‘dictatorship’—or work with other groups on the left in the spirit of anti-fascist unity. Figures favouring the latter prevailed at a series of meetings held from 21 to 26 July, which approved the creation of the *Comité Central de Milicias Antifascistas* (Central Antifascist Militia Committee, CCMA) under the authority of the Generalitat.⁸⁵ Formal collaboration soon followed. On 4 September, the veteran UGT leader Francisco Largo Caballero was made prime minister, and senior figures in the anarchist movement began negotiations to enter both regional and national governments.⁸⁶ At the end of the month, the CNT–FAI agreed to dissolve the CCMA and join the Generalitat, which within weeks

approved the containment of collectivisation and reconstituted the region's anarchist-dominated local committees to reflect a plurality of political positions. On 4 November Caballero appointed four members of the CNT–FAI to national ministerial positions: the aforementioned García Oliver (Justice), the syndicalists Joan Perió (Industry) and Joan López (Trade), and the FAI's Federica Montseny (Health), whose appointment made her one of the first women in European history to hold a cabinet role. The CNT organ *Solidaridad Obrera* announced this development as a 'historical necessity', borne of a war that had 'transformed the nature of the government and the Spanish state' which had 'ceased to be an oppressive, anti-working-class force'.⁸⁷

For critics of the movement's leadership, collaboration not only violated one of the core principles of anarchism, it was also a strategically poor decision which politically 'disarmed' the movement.⁸⁸ Official resistance to the counter-revolution would now take place within official bodies, where CNT–FAI figures were consistently outnumbered, outmanoeuvred, and constrained by ministerial responsibility. Criticism of collaboration was also directed from foreign revolutionaries, including Alexander Schapiro and Emma Goldman, who felt the CNT–FAI was 'permitting itself to be treated like children'.⁸⁹ From the winter of 1936 onwards, the movement's leadership sought to co-opt, silence, and expel these opponents, and enacted increasingly bureaucratic practices in meetings to stifle grassroots criticism.⁹⁰ The leadership justified these moves as a necessary step in securing anti-fascist unity and maintaining the war effort, a view which hardened after the disastrous loss of Málaga to the Nationalists on 7 February 1937.⁹¹

Although a minority, critical voices from the movement's grassroots gained coherency and strength through early 1937, as state reconstruction accelerated and Barcelona was hit by an economic crisis.⁹² By spring, hostility towards the movement's leadership and calls for a 'Second July' were being openly expressed in organisations such as MMLL, JJLL, and ADD, in the Barcelona defence committees, and in papers such as *Acracia* (Lleida), *Nosotros* (Valencia), and *Ideas* (Bajo Llobregat).⁹³ Thus, when the insurrection of May 1937 erupted, the movement's leadership and a substantial section of its membership found themselves separated by more than just barricades.⁹⁴ For the CNT–FAI ministers and higher committees, the May Days threatened the revolution which they had secured through participation in government. For those on the streets, defence of the arms and buildings won in July 1936 reflected a desire to maintain the revolution, which had been abandoned months earlier by their leaders.⁹⁵

In the aftermath of the war, many of the protagonists in state collaboration reflected on the agonising choices they faced in 1936. As committed anarchists and syndicalists, they knew that their actions were undermining their ideology and the revolution, yet they could not reconcile themselves to the prospect of aiding a Nationalist victory, which they saw as the consequence of 'going for everything' in July 1936 and May 1937.⁹⁶ Many historians would agree with this perspective, adding that the revolution was doomed to failure because of

the naïve, antiquated, and incoherent nature of anarchist ideology and practice.⁹⁷ In this view, collaboration and the top-down renovation of the movement imposed by the CNT–FAI leadership was a necessary step in the modernisation of Spanish anarchism, which purposefully broke with its long-standing traditions and ultimately ‘condemned [it] to extinction’.⁹⁸ A different reading accepts the limitations of the movement and the revolution, yet questions the inevitability of their eventual failure. This view would suggest an alternative to both collaboration and an ‘anarchist dictatorship’, namely, the creation of revolutionary institutions backed by a workers’ alliance of the CNT, UGT, and POUM, which would consolidate the revolution, rather than allowing it to peter out as spectacle.⁹⁹ Elements of this position can be found in the radical critique of collaboration and denial of the ‘fatalism’ which enveloped the movement’s leaders from the autumn of 1936. Radical calls for an end of collaboration, resistance to militarisation, full socialisation of the economy, the creation of a revolutionary army, and the maintenance of anarchist dominance in local committees also show how this position sought a solution which would bring victory in both the revolution and the war.¹⁰⁰ This was a minority position, highly unlikely to succeed, and never countenanced by the movement’s leaders, yet the existence of this radical alternative does mitigate the claim that the movement had no choice other than to assist in its own demise.

DEFEAT

The summer of 1937 saw the end of both the revolution and anarchist participation in government. Under increasing pressure after the May Days, Caballero resigned and was replaced by the PSOE’s Juan Negrín on 17 May, who removed the CNT–FAI from ministerial positions in the national government and Generalitat. Despite these expulsions, the movement’s leaders did not abandon the principle of collaboration and sought re-entry into the government through the remainder of the war.¹⁰¹ These figures had achieved little during months of collaboration, where they had been exposed as poor politicians with limited choices or power. They had more success in exerting greater control over the movement, which continued long after their departure from government. Hierarchy, centralisation, discipline, and the purging of dissenting voices intensified, now that the tragic—and in the leadership’s view, inevitable—defeat of the revolution had played out.¹⁰² Resistance to these processes also continued in clandestine papers and sections of the FAI, MMLL, and JJLL, who sought in vain to defend the remaining vestiges of the revolution, end collaboration, and maintain the CNT’s pre-war federal structure.¹⁰³

The CNT–FAI retained a considerable membership and continued to function until the end of the war, yet it was a demoralised and minority force during the continuing erosion of Republican Spain. Bilbao fell to the Nationalists a month after the May Days, followed by Santander on 26 August and Gijón on 19 October. With the north lost, government policy now rested on the slim prospect of lifting the arms embargo imposed by the Non-Intervention

agreement, which was ignored by its signatories Germany and Italy but upheld by Britain and France, and the withdrawal of Axis troops. These hopes never came close to realisation.¹⁰⁴ In April 1938, eastern Aragon was invaded and Catalonia was severed from the rest of Republican territory, prompting a split between the CNT and FAI over the policy of resistance.¹⁰⁵ A month earlier, Horacio Prieto, the former CNT general secretary and one of the leading instigators of collaboration, announced to the confederation's national plenum that the war was lost.¹⁰⁶ Although stalled by a Republican offensive along the Ebro River in the summer, the collapse continued. By the end of 1938, a huge movement of people was underway from Catalonia to France, broken by starvation, disease, and relentless bombing of urban areas.¹⁰⁷ Many of the 500,000 refugees who survived attacks by the Italian air force and the winter crossing of the Pyrenees found themselves interned in concentration camps once they crossed the French border.¹⁰⁸ This included some within the leadership of the CNT-FAI and thousands of its members, who fled Barcelona as Nationalist troops entered the city on 26 January 1939.¹⁰⁹

The last significant act of the anarchist movement during the Civil War took place in Madrid in the final month of the conflict, when the CNT assisted the military coup of Segismundo Casado against Negrín and the PCE.¹¹⁰ With the war all but over, the CNT supported the coup to aid the evacuation of its leadership from the capital, and gain revenge for the communists' role in the May Days and the movement's subsequent marginalisation.¹¹¹ The coup left around 230 dead and Casado clear to attempt, and fail, to negotiate a cease-fire. Nationalist forces marched into Madrid unopposed on 28 March, and on 1 April, Franco declared victory over all of Spain.¹¹²

Under Franco's dictatorship the movement faced a period of repression of greater intensity and duration than at any other period in its history. Its organisations and cultural practices were banned, and thousands of its members were arrested, tortured, detained in prisons and concentration camps, and executed. While the CNT continued as a clandestine organisation, it was exhausted by the war and repression and fractured by internal schisms.¹¹³ Similar problems were experienced by the movement in exile, which remained split over the memory of the revolution and collaboration.¹¹⁴ Following Franco's death in 1975, the CNT's membership soared, and hundreds of thousands attended its rallies in Valencia and Barcelona, yet this apparent resurgence was not sustained, and by 1978 the movement had shed most of its members and was once again split, leaving it a marginal force in the transition to democracy which followed.¹¹⁵

Few anarchist movements have come close to the size and longevity of that which existed in Spain. The Republic's defeat in the Civil War marked the end of a period of seventy years where libertarian ideas were articulated in mass movements across Europe and the Americas, in which the years of 1936–1939 stand out as a moment of great hope for anarchists in Spain and around the world, as well as great regret at what could have been. Research into the contexts, decisions, and experiences of the Civil War and Revolution continues

to ask new questions of these well-studied events.¹¹⁶ Particularly encouraging is the growing effort to reflect the international dimensions of the revolution and bring it into comparative history, helping to undermine the persistent notion that anarchism in Spain was an exceptional phenomenon, peculiar to its national context.¹¹⁷ Likewise, increasing attention to the functioning of the CNT at its committee and grassroots levels is revealing it to be a far broader, more plural, and complex organisation than has previously been acknowledged.¹¹⁸ The Spanish movement and its role in the Civil War thus rightly remains a focal point—or, to use the movement's terms, 'fertile terrain'—for studies into the history of anarchism and the experience of revolution and defeat.

GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL GROUPS

- ADD:** Amigos de Durruti (Friends of Durruti) Radical anarchist group, hostile to militarization and 'encroachment' on the revolution. Founded March 1937.
- CCMA:** Comité Central de Milicias Antifascistas (Central Committee of Anti-fascist Militia) Anti-fascist co-ordinating body established in Catalonia during the early revolution.
- CNT:** Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (National Confederation of Labour) Spanish anarcho-sindicalist organisation. Founded 1910–1911.
- FAI:** Federación Anarquista Ibérica (Iberian Anarchist Federation) Purist anarchist organisation, aimed to direct the CNT. Founded 1927.
- FIJL:** Federación Ibérica de Juventudes Libertarias (Iberian Federation of Libertarian Youth) National anarchist youth organisation.
- FRE:** Federación Regional de España (Regional Federation of Spain) Spanish section of the First International, dominated by Bakuninists. 1870–1874. Peak membership c.15,000.
- FSORE:** Federación de Sociedades de Resistencia de la Región España (Federation of Societies of Resistance of the Spanish Region) Successor to the FRE and FTRE. 1900–1907. Peak membership c.70,000.
- FTRE:** Federación de Trabajadores de la Región España (Federation of Workers of the Spanish Region) Anarcho-collectivist labour federation. 1880–1888. Peak membership c.50,000.
- JJLL:** Juventudes Libertarias (Libertarian Youth) Catalan anarchist youth organisation.
- MMLL:** Mujeres Libres (Free Women) Anarcho-feminist group. Founded May 1936. Membership c.20,000.
- PCE:** Partido Comunista de España (Communist Party of Spain) National Communist Party. Dramatically grew in support and influence during the Civil War.
- POUM:** Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (Party of Marxist Unification) Coalition of Trotskyist and other dissident communist groups, primarily active in Catalonia. Founded 1935.

- PSOE:** Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) Parliamentary party of the socialist movement.
- PSUC:** Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (Unified Socialist Party of Cataluña) Coalition of socialist and communist groups in Catalonia, federated with PCE. Founded July 1936.
- UGT:** Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers' Union) National union of the socialist movement.

NOTES

1. On the nineteenth-century movement, see J. Termes, *Anarquismo y sindicalismo en España: La Primera Internacional (1864–1881)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2000); G. Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain, 1868–1898* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989). The FRE claimed 15,000 affiliates at its height, the FTRE 70,000, and the FSORE 80,000.
2. Á. Herrerín López, *Anarquía, dinamita y revolución social: Violencia y represión en la España de entre siglos (1868–1909)* (Madrid: Catarata, 2011), 129–234 and ‘Anarchist sociability in Spain: In times of violence and clandestinity’, *Bulletin for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies*, 38.1 (2013), 155–174.
3. On turn-of-the-century anarchist culture and ideology, see J. Álvarez Junco, *La ideología política del anarquismo español (1868–1910)* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1991); L. Litvak, *Musa libertaria: Arte, literatura y vida cultural del anarquismo español (1880–1913)* (Madrid: Fundación Anselmo Lorenzo, 2001).
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Anarchism and 1968

David Berry

1968 IN ANARCHIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

1968 is one of those dates—alongside, perhaps, 1871 (the Paris Commune), 1936 (the Spanish Revolution), 1917 (before the Bolsheviks tightened their grip on the Soviets) and 1956 (the Hungarian Revolution)—which often feature as high-water marks in anarchist histories. But why is this? Why is 1968 of interest to present-day anarchists? To what extent were the ideas and practice of the ‘sixty-eighters’ anarchistic? What exactly was the involvement of self-identifying anarchists at the time? How did they respond, and did 1968 have an effect on the anarchist movement or anarchist theory? This chapter will try to address these questions.

‘1968’

‘1968’ is often used as shorthand to refer to a much longer period which saw profound economic, social, political and cultural changes. What Katsiaficas calls the ‘world historical social movement of 1968’ was clearly not limited to one year: ‘After all, it was in 1955 that Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat in the back of the bus and in 1977 that the Italian counterculture crashed head-on into the forces of order’.¹ Specifically with regard to France, Zancarini-Fournel argues that the *années 1968* began in 1962 (with the end of France’s colonial wars and the introduction of a directly elected presidency) and ended in 1981 (with the election of the Socialist François Mitterrand as president, and the ‘decisive weakening, in the social and political cultures of the left, of the idea of revolution’).² The precise chronology chosen varies depending on local particularities.

D. Berry (✉)
Department of Politics, History and International Relations,
Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK
e-mail: d.g.berry@lboro.ac.uk

Until relatively recently there had been a tendency to study local instances of the 1968 rebellions more or less in isolation from those in other countries, or at best to provide a 'simple catalogue of the national variants', a series of juxtaposed or at best comparative national studies.³ Sirinelli makes the case for a 'world history' approach to 1968. The near simultaneity of the '1968 moment', as he calls it, in so many very diverse parts of the world—the USA, Canada, Central and South America, Western Europe, Francoist Spain, Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, India, Japan, Senegal and so on—seems difficult to explain just in terms of cultural transfers, the international dissemination of ideas, 'copycat' actions and so on, although this was clearly an important aspect of 1968. Militants the world over read the same texts: Marx (especially the *Paris Manuscripts*) and Mao, Wilhelm Reich, C. Wright Mills and Herbert Marcuse ('the transnational lodestar of the 1960s new left', according to Horn⁴), Camus and Sartre. And militants criss-crossed the world in a transnational network of leftists: activists from all over Europe and the Americas attended the International Vietnam Conference in West Berlin in February 1968; the Ulster activist Eamonn McCann heard Marcuse and Stokely Carmichael speak in London in 1967⁵; Rudi Dutschke spoke in Prague in the spring of 1968⁶; Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Tariq Ali and other internationally prominent activists appeared together in a BBC studio in June 1968; and so on. The adoption of a transnational perspective has thus come to be seen as essential.

This was always true of the 'world-system' approach developed by Wallerstein and others:

It was not by chance alone that the Tet offensive in Vietnam occurred in the same year as the Prague Spring, the May events in France, the student rebellion in West Germany, the assassination of Martin Luther King, the takeover of Columbia University, riots at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, and the pre-Olympic massacre in Mexico City.⁷

The years 1967–1973 were a crisis point in terms of the long-term trends in the history of the capitalist 'world system' according to Wallerstein, and the unrest experienced in different parts of the world should be seen as a whole:

The revolution of 1968 was a revolution; it was a single revolution. It was marked by demonstrations, disorder and violence in many parts of the world over a period of at least three years. Its origins, consequences, and lessons cannot be analyzed correctly by appealing to the particular circumstances of the local manifestations of this global phenomenon, however much the local factors conditioned the details of the political and social struggles in each locality. [...] It was one of the great, formative events in the history of our modern world-system.⁸

As for the targets of the 1968 protests, what united them according to Wallerstein was, first, their critique of 'US hegemony in the world system (and Soviet acquiescence in that hegemony)', and, second, an attack on 'the "old

left” antisystemic movements’.⁹ Wallerstein consequently rejects those interpretations which primarily emphasise cultural liberalisation: ‘Counter-culture was part of revolutionary euphoria, but was not politically central to 1968’.¹⁰ I propose to look at what are argued to be common characteristics of the various instances of ‘1968’ in the conclusion. But for now I intend to focus on the country which has commonly been regarded as the paradigm or epicentre of the global revolt and the one whose influence and impact were greatest: France. For as Brinton put it:

The French events have a significance that extends far beyond the frontiers of modern France. They will leave their mark on the history of the second half of the 20th century. [...] A whole epoch has just come to an end: the epoch during which people could say, with a semblance of verisimilitude, that ‘it couldn’t happen here’. Another epoch is starting: that in which people *know* that revolution is possible under the conditions of modern bureaucratic capitalism.¹¹

THE FRENCH 1968

It is not my intention here to engage in any detail with the massive literature on the French 1968 or with the many different interpretations that have been produced, but a brief survey of certain trends enables us to draw out their political implications. Already by 1970, French political scientists were able to list eight main kinds of interpretation.¹² By the time of the 20th anniversary, the dominant view was that 1968 was about the ‘baby boomer’ generation, a generation which embodied rapid cultural change and which came into conflict with a society in which conservative values and attitudes still prevailed and whose political structures were widely perceived as authoritarian. The idea that 1968 represented above all a cultural revolution (liberalisation in interpersonal relations, morals, sexuality, dress, music, etc.) was further consolidated by Marwick’s monumental study, *The Sixties*.¹³ A derivative of this interpretation was Lipovetsky’s postmodernist notion of the ‘second individualist revolution’, according to which the 1968 generation’s emphasis on the freedom of the hedonistic individual prepared the ground for neo-liberalism.¹⁴ Such perceptions were strengthened by the very public mea culpas of a number of prominent actors of the French student movement who now dismissed their youthful radicalism as hyperbole expressed in the outdated language of class conflict and socialism, which disguised what was, in retrospect, just a desire for individual freedom. Others have been rightly sceptical about the unjustified focus on the opinions of an unrepresentative number of media stars—besides which, the Situationists’ 1966 pamphlet *De la misère en milieu étudiant* had already been scathing about attempts to write off the wave of protests around the world, from Berkeley to Amsterdam to Japan, as being explicable simply by patronising reference to a supposedly eternally rebellious youth.¹⁵

Such ‘rewritings’, Gobille concludes, have rendered 1968 ‘unrecognisable’.¹⁶ As Ross noted, examination of primary sources such as pamphlets,

newspapers, leaflets and so on shows clearly what the ‘ideological targets’ of 1968 were: ‘These were three: capitalism, American imperialism, and Gaullism. How then do we arrive, twenty years later, at a consensus view of ’68 as a mellow, sympathetic, poetic “youth revolt” and lifestyle reform?’¹⁷ As Prince has put it:

Sixty-eighters were not turning away from politics in the pursuit of pleasure: isolated individuals found happiness in collective action. They believed that they were part of a global struggle to emancipate, not the individual from outdated ways of living, but humanity from imperialism, capitalism, and bureaucracy. Instead of a fleeting festival of liberation, ’68 emerges as the culmination of the post-war revision of Marxism and socialism as a whole.¹⁸

And as we have seen, ‘1968’ cannot be reduced to ‘May’ or even to 1968. That would exclude the pre-history of the events of 1968, as well as the frequently violent state repression, worker unrest and leftist violence that continued well into the 1970s:

In fact, a whole fifteen- to twenty-year period of radical political culture is occluded from view, a political culture whose traces were manifest in the growth of a small but significant opposition to the Algerian War and in the embrace by many of the enormous successes of the colonial revolutions. This political culture was also manifest in the recurrent outbreaks of worker unrest in French factories throughout the mid-1960s, in the rise of an anti-Stalinist, critical Marxist perspective available in countless journals that flourished between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s.¹⁹

In sum, revisiting 1968 is not mere nostalgia and merits serious attention from anarchists and other socialists not content with a choice between dictatorship and welfare capitalism.

THE ‘EVENTS’ OF MAY–JUNE 1968²⁰

With hindsight, it is easy to point to worker unrest earlier in the 1960s, notably a successful and popular miners’ strike in 1963 and strikes in other industries in 1967, which foreshadowed 1968. Be that as it may, when student protests and then strikes erupted in May and rapidly spread, it came as a complete surprise to most people, something which fed into early interpretations that the events were incomprehensible and irrational outbursts. It is often simply stated that the immediate trigger for the disturbances was a student campaign for the liberalisation of attitudes to sex, and specifically protests about regulations prohibiting male access to women’s halls of residence at Nanterre University (building on similar protests in various French universities since 1965). This is true but misleading, and it is important to point out that the group at the heart of the protests, the *Mouvement du 22 mars* (22 March Movement, M22M), initially grew out of protests against US imperialism and specifically the Vietnam

War.²¹ A spiral of provocative direct actions and clumsy attempts at repression led to riots and hundreds of arrests. Subsequent demonstrations drew tens of thousands of university and lycée students, and the violent over-reaction of the police was recorded by the media and drew wide popular support for the protestors.

Support for the protestors was not forthcoming from the French Communist Party (PCF) or from the General Labour Confederation (CGT) it controlled, however. The PCF's daily, *L'Humanité*, branded the students spoiled, middle-class provocateurs and dismissed the various Trotskyist, Maoist, anarchist and other organisations as *groupuscules* (a contraction of *groupes minuscules*). Another term was used by the PCF to describe the heterogeneous set of anarchist and unorthodox Marxist groups and organisations to the left of the Communists: *gauchiste*, or 'leftist', taken from Lenin's 1920 pamphlet "*Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder*: 'petty-bourgeois revolutionism, which smacks of anarchism, [...] does not measure up to the conditions and requirements of a consistently proletarian class struggle'.²²

The CFDT union (Democratic French Labour Confederation), on the other hand, backed the student movement. The CFDT had its roots in social Catholicism rather than Marxism but was nevertheless committed to class struggle (and was favoured by many anti-Stalinist revolutionary workers as a result) and was more open to more 'qualitative' demands on the part of workers. Even before 1968 it was strongly identified with the movement in favour of *autogestion*, self-management—the most durable achievement of the revolution of May'.²³

After demonstrations in towns across France and strikes in hundreds of lycées, the night of 10–11 May saw the first 'night of the barricades' in the Latin Quarter.²⁴ In advance of a national demonstration and one-day general strike called for 13 May, red flags appeared above the Sorbonne, and campus buildings and the Odéon theatre were occupied and became a centre for the student movement. In the occupied universities, general assemblies met each evening with thousands of participants discussing the events of the day and plans for the next. The demonstrations of 13 May were huge everywhere: nearly a million in Paris, tens of thousands in other towns.²⁵ Despite the strike call having been for just one day, some workers decided to stay out on strike, and even occupy their workplace: the first were workers at Sud-Aviation in Nantes, who occupied the plant and locked the director in his office. The strikes spread more or less spontaneously and turned into a tidal wave which had submerged the whole country by the end of May, affecting all regions and all industries, both public and private sectors. The Sud-Aviation strike even spread across the city to the extent that people began to talk of the 'Nantes Commune', with the town effectively being run for a fortnight by a General Strike Council.²⁶ 'Unlike the huge strikes of 1947, there were no orders from above, no central strike committee; the movement spread from below'.²⁷ At the height of the general strike, it is now estimated that seven million workers were involved: the biggest strike in French history.

The strikes were however undermined by the tripartite Grenelle agreement (named after the location of the Ministry of Social Affairs) announced on 27 May, which included a 35% increase in the minimum wage, a 10% wage increase across industry and the legal right to union representation in the workplace. The more qualitative demands such as those mooted by the CFDT were ignored. On 5 June the CGT declared that the workers' demands had been met and they should return to work. Many workers were dissatisfied and the CGT Secretary General Georges Séguy was booed by Renault workers. The strikes and occupations continued.

The parties of the left did their best to take advantage of the situation. The PCF called for a 'government of the people'. Representatives of the *Parti socialiste unifié*, part of the pre-1968 'New Left'²⁸ spoke at a mass rally organised by the UNEF (*Union nationale des étudiants français*, National Union of French Students) in the Charléty stadium on 27 May. Both the CGT and CFDT approved, with the former reiterating its call for a 'people's government' and the latter supporting the PSU's Pierre Mendès-France. The socialist François Mitterrand put himself forward as a presidential candidate. None of this came to anything, but the various Marxist groups were too small (and sectarian) to have any impact, and the more libertarian groups were focussed on the potentially insurrectionary role of the 'action committees'. On 30 May President de Gaulle made a broadcast in which he accused the Communist Party of plotting to take power, dissolved the National Assembly and called fresh elections, which a resurgent right won outright. Some strikes dragged on into late June and even July, but, undermined by Grenelle and lacking support from the CGT, most were ended by mid-June. The student movement gradually lost impetus too. Leftist organisations were banned on 12 June, the Odéon was cleared on the 14th and the Sorbonne on the 16th—thus putting an end to the 'Student Commune'.

THE COMITÉS D'ACTION

The rapid appearance and proliferation of 'action committees' has been seen as one of the most interesting and anarchistic aspects of 1968, seemingly fitting with the leftists' insistence on self-organisation, spontaneity and participation. For a while the occupation committees and action committees were 'authentic, autonomous organisations of the masses. It is in this phenomenon that the libertarian stamp on the movement is most evident'.²⁹ It is true that the various vanguardist organisations soon began to try and take over, their priority being to build their respective parties. As one anarchist put it: 'The *groupuscules* didn't understand what May was about. [...] They couldn't give up the classic organisational models. [...] It's in action that we have to find unity'.³⁰ Nevertheless:

In contrast to this attitude, the great majority of the students rediscovered what is at the heart of the anarchist idea: self-organisation and self-administration, and

the struggle against hierarchies. What's more the profoundly libertarian character of the movement became more pronounced in proportion as vanguardists attempted to take it over. The black flag very quickly became the emblem not of the 'historic' anarchists, but of those who opposed the vanguardist presumptions of leaders who until then had had no followers and badly wanted some!³¹

By the end of May, there were estimated to be over 400 university committees, neighbourhood committees and workplace committees all over France.³² Their relative informality made it possible to maintain the flexibility necessary to respond to rapidly changing situations in a state of almost permanent mobilisation while providing some kind of organisational framework and co-ordination. Nor was participation predicated on acceptance of a particular ideology or programme. Indeed, as Gombin points out, this heterogeneity was an important aspect of the movement's originality:

In the absence of a single revolutionary leadership, of a predominant ideological framework, ideas flowed freely, and everyone joined in the debate. [...] Nine-tenths of the ideas expressed were put forward by people who belonged to no organization, by the anonymous crowds who were the true protagonists of the May revolt.³³

The action committee form had precedents in the lycée students' action committees, and various Vietnam committees or, further afield, the *Aktionsgruppen* formed by the German SDS (Socialist German Students' League) following the killing of Benno Ohnesorg by police in June 1967.³⁴ Some of those involved in the 1968 action committees, the Situationists notably, also pointed to historical precedents, starting with the Saint Petersburg Soviet of 1905: according to their 1966 pamphlet *On the Poverty of Student Life*, the revolutionary movement's ultimate aim must be 'the realisation on an international scale of the absolute power of the Workers' Councils, according to the model outlined in the experiences of the proletarian revolutions of this century'.³⁵ Councilism was also an important theme in Guérin's influential 1965 book, *Anarchism: From Theory to Practice*, which sold in enormous numbers in May 1968.³⁶

Despite their variety, the committees tended to adopt a number of principles and practices usually associated with anarchism: antiauthoritarianism and the rejection of hierarchies, direct democracy and the participation of all, binding and revocable mandates rather than representation and the rejection of bureaucracy, institutionalisation and vanguardism. A prefigurative approach to organising was a central concern. This seems not to have been because of a widespread awareness of anarchist doctrine, and the role of self-identifying anarchists was minimal. It was more the result of a generalised distrust of institutionalised politics and parties, and an unwillingness to reproduce the usual division of social roles or identities, both within the movement and in relation to 'the masses'.

The question of co-ordination or organisation was a matter for debate in the action committees from the very beginning. A Coordination Committee was

set up at the Sorbonne on 5 May, the aim being to promote the creative spontaneity of the autonomous grassroots action committees while providing a minimum of co-ordination which would help sustain the mobilisation over the longer term—with the ultimate aim of bringing down the regime. In contrast, the M22M was adamant that any attempt to structure the movement ‘from above’ would inevitably lead to bureaucratisation and hierarchies. They put their faith entirely in the ‘creative spontaneity’ of the grassroots, even during a downswing in the mobilisation. The action committees continued to proliferate in June, but they were unable to counter either the determination of the parties of the left to look to an institutional outcome through elections, or the willingness of the trade unions to settle, or the hardening of the government’s stance in mid-June.

One of the main themes developed by the movement was the liberation of the creativity of all, both as an end and as a means. Some formulation or other of it became ubiquitous. It was conceived as a revolutionary means to combat alienation and the division of labour which define social roles and identities—1968, as Ross argues, was about ‘the flight from social determinations’, ‘a shattering of social identity’.³⁷ Or in Dutschke’s words, ‘We do not allow ourselves to be made into functions any longer!’³⁸ Such a critique politicised many questions previously excluded from public deliberation. It was about removing barriers and about liberating the creative powers of those normally repressed by the ‘bourgeois cultural system’. This implied an attack on the patriarchal, sexually repressive bourgeois family, on bourgeois education and the attitudes and values it inculcates. It was also directed against bureaucracy, productivism and consumerism. According to the ‘Freud—Che Guevara Action Committee’ the objective was a socialist system which would destroy the barriers which prevented the free creativity of all.³⁹

An important novelty here was the shift in perspective from what the journal *Arguments* a few years earlier had called the ‘macro-social level’ to the ‘micro-social’: the idea, discernible in Fourier and later in anarcho-syndicalism, that ‘the construction of a socialist society must be carried out at the level of the small, basic units of society’.⁴⁰ More recently, theorists such as Henri Lefebvre had begun to put the emphasis on everyday life:

In this sense one could say that society has not been revolutionised if, when the structures of ownership or the state system are transformed, human and inter-human relations remain what they were before.⁴¹

Or as the Situationist Vaneigem, an admirer of Lefebvre, put it in 1967:

People who talk about revolution and class struggle without referring explicitly to everyday life, without understanding what is subversive about love and what is positive in the refusal of constraints—such people have a corpse in their mouth.⁴²

GENERAL STRIKE: SPONTANEITY, OCCUPATIONS AND SELF-MANAGEMENT

Vigna argues that historians must ‘challenge the superficial idea that it was among young student rebels that one finds the inventiveness and verve of 68 while the workers were stuck in the rut of traditional material demands’.⁴³ Indeed, from an anarchist viewpoint, certain aspects of the 1968 strikes seem particularly interesting:

[T]he radical contestation of all aspects of power within the factory, the attempts at self-organization, even self-management, criticism of the very role of the unions, the unleashing of conflicts in whole sectors, are the distinctive signs of a mode of action which may well be described as libertarian.⁴⁴

In some respects—the organisation of some strikes by the unions, the more quantitative nature of their demands and the fact that the strikers were ready to negotiate—the 1968 strikes were rather traditional, but in other respects they were novel and radical. They were, to begin with, very strongly supported by an unprecedentedly large proportion of workers and across an unusually broad range of industries. They were also unusual in that they often involved links with other movements and therefore other demands. In part this was a function of changes in the nature of the working class since the mid-1950s which had tended to undermine the order and discipline both of the factory and of the union: worker-peasants, immigrant workers, women, young workers often from other regions and semi-skilled workers.⁴⁵ Less integrated into either trade union culture or the firm, it was often such workers who from the early 1960s adopted unconventional forms of struggle; in 1968 they were also often the least willing to accept the authority of the union and were more open to the radicalisation sought by revolutionaries in the unions. In May–June, it seems to be the case that the militancy of many workers derived from ‘a reaction against all forms of domination: that of the workplace, with all its constraints, that of the company on life outside the factory, that of the state, through its troops of police at the service of the employer’.⁴⁶

It is noteworthy how quickly *autogestion* (self-management) became the buzzword of 1968, to the extent that the national leadership of the big union confederations was effectively obliged to address it.⁴⁷ The CFDT declared its support on 25 May, but the PCF and CGT, as we have seen, actively opposed it: Séguy declared in the pages of *L’Humanité* on 22 May that ‘self-management is an empty phrase’.

Worker self-management had been a major theme of New Left discourse for the previous decade, with the journal *Autogestion* being founded in 1965 by Proudhon specialist Georges Gurvitch (following a conference on the contemporary relevance of Proudhon the previous year⁴⁸). But the idea was by no means limited to intellectual circles: the idea had been raised as early as 1963, for instance, by the CFDT’s Clothing, Leather and Textile Workers’

Federation.⁴⁹ As soon as the occupations began in mid-May, the CFDT proposed the replacement of ‘administrative and industrial monarchy’ with democratic structures based on self-management.⁵⁰ It is true that most attempts at worker self-management were relatively limited, but it is also the case that there were often demands for greater worker participation in various aspects of management and demands for greater rights of trade union representation. Given the massive disruption to the normal workings of the capitalist economy, many workers were also obliged to organise things themselves collectively and in solidarity. Vigna emphasises that even in workplaces where there were occupations but no attempt at self-management, we should not minimise just how transgressive the occupations were:

As a moment of contestation and denunciation of existing structures, and as an assertion of the right to be heard, 1968 profoundly shook the world of French labour relations and inaugurated a decade of labour ‘insubordination’.⁵¹

Such working-class insubordination was fostered by the endless meetings and discussions which took place as a result of the strikes and occupations, in a comparable way to the more famous debates in the occupied universities and the Odéon theatre. These meetings enabled the drafting of lists of demands, in which criticisms of Fordist rationalisation featured prominently, despite union officials’ efforts to channel the demands towards more ‘traditional’ areas.⁵²

When the strike movement began to decline in June, workers also began to give voice to criticisms of the unions, for a number of reasons. Many strikers did not feel that their union’s demands addressed questions of power relations in the workplace properly, and in some places grassroots committees were created to formulate demands concerning the organisation of work. Secondly, it was by no means only leftist revolutionaries who questioned the role of the CGT in perennially downplaying the possibility of revolutionary change and insisting that demands had to be limited to the usual ones of ‘pay, pensions, retirement’.⁵³ This had happened in 1936, 1947, 1958 and now 1968, and impatience with it was quite widespread among the striking workers of 1968. The conclusion formed by many was that this was either a result of the CGT’s being overtaken by events, or because it had become ‘caught up in the system’.⁵⁴

‘LEFTISM’, THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AND THE *MOUVEMENT DU 22 MARS*

For Gombin, the interest in examining leftism lies in the fact that it presented itself as ‘a successor to a theoretical construction which has practically monopolized radical thought over the last half-century’, namely, Marxism-Leninism.⁵⁵ (Gombin acknowledges anarchism and syndicalism but points out that since the October Revolution they had survived only as sects, ‘expending the best part of their energies in pursuing a fanatical critique of the Soviet Union and its

supporters'.⁵⁶) Leftism had found 'a sociological base in a living movement' and claimed to be 'the expression of current struggle', and thus 'no longer represents one radical utopia among others', but is 'the *theory* of a revolutionary movement in full flood'.⁵⁷

One of the principal matrices of leftism was, of course, the student movement, and like the main political parties of the left, the main student organisation, the UNEF, was in crisis. Despite having successfully mobilised students against the Vietnam War, it was fragmented and in the years 1962–1968 became a site of competition between Communist, Trotskyist, Maoist, anarchist, PSU and other student organisations.⁵⁸ Anarchist and Situationist students at Strasbourg, Nantes and Nanterre created a *Tendance syndicale révolutionnaire fédéraliste* which succeeded in taking control of their respective associations.⁵⁹ It was the Situationists in the Strasbourg students' union who in 1966 published the notorious pamphlet, *On the Poverty of Student Life*, with its scandalous attack on the role of education in modern capitalist society, the conformism of the student body, sexual repression, the parlous state of the contemporary left and so on.

In May the M22M was at the centre of events: 'Its victories on the Nanterre campus and the militant fervour of its members made it the most active and popular of the groups'.⁶⁰ It was so named after the date on which 142 of its members occupied the university council chamber in protest against the arrest of five students from the National Vietnam Committee and the JCR following attacks on Chase Manhattan Bank and American Express buildings in Paris. Daniel Bensaid would describe the M22M—the form of whose name was probably inspired by Castro's 'Movement of 26 July'—as anti-imperialist, anti-bureaucratic and anti-capitalist.⁶¹ Its mixture of anarchist, Trotskyist and unaligned militants functioned 'at the cost of reciprocal concessions and on the basis of a common political experience which is the starting point of debate, without agreement on a "line" being a prerequisite for action'.⁶² So the M22M was not really an 'organisation' but simply brought together revolutionary students who belonged to a number of organisations or none: members of the Nanterre Anarchist Group, who had split from the Anarchist Federation (FA), the Anarchist Students Liaison (LEA), Trotskyists from the JCR, Maoists from the UJC-ML, 'pro-Situationists', council Communists, left Catholics and many without an ideological label.⁶³ The M22M also had a very decentralised, federal organisational structure, but in practice it was very informal: a community of militants who met each other regularly and made decisions collectively at general meetings.⁶⁴ They refused to be integrated into the structures created in the occupied universities and 'wanted to exist only as an informal group, perpetually inventing forms of action':

They remained, therefore, one of those 'agitating minorities' of which Sorel has spoken, which aimed at inspiring revolutionary movement without any theory. [...] Their actions were to be *exemplary*, that is, they were to have the character of political escalation designed to induce others to follow their example. [...]

Direct action of this kind went further than any proposed by the syndicalists in that it was inspired by the example of guerrilla warfare and the tactics of systematic provocation.⁶⁵

Daniel Cohn-Bendit himself identified as an anarchist, but his attitude was similar to that defined by the UGAC (Union of Anarchist Communist Groups) in 1966: anarchists are only one part of a broad revolutionary movement; many Marxists now accept elements of the libertarian critique and are in favour of self-management; it is time to move beyond ‘old quarrels inherited from the past’, in particular that between Marx and Bakunin.⁶⁶ He was nevertheless ‘very anti-Leninist’ when it came to organisational methods: ‘I am for organisational federalism—for federated autonomous groups which act together but still preserve their autonomy’.⁶⁷

When an interviewer tried to pin him down with regard to intellectual influences on the revolutionary movement, Cohn-Bendit was dismissive:

There aren’t ten people in the movement who have read Marcuse. [...] Camus is still a source, we read him, but he doesn’t have the same influence now. [...] Sartre belongs to the post-war period. We are at another stage. [...] I’m not going to name a single anarchist thinker; I don’t give a damn about theoreticians. There must be a theory which leads on to a particular activity. [...] In practice one relies on Marx and Bakunin, on Marcuse today, or Kolakowski. It is a fundamental error in studying the French student movement to search for some thinker who inspires our activity. [...] Every thinker counts for us.⁶⁸

Compared to the heavily theorised critique of daily life produced by the Situationists, the ‘global contestation’ of the M22M was ‘primarily a tactical concept enabling activist minorities to attack by word and deed the numerous “forms of repression” of bourgeois society’.⁶⁹

Many of the leading figures in the M22M had previously been involved in one or other of the small anarchist groups which had distanced themselves from the FA, rejecting what they saw as a form of anarchist dogmatism. They had wanted ‘not so much to renew anarchism as to renew revolutionary theory’.⁷⁰ Journals such as *Noir et Rouge*, *Informations Correspondence Ouvrières* (ICO) and *Socialisme ou Barbarie* (which of course came out of the Marxist tradition but was described by Morin as representing ‘an original synthesis of Marxism and anarchism’⁷¹ and was immensely influential on many anarchists⁷²) were devoted to a fundamental reconsideration of radical politics. ‘In this crucible, anarchism was smelted with other ideologies and practices’.⁷³ This was facilitated by the M22M’s contacts with Trotskyists, with students from Berkeley and especially from the German SDS. They learned lessons from the suppression of the Kronstadt revolt, the 1920 Italian factory committees, Trotsky’s critique of Stalinism, Mao’s emphasis on the role of the peasantry, Marcuse’s analysis of the repressive nature of modern capitalism and the tactics adopted by the Berkeley students and the Dutch ‘Provos’.⁷⁴ The Situationists

were also very important for the M22M's theoretical horizons, and they distributed copies of *The Poverty of Student Life*, of Vaneigem's *The Revolution of Everyday Life* (1967) and of Debord's *Society of the Spectacle* (1967).⁷⁵ Scornful of orthodoxy and labels, many nevertheless accepted the labels 'libertarian Marxist' or 'anarchist' when pushed.⁷⁶ For Biard, an anarchist active in the May movement, the M22M incarnated perfectly 'the diffuse anti-authoritarian spirit which marked the movement in the early days both in the universities and in workplaces'.⁷⁷

A number of young French leftists, including Cohn-Bendit, attended the international anarchist congress in Carrara in Italy in August–September 1968. The conference represented a clear generational clash. The leftists' argument was that 'the May insurrection was not the work of a specific organisation' but 'a perfect example of the spontaneity of the masses, and various revolutionary movements, especially the anarchists, played a leading role in triggering it'.⁷⁸ Traditional anarchism represented 'an orthodoxy which was completely overwhelmed in the street by the events of May': the revolution would be made 'through direct action and not through theory'. Any kind of 'institutional structure [...] stifles the vitality of the revolution'.⁷⁹

More experienced anarchists condemned the leftists' 'spontaneism' and faith in the efficacy of 'exemplary action' as being both a return to a failed nineteenth-century tactic and as naïve.⁸⁰ In their eyes, the failure of the May insurrection was thus due to the 'spontaneism' of groups such as the M22M.⁸¹ Even Guérin, a champion of revolutionary spontaneity and close to Cohn-Bendit, had reservations, and it seems to have been the failure of 1968 which pushed him and others away from anarchism and towards a kind of libertarian Marxism (especially Luxemburgism). As he wrote in 1971:

Apart from a handful of unrepentant 'spontaneists', obsessive adversaries of organisation because of their dread of the bureaucratic peril and who have as a result condemned themselves to sterility, no militant, either among the students or in the working class, believes today that it would be possible to make a lasting revolution without an 'active minority'.⁸²

CONCLUSIONS

Was '1968' Anarchist?

The consensus among both activists and researchers is that the anarchist movement was at a low ebb in 1968. According to Leval, a veteran of anarchist struggles in France, Spain and Argentina, 'never since its appearance in different countries [...], has anarchism been as weak both in terms of its numerical strength or its intellectual contribution', the principal reason being 'ideological, philosophical, ethical and tactical confusion'.⁸³ Of course anarchists became involved in the movement, but as Joyeux, a leading figure in the FA, put it, 'we jumped on a train that was already moving!'⁸⁴ But the anarchist movement as

a whole was overwhelmed by 1968: 'Their small numbers and their notorious unpreparedness for dealing with such situations reduced them to the status of spectators'.⁸⁵ Nor did anarchist organisations grow as a result of 1968, and in the early 1970s the movement was as numerically weak and as divided as before 1968.⁸⁶ The anarchist presence in the occupied universities in terms of groups and literature was minimal.⁸⁷ References in movement literature were to Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and Mao, not the anarchist canon. On the rare occasion that anarchism was referred to, it was negative. The Situationists had a certain profile but did not identify as anarchists and even objected to the fact that the bourgeois press assimilated them to the anarchist movement.⁸⁸ (Having said that, the conflation was justified to an extent given the Situationists' aims, as defined in a leaflet of May 1968 produced by the *Comité Enragés-Internationale Situationniste*: direct democracy, revocable delegates, the abolition of hierarchy, the permanent creative participation of the masses, etc.⁸⁹).

Some have argued that 1968 represented the birth of a new kind of anarchism. Duteuil suggests that the anarchist students and others involved in the various dissident groups 'shared a certain vision of anarchism far removed from the non-violent, humanistic individualism that had been prevalent in the movement and especially within the FA for some years'. They were what he called 'the forerunners of a slow and ongoing transformation of the anarchist movement that would take it back to more social and movement-centred activities, and more militant ones'.⁹⁰

Morin wrote in July 1968: 'It seems to me that we can speak both of a resurrection and of a renaissance of anarchy among the students'.⁹¹ By 'resurrection', he meant that the students in 1968 wanted to 'change their lives as much as they wanted to change society', that they were inspired partly by the American beatnik and hippy movements and partly by a rediscovery of anarchism. By 'renaissance', he meant that the students had taken anarchism, with its exclusive references to anarchist thinkers of the nineteenth century, and had integrated aspects of the thought of Marx and of Freud to produce a kind of 'libertarian communism':

Searching for a theoretical justification for their desire for freedom and authenticity, they came across different currents of modern thought, and it is from this extremely open revisionism that the renaissance of the libertarian movement was born.⁹²

Some have argued that 1968 globally was strongly influenced by the anarchist and revolutionary syndicalist traditions.⁹³ As the US anarchist Paul Goodman put it:

Needless to say, officials of the capitalist countries say that the agitators are Communists, and Communists say they are bourgeois revisionists. In my opinion, there is a totally different political philosophy underlying—it is anarchism.⁹⁴

For Goodman, ‘the protesting students are anarchist because they are in a historical situation to which anarchism is their only possible response’⁹⁵—namely, the Cold War and the dominance of the military-industrial complex, the abuse of science and technology and impending ecological crisis, the centralisation and technocratic management of society and the hollowing out of democracy, the subordination of education to the needs of capital. One should add to Goodman’s list the failure of the institutional left. This was all analysed in detail in the 1962 Port Huron Statement⁹⁶ and, in somewhat less accessible language, in the Situationists’ *Poverty of Student Life* in 1966. As Arblaster put it:

Anarchism, with its emphasis on self-activity, on people having direct power over their own lives, makes an obviously relevant challenge and response to the feelings of helplessness and powerlessness which are the inevitable obverse of the concentration of power at the top.⁹⁷

Suggesting that both capitalist and ‘socialist’ countries saw ‘a distinct, though fairly modest growth in the numbers of the anarchists themselves’, Arblaster also argued for a more diffuse but still significant influence of anarchist ideas⁹⁸:

It would be absurd to suggest that the majority of the New Left have read deeply in the writings of Proudhon or Kropotkin [...]. Nevertheless [...] anarchist ideas and attitudes have been widely adopted outside the ‘official’ anarchist movement itself. And perhaps this is in itself a paradoxical tribute to the influence of anarchism. The intense resistance among young radicals to being labelled, towards fixed ideologies and doctrines, and formal political parties and sects, has led to their fighting shy of identifying themselves even with anarchism. And, after all, not even the anarchist movement has entirely succeeded in avoiding the kind of bureaucratic fossilization to which the established parties of the left have fallen prey.⁹⁹

This is similar to George Woodcock’s conclusion about the apparent revival of anarchism: ‘The old revolutionary sect has not been resurrected, but in its place has appeared a moral-political movement typical of the age’.¹⁰⁰

The Spirit of 68

1968 was profoundly antiauthoritarian, questioning the legitimacy of all power relations, of all institutions, of all imposed social roles. Katsiaticas stresses the attack on social identities and divisions and the implicit demand for equality:

The animating principle of the world spirit of 1968 was to forge new identities based on the negation of existing divisions: in place of patriotism and national chauvinism, international solidarity; instead of hierarchy and patterns of domination and submission, self-management and individual self-determination; in place of patriarchy and racism, egalitarian humanism; rather than competition, cooperation; rather than the accumulation of wealth, attempts to end poverty; instead of the domination of nature, ecological harmony.¹⁰¹

For Goodman, the defining characteristic of 1968 was participatory democracy, ‘the chief idea in the Port Huron Statement’:

It is a cry for a say in the decisions that shape our lives, against top-down direction, social engineering, corporate and political centralization, absentee owners, brainwashing by mass media. In its connotations, it encompasses no taxation without representation, grass-roots populism, the town meeting, congregationalism, federalism, Student Power, Black Power, workers’ management, soldiers’ democracy, guerrilla organization. It is, of course, the essence of anarchist social order, the voluntary federation of self-managed enterprises.¹⁰²

The actual phrase ‘participatory democracy’ may have been coined in 1962 by the SDS authors of the Port Huron Statement, but before that, as Horn reminds us, the practice came out of the experimental communities developed through the ‘grassroots democracy’ of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (created in 1960) in the American Deep South: ‘a commitment to surmount the usual barrier of status, a commitment on the part of participants to trust each other as equals, not by dividing power up equally, but by fostering each person’s self-development’.¹⁰³ Direct democracy, dialogue and mass participation were adopted spontaneously throughout the American and European New Left movements, beginning with Berkeley’s aptly named Free Speech Movement (1964–1965). 1960s student movements were characterised everywhere by the frequency of mass meetings or general assemblies, and later by innumerable working groups, commissions and sub-committees which enabled the participation of an even greater proportion of activists. Occupations, whether of university buildings or workplaces, became equally frequent across America and Europe and provided the physical space and time for such deliberations. An extension of this desire to liberate thought and speech can be seen in the spread of alternative curricula and forms of education, from the Freedom Schools that spread through African American communities to the Free University of Berkeley in 1965, and then ‘free’ or ‘critical’ universities in Italy, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and France in 1966–1968. As for labour unrest in this period, it was also characterised by the normalisation of large general assemblies in factories and office buildings, and these, similar to what occurred in the universities, spawned commissions and sub-commissions. More permanent organisms were also created by striking workers, bringing together all workers irrespective of union membership: the Italian ‘unitary base committees’, strike or workers’ committees elsewhere. Experiments in self-management in France, Portugal and elsewhere were extensions of democracy to everyday working life.

The Legacy of 1968

Despite attempts to portray 1968 as having achieved little, the ‘long 1960s’ did in fact achieve a great deal, even if it fell short of the ‘total revolution’ envisaged

by many of 1968's protagonists. Marwick provided plenty of empirical evidence for 'a "revolution", or "transformation" in material conditions, lifestyles, family relationships and personal freedoms for the vast majority of ordinary people'.¹⁰⁴ Across Europe, workers (blue and white collar) gained significant wage increases in the years following 1968, as well as 'the only significant reduction of working time since World War II'¹⁰⁵ thanks to the decade of heightened social conflict which continued well into the 1970s.¹⁰⁶

But perhaps other less tangible changes are more important:

[T]he concrete experience of a qualitatively different way of life, the exposure to non-hierarchical modes of social interaction, the lived environment of solidarity, the heated atmosphere of open debate, the concrete strivings for a common and mutually beneficial system-transcending goal.¹⁰⁷

1968 was a source of hope and inspiration for at least a generation and ushered in a period of militancy: in the workplace, in the new social movements (feminism, lesbian and gay rights, environmentalism, prisoners' rights, immigrants' rights) and in education and culture. 1968 represented 'the ideological tomb of the concept of the "leading role"' of the industrial proletariat':

After 1968, none of the "other" groups in struggle—neither women nor racial "minorities" nor sexual "minorities" nor the handicapped nor the "ecologists" [...]—would ever again accept the legitimacy of "waiting" upon some other revolution. And since 1968, the "old left" movements have themselves become increasingly embarrassed about making, have indeed hesitated to continue to make, such demands for the "postponement" of claims until some presumed post-revolutionary epoch.¹⁰⁸

In that sense, it can be argued that 1968, as well as being the last nail in the coffin of orthodox Communism, also effectively redefined politics, and that we can find in 1968 the roots of the 'unofficial politics' which characterises the various 'anti-capitalist' movements of the 1990s and 2000s¹⁰⁹:

World-historical movements define new epochs in the cultural, political, and economic dimensions of society. *Even in failure*, they present new ideas and values which become common sense as time passes. World-historical movements qualitatively reformulate the meaning of freedom for millions of human beings.¹¹⁰

NOTES

1. Georgy Katsiaficas, *The Subversion of Politics. European Autonomous Social Movements and the Decolonization of Everyday Life* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2006), 1.
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From the Zapatistas to Seattle: The ‘New Anarchists’

Francis Dupuis-Déri

From the anarchists’ point of view, the twentieth century started in 1911 with the Mexican revolution and more specifically with the armed struggle of the anarchist organisation known as the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM). Starting in February of that year, a group of internationalist anarchists, including members of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and the famous Flores Magón brothers, held several towns in northern Baja California until their eventual defeat in June.

For the anarchists, it was once again in Mexico where the twenty-first century truly began, on 1 January 1994, with the uprising of the Zapatistas in the state of Chiapas. The rebels of the *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (EZLN—Zapatista Army of National Liberation) launched their offensive on the very day of the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a regional neoliberal deal between the political elite of Canada, the United States and Mexico. ‘*¡Ya basta!*’ (Enough!) was the Zapatista slogan. The battle lasted about two weeks, followed by a ceasefire with the Mexican State, then years of skirmishes and counter-insurrectionary operations.

The Zapatistas succeeded in securing autonomy and direct democracy for the populations of the liberated towns, which included San Cristobal de Las Casas and Las Margaritas. Signs were posted to warn visitors: ‘You are in Zapatista rebel territory: here the people rule and the government obeys’. The Zapatistas also built international support around the world: they organised an

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F. Dupuis-Déri (✉)
Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal,
QC, Canada
e-mail: dupuis-deri.francis@uqam.ca

Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism in 1996, which resulted in the emergence of Peoples' Global Action (PGA), a transnational network allowing for the more radical members of the alterglobalisation movement to express themselves.¹

A decade later, in *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*, the anarchist David Graeber recalled that '[t]he Zapatistas do not call themselves anarchists [...] they are trying to revolutionize revolutionary strategy itself by abandoning any notion of a vanguard party seizing control of the state [...] instead battling to create free enclaves that could serve as models for autonomous self-government [...] into a complex overlapping network of self-managing groups that could then begin to discuss the reinvention of political society'. Then, Graeber asked, 'who was listening to what they really had to say? Largely, it seems, a collection of teenage anarchists in Europe and North America, who soon began besieging the summits of the very global elite'.²

Such a statement suggests there was a link between the Zapatista uprising on the one hand and the 'new anarchists' of the so-called global justice or alterglobalisation movement on the other. And yet to grasp the spirit of neo-anarchism—both its *raison d'être* and *emotion d'être*—one should not forget that it is part of a web of historical references and relations going back to May '68 in Paris, and then re-stated over the years in such momentous manifestations as Seattle 1999, Occupy 2011 and even the Kurds' armed resistance in 2017.

THE NEW WORLD ORDER ERA: THE EARLY 1990s

In the early 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet empire, the political and economic elite of the so-called 'Free world' was celebrating its victory against statist socialism. Anarchism in overdeveloped countries was a political and social force, and yet it was marginal and mostly unknown outside radical circles. It seems that most of the anarchists at the time had no hope of seeing a revolution in their lifetime, according to studies in France, the United Kingdom and the United States.³ At the time, anarchism was above all about 'social justice' and bringing people to see governments and corporations from a critical perspective (hence the popularity of books by Noam Chomsky and Naomi Klein).

Anarchists were divided between the traditional currents of anarchism, such as anarcho-syndicalism, anarcho-pacifism, anarcho-communism and anarcha-feminism. Organising in decentralised networks such as the Animal Liberation Front and Earth First!, anarcho-ecologists were probably the most militant and were soon labelled 'ecoterrorists' by intelligence services, in the United States. There were a few self-proclaimed anarchist networks, such as the Love & Rage Federation in North America (1989–1998—Canada, Mexico, United States), the Fédération anarchiste in France, and journals such as *Anarchy* (United States), *Freedom* (United Kingdom), *Le Monde libertaire* (France), and *Rebelles* (Québec). Anarchists also held international meetings, such as the Rencontres anarchistes internationales in Barcelona (1993). Most of the time, however, anarchists were isolated into small groups—the Food Not Bombs collectives,

for instance—with specific priorities, such as anti-police brutality, anti-prison and solidarity with prisoners (Black Rose collectives), antiracism (Anti-Racist Action—ARA) and antifascism (Antifaschistische Aktion), and radical unionism (Confédération Nationale du Travail—CNT—and IWW). On the counter-cultural scene, the glorious years of the Autonomes squatters in Berlin were fading away. Lifestyle anarcho-punks were not dead, yet punk fashion was becoming increasingly commercialised.

Slowly but surely, however, anarchism was gaining influence by the very fact that the Marxist-Leninist ideologies and organisations had suffered a terrible setback with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Anarchism came out of the Soviet experience as politically and morally clean, offering a 'new' option for wannabe radicals and anticapitalist revolutionaries.

Even more significantly, anarchism was in tune with the so-called 'new social movements' that had roots in the 1960s and 1970s. Radical feminists, gays and lesbians, ecologists and anti-war and anti-nuclear activists had for decades been practising leaderless decentralised forms of organisation, direct democracy in deliberative assemblies and autonomous collective actions. Their tactics and organisational forms were drawn from the anarchist tradition often without even knowing it, or were re-invented through the collective imagination. The idea of the affinity group, for instance, was invented by Spanish anarchists at the end of the nineteenth century. It was then adopted by the anti-war movement in the United States in the 1950s, by the anti-nuclear movement in the 1970s, by Act Up (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power) in the 1980s and by the alterglobalisation movement in the 1990s.⁴

Some anarchists, such as Spaniard Tomas Ibanez, who lived in France and participated in the events of May '68, acknowledge today that a new form of anarchism emerged in the late 1960s and reached its full potential with the Battle of Seattle in 1999, as well as with the Indignados movement and Occupy in 2011. Such 'neo-anarchism' exists without any open references to anarchism, yet embodying anarchist values and practices.⁵ Similarly, Barbara Epstein, who encountered anarchists while doing research on the US anti-nuclear mass mobilisations in the 1970s, claimed in her 2001 article 'Anarchism and the Anti-Globalization movement' that '[t]he current anti-globalization movement has roots in the nonviolent direct action movement', that is, the 1960s and 1970s radical social movements, 'with which it shares a structure based on small autonomous groups, a practice of decision-making by consensus, and a style of protest that revolves around mass civil disobedience'. According to Epstein, '[m]any among today's young radical activists, especially those at the center of the anti-globalization and anti-corporate movements, call themselves anarchists. But the intellectual/philosophical perspective that holds sway in these circles might be better described as an anarchist sensibility than as anarchism per se'.⁶

As Maia Ramnath noticed in her book *Decolonizing Anarchism*, such a tendency was also in motion outside the overdeveloped countries. In the 1990s in India, for instance, 'non-party people's movements' of women, peasants,

ecologists and postleftist activists organised their antisystemic struggles outside political parties and traditional guerrilla groups, and they will soon get involved in the alterglobalisation movement.⁷ Maia Ramnath acknowledged that '[n]one of the movements discussed here is anarchist with a capital A', and yet 'the questions, themes, conflicts, and issues involved [...] are analogous to those that have characterized the anarchist problematic and lowercase *a* motif. They are not anarchists, but some of them—for example, Vandana Shiva and Arundhati Roy—are people whom anarchists appreciate',⁸ along with some of their concepts, such as Shiva's 'earth democracy'.

By the early 1990s, anarchism in overdeveloped countries was also in tune with the so-called 'postmodern' cultural mood of the time, related to the dismissal of Marxism and class-based analysis, the victory of liberalism and individualism and the consolidation of identity politics. More and more people felt alienated by national catch-all multi-issue political parties that claimed to be able to represent the entire nation, to deal with every issue and to implement global solutions (see the drop in electoral turnout from the 1960s to the 1990s). New activists were involved in non-partisan single-issue mobilisations, looking for direct action rather than a spokesperson who would claim to represent their will and speak in their name.

It was also a time for resistance against the neoconservative and neoliberal backlash and the 'New World Order' to recall the words of President George Bush Sr. uttered on 11 September 1991 in a speech about the war against Iraq. As a matter of fact, anarchists were actively involved in mass demonstrations against the war, where the Black Bloc tactic was apparently used for the first time by anarchists in the United States.⁹ Such a visibly militant form of activism draws people towards anarchism.¹⁰

THE ZAPATISTA UPRISING AND NEO-ANARCHISM

It comes as no surprise, then, that the Zapatista uprising of 1994 was inspiring and attractive to so many anarchists—as well as many Trotskyists and liberals—from Canada, the United States and Europe.¹¹ In Mexico City, anarcho-punks set up a music show to collect food for the Zapatistas,¹² who embodied a new political alternative, the spirit of resistance against neoliberalism and global capitalism, and the ideals of a leaderless deliberative and direct democracy (i.e. horizontalism). As stated by Eloisa, a Zapatista woman, their opponents were 'afraid that we realize that we are able to govern ourselves'.¹³ *Changing the World Without Taking Power* was not only an anarchist catchphrase but also the title of a book by John Holloway with the Zapatista experience in mind. The famous Zapatista leader, Subcommandante Marcos, was a paradoxical anonymous icon, his face hidden under a black hood like all the Zapatista rebels—fashion Mexican anarcho-punks equate with Black Bloc activism. More importantly, he claimed to be learning while walking and serving while leading, and he identified with anyone fighting injustice, claiming to be 'a Palestinian in

Israel, a Mayan Indian in the streets of San Cristobal, a Jew in Germany, a Gypsy in Poland, a Mohawk in Quebec' and 'an anarchist in Spain'.¹⁴

Like many anarchists in overdeveloped countries, Marianne Enckell, organiser of the Centre International de Recherches sur l'Anarchisme (CIRA—International Centre for Research on Anarchism) at Lausanne, recognised her ideals in the Zapatista experience.¹⁵ Yet anarchists were not the only ones to find inspiration in Chiapas. Radical French feminist and sociologist Jules Falquet complained ironically that no one in Europe cared about 'things that have been said for decades by feminists, but also, for example, *by anarchists*', but 'when the Zapatistas say the same things, it's great: we never heard of it, it's so interesting, it's so new!'¹⁶

In Chiapas, anarchists saw vivid proof that another world is possible, to recall the alterglobalisation slogan, and even that anarchy may actually work.

Many anarchists made the journey to be on the ground with the Zapatistas, acting as 'internationals' to defuse the tension between the rebels and the military and participating in global assemblies. And yet, according to Alex Khasnabish, '[r]ather than simply importing the model of the Zapatistas' struggle, activists in other places in the north of the Americas have sought to translate this resonance in ways that make sense within their own contexts'.¹⁷

Such was the case with Sarita Ahooja, a Montréal-based activist who went to Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico to participate in indigenous social movements, particularly with indigenous women. She then came back to Canada to be part of the alterglobalisation mobilisations, but also to participate in collective actions with refugees and migrants, such as No One Is Illegal, and with First Nations activists. Sarita Ahooja and many of her contemporaries¹⁸ noticed how settler-anarchists too often focus on so-called 'paradoxes' while indigenous people agree to talk with state representatives. They also saw how the anarchist catchphrase 'No Gods, No Masters' has led many Western, urban anarchists to dismiss the practice of spiritual rituals, thereby discounting the experience of many indigenous people and especially women. Sarita Ahooja is also critical of the cultural imperialism involved in branding indigenists as 'anarchists'. Yet she claimed that indigenism is inspiring for anarchists with regard to values, principles, discourses and practices. More importantly, she stated that anarchists should stand by indigenous people as allies, auxiliaries and accomplices in their struggles against state colonialism and capitalist imperialism.¹⁹

FROM CHIAPAS TO SEATTLE

For many commentators, the anti- or alterglobalisation movement was initiated by the Zapatistas in 1994, but for others it was born in the streets of Seattle on 30 November 1999. In fact, this global movement emerged and consolidated throughout the 1990s with a series of campaigns and mobilisations against the globalisation of capitalism, neoliberalism and the structural adjustments imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) (loans provided in exchange for public debt reduction and austerity

policies). The ‘movement of movements’ was a loose constellation of a variety of local social movements and activist groups ranging from anarchist affinity groups to Christian transnational organisations such as Oxfam, as well as unions, peasant organisations, student associations, communist parties, ecologists, Indian women opposing dam projects funded by the World Bank, autonomous media taking advantage of the new World Wide Web and so on.

According to the more radical activists in the movement—anarchists, autonomous communists, ecologists, radical feminists and queers—parliamentarism and capitalism cannot be reformed. Among the statements of the Black Bloc after their riot in Genoa during the G8 Summit in July 2001: ‘We don’t want a place at the table to discuss with the masters of the world, we want there to be no more masters of the world!’²⁰

Throughout the 1990s, anarchists encountered allies and accomplices within the alterglobalisation campaigns and mobilisations. For instance, some feminist activists and writers acknowledged that radical ‘feminist global justice activists’ were feeling, thinking, talking and acting more or less like anarchists, although they might have good reasons not to brand themselves as such.²¹ While radical feminists may share certain political interests with anarchists, they rightly denounce the phenomenon of ‘manarchists’—activists who confuse anarchist identities and masculine attitudes—as well as the male domination and sexual aggressions within anarchist networks and groups, which are almost always followed by a backlash against the survivors and their allies. Nevertheless, anarchists have tried to implement principles of anti-oppression in their milieu, and claim to be against sexism and homophobia. In the late 1990s, anarchists were part of the No Border Network, which set up temporary autonomous camps to protest racist immigration policies in Europe, and they also took part in Reclaim the Streets in the UK, which organised carnivals against capitalism, such as the Global Street Party in May 1998 to protest the G8 Summit in Birmingham.²² Then came Seattle.

Early in the morning, activists from the Direct Action Network (DAN) occupied crossroads and chained themselves around the convention centre where the WTO meeting was about to begin. The Ruckus Society had trained them so well in techniques of non-violent civil disobedience that the police were unable to break through their lines to allow the congresspeople access to the building. As Clive Gabay noted in the text ‘What did the anarchists ever do for us? Anarchy, decentralization, and autonomy at the Seattle anti-WTO protests’, ‘whilst the majority of demonstrators themselves were not anarchists, anarchist values and methods in fact played an integral part in the highly drilled non-violent demonstrations that shut down the WTO Seattle meeting’.²³ Indeed, the DAN embodied anarchist principles and forms of organisation: leaderless direct democracy, consensus-based decision-making, affinity groups, direct action and so on. Under pressure from the White House and with President Bill Clinton on his way to Seattle, the police started to club, pepper spray and tear gas peaceful protesters. Around 11 a.m., the police ran out of ammunition and was forced to resupply from suburban police stations. At this

moment, far away from the convention centre, about 200 masked, black-clad protesters—the Black Bloc—targeted symbols of transnational capitalism, smashing windows of banks and stores such as Nike, McDonald's and Starbucks. Around noon, the 'united' march organised by the unions and NGOs left the stadium, walked in a circle far from the convention centre and came back to its starting point. Many rank-and-file participants in that march bypassed the marshals to join the 'kids' in the streets.²⁴

The situation was compared to the Japanese military attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, to highlight the extent to which the police had been taken off guard. A curfew was enforced by the National Guard to restore law and order, but that did not prevent riots in the residential neighbourhoods to which the crowd had been pushed. Neighbourhood residents joined the protesters in the streets, expressing their outrage about the clouds of tear gas. About 600 protesters were arrested but not even 5% were found guilty. The Seattle Chief of Police resigned. Several class action lawsuits were launched, which only proved successful several years later.²⁵

According to an observer:

The true heroes of the Battle in Seattle [were] the street warriors, the Ruckus Society, *the Anarchists*, Earth Firsters, the Direct Action Media Network (DAMN), radical labor militants such as the folks at Jobs With Justice, hundreds of Longshoremen, Steelworkers Electrical Workers and Teamsters who disgustingly abandoned the respectable, police sanctioned official AFL-CIO parade and joined the street warriors at the barricades in downtown.... The main march withdrew in respectable good order and dispersed peacefully to their hotels.... Fortunately the street warriors won.²⁶

For the anarchists and other alterglobalists, the Battle of Seattle has since been much mythologised. There are claims that the WTO negotiation process failed because of the protests (in fact, the protests simply forced the meeting to be postponed for a few hours; the negotiations failed because of internal disagreements). The coverage of the protests by state and corporate media was widely contemptuous, connecting anarchism to violence, riots, chaos and disorder, and associating anarchists with troublemakers and thugs. The media also wrongly stated that the police violence was a reaction to the Black Bloc's action.²⁷ In fact, the media showered so much attention on the black-clad activists that anarchist websites such as Infoshop got flooded by visitors on the days following the protest (an increase of 300%). As two scholars explained, '[t]here is no question, however, that [the Black Bloc] has played a critical role in re-establishing the public visibility of the anarchist movement. This in turn helped anarchists to overcome the access problems of the Web, allowing anarchists online to tap the potential of the medium to expose a wider audience to their views.'²⁸

In the following months and years, and despite intense police repression, anarchists protested the International Monetary Fund and World Bank

meetings in Washington (April 2000) and Prague (September 2000), the Summit of the Americas in Québec (April 2001), the European Union meeting in Gothenburg (June 2001) and the G8 Summit in Genoa (July 2001). Before each international summit, intelligence services and security forces as well as state and corporate media focused on the threat of the Black Bloc, labelling its participants ‘violent anarchists’ or ‘anarchist criminals’. Thousands of police officers were mobilised, preventive arrests of ‘ringleaders’ were made, ‘no protest zones’ were fenced off to prevent demonstrations from coming too close to the global elite meetings.²⁹

According to some participating anarchists, those demonstrations or riots gave them the opportunity to publicly express their outrage against the system, to disrupt the media staging of the global elite, to draw attention to their messages, to show combative disobedience and resistance in face of the new world order, and to bring people to join them in the streets, or in their groups and organisations.³⁰ The PGA seized the opportunity presented by those international events to call for a Global Day of Action. While people were protesting in Seattle, for instance, demonstrations were also taking place in 14 other US cities, as well as in Manila, Paris and Seoul. In Mexico City, many activists were arrested and tortured by the police for protesting against the imprisonment of Seattle demonstrators.³¹

Some participants complained about ‘summit hopping’, arguing that such manifestations take too much time and energy, and often leave local groups to deal with the aftermath of a transnational mobilisation: criminalisation and repression, burnout and trauma and so on. And yet anarchists are still involved in the alterglobalisation movement almost two decades after Seattle, protesting the G20 summit in Toronto (2010) and the G20 summit in Hamburg (2017).

VIOLENCE VS NON-VIOLENCE: THE NEVER-ENDING DEBATE

The idea of using so-called ‘violence’ as a protest tactic was at the core of the most heated debate about anarchist involvement in the alterglobalisation movement. This was nothing new. Barbara Epstein recalled a similar debate in the 1970s when the Clamshell Alliance organised a mass demonstration against the construction of a nuclear plant in Seabrook, about 40 miles from Boston. An anarchist affinity group named Hard Rain wanted to bring a wirecutter to get through the fence to enter the site, but the proposal was opposed on the grounds that it was violent in and of itself, and would invite police repression at the protest.³² There were similar debates in the 1980s in West Berlin among the anticapitalist squatters of the Autonomomen movement. These debates pitted hippies or ‘Müslis’ (in reference to the health cereal) against punks or ‘Mollis’ (in reference to Molotov cocktails).³³ In the United Kingdom in the early 1990s, the debate was known as ‘fluffy vs spiky’. Yet, the underground magazine *POD* claimed that ‘[t]he whole Fluffy/Spiky debate was seen by most activists as a fuss about nothing’.³⁴ This never-ending debate attests to the

sacralisation of the law and the fear of transgression even amongst the most radical dissenters, but also to their very high ethical standard: anarchists may debate for weeks about the 'violence' of a rock thrown at a window or of a wirecutter used to enter the site of a nuclear plant. Clearly, any head of state, liberals included, would not express similar ethical concerns about political 'violence'.

The systematic demands by state and corporate journalists for alterglobalisation spokespeople and activists to distance themselves from these troublemakers resulted in a recurring debate within the alterglobalisation movement about whether to condemn these radicals and denounce their violent tactics. Struggling to explain and justify their deeds, some blackblockers chose to explicitly define what they understood as violent, and why they believe property destruction is legitimate. The activists of an affinity group of the Seattle Black Bloc known as the ACME Collective released the *N30 Black Bloc Communique*, in which they stated:

We contend that property destruction is not a violent activity unless it destroys lives or causes pain in the process [...] When we smash a window, we aim to destroy the thin veneer of legitimacy that surrounds private property rights [...] By 'destroying' private property, we convert its limited exchange value into an expanded use value [...] A dumpster becomes an obstruction to a phalanx of rioting cops and a source of heat and light. A building facade becomes a message board to record brainstorm ideas for a better world. After N30, many people will never see a shop window or a hammer the same way again.³⁵

Despite this heated debate, anarchists and some alterglobalisation activists managed over time to work together to build solidarity. One of the giant fairies of the Tactical Frivolity collective, part of the Pink and Silver Bloc in Prague in 2000, dismissed the 'fluffy vs spiky' debate, wondering, 'what is violence anyway when the State is like killing people every day, man. And the people in the World Bank eat Third World babies for breakfast, so if they get bricked then hey, that's their fault'.³⁶

One way to defuse the tension was to identify several protest zones in the same city. The goal was to establish, as Amory Starr explained, a 'separation between permitted and non-permitted events by time and space to ensure safe space for internationals, high risk folks or others who want to be assured of avoiding police repression in any form'. The goal was also to foster a 'sense of unity between all aspects of the action whether permitted or non-permitted'.³⁷ Aware of the debate, the activists of the Montréal Convergence des luttes anti-capitalistes (CLAC—Anti-Capitalist Convergence), a group founded by three anarchists to organise radical demonstrations against the 2001 Summit of the Americas in Québec City, coined the principle of 'respect for a diversity of tactics', in their 'basis of unity'.³⁸ They aimed to bring together radical demonstrators with different views and feelings about how to protest.

In Québec City, the CLAC identified three zones: green (chill out), yellow (peaceful civil disobedience) and red (confrontation). Even Starhawk, a well-known pagan pacifist, feminist and an instructor in civil disobedience strategies, came to see the Black Bloc as a friendly tactic, especially after the police violence in Québec City. Talking about ‘the movement for global justice’ in her 2002 book *Webs of Power: Notes from the Global Uprising*, she suggested that the challengers of the new world order tend, overall,

to be young, to be aligned with *antiauthoritarian and anarchist visions* [...] They mostly work outside of formal organization. In North America, the groups they do form are direct action oriented. They include CLAC, the Anti-Capitalist Convergence [...] And they don’t advocate violence, but rather a diversity of tactics. Diversity of tactics, in part, means flexibility, not being locked into strict guidelines. It means support for every group to make their own decisions about what to do tactically and strategically.³⁹

The police would occasionally attack designated ‘green’ zones, but still, in the months that followed the Summit of the Americas, Anticapitalist Convergences sprang up in New York, Washington, Chicago, Seattle and Calgary, adopting the same ‘basis of unity’. In Québec, the most vivid and militant national federation of students, Association pour une solidarité syndicale étudiante (ASSÉ—Association for Student Union Solidarity), which was founded in February 2001 in the wake of the mobilisation against the Summit of the Americas, made the decision to adopt the principle of respect for a diversity of tactics, a choice of significant importance during the seven-month-long student strike in 2012 known as the ‘Maple Spring’.

Another way to respect a diversity of tactics was to identify timeframes for different kinds of demonstration. For instance, a demonstration may start as a peaceful protest, then a group may split off to strike at symbols of capitalism or to clash with the police. This is what happened during the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto. During the Maple Spring in Québec in 2012, ‘manifs nocturnes’ (night protests) were called anonymously on the Web and were held every single evening at 9 p.m. for months. These night protests were leaderless and were known to be an open space for confrontation with the police and destruction of state and private property (however, ‘peace-police’ protesters sometimes physically attacked blackblockers).

The respect for a diversity of tactics is also grounded on the fact that anarchists and other anticapitalists were not restricted to the Black Blocs. Anarchists were also part of the Pink and Silver Blocs, the street medics units, the independent media crews, the samba bands such as the Infernal Noise Brigade,⁴⁰ the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army and so on. It thus came as no surprise that UK Prime Minister Tony Blair called the alterglobalisation protests an ‘anarchist travelling circus’.

SEATTLE'S DAUGHTERS AND SONS

Almost 20 years after Seattle, a new generation of activists have gotten on board the 'neo-anarchist' train that started its journey in 1968 in Berkeley, Paris, Mexico⁴¹ and elsewhere. In 2017, Paolo Gerbaudo published *The Mask and the Flag: Populism, Citizenism and Global Protest*, a book equating new mobilisations such as Occupy (2011) and Nuit Debout (Paris, 2016) with the neo-anarchist tradition running from 'the self-management ethos of the '68 occupiers to the self-government of the Zapatistas in Mexico [...] [to] anti-globalization activists'.⁴² Paolo Gerbaudo also quotes Egyptian activist Mahmoud Salem who claimed that occupations of public squares and places in Egypt in 2011, but also in Madrid, Tel Aviv, New York and so on, were 'anarchist without knowing it is anarchist'.⁴³

Many self-proclaimed anarchists have been involved in recent years in anti-austerity mobilisations in Greece, probably the country with the most vivid anarchist movement, but also in the Occupy mobilisation, the anti-cut movement in the United Kingdom in 2011, the Brazilian mobilisations for free public transportation in 2013 and against the football World Cup in 2014, as well as anti-Trump and anti-fascist protests in the United States in 2017, without forgetting the anarcho-hacking and cyberactivism of Anonymous. And while we may trace the roots of this movement to Paris, some of this new generation of activists have started using the slogan: 'Fuck May 68! Fight Now!'

Neo-anarchism is what many young people make of their contentious movement. In France in 2016, waves of protests were occurring simultaneously, including (1) a national union mobilisation against the new *Loi du Travail* (Work Law) while the 'cortège de tête' (head procession) of their street protests was hijacked by hundreds of blackblockers and their friends and accomplices, (2) a daily occupation of the Place de la République (Nuit Debout) and (3) a wave of protests by *lycéens* (high school students). The latter launched the network 'Génération ingouvernable' (Ungovernable Generation), known to be sympathetic to anarchism. In my own research about democracy and contentious politics in high schools in Québec, many of the young rebels are anarchists if not in their minds, at least in their hearts. They organised themselves autonomously and spontaneously, calling a general assembly in the cafeteria or in a nearby park, where they voted for one or two days of striking. While I thought at the beginning of my research that they had followed the lead of older student activists, it was in fact the other way around: after they collectively decided to organise and mobilise, they went to a university student association to ask for help, for instance, for money to buy materials. More importantly, most of them came out of their first political experience with no respect for formal student councils—those embodiments of the powerless elected institution—and with a strong sense of defiance towards electoral politics in general (so-called representative democracy). Among those who were old enough to appear on voting lists when they talked to me, many do not vote.⁴⁴

BACKLASH AGAINST NEO-ANARCHISM

Neo-anarchists have been targeted not only by the police—thousands of arrests in the streets—but also reviled by politicians, journalists and pundits, as well as by spokespeople and intellectuals who claim to be reasonable liberals, and by ‘peace-police’ fellow demonstrators. In Seattle, Lori Wallach, an American lobbyist and director of Global Trade Watch, explained that some ‘anarchists’ apparently wished to break windows the day before the opening of the WTO meeting, while the French peasant José Bové was distributing Roquefort cheese in front of a McDonald’s.

Our people actually picked up *the anarchists*. Because we had with us steelworkers and longshoremen who, by sheer bulk, were three or four times larger. So we had them literally just sort of, a teamster on either side, just pick up an *anarchist*. We’d walk him over to the cops and say this boy just broke a window. He doesn’t belong to us. We hate the WTO, so does he, maybe, but we don’t break things. Please arrest him. And the cops wouldn’t arrest anyone.⁴⁵

The next day, a campaigner against sweatshops stood in front of stores to protect their windows from the ‘vandals’. She asked herself, ‘Where are the police? The anarchists should have been arrested’.⁴⁶

More recently, the political philosopher Nancy Fraser, an influential socialist and feminist from the New School of Social Research in New York, published an article under the provocative title ‘Against anarchism’.⁴⁷ Such a backlash by a high-profile scholar seems to testify to the growing influence of neo-anarchism in the streets, the public sphere, and even academia. Indeed, while older Marxist professors have turned their coats, sunk into silent melancholy or retired, many post-Seattle graduate scholars have made their way from the street to the campus, got hired and made enough noise that some are now talking about ‘the anarchist turn’ in academia, to recall the seminal book edited by scholars from the New School. Academic specialists of social movements talk about ‘anarchism reloaded’⁴⁸ or ‘anarchism revived’⁴⁹ while others in cultural studies, arts and literature theorise about ‘post-anarchism’. Although it is clearly a paradox—or even a contradiction—for a university professor to claim to be an anarchist, especially in a State-run university, many of us are trying to make our work (minimally) useful to activists, and to sustain an activist life despite a lack of time and energy, sly comments of reactionary columnists and threatening contempt from deans and tenured colleagues.

Nancy Fraser’s charge against anarchism was actually a reply to Fuyuki Kurasawa, a sociologist from York University in Toronto who advocated, from an ‘anarchist-inspired model of cosmopolitanism’,⁵⁰ that an anarchist counter-public should include not only anarchists but also subalterns. It should also critically withdraw from official institutions while contesting mainstream discourses and sustaining autonomous self-managed (direct democracy) organisations. On the contrary, Nancy Fraser stressed that anarchists must be pragmatic

and join progressive (liberal) organisations and movements, including the Democratic Party itself (in 2016, Fraser supported the candidate for the Democrat primaries Bernie Sanders⁵¹). This is not a new concern for Fraser, who had condemned the radical feminists of the 1970s—the forerunners of the ‘neo-anarchists’—who refused to deal with the State apparatus. On similar grounds, Fraser stated that ‘anarchist tactics are not themselves sufficient to effect fundamental structural change [...] Better to fight to democratize, than to abolish, the institutions that regulate transnational interaction in a globalizing world’. Chantal Mouffe, another high-profile political philosopher advocating ‘radical democracy’, shares Fraser’s contempt towards neo-anarchists and their refusal to get involved in official and hierarchical institutions:

What I call ‘withdrawal from’ [...] is the strategy of the Indignados in Spain or Occupy Movement, as the protesters say, ‘we don’t want anything to do with parties, with trade unions, with existing institutions because they can’t be transformed. We need to assemble and organise new forms of life. We should try democracy in presence, in act.’ The strategy that I oppose to that of ‘withdrawal from’ is a strategy that I call ‘engagement with’—it engages with the existing institutions in order to transform them.⁵²

Mouffe is an advisor for the new Spanish political party Podemos. The interventions of both Fraser and Mouffe are in line with the never-ending debate within the broader socialist family between the so-called reformists (or parliamentarians) and radicals (antiparliamentarians or anarchists).

What remains of anarchist dreams in Fraser’s political project? Not much. She ends up stating that we ‘should incorporate neo-anarchism’s best insights, while rejecting wholesale anarchism’, yet she avoids identifying any of these best insights outright. Fraser and Mouffe offer anarchists a one-way deal. They ask them to enlist in official institutions, to become one among many rank-and-file volunteers focusing on the next election day. Some might get an executive office in the political machine. But among anarchists, this sort of deal has a name: selling out. More dramatically, what Fraser and Mouffe ask anarchists to do is to renounce their hopes and their reasons for fighting, to renounce what they are and what they want to be, to renounce to their very *raison d’être* and *émotion d’être*.

The position held by Fraser and Mouffe is a clear rebuttal of the Zapatistas and Seattle inheritance. For neo-anarchists, elections and political parties are no democracy at all. The goal is not to repair or renovate a failed regime, but to believe that another world is possible, and to create and build this new world through autonomous, horizontal organisation and direct action. As David Graeber explained in his text ‘The New Anarchists’, published in 2002 in *The New Left Review*:

In North America especially, this is a movement about reinventing democracy. It is not opposed to organization. It is about creating new forms of organization. It

is not lacking in ideology. Those new forms of organization *are* its ideology. It is about creating and enacting horizontal networks instead of top-down structures like states, parties or corporations; networks based on principles of decentralized, non-hierarchical consensus democracy. Ultimately, it aspires to be much more than that, because ultimately it aspires to reinvent daily life as whole.⁵³

With the overall rejection of elections and parliamentarism, the politics of demand is dismissed to the benefit of the politics of action: resistance and confrontation.⁵⁴ Forms of organisation and modes of direct action are understood as ‘prefigurative politics’, that is, what one does and how one organises *here and now* is coherent with the ideal society one dreams about. Today, anarchists reconceptualise revolution itself, drawing—consciously or not—from nineteenth-century mutualism and individualist anarchism by claiming that the process itself is the goal, and that it is possible to live according to our ideals right here and right now (in a sexual or love relationship, a free commune, a squat, an affinity group, a political organisation, etc.). Anarchists are therefore active in the world, struggling in a process of self-emancipation while at the same time standing for and engaged with people in need of solidarity and mutual aid. This is what we learned from the Zapatista legacy.

To close the circle, the Mohawk activist and academic Taiaiake Alfred from the University of Victoria in Canada coined the concept of ‘anarcho-indigenism’ to facilitate ‘collaborations between anarchists and Onkwehonwe [original people] in the anti-globalization movement’. According to Alfred, ‘there are philosophical connections between indigenous and some strains of anarchist thought on the spirit of freedom and the ideals of a good society. [...] There are also important strategic commonalities between indigenous and anarchist ways of seeing and being in the world’.⁵⁵ Indeed, indigenous warriors and settler-anarchists have stood side by side in several collective actions in the 2000s, including the protests at the WTO in Cancun in 2003, the ‘No Olympics on Stolen Lands’ campaign in Vancouver in 2010, and the Ni Canada, Ni Québec (Neither Canada, nor Québec) network.⁵⁶

Although it is still too early to know how this will play out in anarchist histories and mythologies, many anarchists—especially in Europe—are now attracted towards the Kurdish armed resistance against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). Long-time Zapatistas admirer David Graeber now equates the war in Syria with the Spanish Civil War, recalling that:

In 1937, my father volunteered to fight in the International Brigades in defence of the Spanish Republic [...] I never thought I would, in my own lifetime, see the same thing happen again [...] The autonomous region of Rojava [...] has not only maintained its independence, but is a remarkable democratic experiment. Popular assemblies have been created as the ultimate decision-making bodies, councils selected with careful ethnic balance [...] there are women’s and youth councils, and, in a remarkable echo of the armed Mujeres Libres (Free Women) of Spain, a feminist army, the “YJA Star” militia (the “Union of Free Women”, the star here referring to the ancient Mesopotamian goddess Ishtar).⁵⁷

There are strong similarities between how Graeber talked back then about the Zapatistas and the current situation with the Kurds: 'the young people are very enthusiastic. They're not anarchists, but they embrace a lot of anarchist ideas; they've been reading anarchism. They're anti-state, so what they call themselves doesn't really matter from an anarchist position as long as you're anti-state and anti-capitalism'.⁵⁸ However, the situation may be more complicated, from an anarchist point of view. The Zapatistas were resisting using (relatively) low-intensity guerilla warfare to fight neoliberalism, global capitalism and the economic collusion of the postcolonial Mexican State with the United States. From an anarchist perspective, it might be less appealing to fight with the Kurds—but alongside the US army—against Islamists while overdeveloped countries are plagued by neo-Nazi groups and neo-fascist political parties playing the Islamophobia card.

Possibly inspired by the Zapatistas, the Kurds wish to convince liberal and anarchist intellectuals from overdeveloped countries that they are radical democrats or even anarchists, inviting foreign delegates to meet with movement leaders and instructors, to visit the Women's Academy and to talk about how the 'democratic confederalism' drafted by Abdullah Öcalan, their jailed leader, echoes Murray Bookchin's libertarian municipalism.⁵⁹ Some Western black-blockers have even volunteered for the Kurdish militia. One of them left to fight in Syria after watching 'a video on an anarchist website'. Back in Montréal after a few months in the Kurdish militia, one activist told a journalist: 'It is a system really close to anarchism'.⁶⁰

No one knows for sure what the future of neo-anarchism will look like, especially with our current arrogant rulers, cybercapitalism and climate change, with our nuclear plants and our thousands of nuclear warheads, with our perpetual 'war on terrorism', police militarisation, mass incarceration, mobilisation of reactionary 'angry white males', racism and Islamophobia. And yet from the Zapatistas of Chiapas to the Kurds of Syria, from the streets of Seattle to the squares of Madrid, there is a feeling that we are no longer embroiled in the pessimism of the 1980s anarcho-punks, who claimed there was 'No Future'. After more than two generations of anarchist revival, today anarchists in the streets of Athens may claim: 'We are an image of the future'.

NOTES

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PART IV

Applications



Utopianism and Intentional Communities

Rhiannon Firth

THE CONCEPT OF UTOPIA

‘Utopia’ is a neologism coined by Sir Thomas More in 1516¹ based on a pun on the Greek *eutopia* meaning ‘good place’ and *outopia* meaning ‘no place’.² The concept is thus ambiguous and paradoxical: it implies positioning in time and space, yet also non-existence and elusiveness. Utopia has a particular resonance with anarchism, since it implies a lifeworld outside and beyond the usual terrain of politics, which celebrates the role of the imagination. Utopianism is an approach to social change that starts from the premise that there is something wrong with the world and proceeds to dream and imagine how things might be if circumstances were radically changed. Utopias can take a variety of forms: the best known are fiction, social theory, and the topic of this chapter: experiments in alternative living. Utopianism poses a productive and creative tension between critique (of the status quo) and desire (for something different) whilst introducing an element of uncertainty, contingency and (im)possibility.³

This tension of (im)possibility—the good place we can desire and imagine, that nonetheless is no place—is the basis of a widespread sentiment of anti-utopianism throughout mainstream politics and culture, as well as many traditions of political theory. Criticisms of utopianism arise on two fronts. First, there are those who deny the possibility of any alternative to the current capitalist economy and neoliberal state politics. This stance is summed up in Francis Fukuyama’s assertion that in liberal democracy we have reached ‘the end of history’.⁴ Liberals such as Karl Popper have linked utopianism to totalitarianism since it is presumed to involve a strategy to be executed ‘all at once’ by ‘a strong centralised leadership’.⁵ Popper’s critique was specifically aimed at Marxism. For Popper, utopias were blueprints that were impervious to change, therefore

R. Firth (✉)
University of Essex, Essex, UK
e-mail: R.firth@essex.ac.uk

oppressive of dissidents, whilst liberal society should aim for ‘piecemeal’ reformist and gradual change. Similarly, colloquial use of the term ‘utopia’ tends to associate it with perfection and impossibility. Examples of this understanding abound in popular culture, where societies designed on rational principles turn out to be terrifying dystopias in practice, for example, in the films *Demolition Man* (1993), *Brazil* (1985), *Blade Runner* (1982), *High-Rise* (2015), *THX 1138* (1971) and others. Such films often centre on corrupt governments and renegade individuals who refuse to conform to stultifying norms. The underlying assumption is that since human beings are imperfect, and have different needs and desires, attempts to institute a singular vision of utopia from ‘on high’ would be totalitarian and oppress individuality. Of course, these kinds of misfired blueprints have nothing to do with anarchism: the implicit critique is usually aimed at Soviet communism, an intensified and illiberal capitalism, or other dictatorial regimes. Nonetheless the cultural conflation of anarchism with violent utopianism strikes a misplaced fear in the hearts of many, whilst the conflation of utopias with totalitarianism silences and renders invisible true anarchist utopias. Thus, the conversational put-down familiar to many anarchists: ‘it sounds great in theory, but it wouldn’t work in practice’.

The second front from which the assault on utopianism is issued comes from within the field of radical theory. Whilst Marxists have tended to share with anarchists and utopians a critique of the current economic system and a revolutionary rather than reformist approach to change, Marx himself was critical of the utopian model of social change. His critique was directed at the ‘utopian socialists’ (who did not themselves use this term), Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, and Robert Owen who lived in the early nineteenth century. The utopian socialists drew up detailed plans of imagined societies with the premise that if these were appealing and convincing then people of all classes would voluntarily join them. These idealistic plans were even put into place in communities such as Robert Owen’s New Harmony and New Lanark and the Fourierist Brook Farm.⁶ Marx and Engels criticised the utopian socialists, because unlike their ‘scientific’ analysis of material conditions, the utopian socialists did not locate their alternatives within the context of existing class struggle, and therefore they were seen to lack an agent of social change.⁷

Marx and Popper define the field of utopianism differently: Popper’s critique of utopianism was aimed at Marxists, whilst Marx believed the utopians were socialists and anarchists. Nonetheless, both classical Marxists and Liberals claim a unifying truth against which deviations are labelled ‘utopian’ and derided as impossible, when in fact, both of these modes of theorising have their own utopian visions. Marx’s utopian vision is future-oriented and descriptive; a communist society where one can ‘hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner’.⁸ Not too different then, from the utopias of the ‘utopian socialists’ perhaps, as well as the lives of many contemporary communards. It is uncontroversial, in contemporary societies contextualised by the collapse of the Soviet Union, to deride Marxist

ideals as utopian, yet theorist Ruth Levitas asserts that ‘we have to recognise that utopias are not the monopoly of the Left’.⁹ Contemporary conservative and neoliberal ideologies have their own utopian visions. Even though the conservative vision of the future is ostensibly based on preservation and restoration of hierarchies and inequalities: ‘there is no doubt that there is an image of a desired society here, where there is unquestioned loyalty to the state (and where trade union activity is seen as a form of subversion), where there is hierarchy, deference, order, centralised power—and, incidentally, where the patriarchal family is the fundamental unit of society and where sexuality outside of this has been eliminated’.¹⁰ The neoliberal utopia portrays unbridled individualism, inexorable technological progress and unlimited natural resources, alongside ‘the elimination of the public sphere, total liberation for corporations and skeletal social spending’.¹¹ Anarchist utopias, which will be considered in more detail below, can be wildly variant but tend to be based on some vision of non-hierarchy, mutual aid, equal distribution, non-exploitative production and relationships, individual autonomy and freedom of expression.¹²

Whether we perceive any of these variant visions as positive or negative, utopianism is the expression of diverse dreams of a better world and has the potential to produce effects in the world by altering people’s beliefs, values, emotions and actions. Rather than defining utopia in terms of form (e.g. fiction or social theory) or content (e.g. conservative or radical), many scholars of utopia agree that we should define utopia in terms of its *function*: ‘the education of desire’.¹³ Utopias and utopianism articulate critique and dissatisfaction (with either the entire *status quo*, or with specific elements within it) as well as desire, for something better. Whilst the forms and content of this expression of desire can vary wildly, we need not accept all forms of utopia as equally valid, and we may well share the liberalist fear of totalitarian and oppressive utopias as well as Marx’s fear that utopias can be purely compensatory and removed from social struggle. Yet this does not necessitate that we give up on utopia entirely.

The issue at stake here is epistemological. Both the liberalist and Marxist visions have utopian elements, but they are obscured by the ways in which each lays claim to truth—whether this be in claiming to know the reality of ‘human nature’ or through having foundations in ‘scientific analysis’. There are several problems here. First of all, the claim that some idea might be impossible to achieve in practice does not necessarily negate the possibility or desirability of trying, which might be a productive or ethically attractive process regardless. It is the truth-claiming, rather than the imaginative aspects of utopianism that anarchist anthropologist David Graeber argues lies at the heart of violence and oppression:

Stalinists and their ilk did not kill because they dreamed great dreams ... but because they mistook their dreams for scientific certainties ... In fact all forms of systemic violence are (amongst other things) assaults on the role of the imagination as a political principle.¹⁴

It is not, then, the lack of a basis in ‘truth’ which makes particular utopias potentially oppressive. Rather, the harm resides in the totalising effects of utopias which lay claim to singular and unassailable truth, through abstract rationalism, pragmatism, or scientism. The utopias of the mainstream have often been as hierarchical and authoritarian as the cultures which produced them.¹⁵ As the theorist of utopianism, Susan McManus puts it, ‘ostensibly authoritative modes of knowledge production, are always-already creative epistemologies ... that efface their contingency and creative power in favour of their legislative and authoritative power’.¹⁶

Other ways of thinking and doing utopia are possible. Tom Moylan and Lucy Sargisson identify trends within utopian fiction, which they term ‘critical’¹⁷ and ‘transgressive’.¹⁸ In these literary works, such as Marge Piercy’s *Woman on the Edge of Time*, Joanna Russ’ *The Female Man* and Samuel R. Delany’s *Triton*, the critical and creative function of utopia is not obscured behind truth-claims. The societies portrayed do not appear as perfect visions nor as closed blueprints. The authors take great trouble to explore and celebrate themes of difference, deviance and dissent. Many of these creative and playful fictional utopias have explored anarchist themes, for example, Ursula Le Guin’s *The Dispossessed*, Starhawk’s *The Fifth Sacred Thing* and Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s *Herland*. Such utopias are ‘critical’, Moylan argues, in three ways: they are critical of the *status quo*; they are also self-critical, exploring forms of domination and exclusion that arise from within; and they are critical in their aim to produce social change through a *critical mass*; a flourishing of libertarian utopias in all their diverse forms.¹⁹

Thinking about the utopian impulse as both a means of expressing and educating desire can help us to realise that utopia is not always about the future, nor about impossible blueprints, but rather it is something endemic to the present of everyday life. Theorist Ernst Bloch has interpreted practices as diverse as medicine, fairy tales and architecture as utopian.²⁰ Thus, whilst utopias and utopianism are not necessarily anarchist, there is a peculiar resonance between this playful, contingent and experimental function and anarchism, and utopianism has played an important role in the history of anarchism.²¹ Similarly, anarchism has often been associated with the impossible and the perilously idealistic, yet seeds of anarchist utopias can be found all around us in everyday life.²² Literary critical utopias offer us a useful way in to thinking about the political function of lived utopias, because they offer a vision of social change that does not separate means from ends; a way to educate desire by experimenting with new ways of thinking and living in the here-and-now. Such utopias are both possible and pragmatic, whilst engaging concretely in social struggle. I will now turn to a consideration of lived and applied aspects of utopianism as they relate to anarchism.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANARCHISM AND UTOPIA: WHY ANARCHISTS SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN INTENTIONAL COMMUNITIES

Literary ‘critical utopias’ such as those mentioned above have a resonance with anarchism. They help us to criticise dominant social and political arrangements, imagine alternatives, transgress our previously unquestioned beliefs, and in so doing, transform consciousness and ‘educate desire’ towards a more liberatory way of life. However, there is no denying that reading is usually a rather solitary activity and does not in itself change the world. Utopias in the form of lived collective experiments are also possible. The idea of voluntary communities based on shared values and principles as forms of social change has been important to anarchist theorists such as Max Stirner, who spoke of a ‘union of egoists’²³; Gustav Landauer whose ‘social anarchism’ was based on a ‘union of individuals’ who voluntarily founded and joined small socialist communities,²⁴ and Martin Buber, who postulated that small communities facilitate ‘a renewal of society through its cell tissue’.²⁵ This was based on the premise that the state is not a ‘thing’ that can be identified and destroyed in one fell swoop, through revolution, but rather is a particular form of dominatory relationship between people,²⁶ or to Stirner, something more akin to an alienated internal psychological state, a system of beliefs and values that he termed a ‘spook’.²⁷ These insidious beliefs and relationships create the conditions for agents of the state to act as such, for subjects and subordinates to defer to their authority, and thus for the logic of ‘the state’ to continue. The state is theorised as a powerful and dangerous fiction which is perpetrated through claims to, and beliefs in, its truth. Buber argued that Marx shared the same goal as utopian socialists and anarchists, yet the belief that this goal could be achieved through a top-down hierarchical revolution was mistaken. For Buber, domination could not be overcome by means of further domination. Rather, the best way to overcome the state is through experimentation and practice, or to use a frequently used adage in prefigurative movements: ‘be the change you want to see’.²⁸

Many anarchist theorists have studied existing practices through the framework of anarchism, even where those practices were not anarchist by intent, for example, Peter Kropotkin’s descriptions of mutual aid in primitive and medieval societies²⁹ and Colin Ward’s descriptions of anarchy in everyday life.³⁰ Taking an ethnographic approach to studying existing examples of anarchy in action should not simply serve the purpose of ‘proving’ anarchist theory to be possible or correct. Intentional communities are invaluable for anarchists, because studying already-existing ‘utopias’ can provide inspiration for further anarchist practices whilst helping to explore problems and tensions that arise in practice. Graeber calls this process ‘utopian extrapolation’: ‘a matter of teasing out the tacit logic or principles underlying certain forms of radical practice, and then, not only offering the analysis back to those communities, but using them to formulate new visions’.³¹

INTENTIONAL COMMUNITIES AS PRACTICAL UTOPIAS

Intentional communities can be defined as:

A group of five or more adults and their children, if any, who come from more than one nuclear family and who have chosen to live together to enhance their shared values or for some other mutually agreed-upon purpose.³²

The history of intentional communities is rich and varied, spanning centuries and continents, and can be traced back to the sixth century BCE in what is now Southern Italy, where Pythagoras founded the community Homakoeion, based on vegetarianism, spirituality and equality of the sexes. Around the same time, followers of Buddha joined together to form ashrams to work and live together in a spiritual manner.³³ Notable movements in the history of intentional communities include the Diggers of seventeenth-century England, a group of Protestant radicals seen as antecedents of modern anarchism, who took their name from their attempts to farm common land.³⁴ The utopian socialists of the nineteenth century (discussed above) also deserve a mention in this brief history, as well as the counter-cultural movements of the 1960s and 1970s, which led to the foundation of several thousand communes throughout the Western world.³⁵ Many of these were short lived, but a small number continue to this day. That nobody has written a comprehensive history representative of the diversity of the movement worldwide attests to the magnitude of such a task. The diversity and scope of intentional communities are explored in texts such as Chris Coates' *Utopia Britannica*³⁶ for a history of utopian experiments in Britain between 1325 and 1945; the edited book *West of Eden*³⁷ for a history of intentional communities in North California focusing on the 1960s–1970s, or James Horrox' *A Living Revolution* for a history of anarchism in the kibbutz movement of Israel.³⁸ The examples drawn on in this chapter are mostly based in the United Kingdom,³⁹ and more information on the UK intentional communities movement can be found at the Diggers and Dreamers website.⁴⁰ Further information and a directory of the worldwide intentional communities movement can be found on the website of the Fellowship for Intentional Community.⁴¹

Intentional communities can include shared households, cohousing communities, ecovillages, communes, survivalist retreats, kibbutzim, ashrams, housing co-operatives and squats. They can be urban or rural. The kinds of shared principles that they are based on, similarly to fictional and political utopias, are wildly variant and can include political, religious, social or spiritual values and practices, and the principles can be as vague as 'commitment to a shared lifestyle' or 'commitment to shared living'.⁴² Most, but not all intentional communities have a constitution or founding document which sets out shared principles, which may or may not be open to negotiation and modification by new members. The question of utopian intent is complex and has been the subject of debate.⁴³ Not all intentional communities are anarchist, though some are explicitly inspired by anarchist principles, such as Brambles in Sheffield,

UK.⁴⁴ Most embrace equality and non-hierarchy, yet some have been strictly ordered and hierarchical⁴⁵ whilst others prioritise religious or spiritual aims. Some communities, such as Findhorn community in Scotland⁴⁶ and The Catholic Worker Farm in Hertfordshire⁴⁷ aim to illustrate continuity between spirituality and social justice. Communities therefore vary wildly in the values and forms of organisation they embrace, and some of these, explicitly or not, are more resonant with anarchist theory than others. Of particular relevance for our purpose here are communities that espouse a critique of hierarchy as a core value and aim to practice non-hierarchy in their organisation and decision-making. Intentional communities have frequently been studied as utopian experiments and in the context of the utopian studies canon.⁴⁸ However, few communards define their practices as utopian, perhaps due to the colloquial association of utopia with perfection and impossibility. Intentional communities are neither perfect nor impossible. Nonetheless, framing their activities as utopian can help us to understand something about them, whilst intentional communities also have much to tell us about anarchism.

PROPERTY RELATIONS

One of the ways in which intentional communities bring anarchist ideals into practice is through experimenting with different forms of property relations. The idea that ‘property is theft’ was most famously captured by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon,⁴⁹ and opposition to both state and capitalism unites all anarchists. Anarchists view property as a source of coercive authority and tend to favour economies based on mutual aid,⁵⁰ gift economies⁵¹ and ideas of the commons.⁵² Intentional communities challenge dominant property narratives that ‘inform modern attitudes, beliefs and behaviour about property’.⁵³

Ownership is a complex issue for intentional communities, because whilst they attempt to actualise alternative property relations, like other anarchist practices they have to exist within a capitalist economy and must assume modes of ownership within or against this. In the United Kingdom, communities experimenting with alternative living, like anyone looking to inhabit a space, by necessity assume one of four different practical models of ownership of their space: squatting, renting, fully mutual housing co-operatives and private ownership (with or without a mortgage). Whilst squatting offers arguably the most integrated critique and resistance to capitalist models of ownership, it tends to be a precarious and temporary practice and offers less opportunity for sustained and long-term experiments with utopian social relations. Autonomous social centres sometimes use squatting and renting, but intentional communities, which often aim for stability and longevity, tend to favour the fully mutual housing co-operative model. Fully mutual ownership requires a community to own a place either outright or with a mortgage. It is a legal model whereby members pay a small fee, usually the legal minimum of £1 in order to become a shareholder, whereby they become both landlord and tenant, and are granted occupancy subject to the particular rules of the community. Within this legal

model, communities have evolved richly diverse cultures of co-operative living and alternative property relations. If there is a mortgage to be paid, usually members pay ‘cost-share’, a monthly payment similar to rent, which will often include shared goods such as food, cleaning products, council tax, maintenance and other expenditures. All members are involved in decisions around cost-share, usually through consensus. There is often an expectation that members will spend a certain amount of time working for the co-operative, outside of which members are entitled to earn what they like through other jobs. Exceptions exist, such as Findhorn Community, where core members are employed full-time by the community. A very small number of communities engage in income sharing, which was popular during the 1960s–1970s wave of co-operatives but has fallen out of fashion.⁵⁴ Income sharing involves surrendering one’s personal income to the community which is then distributed amongst members according to agreed procedures. Although this practice is not widespread, most communities have an ethos of sharing non-monetary goods and prioritising the good of community over personal gain. This has deep implications for subject-formation, and Sargisson argues that such practices ‘transgress and disrupt the egoistic self of possessive individualism’.⁵⁵ Utopian practices in intentional communities disrupt the ontological foundations of widely held beliefs in the naturalness and necessity of neoliberal capitalism, illustrating that another world is possible. This highlights a key function of utopianism: not only do utopias offer critique, but they are spaces in which we can think and do things differently.

DECISION-MAKING

A key tenet of the anarchist tradition is rejection of political representation: the idea that one person can represent others, meaning alienation of choice, expression, action and decision-making which occurs when political actors speak, campaign, act and decide on behalf of others in the political arena. Bakunin criticised representative democracy when it was just an embryonic movement. Seen by many as a force for liberation, Bakunin termed it ‘bourgeois democracy’⁵⁶ and ‘so-called representative democracy’.⁵⁷ He argued it was an expression of existent relations of inequality, whereby political elite with privileged access to resources such as wealth, education and free time are able to deceive people into thinking it is acting in their interests whereas it is ‘invariably exploiting them’.⁵⁸ Max Stirner argued that not only political representation but any forms of subjugation to ideas and principles that are not one’s own leads to oppression of minorities and self-creativity.⁵⁹ More recently, Todd May⁶⁰ and Saul Newman⁶¹ have drawn an anarchist critique of representation from post-structural theorists such as Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari and Foucault. The anarchist critique seems to have gained increasing importance during a time that some academic commentators label a ‘crisis of representation’ whereby many publics, not only anarchists, are losing faith in the ability of representative democracy to articulate their interests.^{62,63} The anarchist alternative to

‘representative democracy’ is sometimes called ‘direct democracy’ although some anarchists eschew the term ‘democracy’ altogether, since it means ‘rule by the people’, and ‘the people’ is an abstraction.⁶⁴

A specific practice associated with anarchism, which attempts to offer an alternative to representation, is consensus decision-making. Consensus in its most basic form means that all people affected by a decision can take part in deciding, in a face-to-face process, and everyone must agree before action is taken. It means that minorities have power to veto and so cannot be ignored. Consensus requires commitment to making decisions acceptable to everyone affected by the outcome. Instead of choosing between polarised positions through voting, consensus involves creatively modifying options through sometimes long processes of negotiation in order to take everyone’s needs into account.⁶⁵ Unlike political representation, consensus does not assume unity of identity or desires that can be represented as a single vision. Rather, consensus assumes conflict—minorities can veto a decision, so they cannot be ignored. Combining perspectives on an issue in both process and outcomes can lead to more creative and effective decisions, and the process itself helps to build bonds and community. Consensus requires trust and openness, unlike parliamentary democracy which tends to assume conflict and competition. All participants invest time and energy in the process and all agree so they are more committed to implementing the outcome.⁶⁶

Many intentional communities, whether explicitly anarchist or not, prefer to use consensus for making important decisions. Practical details vary from group to group. Usually there is a facilitator, whose role is to make sure everyone has equal opportunity to speak and procedures are followed. Some groups have informal procedures, simply discussing a subject until everyone agrees. Other communities use coloured cards or hand signals, coded to communicate agreement, disagreement (blocking a decision), and desire to intervene with a question or comment. The purpose of such systems is to minimise talking-over and interrupting. When well facilitated, consensus should allow everyone to speak, be listened to and understood, whilst louder voices and more assertive personalities should be prevented from dominating the proceedings. Some groups have a pre-consensus ‘heart session’ where participants can talk about, for example, how their week has been and reveal any personal worries or troubles, with the premise that this might ameliorate the possibility of repressed emotions being played out during the consensus process.⁶⁷

Consensus requires small groups to work effectively. Communities visited during my research varied from 4 members to about 400. As group size increased, consensus became increasingly difficult, and larger communities tended to delegate to sub-groups where possible but use varying forms of majority voting or representation for decisions affecting the entire community.⁶⁸ Critics of anarchism cite this as a reason that anarchism could not work on a ‘large scale’.⁶⁹ However, this misunderstands the anarchist position, which resides precisely in a re-scaling and dis-alienation of society.⁷⁰

SCALE AND FEDERATION

A further resonance between the intentional communities movement and anarchism resides in the idea and practice of networked federation. The best known anarchist proponent of federalism was Proudhon.⁷¹ Many other anarchists have based visions on the idea of small and diverse self-governing communities associated through networks and loose associations, forming non-coercive organisations to communicate.⁷² Federation is a partial response to the issue of scale. Many aspects of anarchism, for example, decentralised production, affinity, community and limits on authority, require communities not to expand over a certain size. Federation in anarchism means that ‘the basic idea is to reproduce the collective, not expand it’.⁷³ The principle of small-scale communities is also espoused by eco-anarchists such as Leopold Kohr⁷⁴ who anticipated the deep-ecology movement’s⁷⁵ preoccupation with bioregions and decentralisation through his promotion of ‘human scale’ and small communal life. The issue of size and scale is also important in utopian studies. John P. Clark argues that the dominant utopia is based on a fantasy of infinite superpower that ‘drives relentlessly toward the destruction of all diversity and complexity’⁷⁶ in the name of progress, whilst anarchist utopias are experimental and connect the rich specificity of ‘sense of place’ with diverse cultures and ecosystems.⁷⁷ Tom Moylan also argues that whilst top-down, totalitarian utopias assume a singular jurisdiction over a very large area, critical utopianism assumes a proliferation of diverse small-scale experiments, calling for an ‘alliance of margins without a centre’.⁷⁸

Many intentional communities practise federation through the organisation Radical Routes. Radical Routes is ‘a network of radical co-ops whose members are committed to working for positive social change’.⁷⁹ Four times a year, nominated members will attend a gathering at which issues affecting co-operatives will be discussed, such as national laws and policies, and new applications to join, as well as issues facing groups in financial need (Radical Routes can provide loans). The organisation’s purpose is to provide ‘a form of structured mutual aid’ that is ‘about people taking control of their own housing, work, education and leisure activities’.⁸⁰ In a very real and practical sense, intentional communities, networked through Radical Routes, are engaged in renewing society from the grassroots, here-and-now, as called for by anarchists like Buber and Landauer. Nonetheless, there are several controversies and tensions. Debates issue from anarchist theory about communal life and from within the communal movement.

CONTROVERSIES AND TENSIONS

‘Lifestyle Anarchism’ Versus ‘Social Anarchism’

A key controversy about communities within anarchist theory is somewhat reflective of erstwhile tensions between Marx and the Utopian Socialists.

Murray Bookchin⁸¹ claims to discover two trends within contemporary anarchism: ‘Lifestyle anarchism’ and ‘social anarchism’. ‘Lifestyle anarchism’, according to Bookchin, is individualistic, bourgeois and immature. It is associated with thinkers such as Max Stirner, Emma Goldman, Hakim Bey and John Zerzan, and practices such as drug-taking, counter-culture, and celebrating the imagination,⁸² New Age spirituality and critique of technology and science.⁸³ Bookchin argues that it is divorced from social struggle and the working classes.⁸⁴ ‘Lifestyle anarchists’ demand to live anarchy in the present, divorced from struggle or revolution, demanding social change through lifestyle changes. Many of these descriptors would fit intentional communities. Bookchin counterposes this to ‘social anarchism’, which beseeches people ‘to rise in revolution and seek the reconstruction of society’⁸⁵ with an emphasis on mutual responsibility, collectivism, enlightenment rationality, and institutional structures.⁸⁶

Bookchin has been critiqued by post-left anarchist Bob Black, whose book *Anarchy After Leftism*⁸⁷ concentrates on debunking Bookchin. Black argues that Bookchin is a communist in disguise, re-hashing tired Marxist arguments about the need for top-down social change. Bookchin accuses anarchists of hedonism, yet Black argues that anarchism has always been about building the future anarchists want to see in the present.⁸⁸ Whilst Bookchin calls ‘lifestyle anarchism’ individualistic, Black argues this is a straw-man concept designed to obfuscate the fact that Bookchin is attempting to construct a top-down, rather than anarchist utopia—he wants to institute his own idea of the good life. Black proposes the rejection of political tendencies associated with leftism, particularly: vanguardism; mass politics; identity politics; representation; work; and activism based on guilt, responsibility and repression of desire.⁸⁹ Instead, post-left anarchism favours ‘the immediate expression of desire, constructing the kind of world one wants to live in immanently and horizontally, and radically and antagonistically rejecting or attacking the social forms and institutions of the dominant system’.⁹⁰

In practice, many intentional communities fall somewhere in the middle or outside of this theoretical debate. Whilst they do often have a preeminent concern with lifestyle choices and ‘politicising the quotidian’,⁹¹ this does not mean they always express their desires immediately, live intensely or antagonistically reject dominant social forms in the way described by post-left theory. The intentional communities movement has been argued to espouse middle-class values^{92,93} yet may have more class diversity than often presumed.⁹⁴ Many communities are very much involved in wider social and political struggles. For example, one community gives up part of its space for a refugee shelter and does a lot of work in refugee advocacy, whilst others open their communities for school trips around food and environmental sustainability and justice. Individual members dedicate huge amounts of time to education, political protest, direct action, radical publishing and many other actions.

COMMITMENT VERSUS TEMPORARINESS

Usually, intentional communities require a high degree of commitment in order to produce social cohesion and stability.⁹⁵ Many communities have long joining procedures for this reason.⁹⁶ For example, Mornington Grove community in Bow, East London, outlines a nine-stage joining procedure on its website, which it states takes at least six months. They state the reason: ‘we aim to be a relatively stable community, and it takes time and energy to join and get to know the ropes, we ask all new members to make a commitment to stay for two years’.⁹⁷ However, Hakim Bey, a post-left anarchist, argues in his book *Temporary Autonomous Zone*⁹⁸ that anarchist communities, which he terms ‘intentional communities’ and ‘pirate utopias’,⁹⁹ ought to be short-lived and exceptional, in order to preserve levels of intensity required for radicalism, and to prevent ossification into fixed structures and stable hierarchies: ‘Like festivals, uprisings cannot happen every day—otherwise they would not be ‘nonordinary.’ But such moments of intensity give shape and meaning to the entirety of a life’.¹⁰⁰ Conversely, Stephen Shukaitis has argued it is precisely this embedding of anarchist principles into ‘ordinary’ everyday life that constitutes their value and the sustainable ‘social reproduction’ of anarchist ways of living.¹⁰¹ This involves activities like caring for the young and elderly, which tend to require some degree of communal stability and longevity. Furthermore, Shukaitis argues it is very much the case that struggles around the everyday and ‘ordinary’ can connect ‘minor moments of rupture and rebellion into connected networks of struggle’.¹⁰² Of course, it is quite possible that both these modes of resistance are important, for example, communities in squats tend to be more temporary, yet more radical in their ability to highlight and resist exploitative property relations, whilst also better suited for people in precarious circumstances. Whilst some degree of stability is important for many communards, it is likely Kanter overstates the case by defining the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of an intentional community in terms of its longevity, since even short-lived communities can be intensely meaningful to those who participated.

‘TYRANNY OF STRUCTURELESSNESS’ VERSUS ‘TYRANNY OF TYRANNY’

The term ‘tyranny of structurelessness’ is drawn from an article by Jo Freeman, which is widely cited as an idea, sometimes even by people who are not aware of the text, in activist circles including intentional communities. Freeman’s analysis, written from within the 1970s feminist movement, revolves around the idea that informal groups without clear organisational structures are susceptible to power struggles and undemocratic hierarchies. She argues that a lack of formal structure encourages ‘unquestioned hegemony’¹⁰³ since it leads to the formation of elites, where cliques of friends dominate groups, and encourages a “‘Star” system’ where charismatic members are perceived to be representatives without undergoing democratic election.¹⁰⁴ Her final criticism

is that informal groups are not politically effective, and are only useful for a ‘consciousness-raising’ phase, rather than for achieving real change.¹⁰⁵ She proceeds to outline seven recommendations for ‘democratic structuring’, including: delegation of authority for specific tasks by democratic procedures; requiring those in authority to be responsible to those who selected them; distribution of authority among ‘as many people as is reasonably possible’; rotation of tasks; allocation of tasks along rational criteria; frequent diffusion of information; and equal access to resources (Freeman 1984[1972]: 14–15).¹⁰⁶

In reply to Freeman’s essay, Cathy Levine argues from an anarchist perspective that small, structureless groups are not ineffective and unintentionally oppressive, but rather ‘a valid, conscious strategy for building a revolutionary movement’ and are in fact less tyrannical than the organised democratic groups Freeman recommends.¹⁰⁷ The anarchist ideal of ‘small groups in voluntary organisation’¹⁰⁸ is the antidote to mass hierarchical organisations with centralised control—such as capitalist, imperialist states—but also, Levine argues, traditionally patriarchal Left party politics. For Levine, consciousness-raising is the very core of political movement, which should not concentrate on a power takeover, but rather become a matter of building a women’s culture from the bottom-up.

This debate has a lot of relevance and reflects debates within intentional communities. Many, if not all, communities encounter issues whereby some individuals dominate certain situations, and unintentional hierarchies arise, often based on gender, education, longevity (in the group) and confidence.¹⁰⁹ This of course takes place everywhere in everyday life, yet arguably there is more reflexivity in intentional communities, who tend to discuss these matters. Furthermore, intentional communities do tend already to adopt many of Freeman’s principles, for example, it is impractical to bring all decisions to meetings, so there is delegation to sub-collectives (e.g. there may be a sub-collective for permaculture gardening and another for buildings maintenance). Groups also have formal organisational procedures laid out in constitutional documents. This ought not be taken as straightforward vindication of Freeman against Levine’s more anarchist line of thought. Jason McQuinn has claimed: ‘each of [Freeman’s] suggestions are far more commonly accomplished by informal libertarian groups than by any ... of the formal organizations of the world, including formal anarchist organizations. And they can be recommended for any organization, whether it’s formal or informal’.¹¹⁰ Thus Freeman’s principles are already anarchist principles, except, Quinn argues, her two suggestions that are ‘explicitly based on authoritarian assumptions’¹¹¹; those are: ‘distribution of authority among as many people as is reasonably possible’ and ‘requiring those in authority to be responsible to those who selected them’¹¹² which simply describe the very kinds of representative democracy and political authority that anarchists are against. Similarly to anarchists, intentional communities tend to reject political authority and representation, and in the preceding sections I have attempted to read anarchism in and through the organisational processes of intentional communities. However, this approach does raise some issues, which will be addressed in the conclusion.

CONCLUSION: WHAT DO UTOPIAN AND INTENTIONAL COMMUNITIES REVEAL ABOUT ANARCHISM AS AN IDEOLOGY?

Intentional communities vary drastically in how they are organised, the ideals and values they follow, whether they are urban or rural, the ways in which they arrange and occupy space, and their relationships to ownership, property and production. There is no single model, and not all intentional communities are anarchist, nor even broadly libertarian or leftist. Nonetheless, there are many utopian threads that weave through intentional communities and anarchism. The histories of both movements are tied together through the ideas and practices of utopian socialists, theorists, hippies, feminists and a host of other characters seeking a better way of living. Throughout this history, anarchists, utopians and communards have been subject to the same invalidating criticisms: that their values are idealistic and their very real, embodied practices and experiences are 'impossible'. At the same time, anarchists and utopian communards have shared a positive vision: of grassroots, bottom-up social change, which starts in the here-and-now, transforming relationships and consciousness, rather than deferring to the future, which takes the form of continually evolving experiments rather than totalitarian blueprints. Small groups, face-to-face relationships, and dis-alienated relations with nature are the bedrock of many anarchist utopias, and intentional communities bring these into practice.

Utopianism as a methodology operates through critique and transgression, which has a consciousness-raising function. Both anarchism and intentional communities arise from a context where certain assumptions are taken-for-granted: that a key purpose of the state is to protect (unequal) property relations; effective decisions can only be made when political authority is delegated to a representative; and the essential territorial scale of a political entity is the nation state. The nation state is often taken to be a natural or inevitable political entity rather than something that is itself politically constructed,¹¹³ and the necessity of a state with a monopoly on the use of violence to protect private property rests on essential claims about 'human nature' which are actually contestable. These truth-claims—about what it is to be human, and to belong—obfuscate political desires and interests behind truth-claiming discourse. A key function of utopianism is to critique and transgress taken-for-granted assumptions and to reveal them as political choices rather than ontological necessities. Intentional communities posit alternatives: gift economies, face-to-face relationships and consensus decisions in small, loosely federated groups. In so doing, they de-naturalise taken-for-granted assumptions about human nature, economy and belonging. This is both a critical and a utopian approach, which attempts to embrace and harmonise different desires, and take everyone's needs and interests into account. The approach is one of voluntarism and experimentalism: many flowers may bloom with no single over-arching approach to either epistemology or politics of community.

Anarchism fits well as an epistemological approach to understanding intentional communities, but utopianism and the intentional communities move-

ment are very broad, and encompass anarchist and non-anarchist tendencies. The relationship is perhaps best thought of as rhizomic, rather than foundational or definitional. To restrict one's analysis to communities that explicitly named themselves anarchist would leave a very small number of cases. Therefore, when working with intentional communities one frequently finds oneself interpreting practices as anarchist that practitioners might not self-define as such. This can be a useful exercise, as intentional communities have much to offer anarchism, and vice versa. Nonetheless, we must be careful not to 'colonise' practices and practitioners' perspectives by representing them only using ideals and terminology that are not their own. Furthermore, one risks compromising anarchist values by reading certain practices uncritically as anarchism, when in fact they might fall short. Many community members have carefully considered personal perspectives, frequently inspired by, reacting to, and in dialogue with their encounters with anarchism and anarchists through their communities and other radical networks. Perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the intentional communities movement are the possibilities for connection and affinity between our wider anarchist movements and intentional communities, as well as the possibility of taking inspiration from intentional communities for practices we can bring to our own unintentional communities, classrooms, neighbourhoods and relationships.

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Anarchist Education

Judith Suissa

INTRODUCTION

Many people, on hearing the term ‘anarchist education’, will intuitively respond with a comment along the lines of: ‘Doesn’t that just mean letting children do whatever they want?’ This chapter will show that such a response reflects some common misperceptions about anarchism; that educational questions were central to the work of leading anarchist theorists and activists; and that there is a distinct tradition of anarchist education that, while sharing some features with other radical educational movements, is also significantly different from the more familiar examples of progressive, democratic and libertarian education. At the same time, the chapter will explore some of the tensions at the heart of anarchist educational experiments, tensions that reflect the complex conceptual and political questions involved in any educational project concerned with radical social change.

ANARCHIST SCHOOLS

In 1904, the anarchist activist Francisco Ferrer established the *Escuela Moderna* (Modern School) in Barcelona. In the school’s prospectus, he declared: ‘I will teach them only the simple truth. I will not ram a dogma into their heads. I will not conceal from them one iota of fact. I will teach them not what to think but how to think’.¹

The school took a radically critical stance, in its ethos, curriculum and daily practice, against the dominant educational and political ideas of the time. In the face of a public school system completely controlled by the Catholic Church, the Modern School was co-educational and offered a curriculum that

J. Suissa (✉)
University College London, London, UK

explicitly rejected the dogmatic teaching of the Church on the one hand and the nationalistic education of the capitalist state on the other. Class attendance was not compulsory, students organised their own individual timetables, and there were no grades, prizes or punishments at the school. 'Having admitted and practised', wrote Ferrer,

the coeducation of boys and girls, of rich and poor—having, that is to say, started from the principle of solidarity and equality—we are not prepared to create a new inequality. Hence in the Modern School there will be no rewards and no punishments; there will be no examinations to puff up some children with the flattering title of 'excellent', to give others the vulgar title of 'good', and make others unhappy with a consciousness of incapacity and failure.²

Although Ferrer acknowledged that some form of assessment may be useful to monitor students' learning progress, particularly when it came to technical skills, he insisted that, if not conducive to the pupils' personal development, grades and exams had no part to play in the kind of education he was advocating.

A great emphasis was placed on 'learning by doing' and accordingly much of the curriculum of the school consisted in practical training, visits to museums, factories and laboratories or field trips to study physical geography, geology and botany.

Ferrer was also adamant that teachers must have complete 'professional independence'. Criticising the system by which the educator is regarded as an 'official servant, narrowly enslaved to minute regulations, inexorable programmes', he proclaimed that the principle of free, spontaneous learning should apply not only to pupils but to teachers. 'He who has charge of a group of children, and is responsible for them, should alone be qualified to decide what to do and what not to do'.³

Convinced that all existing school textbooks reflected either the religious dogma of the Church or the nationalistic dogma of the state, Ferrer issued a call to leading intellectuals across Europe commissioning textbooks to reflect the latest scientific discoveries, and installed a printing press on the school premises. The works adopted for the school library included texts on 'the injustices connected with patriotism, the horrors of war, and the iniquity of conquest'.⁴ Alongside titles such as *A Compendium of Universal History*, *Origins of Christianity and Poverty; Its Cause and Cure*, the children regularly read a utopian fairy tale by Jean Grave, *The Adventures of Nono* in which, as Ferrer put it, 'the happier future is ingeniously and dramatically contrasted with the sordid realities of the present order'.⁵

The children were encouraged to value brotherhood and cooperation and to develop a keen sense of social justice, and the curriculum carried a clear anti-capitalist, anti-statist and anti-militarist message. Pupils were given lessons in Esperanto to promote international solidarity.

Unsurprisingly, the Spanish authorities saw the Escuela Moderna, and Ferrer himself, as a threat. Although Ferrer was not directly involved in anarchist activity during his time at the school, his anarchist sympathies were obvious, and the school was constantly under surveillance and was frequently denounced by the clerical authorities as a nest of subversion. In 1906, after years of official harassment, it was closed down. Ferrer was arrested in August 1909 on false charges of instigating a mass uprising. In spite of attempts by the international liberal community to intervene, he was found guilty at a mock trial, and condemned to death by firing squad.

Ferrer's death, on 13 October 1909, sparked off a wave of international protest and is probably, as Paul Avrich notes, the reason why he rather than anyone else became the most famous representative of anarchist education. In the wake of his execution, anarchist activists and enthusiasts for libertarian education around the world were moved to establish educational projects designed to continue and promote Ferrer's ideas. Schools based on the Modern School model were established, often as part of revolutionary movements for social change, across Western and Central Europe, in many Latin American countries, and in Japan.⁶ As Paul Avrich's research has meticulously documented, an extensive Ferrer movement developed in the United States, where around twenty Ferrer Schools were established, the most well documented and long-lived of which was the Ferrer School in New York, founded in 1911.

The Ferrer School in New York (later known as the Modern School) took Ferrer's educational creed as its inspiration. The school was run on very similar lines to the original school in Barcelona: co-education, an emphasis on 'learning by doing', an anti-authoritarian pedagogy and a heavily anti-capitalistic, anti-statist and anti-religious message throughout the curriculum. Although there was no formal timetable at the Modern School, lessons were offered along the lines of fairly traditional academic subjects and children were free to attend them if and when they wished.

The founders of the school, who included prominent anarchist activists such as Emma Goldman, Alexander Berkman, Harry Kelly and Leonard Abbott, saw it as a microcosm of an alternative society organised on non-hierarchical, cooperative grounds. They insisted that in order for the children to develop an adequate understanding of ideas such as justice, equality and cooperation, they must experience them first-hand in the fullest possible way:

We hold that children do not and cannot learn the meaning of duties or rights in an economic system composed of masters and slaves. That is why the children of the public schools and the vast majority of children who are pampered and petted by their ignorant or blinded parents know nothing clearly of either rights or duties. Where alone can children, or any others, learn the meaning of rights and duties? In a mode of life which is genuinely cooperative. A life whose products all justly share and whose labour all justly share. This points inevitably to a school which is based upon complete and inclusive cooperation.⁷

Accordingly, the New York school had a communal garden, where children learnt to plan, plant, care for and gather plants communally, and all maintenance and domestic work was shared cooperatively by the children and staff. The New York school also served as a community centre, offering a wide range of adult education courses, public lectures and social gatherings, and as a centre for political activism. In 1915, pursuing their ideal of communal life further, the New York anarchist group purchased a tract of farming land in Stelton, New Jersey, where they set about founding an anarchist colony. The school, which moved there, became a focal point of the colony. Here the community attempted to put their social anarchist ideals into practice, working the land and sharing administration of community matters. Many of the teachers and parents involved in the school were also active members of the colony, and the children naturally combined schoolwork with work in the community.

WHAT MAKES ANARCHIST SCHOOLS ANARCHIST?

Given the many similarities, that I explore in further detail below, between anarchist schools and libertarian or progressive educational experiments, it is important to ask what it is that makes anarchist schools uniquely anarchist. One answer to this question is that the explicitly anarchist character of schools such as the Escuela Moderna consists not in any particular set of pedagogical practices, school governance or teacher-pupil relationships, but in the substantive political ideals and commitments behind these practices.

An obvious way in which this is true is in the very rejection of state education, as a logical conclusion of the anarchist objection to the state, first famously articulated by William Godwin in 1793: 'The project of national education ought uniformly to be discouraged on account of its obvious alliance with national government. [...] Government will not fail to employ it, to strengthen its hands, and perpetuate its institutions...'.⁸

This position, while most closely associated with the anarchists, was also held by J.S. Mill, the forefather of modern liberal theory, who vehemently opposed the idea of universal state education on the grounds that it was 'a mere contrivance for molding people to be exactly like one another'.⁹

Godwin's argument was echoed by Ferrer, who wrote, at the time of establishing the Escuela Moderna:

If modern pedagogy means a new orientation toward a reasonable and just society; if modern pedagogy means that we propose to instruct the new generations in the causes which have brought about and maintain the lack of social equilibrium; if it means that we are anxious to prepare a happy humanity, by freeing it from all religious fiction and from all idea of submission to an inevitable socioeconomic inequality; we cannot entrust it to the State nor to other official organisms which necessarily maintain existing privileges and support the laws which consecrate the exploitation of man by man, the pernicious source of the worst abuses.¹⁰

In contrast, while many progressive and libertarian schools exist outside the state system, they generally do so not out of any rejection of the underlying socio-economic structures of the state as such, but out of an objection to the dominant practices of state schooling.

Similarly, while certain pedagogical approaches—notably the idea of ‘learning by doing’ and the emphasis on combining vocational skills, crafts and creativity with traditional academic subjects—are common across a range of ‘alternative’ schools, in the case of anarchist schools, the adoption of these approaches was motivated not by a belief that they would bring about more effective learning, but by the view that they best embodied the underlying political and social values that underpin the ideal of an anarchist society.

This is most obviously so in the case of integral education, which was a key feature of anarchist schools and which was developed and defended by anarchist theorists such as Kropotkin, who wrote, in 1890, ‘Instead of “technical education”, which means the maintenance of the present division between brain work and manual work, we advocate the *éducation intégrale*, or complete education, which means the disappearance of that pernicious distinction’.¹¹

For anarchists, the socio-economic inequalities and hierarchical class structure of the capitalist state were reflected in, and reinforced by, the distinction between manual labour and intellectual work. The only way to break down the resulting inequalities was to provide an education in which, in Proudhon’s words, ‘the industrial worker, the man of action and the intellectual will all be rolled into one’.¹²

So while not generally hostile to ‘book learning’, anarchist educators like Ferrer insisted that pupils should receive an education where academic learning and vocational learning were given equal weight and value. Children at the Modern School not only studied academic subjects but also learnt crafts and practical skills—both in the school workshop and garden but also in visits to factories and laboratories.¹³ The justification for this approach was not some romantic ideal of educating ‘the whole child’, or a philosophical challenge to the conceptual distinction between different forms of knowledge at the heart of the liberal educational ideal. Rather, it was entirely political, designed to break down the ‘pernicious distinction’ between brain work and manual work that was imposed by, and sustained, the capitalist state. As Harry Kelly, one of the founders of the New York Modern School wrote,

The curse of existing capitalist society is its parasitism. It permits idle and useless people to live on the products of its useful members. No society is tolerable in which all are not workers. In the Modern School, all are workers.¹⁴

In insisting on these ways of organising the school and the curriculum, anarchist educators were reflecting the key anarchist idea of prefigurative practice as a means of radical social change; an idea captured in Martin Buber’s remarks that

The anarchist desires a means commensurate with his ends; he refuses to believe that in our reliance on the future ‘leap’ we have to do now the direct opposite of what we are striving for; he believes rather that we must create here and now the space now possible for the thing for which we are striving, so that it may come to fulfilment then; he does not believe in the post-revolutionary leap, but he does believe in revolutionary continuity.¹⁵

Ferrer and other anarchist educators indeed saw their schools as embryos of the future, anarchist society; as proof that, even within the authoritarian society surrounding it, an alternative society organised on non-hierarchical, cooperative grounds, was possible.

Thus anarchist educators who established schools with no formal structure or schedules, and without the usual hierarchies or systems of rules and discipline, were consciously attempting to embody the non-hierarchical, decentralised anarchist model of social organisation. Likewise, in maintaining only ‘what order we feel necessary’, abolishing school disciplinary rules and largely allowing children to determine their own school schedule, the Modern School founders and other anarchist educators were relying on the anarchist theory of spontaneous order; the theory that, as Colin Ward explains, ‘given a common need, a collection of people will, by trial and error, by improvisation and experiment, evolve order out of the situation—this order being more durable and more closely related to their needs than any kind of externally imposed authority could provide’.¹⁶ Although this idea is commonly discussed by anarchist theorists in the context of revolutionary social change, many anarchist educators explicitly or implicitly appealed to it in experimenting with allowing order to evolve naturally in their classrooms.¹⁷

LIBERTARIAN PEDAGOGY AND THE FREEDOM OF THE CHILD

The period during which the anarchist Modern School Movement was flourishing was also the period that saw the growth of the movement for progressive, or libertarian, education. Many of the schools set up in the wake of Ferrer’s execution were in fact continuing a tradition of libertarian educational experiments that dates back at least to Tolstoy’s school at Yasnaya Polyana, established in the 1860s, and to the libertarian schools of Paul Robin (Cempuis, founded in 1880) and Sebastien Faure (La Ruche, founded in 1904). Many of the anarchist ideas implemented by Ferrer, such as integral education, were central features of these schools. Similar ideas can also be found in the working-class educational experiments that sprung up in Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in opposition to the dominant model of state education. Often taking the form of Sunday schools or supplementary schools, and generally founded by and for working-class communities, these schools, as John Shotton points out, ‘challenge the historical view that the majority of libertarian initiatives in education have only served the privileged few’.¹⁸ Yet the spread of the Modern School Movement in the wake of Ferrer’s execution

overlapped not only with this earlier libertarian tradition but with the newer wave of ‘progressive’ schools—schools like Summerhill (1924), Dartington Hall (1920) and Beacon Hill (1927) which, as Shotton notes, are far more well-known examples of libertarian education. The intellectual sources that founders of the new progressive schools drew on were varied, and not consistently libertarian, ranging from Rousseau and Tolstoy to Froebel, Montessori and Dewey. They all, to some degree, emphasised the freedom of the child, although some educators, notably A.S. Neill, took a more explicitly libertarian position. These schools often, like the early anarchist schools, operated outside the mainstream state education system.

Again, like the anarchist schools discussed above, at the heart of these early twentieth-century experiments in libertarian or ‘progressive’ education is the question of compulsion. As Michael Smith notes, ‘The question of whether attendance at school should be compulsory was widely debated at the end of the eighteenth century and for much of the nineteenth century in other countries as in Britain’.¹⁹ Yet by the early twentieth century, universal, compulsory state schooling was the dominant model in most industrialised societies.²⁰ The insistence that the child should be given the freedom to decide whether or not to attend classes was therefore a radical position in and of itself. This position was common to anarchist educators like Ferrer and to proponents of democratic education such as A.S. Neill, the founder of Summerhill School in Leiston, Suffolk, described as ‘the oldest children’s democracy in the world’,²¹ and probably the most famous example of a school where the freedom of the child is the guiding principle.

SO ARE ANARCHIST SCHOOLS LIBERTARIAN?

The term ‘libertarian education’ is used to refer, broadly, to all educational approaches which reject traditional models of teacher authority and hierarchical school structure, and which advocate maximum freedom for the individual child within the educational process. Yet while the terms ‘anarchist education’ and ‘libertarian education’ are often conflated—not least by writers themselves sympathetic to the anarchist tradition, such as John Shotton or Michael Smith, whose book on the subject is titled *The Libertarians and Education*²²—they are not co-extensive. The overlaps between the traditions, however, mean that many accounts of libertarian education include both anarchist and non-anarchist schools and educators. A commonly cited example here is the school set up by Tolstoy in the 1860s. Tolstoy is often described as an anarcho-pacifist, or a Christian anarchist, and although his emphasis on individual responsibility and freedom places him at some distance from the social anarchists, he shared their objections to the state, the church and the institution of private property. However, he was not part of the anarchist movement and, as Michael Smith points out,²³ his commitment to non-coercive pedagogy stemmed more from an educational and moral principle than a political one. Tolstoy’s chief argument—expressed eloquently in his essay ‘Education and Culture’²⁴—was that

‘for education to be effective it had to be free’.²⁵ In articulating this idea, Tolstoy can be seen to be close to the educational outlook of A.S. Neill, for whom the principle of non-compulsion itself was the very core of the educational experience he wanted to create at Summerhill, and who was driven more by moral concerns about interference in children’s development than by a vision of an alternative, self-governing society.

As Michael Smith explains, there are two elements to the libertarian argument for removing compulsion from children’s education: ‘one is the moral one that any form of coercion is wrong and detracts from a person’s autonomy. The other [...] is a pedagogical one’.²⁶ The pedagogical principle has to do with the role of motivation in the learning process and the belief that intrinsic, or ‘natural’ motivation will lead to genuine learning, whereas extrinsic motivation (i.e. the use of rewards, sanctions and authoritarian teacher-pupil relationships) will inhibit learning.

While libertarian educators such as A.S. Neill and John Holt²⁷ were quite explicit in their defence of both the pedagogical and the moral arguments, amongst anarchist educators, there seems to have often been a degree of ambiguity on these issues.

Some anarchist writers seemed enthusiastic about a libertarian pedagogy, linking it explicitly to the anarchist commitment to individual freedom. For example, Emma Goldman, after visiting La Ruche, Sebastian Faure’s libertarian anarchist school in France at the beginning of the twentieth century, commented,

If education should really mean anything at all, it must insist upon the free growth and development of the innate forces and tendencies of the child. In this way alone can we hope for the free individual and eventually also for a free community which shall make interference and coercion of human growth impossible.²⁸

Other anarchists involved in educational projects, however, interpreted ‘freedom’ less in terms of the need to give the child complete freedom within the educational environment, and more—echoing a classic liberal ideal of education—in terms of the intellectual and personal freedom that would result from the content of the school curriculum. Like Ferrer, many of the anarchists associated with the Modern School Movement in the United States saw themselves as offering an education that, being avowedly ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’, would thereby liberate people from the superstition and dogma inherent in the state system.

The founders of the Modern School in New York were clearly convinced that a rational rather than a completely libertarian educational approach was the most likely to advance anarchist ideas. Thus the 1914–1915 prospectus for the school states: ‘The Modern School has been established by men and women who believe that a child educated in a natural way, unspoiled by the dogmas and conventionalities of the adult, may be trusted in later life to set his face against injustice and oppression’.²⁹

What seems to be clear is that although, as John Shotton notes, ‘libertarians were perhaps the first educational theorists to regard children as being equal to adults, with the same need for freedom and dignity’, anarchist educators, while sympathetic to these libertarian ideas, did not generally interpret them as requiring that teachers abstain from all intentional attempts to direct the moral and political development of the child.³⁰

A.S. Neill, in contrast, was adamant that teachers at Summerhill should avoid all overt political or moral messages in their teaching and curriculum materials, insisting—with Rousseau—that ‘children will turn out to be good human beings if they are not crippled and thwarted in their natural development by interference’.³¹ Neill believed that ‘if left to himself without adult suggestion of any kind, [the child] will develop as far as he is capable of developing’.³²

Harry Kelly, one of the founders of the Modern School in New York, offered a somewhat different interpretation of the principle of freedom in a 1913 editorial for *The Modern School* journal entitled ‘The Meaning of Libertarian Education’:

Our aim in the Ferrer School is to free both the child and the adult from the false conventionalities and superstitions which now hinder the progress of the race. We believe that these superstitions operate chiefly in the fields of industry, religion and sex, so that we especially direct attention to those three subjects. [...].

Nevertheless, he goes on to state, ‘We are not dogmatics in the sense that we teach any one ism or point of view to the exclusion of others. We believe that every human being has the right to make his or her choice of life philosophy’.³³

Whatever the complexities of this approach in practice, it is clear that, *pace* Neill, Ferrer and other anarchist educators rejected the ideal of a politically neutral education as conceptually incoherent and ideologically dangerous. A piece on ‘The Rational Education of Children’ in *L’Ecole Renovee*, the journal edited by Francisco Ferrer, declared neutrality in the school to be a myth, stating: ‘We should not, in the school, hide the fact that we would awaken in the children a desire for a society of men truly free and truly equal, a society without violence, without hierarchies, and without privilege of any sort’.³⁴

This rejection of the idea of a neutral education is conceptually connected to the anarchist view of human nature. For while, as John Shotton argues,³⁵ ‘the libertarian critique of national state education is also determined by a faith in the essential goodness of human nature’, this is not a faith shared by leading anarchist theorists, most of whom in fact subscribed to what David Morland has described³⁶ as a ‘contextualist’ view of human nature. As Bakunin put it: ‘Man has two opposed instincts; egoism and sociability. He is both more ferocious in his egoism than the most ferocious beasts and more sociable than the bees and ants’.³⁷

The anarchist view of human nature as not predominantly or innately ‘good’ or ‘evil’, but as determined largely by social context, goes a long way towards explaining the central role that anarchist thinkers over the ages have assigned to education and educational experiments, and particularly to the moral content and form of these experiments.

As Kropotkin argued in his paper ‘Are we good enough?’, written for the anarchist journal *Freedom* in 1888, if people were naturally and predominantly kind, altruistic and just, there would be no danger of exploitation and oppression. It is precisely because we are not naturally compassionate, just and provident that the present system is intolerable and must be changed, for the present institutions allow ‘slavishness’ and oppression to flourish.³⁸

Kropotkin’s argument is that capitalism and the capitalist state brings out the selfish, competitive side of people’s nature. Thus the only way to bring out the cooperative benevolent side is to set up different forms of social life. On this view, schools can and should be a microcosm of a radical alternative to existing society; embodying, in their practice, their ethos and their curriculum, a different way of life.

Anarchists, in short, were suspicious of state education precisely because it would encourage in children the moral and social values associated with the hierarchical capitalist state that they wanted to challenge. The schools they founded were designed to embody and foster a different set of values, thus prefiguring the stateless anarchist society.

TENSIONS

Although, as discussed, many anarchist schools shared features with libertarian schools and advocated the total freedom of the child, many did not. Questions remain concerning the extent to which a pedagogy that values and respects the freedom of the child can be combined with a substantive curriculum. In spite of their general sympathy for the idea of child-centred education, their belief in the necessity of radical social change often led anarchist educators to express reservations about this approach, suggesting that such change could only be achieved by people ‘whose education has trained them [...] to cherish and practice the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity’.³⁹ There is little systematic attempt in the work of late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century anarchist educators to address this tension within their practice.

In some ways, the tensions revealed by any attempt to offer a comprehensive account of ‘anarchist education’ reflect both the tensions that have always existed within the anarchist movement regarding theories of radical social change, and the difficulty of pinning down a single definition of ‘anarchism’. While all anarchist schools shared a rejection of the state, the difference between different schools within this tradition and the extent to which they implemented a truly libertarian pedagogy can perhaps be seen as reflecting the distinction between those more on the individualist end of the anarchist spectrum, and those on the socialist end. Matthew Thomas, in his account of British

anarchist schools, suggests that individualist anarchists who followed Max Stirner ‘rejected the entire concept of the school as an affront to the child’s autonomy’.⁴⁰ Yet as Thomas notes, many anarchist educators, believing in the transformative power of education, would have been uncomfortable with this position, and would have sympathised with Stuart Kerr who, writing in defence of the anarchist school movement in the United States, at a time when free public schooling was widely available, noted:

The ruling classes everywhere [...] use the school, often unconsciously, as a means to keep themselves in power, to maintain things as they are. The Modern School, in contrast, is consciously dynamic, aims to cultivate the critical attitude of mind, the indispensable factor in every step forward the world has ever made [...]. The avowed purpose of the public school is to equip the child for his environment. The order of the environment is not questioned [...]. It is the function of the modern school to strip the social system of its economic fallacies and expose its sordid selfishness.⁴¹

Not only did these early anarchist educators not do much to address the connections, and possible tensions, between their pedagogical practices and the political goals and values underlying their approaches; many paid little attention at all to issues of classroom pedagogy. Robert Haworth, in his work on Ferrer, goes so far as to say that:

Despite the accolades that his admirers have lavished upon him, Ferrer made no significant pedagogical innovations [...]. Concepts such as co-education, student autonomy, a focus on the natural environment, and opposition to rewards and punishments had already been developed by others. Scholars concur that Ferrer was not a pedagogical genius and Ferrer agreed, writing that before founding the Modern School he was ‘conscious of [his] incompetence in the art of pedagogy’ so he ‘sought the counsel of others’.⁴²

It is left to contemporary anarchist theorists to conceptualise and explore the relationship between particular pedagogical practices and anarchist values and ideals, and to try to address some of the tensions implicit in the undeniable fact that many anarchist educators, while committed to the principle of non-coercion, adopted far more directive forms of teaching and classroom practice than those that characterise libertarian schools.

Justin Mueller acknowledges that, in fact, ‘A *laissez-faire* pedagogy is insufficient, then, for the anarchist approach to education’ and that ‘while an anarchist education does not imply any sort of dogmatic instruction, anarchist educators do view the open encouragement and practice of values, like solidarity, as a virtue’.⁴³

Echoing the view of the early anarchist educators discussed above, Mueller goes on to explain that ‘True “neutrality” on the part of anti-authoritarian teachers in the face of an unjust and repressive social order is seen by anarchist educators as either impossible or “hypocrisy”’.⁴⁴ Yet Mueller argues that anarchist

educators who go beyond a *laissez-faire* approach can avoid the implied contradiction by seeking to encourage particular anarchist values but not imposing dogma and by openly challenging the social order and its institutions.

Similarly, Nathan Jun notes, in spite of Ferrer's insistence that he would 'teach children not what to think but how to think', that there is a conceptual incoherence in the idea that one can teach children 'how to think' without paying serious attention to 'what students are thinking about, how they're thinking about it, and to what end'. If students never learn 'what is worth thinking about, what questions are worth asking, what issues are worth caring about', then this supposedly critical endeavour can become conservative or even dangerous.⁴⁵

Theorists of utopia who have discussed anarchist utopian theory as a form of 'process utopia', contrasted with end-state models of utopia, have made similar points. Erin McKenna, for example, argues that anarchist theorists were of the view that

the belief that values will change simply by restructuring the material and economic side of life is too simplistic. While this may be a necessary condition of re-constructing society along anarchist lines, it is not sufficient. It must be accompanied by intellectual persuasion.⁴⁶

McKenna quotes Alexander Berkman in support of this view:

The social revolution means much more than the reorganization of conditions only: it means the establishment of new human values and social relationships, a changed attitude of man to man, as of one free and independent to his equal; it means a different spirit in individual and collective life, and that spirit cannot be born overnight. It is a spirit to be cultivated, to be nurtured, and reared [...].⁴⁷

In short, while anarchist schools share certain features, the extent to which a set of specific educational ideas can be gleaned from an analysis of the central elements of anarchist theory is questionable. This is due firstly to the range of different positions within the anarchist tradition on questions to do with revolutionary strategy, social change and conceptions of childhood, and secondly to the different historical and social contexts within which anarchists find themselves operating. Yet the sheer volume of anarchist literature devoted to educational issues, and the efforts invested by anarchists in educational projects, attests to the fact that most anarchists were of the view that schools, and education in general, are a valuable aspect of the project for social change, rather than institutions to be completely dismantled along with the other machinery of state bureaucracy.

In many ways, the tensions to be found within the writings and practice of those involved in the long tradition of anarchist education reflect the question commonly experienced and articulated by radical educators the world over: namely, is it possible to combine an educational process that embodies substantive moral and political values with a respect for the freedom of the child?

ANARCHIST EDUCATION TODAY

In an era when universal, compulsory state schooling has, unlike in Godwin's time, become the unquestioned background against which all debates on educational provision, content and process takes place, suggestions for decoupling education from the state are harder than ever to defend. Historically, anarchists' opposition to the state and its institutions has led them to distance themselves from the state schooling system. However, now that many elements of the radical critique of traditional state education presented by early progressive and libertarian schools have become mainstream, and most contemporary classrooms are far less overtly oppressive and authoritarian places than they were in Ferrer's Spain, it may be harder to see what it is in state schooling that calls for questioning and resistance.

Furthermore, many capitalist states are currently witnessing calls to dismantle state control and provision of education, not from a commitment to the anarchist values of individual freedom, mutual aid and federalism, but as part of a neo-liberal assault on public goods and a belief in the magical power of the market to generate the best and most 'effective' solutions to social needs.

This puts contemporary anarchists in a somewhat uneasy position. On the one hand, anarchists have always, for good reason, been sympathetic to alternative schools such as Summerhill and Sudbury Valley which, while not explicitly anarchist, share many central anarchist commitments to cooperation, freedom from coercion and experimentation, and which challenge, by their very existence, the dominant model of state schooling. Yet on the other hand, the fact that many proposals for 'rolling back the state' come from an agenda aligned with individualism, competition and corporate capitalism means that anarchists may find themselves allied with defenders of public education as part of an attempt to defend values of equality, social justice and local democracy. In the same way as not all schools operating outside the state system reflect and instantiate values of individual freedom, solidarity, cooperation and non-domination, not all state schools are necessarily destructive of such values.

Yet if an important part of anarchism is the ability to understand and criticise the forms of domination present in current social relations, and to imagine a different future, then anarchists should perhaps look to forms of education that, whether within or outside the state system, not only emphasise personal freedom and creativity but encourage an active questioning of current political arrangements and an attempt to imagine alternatives.

Very few alternative schools today explicitly refer to themselves as anarchist. David Gribble has argued that 'over the last hundred years there has been increased recognition of the merits of freedom in schools, but it has not been under the anarchist flag',⁴⁸ and notes that 'the term "democratic schools" is used as a blanket term to cover a range of practice and communities of "non-authoritarian schools"' because 'no government or newspaper could comfortably object to the idea of democratic education, whereas "libertarian", "free", "progressive" or "anarchist" education would be under immediate attack'.⁴⁹

In his research into the range of such schools around the globe, Gribble concludes that while they are all different, ‘they share a central core of common values’, which he lists as:

1. Reliance on reason rather than doctrine
2. Self-government or shared responsibility
3. Freedom to choose
4. Equality
5. Respect for and trust in the individual child.

In Gribble’s view, while none of the schools he describes started out from anarchist principles, ‘what they have in common with each other they also have in common with Francisco Ferrer’.⁵⁰

There are, however, many ongoing educational experiments with a more explicitly anarchist orientation, whether in schools, universities, home education groups, adult education projects or as part of social protest movements. For example, the libertarian Paideia School in Spain describes itself as an anarchist school, explaining: ‘We seek a global transformation of society [...] by means of an education that seeks mutual aid, solidarity, freedom, equality, collective ethics, dignity and responsibility’.⁵¹

Similarly, the Free Skool Santa Cruz, part of a network of explicitly Anarchist Free Schools across North America and Canada, describes itself as ‘a grassroots educational project beyond institutional control’, stating ‘We see Free Skool as a direct challenge to dominant institutions and hierarchical relationships’, and the Anarchist Free School/Skool in Toronto, an adult education project first set up in 1999, describes itself as ‘a decentralized network in which skills, passions, and knowledge are shared outside of the hierarchical, and often authoritarian environment of formal, institutional education’.⁵² The Toronto Free Skool manifesto states: ‘Inspired by anarchist philosophy and the practices of social change movements, we aim to facilitate horizontal, egalitarian learning, and see this model of education as a form of resistance against our society’s stifling culture of disempowerment’.⁵³

Ian Cunningham, who founded the Self-Managed Learning College in Brighton, England, where children and adults are part of non-hierarchical learning groups, explicitly positions this project as part of a tradition inspired by primitive hunter-gatherer anarchies and Kropotkin’s *Mutual Aid*. He argues that ‘democratic education needs to be based on the more natural processes of living that we humans need rather than how democracy has evolved at the macro political level ... it is not about replicating nation state processes and structures. It has to be emancipatory and liberatory’⁵⁴ (Cunningham, 2011: 1).

These contemporary initiatives also illustrate the way in which anarchist theory and practice is constantly evolving and self-reflective, offering, in some cases, explicit criticism of earlier strands in the anarchist tradition. The Free Skool website, for example, notes:

One theoretical limitation to freeskool theory that originates in its anarchist roots is a preoccupation with modernity and rationalism. [...]. Ferrer was deeply concerned with using scientific rationalism as a counter to church teachings that he saw as dogmatic and superstitious. Though this aim was noble and liberatory within its historical and social context, the idea cannot be forwarded to freeskools of today.⁵⁵

Drawing on post-colonial theory and engaging with contemporary feminist and antiracist movements, the authors express sympathy for forms of radical and critical pedagogy rooted in anti-colonial struggles and in indigenous ways of knowledge.

Many contemporary anarchist educational experiments are associated, as were earlier anarchist initiatives, with social protest movements and experiments in communal living. The Occupy Movement has been a catalyst for a number of anarchist educational experiments, and it is also important to note that the forms of activism and organisation involved in many radical social movements, which are often explicitly anarchist, have an important pedagogical function.

In the current climate, the explicit target of the anarchist critique reflected in these experiments is often, in contrast to their early twentieth-century predecessors, less the state and its control of educational institutions, and more the pervasive ideology and interests of global corporate capitalism that have increasingly come to characterise the governance and content of public schooling. In a climate in which the commodification of learning, the standardisation of curriculum and the loss of teachers' autonomy signify a close alliance between state education and corporate capitalism, and in which teachers are required to comply with the 'anti-radicalisation' agendas of Western governments, anarchist educational experiments, however small scale, can constitute what Robert Haworth calls 'creative spaces of resistance'.⁵⁶ One can see such ongoing and ever-evolving projects as what Colin Ward referred to as 'seeds beneath the snow'—evidence that, as he put it, 'an anarchist society, a society which organizes itself without authority, is always in existence, like a seed beneath the snow, buried under the weight of the state and its bureaucracy, capitalism and its waste, privilege and its injustices, nationalism and its suicidal loyalties, religious differences and their superstitious separatism'.⁵⁷

Most of the anarchist schools discussed above saw themselves as playing a role in bringing about the future anarchist society. Yet while the anarchist theory of human nature goes a long way to explaining why some form of education will always be essential, there are still many questions to be asked about the form that education would take in a post-revolutionary anarchist society. It is thus important to look not just at contemporary examples of anarchist-inspired schools in Western liberal states but at educational experiments in situations where the state has effectively collapsed, or where self-governing, stateless political communities are being established. One of the most exciting contemporary examples here is Rojava, in Northern Syria, where the Kurdish-led

Democratic Union Party (PYD) has established a popular democracy based on Abdullah Ocalan's idea of 'democratic confederalism', which draws directly on the anarchist theory of Murray Bookchin. While it is difficult to obtain accurate information about the ongoing situation in Rojava, which at the time of writing is still in the midst of an armed conflict, education is a key element in the social revolution intended to 'replace totalitarianism, capitalism and patriarchy in the Middle East'.⁵⁸

Janet Biehl, describing her visit to Rojava's first and only institution of higher education, the Mesopotamian Social Sciences Academy in Qamislo, argues that 'For decades, the schools of the Baath regime, with its nationalistic focus, had aimed to create an authoritarian mentality. The Mesopotamian Academy is intent on overcoming this grim past by "helping create free individuals and free thoughts"'.⁵⁹

Of course there are many questions to be asked about the anarchist elements of the Rojavan social revolution and the radical educational projects that form such a central part of it, not least because of their association with the Kurdish nationalist movement, and the concern that the Rojava experiment represents a top-down approach to re-educate people in order to prepare them for Ocalan's vision of democratic municipalism. However, as the above discussion has indicated, some of these questions reflect perennial tensions at the heart of any attempt to theorise the relationship between education and radical social change. Whatever reservations one may have about the anarchist credentials of the Rojava activists and leaders, the mass participation in forms of local, direct democracy in order to address immediate social needs is clearly in the tradition of social anarchist experiments and itself has an important pedagogical value.

CONCLUSION

Reflecting on the 'complex relationship anarchism has with education', Robert Haworth comments that 'the more we engage in conversation about these intricate relationships the more we can see that they are filled with tensions and ambiguity'.⁶⁰

Yet in a sense, the tensions suggested by this account of anarchist education are the tensions faced by any educator concerned with issues of social justice, freedom and oppression: how do we address the real needs of the children we are faced with, here and now, in classrooms, homes and universities, while at the same time holding onto the desire to create a better future? All educators, to the extent that they are doing anything more than simply imparting skills and knowledge, face this task. All educators should have the space to reflect on and engage in conversations about these issues, not in order to resolve them once and for all but as part of their continuous struggle to work with them. To leave anarchist voices out of these conversations would be to impoverish our thinking, not just about education but about what different forms of social life and political organisation are desirable and possible.

NOTES

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4. Avrich, *Modern School Movement*, 21.
5. Ferrer, *Origins and Ideals*, 62.
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21. See <http://www.summerhillsschool.co.uk/>.
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24. In Weiner, *Tolstoy*.
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26. *Ibid.*

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The City, Urban Planning and Architecture

Michael Coates

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will do two things: one is to introduce the reader to a body of anarchist theory within and related to architecture and building more generally. The second is to illustrate how people outside of the architectural professions have taken control of their built environments in ways that can be analysed through anarchist modes of thinking. The Franco-Swiss Modernist architect, and famed father of European Modernist, Le Corbusier, once stated: ‘Revolution or Architecture. Revolution can be avoided’¹ to mean that the improved environments that Modern architecture provided meant social revolution was unnecessary. I argue that a revolution in architecture and the architectural professions is required.

In order to introduce the reader to anarchist architectural theory I will look at key thinker Colin Ward, along with people such as John F. C. Turner. I will also address other anarchist theorists from the parallel disciplines of art and literary criticism, notably Sir Herbert Read. Ward and Read are for me exemplars of a very English, quietist² mode of anarchist theory and critique. They are also important in understanding the role of anarchist thought in the critique and revolution of artistic production in an anarchist mode.

Read and Ward’s quietist attitudes are also relevant to the second part of this chapter: The ‘accidental anarchism’ of people taking control of, and having a vested interest in, their built environments. It is necessary in this part of the chapter to look at the history of the radical architecture scene of the mid- to late- 1970s in England. Specifically, I will concentrate on the formation of various groups of individuals during this period that either acted from within the profession, or more commonly were not members of the architectural cogno-

M. Coates (✉)

Faculty of Arts & Humanities, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK
e-mail: M.Coates@mmu.ac.uk

scenti. Examples such as the SOLON housing and architectural works co-operative,³ the co-operative housing groups created to resist demolition in Liverpool⁴ and the Architects' Revolutionary Council (ARC).⁵ My clarification of the role the ARC played in this period gives me a body of evidence from which to construct a history of subversive, radical or anarchist architects and architecture in 1970s England. It brings together the threads of an argument and ideas that led to the establishment of radical architectural movements. The ARC's campaigns and projects, along with other examples to be cited, will provide a re-reading of the history of architecture in this period.

Architecture, with a capital A in this chapter, is taken to mean all aspects of the architectural process: legislation, planning regulations, building control and so on, as well as the material production of this process, the buildings themselves. Whilst Architect, with a capital A, refers to the professions of Architecture and all the professionals within this process, including but not limited to town planners, planning authorities, building inspectors, structural engineers, quantity surveyors and central and local government. The use of the lowercase 'a' indicates the practice of doing architecture' or 'building buildings' and the person of the architect. It is the Architectural professions and Architecture that are the subject of much of the criticisms of this piece as opposed to individuals or the planned process of building buildings. Architecture is rarely used in this way to have two definitions in English. The word Architecture has become synonymous with the profession and their outputs that the word 'builder' and 'building' has come to mean the process of producing structures for shelter and the carrying out of human functions. I am using the term architecture with this definition in mind, and defined for the reader as architecture with lowercase 'a', to try to rehabilitate the term and create a separation in our understanding of the word from the people and structures of the Architectural professions. In effect, I intend to reclaim the term architecture from the Architects, at the same time as reclaiming the practice of architecture from the profession of Architecture.

ANARCHIST THEORY IN ARCHITECTURE

Anarchist thought as an alternative idea for the operation of society has primarily concentrated on the process of change, and the nature of any future anarchist society. This has naturally concentrated on the social and political structures and revolutions required to achieve these changes. Modern Architectural theory has largely ignored anarchist theories of the organisation of society as antithetical to the controlled and highly professionalised process of Architecture. There are however a number of exceptions to these generalisations from within architecture and cultural theory.

Two key thinkers that I will discuss initially are Colin Ward, a British architecture and anarchist theorist,⁶ and Herbert Read, British art historian, critic, philosopher and co-founder of the Institute of Contemporary Arts.⁷ Both Ward and Read, within their differing disciplines, provide us with positions that

demonstrate the validity of anarchist arguments as applied to the fields of creative production. Read's work will be important in articulating the relationship between humanity and the made environment, along Nicholas John Habraken's⁸ contributions in developing alternative modes of building dwellings from the 1960s onwards. Carissa Honeywell has written on the work of Colin Ward placing him, and indeed Read, in their proper context as significant contributors to the development of anarchist thinking in Britain in the twentieth century.⁹ My focus, however, is on the relevance of Ward and Read's ideas as a critique of cultural production specifically, and architectural production in particular. Whilst Read did not write directly about architecture, his concern with art and design provides arguments that can be turned to a critique of modern practices Architecture.

COLIN WARD

Ward wrote and lectured widely throughout his career on the relevance of anarchist ideas to the production of housing architecture. His texts such as *Tenants Take Over* (1974) and *Housing: An Anarchist Approach* (1976) deal directly with examples of anarchist theory and anarchist action as they have been applied to, and manifested in, the building and maintenance of people's homes. In the case of people taking control of their own living conditions, for instance, by carrying out maintenance or rebuilding their own homes, their involvement is motivated by vested interests of protecting their homes from often misguided local or central government schemes of redevelopment. Indeed, I would argue that the vested interests, decried by some critics of Architecture¹⁰ are here a key motivator in people deciding to act in defending or improving their living conditions.

As Ward explores in his 1966 article 'Anarchism as a Theory of Organisation', the Architects' office has been a site of exploration of modes of anarchist organisation. He cites a report produced in 1962:

...for the Institute of British Architects under the title *The Architect and His Office*. The team which prepared this report found two different approaches to the design process, which gave rise to different ways of working and methods of organisation. One they categorised as centralised, which was characterised by autocratic forms of control, and the other they called dispersed, which promoted what they called "an informal atmosphere of free-flowing ideas." This is a very live issue among architects. Mr. W. D. Pile, who in an official capacity helped to sponsor the outstanding success of postwar British architecture, the school-building programme, specifies among the things he looks for in a member of the building team that: "He must have a belief in what I call the non-hierarchical organisation of the work. The work has got to be organised not on the star system, but on the repertory system. The team leader may often be junior to a team member. That will only be accepted if it is commonly accepted that primacy lies with the best idea and not with the senior man." And one of our greatest architects, Walter Gropius, proclaims what he calls the technique of "collaboration

among men, which would release the creative instincts of the individual instead of smothering them. The essence of such technique should be to emphasise individual freedom of initiative, instead of authoritarian direction by a boss ... synchronizing individual effort by a continuous give and take of its members.¹¹

Here, quoted at length, we can see Ward is arguing that the Architectural profession, far from being a hierarchical organisation born, as so many professions in British society, of the British class system could in fact be a hot bed of anarchist organisation. This is not to suggest this is the current situation, but that Ward is arguing that architecture as an anarchist process is achievable. Indeed, he goes on to say:

I believe that the social ideas of anarchism: autonomous groups, spontaneous order, workers' control, the federative principle, add up to a coherent theory of social organisation which is a valid and realistic alternative to the authoritarian, hierarchical and institutional social philosophy which we see in application all around us.¹²

Certain examples, which will be addressed later in this chapter, provide a template for groups of architects/architecture professionals who wish to organise themselves along the lines of the anarcho-syndicalist¹³ modes described by Ward above.

Throughout *Housing: An Anarchist Approach*, Ward illustrates how anarchist modes of organisation can apply readily to doing architecture (lowercase 'a') and indeed the built environment more generally. As he says:

Anarchism—the political philosophy of a non-governmental society of autonomous communities—does not at first sight seem to address itself to the problems of the city at all. But there is in fact a stream of anarchist contributions to urban thought that stretches from Kropotkin to Murray Bookchin historically, and from John Turner to the International Situationists ideologically.¹⁴

The anarchist approach then might be taken as an example that can be employed to cities and architecture, and for the focus of this chapter, housing architecture, but has not been to any significant degree yet. Indeed, the examples cited by Ward in 1976 were confined to Latin American *barrios* and the slums of East London, and squatter occupations, as examples of anarchist modes of seizing control of land and property. It is not really until ten years later, in his book *When We Build Again: Let's Have Housing That Works* (1985), that Ward sets out numerous modes by which occupants can engage in dwelling practices that enable them to work outside of the normal modes of Architecture.

One of the most common and easily recognised modes is that of the co-operative. Similarly to definitions of syndicalism offered by Rudolph Rocker, the co-operative is a collective of autonomous individuals who come together to pool their abilities and labour to achieve an end, in this case building dwellings:

The argument for housing co-operatives is that it is a mode of tenure which changes the situation from one of dependence to one of independence, that it is one which, as the veteran co-operative advocate Harold Campbell put it years ago, “combines private enterprise and mutual aid in a unique form of social ownership which puts at a premium personal responsibility and individual initiative”.¹⁵

Importantly the co-operative model also addresses some questions around land tenure and the ultimate ownership of the dwellings when completed. The co-operative enables those who independently may not be able physically or financially to build their own homes to opt out of the status quo. The self-building or self-organised co-operative worker—self-build being a common mode of co-operative organisation in housing—therefore presents themselves as the seemingly logical result of an anarchist mode of doing architecture. The invention of the *Grand Designs* television programme in 1999 by Channel 4 has created a version of the self-build project that is almost entirely divorced from this kind of working. *Grand Designs* tells the story of rich people building their own homes with the use of skilled craftspeople and, invariably, architects.¹⁶ However, the *Grand Designs* version of building one’s own home has become quite prevalent in British popular culture since the millennium. Ward’s work serves as a significant corrective to this mindset and provides us with myriad examples of people taking an anarchist approach to housing. Ward had some influence on the Architecture professionals of the period, primarily between the 1970s and 1990s. The 1996 book *Talking to Architects: Ten Lectures by Colin Ward*, for example, brings together lectures given to the profession at universities and Architectural conferences between 1976 and 1996.¹⁷ There is notable preponderance of lectures from 1990 onwards. This suggests that the relevance of Ward’s ideas were acknowledged as relevant then, twenty years ago and twenty years after first being published, as I argue they are relevant again now, forty years after first appearing.

ANARCHISM IS A NATURAL STATE OF BEING

Nicholas John Habraken sets out in his book *Supports: An Alternative to Mass Housing* (1967) the concept of the ‘natural relationship’. The ‘natural relationship’ is, at its purest, the expression of individuality and/or necessity that occurs in early human societies. As Habraken says:

It [the natural relationship] all started at a primitive stage when this relationship expressed itself directly in the action of man who by himself, without any help, built his protective environment.¹⁸

Clearly many degrees of separation now exist between the occupant and this direct expression of the ‘natural relationship’ in mass housing. It was the mass housing process in particular that Habraken was railing against in 1967; however, one can expand this idea to incorporate the wider dislocation of the general populace from the architectural professions and the products produced by them.

We need to deal with this concept of the ‘natural’ as used by Habraken and indeed as used by Herbert Read in his seminal essay *To Hell With Culture* (1941). Read refers to the natural as meaning something outside of the conventional organisation of society, more akin with anarchist modes of production and organisation. In *To Hell With Culture* he says:

If we follow this natural order in all the ways of our life, we shall not need to talk about culture. We shall have it without being conscious of it. But how are we to attain this natural order of things, which is my particular concern in this essay? Obviously, we can’t make things naturally in unnatural surroundings. We can’t do things properly unless we are properly fed and properly housed. [...] In other words, before we can make things naturally, we must establish the natural order in society, which for my present purposes I assume is what we will mean by democracy.¹⁹

By democracy and natural here I see it as evident that Read means anarcho-syndicalism, as Rudolph Rocker states,

Anarcho-syndicalists are convinced that a Socialist economic order cannot be created by the decrees and statutes of a government, but only by the solidaric collaboration of the workers with hand and brain.²⁰

In such a society, more likely than the individual builder is a group of autonomous individuals working in a co-operative, ‘solidaric collaboration of the workers’. This serves as both an illustration of previous modes of architecture, as well as present and potentially future versions of house building.

However, the professionalisation of architecture has created a gulf between itself, its products and the rest of society: this gulf seems almost unbridgeable. Read, and to a lesser extent Habraken, argue that this is two-way. It is not just the Architectural professions and those within them withholding all the power but the unwillingness of people who are not part of these professions to engage with architecture. This is an issue I will return to later in this chapter when discussing examples of non-Architects engaging with architecture.

The anarcho-syndicalist organisation of the process of doing architecture does, however, necessitate the replacement of the Architectural professions and the social stratum that they occupy with another mode of doing architecture.

‘ANARCHIST’ ARCHITECTURE

I have entitled this section ‘Anarchist’ architecture as the examples here illustrated demonstrate the ways in which architecture has been carried out historically using forms of self-organisation and do not necessarily equal ‘anarchist’ however. I am arguing that these are anarcho-syndicalist, as defined above by Rocker, in nature even if not consciously anarchist in planning or execution. Anarchist modes of doing and organising can be reliably applied to these exam-

ples, so even though the people engaged in these practices of doing architecture would almost certainly not have considered themselves to be ‘anarchists’, we can analyse their actions from an anarchist position.

In order to understand the degree to which the building of buildings has been professionalised in Britain, we need to look back to an earlier state of affairs. The pre-industrial period supplies manifold examples of the way people used to house themselves independently of any architect or, in many cases, of any landowner. This mode of housing oneself has all but become extinct in industrialised and post-industrial societies. As Habraken said: ‘Man no longer houses himself: he is housed’.²¹ The processes of creating dwellings are now so well advanced that the dweller is not required until the very end of the process, to occupy and/or purchase the consumer object that the architectural process has created. Rather than housing themselves, people now expect to occupy a complete house and sometimes a lifestyle to boot. As Habraken says:

MH [mass housing] reduces the dwelling to a consumer article and the dweller to a consumer. For only in this way can it be expected that the consumer waits until he is offered a complete product. It need not surprise us if this approach proves wrong because individual human action forms part of the housing brief.²²

THE ONE-NIGHT HOUSE

The legend of the *ty unnos*, literally ‘one-night house’, in Wales, and many parts of the Celtic fringe of Ireland and Britain, notably Cornwall and the English West Country more generally, provide us with an ‘origin myth’ for the act of people housing themselves. The *ty unnos* is explored by Colin Ward in his book *Cotters and Squatters: Housing’s Hidden History* (2002): ‘The idea of the one-night house is woven into Welsh history, where it is seen as relating to the imposition of Norman land law’.²³

Ward brings together numerous other examples of the legend of the one-night house from many parts of the British Isles. As this legend has a noticeable preponderance on the Celtic fringe, the inference is therefore that the practice of the one-night house goes back beyond the Roman conquest of Britain into earlier Celtic or pre-Celtic societies. What seems evident from Ward’s considerable research, however, is that this was more than merely a legend that one-night houses were built and landlords, even in feudal England, complied with the historic lore of the land in regard to the right of tenancy that constructing a house in one night bestowed. This is not to suggest that these dwellings were universally accepted by locals or landowners. Quoting from David Jones, in *Rebecca’s Children: a study of rural society, crime and protest* Ward recounts:

They settled on land, under the old custom of *ty unnos*, whereby a person was entitled to the freehold of whatever shelter he or she could build in a night and of the land within a stone’s throw. Such encampments were not universally popular, for they cut across the rights of local farmers ... Their homesteads became the source of ‘ever-lasting quarrels’, and of innumerable court cases.²⁴

It is important we reflect on these settlements with a clear historical perspective and not with rose-tinted spectacles for a simpler time. It is undoubtedly the case that now such settlements can often result in far more stringent legal challenges, and the idea of ‘wastes’ or ‘common land’ is almost entirely lost in our time.

In discussing the relationship between architecture and ‘mere building’ and the move from one set of circumstances to the other meaning the ending of the one-night house, in this case in the Forest of Dean:

By the time of encroachments, when settlements were established and churches were needed, the art of architecture, as opposed to mere building, had been lost. Before the time there had been squatters; for forester believed he had the right to build so long as he got smoke going up the chimney before nightfall on the day that he built his cottage or cabin. If fortunate he stayed, if unlucky he was evicted.²⁵

1970s ENGLAND

The 1970s was a period of radical politics provoked by political and economic decline and public resentment at central government’s inability to deal with these crises. It was also the period in which the boundaries of acceptability in society, pushed so hard in the 1960s, became accepted as the norm, generally speaking. By the mid-1970s this radical attitude had found expression in the architectural professions also. As Anne Karpf noted in October 1977:

Architects, recently, have abbreviated themselves. To the outsider, cryptic collections of capitals like SAG, NAM, ACA, ARC, AOA, AIC, suggest a secret uncrackable code. To the initiated, they—and other, more explicit titles—represent the plethora of architectural pressure groups, and are almost invariably associated with the strong vein of discontent which runs through the profession.²⁶

At the start of her article, Karpf makes reference to the Salaried Architects Group (SAG), New Architecture Movement (NAM), Association of Consultant Architects (ACA), Architects Revolutionary Council (ARC), Association of Official Architects (AOA) and Architects in Industry and Commerce (AIC). These are all associations set up in the economic downturn of the mid- to late-1970s in opposition to the architectural ruling classes, namely the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA). There was a general sense in the 1970s that the powers that be were failing to address the problems created by what we would now refer to as ‘globalisation’. Britain had surrendered most of its major colonial possessions by 1978 and was reorienting itself from being a global empire to a middle-sized nation in a globalised economy. This inevitably difficult reorientation, including joining, in 1973, and reaffirming, in 1975, its membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) had significant social repercussions. At least part of this manifested as a rejection of existing imperial orthodoxy, especially amongst the younger generation coming of age

in the late 1970s.²⁷ The curious reaction to this failure of the old guard in Britain was a reversion to Conservatism, with a capital ‘C’, with the landslide election of Margret Thatcher’s Conservative government in May 1979.

In architectural circles in Britain the obvious manifestation of the small ‘c’ conservative imperial British orthodoxy was the RIBA. Some of the groups which emerged from this rebellion within architecture went on to work directly with residents in participatory practices of architecture, slum clearance and conservation.²⁸ A key point to make here, however, is that whilst most of the organisations listed by Karpf were set up to reform or replace the RIBA, the ARC questioned the very existence of the profession of architecture. The basis of their argument, and indeed mine, concerned the superior social status associated with the title of architect.

That the architect should work directly for and with ‘The People’ and not the powers that be, and that they should work for free,²⁹ fatally undermines the ‘profession’. If one is working for free as architects, it is assumed, under existent social mores, that this cannot be one’s profession. Therefore, one must concede that being ‘an architect’, as redefined as this term would then be, must be an extra role, a voluntary duty that former ‘architects’ perform for the community at large.

The skills of the architect/designer are not unique or rare. They can be taught and learnt. Evidence of creative problem solving, design and adaption can be seen in all human societies, many without any professions even resembling architecture.

THE ARC

The Architects’ Revolutionary Council (ARC) operated from the Architectural Association (AA) in London between 1974 and 1980. At first glance this may appear to be an isolated revolutionary moment that burst onto the scene during a period of uncertainty in architecture circles. This period is perhaps best defined by the ‘RIBA crisis’ of 1971–1972³⁰ and involved its dispute with salaried architects, and the attempts by various sectors of the profession to advance their agendas through the formation of pressure groups. The purpose of this section is both to briefly tell the story of the ARC in relation to its origins and to anarchist architectural theory.

The momentum to establish the ARC in 1974 came principally from former Greater London Council (GLC) planner and later lecturer at the AA, Brian Anson. His radicalisation stemmed from the evident frustration he felt from his involvement in the failed campaign to save the old working-class community of Covent Garden during the Covent Garden Campaign of 1968–1974. The Covent Garden Campaign, whilst successful in saving the physical fabric of Covent Garden, failed, in Anson’s view, to achieve its principal aim, to preserve central London’s last traditional working-class community. Anson blamed this failure on himself, the middle-class ‘colonisers’ and the working-class commu-

nity themselves, saying in the very last lines of his 1981 retelling, *I'll Fight You For It: Behind the Struggle for Covent Garden*:

[The] Covent Garden [campaign] was a failure, not because the struggle was lost but because, paradoxically, it was never waged. Those who claim success in the area are apathetically wrong and it is significant that most of them are either middle-class outsiders or recent colonisers of Covent Garden. ... They could never understand the dream that lay in the heart of a Sam Driscoll or a John Thomey. ... But Covent Garden was also my personal failure. ... But the greatest tragedy of all is that the old community have *allowed* themselves to be defeated like lambs to the slaughter. Oppressed for so long in the centre of London, they have lost the will to fight for their land and culture.³¹

The Covent Garden campaign served for many of those architecture students and staff at the AA whom Anson involved in it, as a springboard for the establishment of the ARC.

This campaign to prevent the Greater London Council's planned scorched earth policy of demolition and rebuild allied the last truly working-class community in central London with the middle-class theatre crowd of the area. Needless to say, the two groups had differing aims but an overlapping purpose, to stop the GLC plan. As Anson would put it they were 'united in only one thing—hatred of the brutal redevelopment scheme the Greater London Council was threatening in the area'.³²

Anson became involved when he joined the planning team at the Greater London Council in August 1966 and was set to work with five others planning the redevelopment of Covent Garden for the departure of the market. Anson recounts how he 'began formulating ideas of a concept which I called 'Immediate Environment Improvement', and that 'the consortium should have fired me there and then because, banal though my own words appear to me now, they contained within them the full spirit of my revolt four years later'.³³

Anson's revolt was catastrophic for the Greater London Council; he took vast quantities of copied documents and knowledge of the intricacies of the plan with him to the people of Covent Garden. His knowledge was then put to use in the working-class community's campaign to save their area, with the founding of the Covent Garden Community Association in 1971.

The overall conclusion that Anson reached regarding the working-class campaign to save Covent Garden was that it was a failure. In the post-mortem carried out towards the end of his book, he says: 'Whether we would have got support for the Community struggle had the theatre fraternity no vested interests in Covent Garden is a debatable point'.³⁴

However, I would argue that the vested interests here referred to by Anson are the reason people are moved to act. It was vested interests that mobilised the working-class community of Covent Garden. What Anson is, in fact, referring to is the ultimate outcome of the campaign. The public inquiry, somewhat predictably, sided with the Greater London Council at its conclusion in mid-

1972; however in 1973 the Secretary of State for the Environment intervened and the Greater London Council scheme was finally destroyed. The physical fabric of Covent Garden had been retained but its working-class community was to be thoroughly killed off by the following ten years of gentrification.

FOUNDATION

The ARC emerged during a period of social and economic upheaval, not unlike the current economic and social situation. The ARC's approach, contrary to some elements of the Architectural profession in 1970s England, was to try and reinvent the practice of architecture. In some instances, during this period the long-ignored users of Architecture, those outside of the profession, also attempted to make their voices heard.

Various ARC acts—their disruption of the RIBA 1976 Hull conference; their posters asking, 'If crime doesn't pay ... Where do architects get all their money?'; and their reworking the RIBA acronym to mean the 'Royal Institute of Bullshitting Aristocrats'—give us a good sense of the level of animosity held by this group towards the architectural establishment.

Referring to the early years of the Covent Garden struggle, Anson says, these were:

the crucial years, when the protest movement had a choice of directions and, in my opinion took the wrong one: to work for reform within the system instead of developing a revolutionary struggle against it.³⁵

For radical Marxist revolutionaries such as Anson and the ARC, the peoples' lack of willingness to revolt openly led to the perpetuation of the status quo and existent power structures.

The ARC was, rather predictably, dubbed 'the enfant terrible of the radical architecture groups' noted for its belief that 'creative architecture should be available to all people in society, regardless of their economic circumstances', and it is 'committed to revolutionary changes within the architectural establishment'.³⁶

MANIFESTO

The ARC manifesto was published in numerous places and in various languages over the year or so after their dramatic 1974 press conference at the AA: In early 1974 a group of radical architectural students operating under the guise of the 'Architects' Revolutionary Council' (ARC) announced their presence to the world, staging a dramatic press conference and publishing an inflammatory manifesto. Calling for the destruction of the RIBA and the establishment of 'an international movement towards community architecture', the ARC emerged from the AA's Intermediate Unit 1, tutored by the charismatic Brian Anson.³⁷

The manifesto made a number of claims for the future of the ARC and by extension the architectural profession itself. Key amongst these were the calls for members of professions, both qualified and students, to ‘join the new international movement and through solidarity help to bring about the architectural revolution’.³⁸ The call to solidarity is significant as the ARC was targeting the power structures of Architecture—primarily the RIBA. This is also evident from earlier sections of the manifesto that, rather than targeting individual practitioners of architecture, focussed on Architecture as a profession and a social stratum in need, not of mere reform, but of annihilation. Their aim to destroy the pedestal upon which the RIBA sat, supported by the capitalist mode of production and the moneyed classes, is dealt with explicitly in the first paragraph of the manifesto:

the ARC calls on all those architects and others involved in the built environment who believe that we should cease working only for a rich powerful minority or the bureaucratic dictatorship of Central and Local Governments and offer our skills and services to the local communities who have little chance to work directly with architects and architecture.³⁹

This places the ARC politically less in the revolutionary Marxist camp, and more in the anarcho-syndicalist camp of temporary syndicates formed for the purposes of solving specific problems or meeting specific needs.⁴⁰

AT WORK

Whilst the subversive qualities of the ARC have been noted, what is less well known is the work the members of the ARC did with various community groups. Much of the ARC’s work was documented at the time in newspapers and comment pieces in the architectural and mainstream press. The projects with which they became involved were invariably via the invitation of the local groups concerned.

In such projects the relationship between the architect or skilled architectural worker and the residents and/or occupants was part of the transgressive work of the ARC. As such this provides a rich seam of study to help contextualise the current fights within the architectural profession.

BRIDGTOWN

Brian Anson considered the ARC’s involvement with residents of Bridgtown (a former mining village, now part of Cannock, Staffordshire⁴¹) in its successful campaign to defy planners’ attempts to demolish the whole area for industrial uses, to be more significant than its ‘RIBA-baiting’ activities. Quoted by Anne Karpf in 1977, Anson said: ‘In Bridgetown [sic], we’ve got closer to the people and it’s logical that we spend more time at the grass roots’.⁴² Bridgtown is

notably now a largely residential area with much of its industry having declined and the sites have been cleared and replaced with housing.

The Bridgtown project was successful in that the Bridgtown Residents Action Group (BRAG) with the assistance of the ARC was able to resist the local authorities' plans for the area. Through protests, public meetings, lobbying of politicians and production of 'propaganda' including leaflets and cartoons (often drawn by Louis Hellman of the *Architects' Journal*⁴³), BRAG and the ARC were able to successfully reverse the decisions taken by the local authority. However, this campaign was not without its difficulties in terms of the ARC's relationship with BRAG, as a letter from Brian Anson to BRAG dated December 1977 reveals. The relationship began well in May 1977 as the ARC was welcomed by BRAG. However by December 1977, relations had deteriorated to such a degree that Anson was moved to write one of his long, part manifesto, part treatise letters to BRAG. Regarding a Bridgtown public meeting at which the ARC spoke, Anson wrote:

We showed slides of our work in other areas of the country. We offered you a manifesto as a platform for your renewed struggle and this unanimously accepted. We wrote you a song. Most important we tackled the problem of the stalemate into which you'd got yourselves, by suggesting that you break off all planning relationships with the Council, on the basis that no community can negotiate it's [sic] own extermination. This was fully accepted and was done.⁴⁴

Anson here expresses his frustration with the apparent success of the divide and rule tactics of the powers that be. The residents' action group was better motivated to defend itself than the group Anson had worked with at Covent Garden. However, the motivating factor here was, once again, vested interests. The villagers of Bridgtown were seeking to defend their way of life as well as their village and were thus motivated to engage in alternative ways of doing architecture.

Later in the letter Anson appears to express concern about the lack of radicalism on the part of the residents' group. His reference to the ARC writing BRAG a 'song' and attempting to engage them in other acts of active resistance received lukewarm support from the residents. Thus the ARC's attempts to reveal to the residents of Bridgtown the inevitable inequality of the planning process, biased then as now towards money and expertise, were unsuccessful. As with other projects, the ARC engaged with the local community who had initially called on their help but who were not interested in the revolutionary ideals that came with them.

This is the essential contradiction at the heart of the revolutionary groups working with the wider populace. The appetite for wholesale change and revolution amongst the general public is apparently minimal. The desire for such change is limited to particular circumstances and particular vested interests. This may seem self-serving or short sighted to the internationally minded revolutionary, but it is the motivating factor in the daily lives of the individual. It is

therefore perhaps more the ARC's failures that we can learn from. Their failure to motivate the people of Bridgtown and numerous other ARC projects (Ealing, Colne Valley, and pre-ARC Covent Garden), to outright resistance or to revolution highlights the contradictions of revolutionary practices inside and outside of architecture. The ARC's failures can be seen as a key example of the difficulties of achieving revolution, Marxist or anarchist, within architecture. The architectural profession has become so removed from everyday life, even in the context of housing architecture, that most people would not immediately consider it to be central to their day-to-day experiences. This could not, however, be further from the truth as Habraken, referenced above, argued in 1962. A pertinent question would therefore be: can a practice that results in such a permanent presence as Architecture ever be revolutionised? The practice of Architecture as we know it is so reliant on the status quo and on money, power structures, authorities, governments and particular models of professionalism that perhaps only its wholesale destruction (as advocated by the ARC) can address the need for an architecture of the people. As Peter Maloney said in a recent interview with the author 'Bridgtown was what Brian saw as what architecture should be, and architects should be doing it for free. There were little successes but the ultimate was build something'.⁴⁵

CONCLUSION

The examples here give us a series of stories and paths from which we can draw together a number of strands illustrating the development of anarchist ideas and modes of working in architecture in the twentieth century. These anarchist practices are, using a term attributed to Colin Ward, as those of an 'unconscious anarchist'.⁴⁶ The key group referenced in this chapter, the ARC, would not even have described themselves as anarchist. Anson, as its most significant member, was ideologically firmly in the Revolutionary Marxist camp, and therefore the ideas of anarcho-syndicalism are perhaps closer to the ARC and its other members. The groups that the ARC worked for, and with, fall more fully into the category of unconsciously anarchist. From Covent Garden to Cannock, they were motivated by vested interests, not pure political ideology, Marxist or anarchist. Their desire was to save their homes, and their wider community, from destruction. Their desire to self-organise, to engage in anarchist practices, was therefore motivated by a more 'natural' desire to protect their homes. The wider work of the housing co-operative, the self-builder, the groups who seized control of their built environment for the greater good, can all be described as unconsciously anarchist acts. Some people such as Ward and Read were more explicit in their anarchism whilst also recognising the lack of anarchist motivation or ideology in the general populace. Ward particularly looked for 'seeds under the snow'⁴⁷ in the behaviours of people who spoke to him of unconscious anarchism.

When attempts were made by the profession of Architecture and the Architect, however revolutionary, to radicalise the populace politically, they

invariably failed. This mismatch is between the politically and ideologically motivated Architect (or architect, lowercase 'a') and the personally and emotionally motivated people. Ultimately however if the field of Architecture is to become one in which anarchist modes of doing and organising can develop, it is up to the profession to surrender its power and control over the process. Continuing the process of building buildings (architecture) does not require the profession (Architecture) to exist. The 'secrets' of Architecture, which are established and defended by the profession at large, are what maintains the Architect's social status. It is this social and professional status that Architecture exists to defend.

It is important here to differentiate between the idea of a profession as a group of skills, expertise or as 'a job well done', and a profession as a means of accruing and retaining power, wealth and status. This distinction is perhaps a difficult one to draw as the two have become almost entirely synonymous in our society. One can understand, with only a vague appreciation of anthropological concepts, how in early human civilisations an individual with a particular skill, useful to the 'clan', would have been feted, and given social status because of this.

This however remains the mode by which professions continue to manifest and accrue power and influence today, albeit in a more a complex, multifaceted, technological society where more professions exist and different skills are needed. Bison hunters are less in evidence than web designers for obvious reasons. It does not follow that the possession of a certain skill has to convey special status: the now unimportant skill of hunting bison means the bison hunter no longer has high social status, as their skills are no longer of use to our society. Architects however are still largely of use. If, rather than seeing the status of the architect as an inevitable consequence of the use-value of the skills, we decoupled the skill from the social status, we could truly democratise the skill set of the architect.

This need not mean the diminishing of those skills but their dissemination. A suitable analogy would be writing. Now, almost everyone in the Global North has been educated to a level where they can read and write fluently. Thus the scribe as a profession has ceased to exist. So might it be with the architect. If all people were taught (or more accurately retaught) how to design and build there would be no more need for architects, they would merely cease to be.

A counter argument to this might be that buildings have become so technically complex that people who are not architects, or one of the manifold professions associated with building, cannot build or design them in this day and age. Then the question has to be 'are these the types of buildings we want and need?' If we have created an architecture so complex that only architects can design or understand it, then whom does this benefit the most? Us, or the Architect? Who is this Architecture for? Us, or the Architect as a social class?

If we want Architecture to lose its mystique, its elevated social status, its elite focus, and be made by the people for the people, then Architects and Architecture must cease to be, and be replaced by architects and architecture. This is not a radical reinvention, as much as a return to first principles of building for need and use, not speculation and profit.

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Anarchism and Ethics

Benjamin Franks

INTRODUCTION

Anarchism is often distinguished from other revolutionary traditions by the priority it gives to moral evaluation¹ rather than, for instance, the largely economic analyses associated with orthodox Marxism.² The importance of ethics, especially with regard to everyday decisions, is because the main forms of anarchism have tended to emphasise the micropolitical.³ Other revolutionary traditions, by contrast, tend to focus on the macropolitical (decisions, policies and institutional norms at the international and state level) and consider the micropolitical as important only insofar as they change or support the former. Because anarchism concentrates on everyday activities and contestation and repositioning of power relations of civil society, there has been a rich tradition of anarchist writings concerning social activities that offer practical guidance on, critiques of and alternatives to:

- Anti-social activity, crime and punishment
- Food production
- Housing
- Personal and sexual relations
- Schooling
- Media
- Social research

These topics cross over with practical questions of organisation: identifying and applying the principles for effective, anti-hierarchical and mutually satisfying forms of social interaction in order to achieve wider benevolent, egalitarian goals.⁴

B. Franks (✉)
University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
e-mail: benjamin.franks@glasgow.ac.uk

It is within practical activities that questions about individual choices and collective decisions arise, not just about how to perform the activity but whether it is worth performing at all and the erroneous moral thinking that sustains the more unnecessary and/or detrimental.⁵ As such this chapter defends the centrality of ethics to anarchist theory and practice. It then argues that a particular form of moral analysis—anti-hierarchical virtue theory—is the most consistent with the main anarchist constellations (socialist anarchisms) whether espoused by classical anarchist (pre-1940) theorists or contemporary anarchist activists and advocates. This is not to argue that all anarchists are explicitly or inherently virtue theorists—indeed, as will be shown, different sub-categories of anarchism are partly identifiable through their distinctive ethical frameworks—but that virtue theory provides the best fit with core analytic principles, epistemologies and practical approaches of the main historical traditions of social (also known as ‘class struggle’) anarchism.

THREE AREAS OF ETHICS

The three main areas of moral philosophy are of meta-ethics, normative ethics, and applied moral analysis. Meta-ethics deals with the status of ethical pronouncements and their epistemological basis. For some, like Immanuel Kant (and Kantian influenced anarchists), moral principles are universal and found through pure reason; or for naturalist philosophers they are found through the scientific method (Kropotkin may be such an example), whilst for others, for instance, subjectivists and egoists, moral expressions values are entirely individual and have little explanatory power but as indicators of personal preference.⁶ Normative ethics deals with the principles, rules and characteristics or traits that are involved in moral decision-making such as those referring to right action, good outcomes, admirable character or desirable activity. Applied ethics involves assessing the pertinence and priority of particular ethical norms and values to specific controversies or fields of action. Sustainability principles, such as re-using discarded materials for social benefit, are highly applicable to most contexts but cause deep upset if the material in question is the medical tissue of a dead child re-used for research without parental (or guardian) consent.⁷

All ideologies are identifiable, as Michael Freeden explains, through the structures of core concepts that encourage particular ways of viewing the world. These concepts identify some social phenomena as problems (and ignore others) and privilege some solutions over others (whilst not recognising others as a potential remedy).⁸ By providing ways to identify and privilege responses, ideologies necessarily have a normative character. They also include meta-ethical and applied principles. Ideologies tend to have their own epistemologies, some preferring tradition (conservatism) or science (Leninism) or reason (liberalism), which structures the legitimacy of their principles and the institutions from which solutions will be found. Similarly, the particularity or generality of solution has an applied element. For instance, in the United

Kingdom contemporary constitutional conservatism adopts principles of ‘equality of opportunity’ as a way of stabilising institutions that have operated on liberal norms for decades, but conservatism makes an exception for the head of state, who is still appointed on a heredity basis.

Even apparently non-evaluative concepts like the *individual*, *property*, *community* or the *state* become part of judgement making, partly because their location next to more clearly normative principles such as equality, liberty or fairness helps to decontest the evaluative principle. ‘Liberty’ becomes about individual freedom understood in terms of property rights when located next to these terms (such as in classical liberalism) but becomes closer to modern liberalism when the freedom is located next to ‘individual’ and ‘community’. So too differences in forms of anarchism can be identified by the constellation of principles and their priority and position given to each component. Core values like anti-hierarchy, prefiguration (means being in accordance with end) and a social view of the self are stable and core to all social anarchisms, but the relative priority given to ‘non-human biotic entities’ will shape how far the sub-ideology is a green or eco-anarchism. Thus, battles within and between ideologies often take the form of competing moralities.⁹

ANARCHISM AND NORMATIVE ETHICS

The three standard positions of normative ethics, deontology or rights theory, consequentialism and virtue theory, have been supplemented by ethical approaches such as *casuistry*, *perfectionism* and the more explicitly multi- or anti-value positions that influence, and are adopted by, more post-structural theorists like *Nihilism*, *Subjectivism*, *Egoism*, *Perspectivism* and Levinasian *first philosophy*.¹⁰ It is not possible in just a short chapter to offer in-depth descriptions and analyses of all and every ethical position and how it relates to anarchism. Even Kropotkin’s book *Ethics: Origin and Development*,¹¹ which provides a structured history of moral theory, is notably both unfinished and reticent on how far the many different ethical traditions he discusses support or challenge anarchism.¹² Instead, this chapter provides a brief outline of some of the main ethical positions and how they have influenced or been incorporated within some forms of anarchist thinking. These principles structure their identification and evaluation of social problems and their types of organisation and forms of action. It also defends the virtue approach as providing the best fit.

Anarchism and Virtue Theory

Whilst once a re-discovered minority tradition within post-Enlightenment ethics, coming a poor third to the scientific naturalism of *utilitarianism* and rationalism of *deontology*, virtue theory has gained an increasingly significant position both in moral theory and political theory.¹³ There are many competing forms of virtue theory: some theorists, like Roger Scruton, consider virtues to be inherently hierarchical and conservative,¹⁴ whilst others, like Paul

Blackledge, view virtue theory as more consistent with Marxism. Anarchists, too, promote and use the language of virtue theory throughout their analyses of current events, even if it is not often part of an explicit or conscious virtue-ethics strategy.¹⁵ Some features of virtue theory are common across these traditions. Character traits or attributes of interpersonal relationships are admired because they are good in themselves as well as having an extrinsic value.

Opposing each virtue are (often) two corresponding vices. Vices are considered undesirable in themselves, as well as likely to generate bad outcomes. For instance, the two corresponding vices to the virtue of generosity are meanness and profligacy. To be generous means avoiding the extremes of never spending money on others or wasting resources unnecessarily. Thus a virtue is seen as being in the middle of two opposing tendencies.¹⁶ The mean is not a mathematical average between the opposing vices, but a heuristic to avoid under- or over-reaction.¹⁷

For virtue theorists these attributes work in unity. To be generous is to identify someone who needs help (wisdom) not to waste effort and resource on those already spoilt (compassion). For radical virtue theorists, virtues flatten hierarchies. Being brave, for instance, involves standing up to bullies, not supporting them. Compassion is about equalising resources, not hoarding them amongst the rich.

In anarchism, actions are praised for being ‘just’, ‘fair’ and ‘brave’, whilst hierarchical and oppressive responses are rejected because they exhibit vices like ‘lack of wisdom’ or because they are ‘cowardly’ or ‘selfish’. Even the more easily forgotten virtues like ‘wit’ are significant features of anarchist publications.¹⁸ Wit supports other anarchist values like solidarity, through building on shared values. It often courageously mocks the powerful and helps develop courage to overcome dominating forces.¹⁹ Wit also provides a space for self-criticism and appropriate, modest reflection on the limits of a group’s abilities.

According to Aristotle, the more people practise virtuous behaviour, the easier it is to act virtuously: it becomes an in-built part of one’s character.²⁰ For Alasdair MacIntyre, the more virtues are embedded into social activities, the more these practices flourish.²¹ In neo-Aristotelian ethics, unlike Kantian philosophy, a morally good person might no longer be rationally deducing correct action, as it simply becomes part of their ingrained personality. Those who prioritise the development of individual character are more commonly associated with individualism, whilst the virtue theory most consistent with anarchism is based on material practices.

The notion of practices is derived from MacIntyre and the revolutionary Aristotelian tradition. Practices are rule-governed activities that generate internal and external goods.²² Internal goods are things that are valuable in themselves without recourse to later benefits: such virtues as friendship, compassion or developing wisdom are cherished not just because they might generate some other good outcome in the future but because they are intrinsically valuable. If someone tried to justify being helpful or friendly because they might generate for themselves some positive benefit in the future, then they aren’t being genu-

inely friends or exhibiting true benevolence. Nonetheless virtuous action foreseeably produces better outcomes, a happy society, less alienated and anti-social people, but it is not the main justification for undertaking these actions.

Practices which generate internal and external goods tend to be resilient, sustaining over long periods and between different geographies and develop into traditions. Though 'traditions' have certain conservative associations, it is pertinent to point out that there are many anti-hierarchical customs and longstanding institutions, such as bottom-up labour organising (syndicalism) and squatting organisations. In addition, traditions are not fixed but evolve. They are also capable of radical transformation because they interact with other social activities, developing and responding to changing circumstances, and thus producing new virtues (transcendence). Different social practices develop different combinations of virtues, with none universally at the fore, so consistent with anarchist commitments to self-management, it is the practitioners themselves and those in similar, adjacent activities who can best appreciate the value of an activity.

Traditions can become irrelevant due to changing technologies (bookbinding was once a major artisanal profession in British anarchism) and disappear, or they can be corrupted and degenerate. Competitive cycling is a good example of this. The wrong goals were imposed on a practice, those of maximising financial reward, and thus key practitioners engaged in it for the wrong reason, justifying cheating and the bullying of others in order to achieve their financially motivated goal. As a result fewer people felt motivated to take up the sport or give it practical support. Revolutionary organisations have been subject to similar criticisms by anarchists. By pursuing the grand overarching goal (*telos*) of the revolutionary event, group members and the revolutionary subject are manipulated and exploited.

Anarchism and Consequentialism

There are a number of consequentialist ethical theories. The dominant one within contemporary political-economy is productivism, where policy decisions are formulated and justified on the basis of achieving measurable economic growth (either in terms of maximising the number of available material goods and services or in terms of maximising profit). For instance, changes in primary, secondary and higher education are often promoted by governments on the basis that the 'reforms' will increase the economic activity of the nation. Closely related to productivism, and a more standard position in moral philosophy, is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism in its most basic form proposes, as John Stuart Mill explains, 'actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness'.²³ Happiness is calculated on the basis of collective or communal satisfaction and absence of pain rather than on a purely individual (hedonistic) level. Utilitarianism's affinity with productivism arises from the assumption that greater availability of goods will necessarily increase societal happiness, an assumption though that is not necessarily borne out.²⁴

There are a number of features of utilitarianism that make it attractive to social anarchism and explain the significant number of utilitarian-style arguments and concepts that appear in activist literatures. These include a compassionate concern for the wellbeing of others, with a corresponding rejection of individualistic hedonism; equality of consideration where one person's happiness is worth as much as another person's; and the development of a dispassionate, unbiased and accessible basis for making decisions.

First and foremost utilitarianism is concerned with producing good social outcomes and having socially benevolent goals, which is a key feature of social anarchism. One of the two motivations for anarchist activism, identified by Gabriel Kuhn, is the desire to 'change the world'.²⁵ Johann Most,²⁶ Sergei Nechayev,²⁷ Mikhail Bakunin²⁸ and British anarchists like Class War with their slogan 'Class War By any Means Necessary'²⁹ often utilise deeply consequentialist slogans. These powerful rhetorical devices express both the wretchedness of the situation for the economically, patriarchally and colonially oppressed but also the intensity of the desire for revolutionary action that will radically improve the lives of the vast majority. Such ends-driven idioms are often undercut or nuanced, especially by Bakunin and Class War, with the recognition that not anything goes. Action has to be by the appropriate agent; otherwise it becomes paternalism or vanguardism.³⁰ Nonetheless, almost all meaningful activities take place with a goal in mind, even if the goal itself changes as time goes on.

There are a number of further positive features of utilitarianism that attract anarchists. First, as Kropotkin notes, it takes the basis for ethical analysis out of the hands of religious authorities. It provides a basis for evaluation that is clear and accessible and thus suitable for developing compassionate social action.³¹ Further, utilitarianism contains some, at least initially, egalitarian features. The happiness or unhappiness of each and every individual entity is included in the utilitarian calculation. The calculation does not discriminate in making a rich person's additional utility count for more than a poor person's, a man's happiness is not preferred over a woman's or an abled-bodied person over someone with disabilities. For environmentally focussed utilitarians, like Peter Singer,³² this means the interests of pain/pleasure feeling non-humans also need to be taken into account, an idea that was originally raised by Jeremy Bentham, another early advocate of utilitarianism:

It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the *os sacrum* [bone at the base of the spine], are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they *reason*? Nor, Can they *talk*? But, Can they *suffer*?³³

In short the affinities for utilitarianism with anarchism are its concern with making social improvement, rather than being just individually focussed, based on apparently non-authoritarian secular basis. Utilitarianism, from an anarchist perspective, also provides a substantive version of equality from which to challenge discriminatory actions that overlook the major interests of one group for the minor interests of another.

However there are significant and substantive areas of division and incompatibility between utilitarianism and anarchism, and these differences centre on the supremacy of outcomes as the overriding principle. First, utilitarianism does not necessarily produce egalitarian outcomes. In its classical form maintaining long entrenched inequalities that benefit a majority population might generate greater happiness than a disruptive egalitarian outcome.³⁴ Second, meta-ethically, despite the attempt to provide a clear ground for ethical decision-making that is distinct from the obscurantism of religion, Mill's argument that there is a scientific basis for utilitarianism is deeply flawed, showing only that on-the-whole individuals prefer to choose actions that fulfil their personal interests rather than frustrate them.³⁵ It does not show a drive towards utilitarian concern to meet other interests or that people *should* pursue them. Indeed, earlier Mill accepts that 'questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to proof'.³⁶ There are epistemological problems associated with claims to know the greater good for others,³⁷ as they seemingly justify colonialism and paternalism in order to emancipate supposedly primitive or backward others.³⁸ Anarchists criticise the political epistemology of Leninist vanguard politics because it reduces the working class to mere clients of the vanguard party's leadership, who are supposedly best equipped to efficiently guide the masses to the predetermined revolutionary goal.³⁹

As mentioned in the discussion of anarchist virtuous practices, imposing targets on diverse, goods-rich social activities can have corrupting impacts on those social activities. Despite different social practices having different resources, rules and discourses, whether it be maintaining an allotment (or community garden), being a member of an amateur sports team or engaging in domestic cookery, they are all rich in virtues like collegiality, benevolence and developing practical and theoretical wisdom, though the priority of each virtue alters within different practices. However, in order to make the utilitarian calculation, the diverse values embedded in different social practices have to be reduced to a single exchange value, so that radically different activities and diverse, irreducible benefits can be traded off. Virtues, for a utilitarian, only become relevant if they can be *cashd out* in terms of social utility.

There are sub-divisions within utilitarianism based on the difference in the desired social ends: maximising pleasure or, for negative utilitarians, prioritising the minimising pain, or for preference utilitarians, the satisfaction of desires (even if they cause personal discomfort). Utilitarianism fails to attend to the questions as to what should people find happiness in? Or what sorts of preferences deserve to be satisfied? As Robert Nozick's anti-utilitarian thought-experiment of the *experience-machine* indicates, there is much more to moral

decision-making than the meeting of particular mental states or the satisfaction of particular preferences.

Nozick imagines a situation in which people are given the free choice to have ‘any experience you desired’ but in reality you were ‘floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain’⁴⁰ or to continue to live life unattached to the machine, but experiencing the hurt, frustration and despair of contemporary living. There are numerous reasons why we might, as Nozick expects, reject being plugged into the experience-machine for anything other than an experimental few minutes or for a brief moment of respite. Even though unplugged people are unhappier or unfulfilled, it seems a better model for how to live as those who are plugged-in are not active agents in the world. Nozick suggests that utilitarians have their moral account back to front: contentment and satisfaction matter because they are a product of our interactions with the world, because we have done something worthwhile, not just as a stand-alone feeling.⁴¹

Political change requires acknowledging that collective (and sometimes individual) action can make change, that there is agency. Further, it means engaging with social activities as they currently are, in all their interesting and often infuriating complexity. But in challenging existing conditions personal and collective transformation is often achieved, with people gaining new skills, forming new relationships and developing new identities. Being a brain in a vat offers no such possibility for making material change.

Anarchism and Deontology

Nozick advanced the challenge to utilitarianism as part of his influential advocacy of right-libertarianism (also known by supporters as ‘libertarianism’ and by opponents as ‘propertarianism’). Propertarianism and other rights-based theories popularised by Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin were rooted in the Enlightenment thought of John Locke and Immanuel Kant. Liberalism is split into two largely rival traditions: classical liberalism (of which neoliberalism and propertarianism are contemporary versions) and modern liberalism. The former is based on the absolute priority of negative freedom (rights of non-interference) over the individual’s conscience, body and legitimate products of their labour,⁴² although there are some notable exceptions.⁴³ From this one core, supreme principle, a rejection of coercion—it is never justified to interfere with someone unless they are interfering with you or your property (‘negative freedom’)—comes the rejection of the redistributive state. In classical liberalism relations between autonomous subjects are based on consensual contract-making.

Modern liberalism concentrates on positive freedom, the freedom to do things, to achieve life goals. It considers classical liberalism’s account of liberty to be too restrictive. For a classical liberal someone starving to death because they lack resources is suffering no restriction on liberty unless it was the result of direct interference. For modern liberals some interventions are legitimate if they extend self-development and thus increase ability to make rational choices.

Thus modern liberalism prohibits slave contracts and supports some degree of redistribution to extend the life chances of the poorest, so long as this best maximises liberty over all. Given the need for redistribution it encourages capitalist production to provide wealth to redistribute. Modern liberalism is criticised by the orthodox left for its support for substantive inequalities and the corresponding humiliations these generate, and by neoliberals, for its generation of a powerful managerialist class tasked whose redistribution undermines negative freedom. Although the distinctive variants of liberalism have similar origins and key terminology, like ‘rights’, ‘autonomy’, ‘individual’, they are as Freedman notes, substantially different ideological clusters, because they surround these terms with other concepts that radically shift their meaning.⁴⁴

These liberalisms developed significant support during the rise of Stalinism and the Cold War. New right versions of classical liberalism offered a critique of faltering national economies that blamed the welfare state, which found favour with economic elites. The discourse of rights and individual freedom was also attractive to social anarchists, especially in the late 1930s to the 1980s, who wanted to demarcate their tradition from the growing hegemony of—and discontent with—the oppressive authoritarianism of orthodox Marxism. For instance, the social revolutionary activist and theorist Giovanni Baldelli concentrates on principles of individual autonomy and lack of coercion, but with additional egalitarian principles of harm minimisation, at least minimal equality of welfare and thus a rejection of absolute property rights,⁴⁵ generating a similar—but not identical—calculation matrix to John Rawls’ modern liberalism. Similarly, David Wieck’s description of anarchism as being based on both negative freedom (what he terms ‘liberty’) and positive freedom demonstrates a rhetorical as well as theoretical commitment to liberal principles as well as socialist ones.⁴⁶ These follow veteran anarcho-syndicalist Rudolf Rocker who described ‘modern anarchism’ as ‘the confluence of the two great currents which during and since the French Revolution have found such characteristic expression in the intellectual life of Europe: Socialism and Liberalism’.⁴⁷ Rocker argues that not only can liberal principles of individual freedom be compatible with socialist principles of equality but that rights of self-ownership (‘right of man [sic.] over his own person’) cannot be realised under a system of economic exploitation which leaves the propertyless ‘compelled to submit to the economic dictation of another if he does not want to starve’.⁴⁸

As liberal principles become increasingly prominent and take priority within an ideological cluster at the expense of socialist ones, then these forms of anarchism became susceptible to an organised ideological takeover by proprietarians (or ‘anarcho-capitalists’), who appeared to share similar terminology but utilised it for distinctive purposes.⁴⁹ This was a move endorsed by the then mainstream of analytical political philosophers such as Robert Paul Wolff⁵⁰ and Andrew J. Simmons⁵¹ who discussed anarchism in the same thin terms as a movement based on a single deontological principle: absence of coercion.

‘Philosophical anarchism’, proposed by Woolf, is based on this thin account of anarchism, with supreme value given to the autonomous individual,

understood in terms of total respect for negative rights.⁵² There are, however, some versions of anarchist individualism, which whilst espousing absolute liberty for the individual, do not hold that the right of non-interference extends to property holdings.⁵³ However, for the main part, ‘philosophical anarchism’ takes propertarian positions and is largely rejected by social anarchists on a number of grounds: (1) because it supports and enhances social and economic inequalities; as a result it has (2) an inadequate account of freedom; which in turn is (3) based on a flawed account of human agency; that (4) undermines value-rich social activities; and (5) requires heteronomous, hierarchical institutions for its operation.

Propertarians and other neoliberals consider (1) social and economic inequalities in material wealth that come about through just contracts as of no concern⁵⁴ and to be positively celebrated as they provide incentives for greater economic productivity.⁵⁵ As the primary social relationship is based on contract-making and contracts invariably favour the most powerful partner in a contractual negotiation, inequalities between the two contractors are likely to widen. As a result (2), someone deprived of access to the goods necessary for survival, due to their economic circumstances (born into poverty or lack of saleable assets or skills) are still free according to classical liberals, because no one is interfering with them. To be unwillingly starved to death because of the oligarchical control of resources is for Nozickian liberals still compatible with freedom, whilst for anarchists and other socialists it is anything but.

The negative account of freedom is based on (3) a conception of the individual as the sole owner of her body (as property) and private property. Graham Baugh points out, with reference to Bakunin’s critique of liberalism, the insufficiency of this account of the individual.⁵⁶ Liberal individualisms are based on moral subjects abstracted from the social setting—that is, agents, who have no shared concepts or language by which to enter into meaningful social practices or contracts. Instead, for Bakunin, agents are already inter-related through their historical, material circumstances⁵⁷ and thus have links of solidarity or pre-existing causes for mutual opposition.

The individualist account of individual freedom and corresponding deontological norms based on contract (4) damage important social practices, especially anti-hierarchical ones. MacIntyre and Michael Sandel have argued that important social virtues are undermined by reducing all human activities to transactional ones. Friendships or other inherently valuable relationships become meaningless if they were bought and sold.⁵⁸ Financial values crowd out other social values, like compassion and mutual respect.⁵⁹

Unlike mutual aid where all partners engage because they wish to participate and gain from the experience, contracts require: (5) enforcement. The difference between propertarians, like Nozick and anarcho-capitalists, like Tibor Machan, David D. Friedman and Murray Rothbard and groups like the Libertarian Alliance, is over whether an ultra-minimum state is required to enforce contracts, protect private property and punish transgressors, or whether private, contracted-in security services can perform this function. Minimum

statists argue that a single private, protective agency is likely to become dominant in a given area as few would be willing to pay for an agency that could not protect them against a more powerful competitor. More traditional classical liberals have supported democratic, but minimal, state institutions, with strong constitutional constraints on property interference, as the best guarantor of rights protection. Nonetheless, for social anarchists it makes little difference if the armed response militia and prisons are state-run or operated by private finance; these are in themselves oppressive and hierarchical as well as maintaining unequal and damaging economic relationships.

The positive account of freedom as being more than non-interference is found in many anarchist texts, such as Baldelli, Weick and Rocker mentioned above. Others, like De Cleyre try to find a nuanced position between the two separate accounts of freedom—one based on propertarian negative rights and commitment to private property and the other more critical. So whilst initially following Benjamin Tucker that ‘Individualism supposes private property to be the cornerstone of personal freedom’,⁶⁰ De Cleyre goes on to modify the belief, recognising the socialist case that free and equal access to the resources of material production are necessary for a society without economic domination.⁶¹ De Cleyre’s solution is to suggest that both could, at least initially, co-exist in an anarchist society with ‘experiment alone’ identifying which takes precedence. It is not clear which criteria determine the success of the experiment, whether it is equality, general satisfaction, productivity or respect for rights.

Anarchism and Casuistry

The concern for experimentation and resistance to absolute values fits with some everyday sceptical approaches to ethical decision-making. All too frequently in ethics, responses to tricky problems are decontested by claiming that they will be resolved on a ‘case-by-case basis’. This slippery phrase can be interpreted in many different ways. It might be simply about allowing an adjudicator some leeway in judgement, so as to mitigate against particular harms, which suggests a fixed set of rules still being applied in a reasonably non-arbitrary and consistent manner. It might mean allowing an adjudicator to apply different standards on a whim or a self-serving basis; it might mean applying different rules in distinctive circumstances, like De Cleyre suggests, which still raises the question of which rules apply in each circumstance and what determines which protocol to use. This latter interpretation rightly draws attention to the fact that different activities have different norms and values, as does virtue theory, but lacks the clarity for determining them.

‘Casuistry’ like every other major term in ethics is open to diverse interpretations and developed different theoretical tools. By and large, it suggests that the other, more standard, ethical methods share a similar epistemological flaw of starting from abstract principles derived from abstract reasoning, which is then applied to real cases.⁶² Sana Loue’s account of casuistry is to examine particular examples of a practice or a problem, then to identify the similarities and

difference in the cases (typification), from which typical rule of thumb can be categorised (relationships to maxims) that form the activity and then (certitude) how consistently does following one set of principles produce the desired (or undesired) outcome. As cases diverge from standard patterns, the more likely different principles need to be applied.⁶³

Casuistry shares much with anarchist—especially anarchist virtue—approaches. It is critical of universalism which questionably assumes that fixed, unchanging principles can be ascertained outside of the activity under consideration. Similar practice approaches and casuistry claim that you need to understand a practice before ascertaining its merits, which suggests that practitioners rather than external legislators are in the most suitable position to evaluate and make changes. However casuistry in its purest form assumes an epistemological naïvety. Typification is expected to take place without a bias towards any preference for pre-existing particular values, but this is a flawed expectation. Casuistry assumes the possibility of a value-free observer, but each individual is already socially located in sets of practices (in capitalist, gendered and racialised societies) with their own implicit and explicit ideological norms and identities. Instead of casuistry and its supposedly naïve investigator, anarchists recognise there are pre-existing power relations and values; the researcher attempts to identify these social structures that have formed them and the nature of their enquiry, in order to critically reflect on and, if need be, challenge them.

(RE)CONSTRUCTING AN ANARCHIST ETHIC

Western political philosophical and ethical debates for much of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have largely been between either forms of consequentialism and deontology (Leninism versus liberalism for instance) or between rival forms of liberalism (modern versus classical or neo-liberalism). Consequentialist theories have enormous strengths in that they recognise the importance of ends in formulating beneficial practice, whilst liberalism is justly critical of the negative impact on individual freedom and responsibility in ends-driven policy and the importance of active participation in the world. Whilst there have been some attempts at marrying the two together through forms of rule utilitarianism, where the rule ‘respect individual freedoms’ is justified on utilitarian grounds, these invariably fail as the two opposing universalist theories necessary create an irresolvable tension. Either one ultimately respected rules (‘rule-worship’) irrespective of outcome or else one allows for violation of rules on consequentialist grounds, in which case the regulation was only hypothetical.

There is a problematic division of means and ends that is common to both utilitarian and deontological traditions in which the one can be sacrificed to the good of the other. Concentrating on consequences at the expense of methods means that internal goods corrode, whilst concentrating on means (respecting rights) at the expense of social outcomes can be negligent to the avoidable harms to others and overlooks the ways in which in the process of political action, means and ends become interchangeable. As David Lamb points out,

with reference to G.W.F. Hegel, the hierarchical authoritarian Leninist party was only supposed to be the means to the end of egalitarian, libertarian revolutionary change (and the ‘withering away’ of the state). But because for Leninism the party was the sole means for effective revolutionary change, building the party became the ultimate goal replacing the revolutionary *telos*. As Errico Malatesta identified, if oppressed subjects and practitioners are reduced to just clients of revolutionary vanguards, it will create a ‘suffocating tyranny’.⁶⁴ Thus anarchists prioritise prefiguration, where the means foreshadow goals.⁶⁵

Prefiguration does not mean just that isolated values or a specific form of social organisation is foreshadowed. As theorists of prefiguration like Marianne Maeckelbergh⁶⁶ and Luke Yates⁶⁷ indicate, it operates in multiple dimensions. These include developing political practices that try to produce in the here-and-now forms that embody anarchist values in decision-making, interpersonal relations that generate immediate shared goods as well as enable anti-hierarchical social transformation. Prefigurative approaches thus share key features with practice-based virtue ethics. Activities have to generate internal goods (virtues) and these are constitutive of a flourishing society.

Because no virtue takes absolute precedence, virtue theory is better at accommodating important features of rival theories and finding an appropriate balance between them than modern liberalism is at accommodating consequentialist principles or rule utilitarianism is at incorporating rights-based principles, such as autonomy. For rule utilitarianism must still make outcomes supreme, otherwise it is not a utilitarianism, and thus respect for rights is undermined; whilst deontology must ultimately respect autonomy, otherwise it is not a rights-based theory. Virtue theory shares with utilitarianism concerns with the welfare of others, through values such as compassion and benevolence, whilst virtues of impartial justice and integrity share with deontology commitments to respecting rights and fulfilling duties. In addition, virtues of solidarity, liberality (friendship), fairness and modesty also add egalitarian and anti-hierarchical values. As no virtue takes priority but each moderates the others, they are mutually sustaining rather than in conflict. For instance, to be truly brave involves acting wisely and with compassion; a bully or a person attacking the wrong person (however well-intentioned) is unjust and rash.

Similarly virtue approaches share many of the strengths of casuistry in that they both recognise that values and norms are dependent on material activities and recognise that values are non-universal. However virtue approaches recognise that research itself is a social practice that already has its own constitutive norms and values (as well as identities and resources), thus there is no pretence at a value-free investigation. It also highlights how similar practices tend to have shared norms and values, with significant overlap with other practices. Thus, the social organisation behind community-run gardens will share many (though not all) principles with allotment societies and these will share similar features with autonomous education collectives, pirate radio stations or co-operative maker and repair groups.

Virtue approaches are rarely explicit within anarchist texts, especially activist materials, which are generally concerned more with practical knowledge sharing than underlying theoretical reflection. But readings of activist texts (as well as more overtly theoretical texts) indicate the prevalence of virtue analysis, with criticisms of the vices of arrogance,⁶⁸ cowardice⁶⁹ and injustice⁷⁰ as part of the analysis of dominant, hierarchical practices but also part of movement self-critique. Virtue approaches are secondary to more pressing concerns such as providing practical advice, identifying a danger or motivating collection action. Some theorists have come closer to a more overt and systematic moral theory embracing virtue positions. Herbert Read's *The Philosophy of Anarchism*⁷¹—partly due to its concision—does not spell out a fully developed anarchist ethic, but does draw out many of the core themes identified here: the rejection of universalism, the importance of virtues and prefiguration and the possibility of developing transcendent identities and values.

CHALLENGES: POST-LEFT AND POSTANARCHIST

As mentioned in the introduction, other competing revolutionary traditions tended to be critical of anarchism for the centrality it places on moral analysis and ethical action—yet intriguingly those seeking to move anarchism beyond socialist and labour movements are similarly critical, sharing with more orthodox Marxists a seeming rejection of moral argument. For instance, Bob Black pronounces in characteristically contrarian fashion: ‘Anarchism, properly understood, has nothing to do with standards and values in a moral sense’.⁷² In his provocative *Anarchy After Leftism*, he criticises what he sees as ‘moralism’ within the anarchist movement, which he associates with puritanism.⁷³ In addition, Black claims that moral principles have no epistemologically justified grounds and are often just a cover for manipulation by the powerful or power-seeking.⁷⁴ In its place Black supports Max Stirner's egoism as an alternative basis for ethics, locating Black's post-left anarchism as conceptually close to some of the main forms of postanarchism,⁷⁵ such as those promoted by Saul Newman.⁷⁶

It would be misleading to position Newman and Black as simply inconsistent amorality because both use ethical analysis within their criticisms. Newman, for instance, prioritises principles of equality and freedom (‘equaliberty’)⁷⁷ and promotion of ‘ethical relations’,⁷⁸ whilst Black criticises opponents for their ‘incivility’ and ‘dishonesty’,⁷⁹ whilst admiring ‘honesty’⁸⁰ and the importance of friendship.⁸¹ A fairer account, is not that postanarchists and post-leftists dismiss morality per se (despite some rhetorical turns in this direction), but the universality of moral principles. They share Stirner's powerful critique of universal principles as ontologically and epistemologically vulnerable and share his rejection of an underlying metaphysical human essence upon which these claims to universality are often predicated.⁸²

Practice-based virtue approaches similarly reject the universality of values. The difference between postanarchists and virtue-based approaches is that for

the latter values are a necessary feature of social practices and pre-exist any particular consciousness, with many values and norms being pervasive, whilst for Stirner they are dependent on the egoist's consciousness alone. Egoism has the further problem of being unable to respond effectively to moral disagreements as these become irresolvable (down to simple subjective will). Egoism thus provides no critical recourse against another who favours oppressive relationships which undermine shared, virtue-rich social practices.

Sociality, which is necessary for so many productive pursuits, rests for Egoists on a voluntary union of intersecting subjectivities. These are individual encounters between individual egoists 'each of whom has only himself before his eyes'.⁸³ There are no social values outside of these encounters. Indeed Black seems to reject any such possibility of commonality not based on immediate subjectivity-to-subjectivity interaction as just a cover for oppression. 'By maintaining the public image of a common struggle against oppression, leftists conceal not only their actual fragmentation, incoherence and weakness, but—paradoxically—what they really do share: acquiescence in the essential elements of state/class society'.⁸⁴

However there are possible commonalities between the postanarchist/post-left approach to ethics and practice-based virtue approaches. Both Black and Newman stress a materiality to their egoism that is largely absent from other interpretations of Stirner. The Stirner they admire is not a proponent of 'amoral egoism... [that] is indifferent to or entirely agnostic about social and economic formations... [but] assume[s] as axiomatic the need for a social matrix for individual efflorescence'.⁸⁵ How then is the social to be realised? One is to enter into social action without any preconditions, labels or values to see what comes out.⁸⁶ But this seems to fall foul of the problems of casuistry mentioned above, namely that subjects are always already socially located, with particular (albeit changeable identities) and engaged in rule-governed social relationships.

Instead, practice-based virtue accounts share with post-left and postanarchisms a rejection of universalism but avoid the subjectivism of egoism, whilst virtue theory recognises that values exist outside of our consciousness alone and helps to shape our identities and activities. These are not fixed and capable of being transcended. Newman's most recent text on postanarchism, which repeatedly stresses the importance of practices as sites for production of anti-hierarchical identities and values,⁸⁷ accepts the plausibility of contingent but core goals, and prefiguration⁸⁸ and shows the possibility for such an affinity. In his discussion of Sorel's general strike, a tactic strongly associated with the syndicalism of classical anarchism, but of which Newman approves, he identifies how mutual struggle sustains and generates anti-hierarchical values. 'While Sorel's moralism might be a strange fit with anarchist politics, it nevertheless points to the need to cultivate certain ethics and virtues for political struggle and autonomous experience'.⁸⁹ What I hope this chapter has shown is that moral analysis is not strange for anarchism and that it is a characteristic of anti-hierarchical theory and practice.

EXAMPLE OF PRACTICE-BASED APPROACHES

The practice-based virtue approach, like post-left and postanarchist approaches, rejects universal principles that can be applied objectively and dispassionately. However, it recognises that norms and values are necessarily part of social practices. Positing and imposing a universal set of guidelines for resolving practical problems outside of the activity itself (or adjacent activities) risks replicating the corrupting, managerial universalism of deontology and utilitarianism.

Discussing virtue approaches provides indicators for clarifying particular applied problems. Take, for instance, the rise of ‘no platform’ movements in response to organised fascism, racism, homophobia and transphobia. One response within and outside the anarchist movement is to support such bans on negative utilitarian lines. Others, like Matthew Wilson, describe ‘no platform’ as contradictory to anarchism’s apparent universal principles of freedom.⁹⁰ One solution to this apparent problem, proposes Wilson, is that anarchists are developing a different account of freedom: albeit one that is currently inadequately supported or articulated sufficiently strongly to be pervasive.⁹¹

Another solution, hinted at by Wilson, is one that establishes ethics on non-universal, but not entirely subjective grounds, but stable (but challengeable and changeable) grounds that are constitutive of social activities.⁹² Different arenas require different types of regulation of free speech. These are not a universal or fixed set of principles but specific to that activity, which best enable that activity to flourish to maintain the mutually supporting anarchist and which enable virtues to flourish. These regulations are usually best determined by practitioners and those in adjacent (that is to say, affected) activities. So a discussion in a university seminar on political ideas requires discussion of rival, controversial viewpoints and arguments, in order to evaluate them and hone different methodologies of political analysis. This is not to say that anything goes in this venue but that different norms and values are to the fore in this forum, as opposed to a horticulture class where racist expressions can only be disruptive to the norms of good education and undermine virtues of wisdom and justice. Preventing fascists from organising is often necessary to protect goods-rich practices from being corrupted or destroyed (including the university politics seminar), whilst policing bigoted speech in every location can lead to paternalism and oppression of the already disadvantaged.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has identified the centrality of ethical analysis to anarchist theory and practice and how different constellations of values identify different ideological structures of anarchism. It argues that the broader social anarchist tradition fits more easily with an anti-hierarchical, practice-based virtue approach than either the other main ethical universalist competitors of deontology and utilitarianism or rivals such as casuistry or egoism. This practice-based virtue approach is consistent with anarchism’s wider materialist philosophical com-

mitments—including its micropolitical orientation and its critique of universalisms. It suggests ways in which anarchist virtue theory provides a strong basis for dealing with contentious contemporary problems in a manner that is compatible with broad anarchist principles and traditions.

NOTES

1. See, for instance, W. Price, 'Libertarian Marxism's Relation to Anarchism', *Anarchist Library* <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/wayne-price-libertarian-marxism-s-relation-to-anarchism>, D. Graeber, 'The Twilight of vanguardism' in J. McPhee and E. Reulan, *Realizing the Impossible* (Oakland: AK, 2007): 250–253; E. Rayner, 'Moralism is no substitute for a materialist Understanding' *International Communist Tendency* 15 June 2012, <http://www.leftcom.org/en/articles/2012-06-15/moralism-is-no-substitute-for-a-materialist-understanding>.
2. See, for instance, K. Marx, 'Preface to' *A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 198), 21.
3. See L. Portwood-Stacer, 'Micropolitics' in B. Franks, N. Jun and L. Williams, (Eds), *Anarchism: A conceptual approach* (London: Routledge, 2018 (forthcoming)), 203–218.
4. See, for instance, D. Graber, 'The new anarchists', *New Left Review* 13, January–February 2002; I. McKay 'Organisation' in B. Franks, N. Jun and L. Williams (Eds), *Anarchism: A conceptual approach* (London: Routledge, 2018 (forthcoming)): 115–128; R. Rocker, *Anarcho-syndicalism* (London: Phoenix, undated).
5. See, for instance, David Graber (2013) 'On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs: A Work Rant', *Strike* <https://strikemag.org/bullshit-jobs>.
6. For more on anarchist and postanarchist meta-ethics, see B. Franks 'Postanarchism and Meta-Ethics', *Anarchist Studies* 16.2 (2008): 135–153.
7. See, for instance, the Alder Hay scandal; BBC News 'Organ scandal background', *BBC Online* 29 January 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/1136723.stm>.
8. M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996); M. Freeden, *Ideology: A very short introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
9. See, for example, Carl Levy (2007) "'Soversivismo": The radical political culture of otherness in Liberal Italy', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 12: 2, 147–161: 151–155.
10. See, for instance, S. Newman, *Bakunin to Lacan* (Oxford: Lexington, 2001); S. Newman, *The Politics of Postanarchism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010).
11. P. Kropotkin, *Ethics: Origin and Development* Montreal: Black Rose, 1992). The project as George Woodcock points out had a far longer origin as well as earlier outputs (G. Woodcock 'Introduction' to P. Kropotkin, *Ethics: Origin and Development* Montreal: Black Rose, 1992), pp. vii–xxvi.
12. G. Woodcock 'Introduction' to P. Kropotkin, *Ethics: Origin and Development* Montreal: Black Rose, 1992), pp. vii–xxvi: xix–xx.

13. See, for instance, C. Laborde 'Republicanism' in M. Freeden, L. T. Sargent and M. Stears., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 511–524: 511, 520.
14. See, for instance, R. Scruton, *On Hunting* (London: Yellow Jersey, 1999) and *England and the Need for Nations* (London: Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 2004), esp. 22–28, 35.
15. Although contemporary anarchist international relations theorist Alex Prichard points out that Pierre-Joseph Proudhon also 'believed that anarchy had distinct virtues'. *Justice, Order and Anarchy* (London: Routledge, 2015): 134.
16. Aristotle, *Ethics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1976), 101.
17. Hughes, G. *Aristotle on Ethics* (London: Routledge, 2001): 62–63.
18. See, for instance, Mr Block (or Blockhead) in *Industrial Worker*, Wildcat in *Freedom, Strike's* situationist-inspired détournements.
19. J. 'Breaking the Frame: Anarchist Comics and Visual Culture'. Belphégor. 2007.
20. Aristotle, *Ethics*.
21. A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (London: Duckworth, 1985): 273–274.
22. *Ibid.*, 187–190, 221.
23. J. Mill, *Utilitarianism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 55; see too J. Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1791) available at <https://www.utilitarianism.com/jeremy-bentham/index.html> Chap. 1.
24. China, despite rapid rises in economic output in the last 25 years has had no noticeable rise in general happiness according to the *UN World Happiness Report*, Chap. 3 http://worldhappiness.report/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/03/HR17-Ch5_w-oAppendix.pdf.
25. G. Kuhn, 'Anarchism Today', *Enough is Enough* 30 December 2016. <https://enoughisenough14.org/2016/12/30/gabriel-kuhn-anarchism-today/>.
26. 'Ethics? The end of revolution is freedom; the end justifies the means.' Q. Most, F. Trautmann, *The Voice of Terror: A biography of Johann Most* (London: Greenwood Press, 1980), 99.
27. Sergei Nechayev, *Catechism of the Revolutionist* (London: Violette Nozieres Press and Active Distribution, 1989), 4–5.
28. M. Bakunin, *Statism and Anarchy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), e.g. 197, 221.
29. See, for instance, *Class War* 47, 1.
30. Bakunin, *Statism and Anarchy*, 182–183, 197.
31. Kropotkin, *Ethics*, 240–244.
32. P. Singer, *Animal Liberation*. Second edition (London: Pimlico, 1995); P. Singer *Practical Ethics* Third edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
33. J. Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Chap. 17, n121, *Library of Economics and Liberty* http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML18.html#anchor_a122.
34. R. Crisp, *Mill On Utilitarianism*. London: Routledge, 1997, 169.
35. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, 81–82.
36. *Ibid.*, 52.

37. Michael Bakunin, *God and the State* (New York: Dover, 1970), 32–33; 39–40; E. Malatesta in R. Vernon (Ed). *Life and Ideas*, (London: Freedom 1984), 38–47.
38. M. Ramnath, *Decolonizing Anarchism* (Edinburgh: AK, 2011), 33.
39. See, for instance, E. Goldman, *My Disillusionment with Russia*, 79 <https://lib-com.org/files/Emma%20Goldman-%20My%20Disillusionment%20in%20Russia.pdf>.
40. R. Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 42.
41. *Ibid.*, 43–44.
42. Nozick *Ibid.*; John Locke *Two Treatises on Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), esp. 285–302.
43. See, for instance, S. M. Okin. *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (New York: Basic books; 1989), 74–88.
44. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 272–295.
45. G. Baldelli, *Social Anarchism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972).
46. D. Weick, ‘Essentials of Anarchism’ in R. Hoffman (Ed), *Anarchism as Political Philosophy* (London: Aldinetransaction, 2010), 86–97.
47. Rocker, *Anarchosindicalism*, 16.
48. *Ibid.*, 17.
49. There was a deliberate attempt to win over the new left to the new right by using apparently similar language but shifting its meaning; see Murray Rothbard’s *Left and Right: A Journal of Libertarian Thought* (1965–68), <https://mises.org/files/left-and-right-journal-libertarian-thought-complete-1965-19682pdf>
50. R. P. Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism* (London: Harper Torchbooks).
51. A. J. Simmons ‘The Anarchist Position: A Reply to Klosko and Senor’, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 16.3. (1987).
52. R. P. Woolf. *Defense of Anarchism* (London: Harper, 1976).
53. See, for instance, P. Valentyne, H. Steiner and M. Otsuka. ‘Why left-libertarianism is not incoherent: indeterminate, or irrelevant: A reply to Fried’, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 33.2 (2005), 201–215.
54. Nozick, *Anarchy*.
55. A. Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 118–120; M. Friedman and R. Friedman, *Free to Choose* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1980), 145–148.
56. G. Baugh, ‘The Poverty of Autonomy: The Failure of Wolff’s Defence of Anarchism’, in D. Roussopoulos (Ed), *The Anarchist Papers* (Montréal: Black Rose, 1986): 107–121.
57. M. Bakunin, *Bakunin on Anarchy* (Ed) S. Dolgoff (pirated edition, npl, npb, nd of Vintage, 1972), 234–236.
58. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*; M. Sandel, *What Money Can’t Buy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2012), 93–97.
59. Sandel *ibid.*, 119.
60. V. De Cleyre, *A Loving Anarchist! The spirit of Voltairine de Cleyre: Selected works and writings of Voltairine de Cleyre – Anarchist, Feminist, Genius* (Ignacio Press) e-book.
61. *Ibid.*
62. A.R. Jonsen ‘Casuistry as methodology in clinical ethics’. *Theoretical Medicine*. 1991 Dec 1; 12.4: 295–307, 296.

63. S. Loue, *Textbook of Research Ethics: Theory and practice* (London: Kluwer Academic/Plenum, 199), 45–46.
64. E. Malatesta, *Conversations on Anarchism* (London: Freedom, 2005), 116.
65. See B. Franks, ‘Prefiguration’ in B. Franks, N. Jun and L. Williams, *Anarchism: A conceptual approach* (London: Routledge, forthcoming). For a different evaluation of the pervasiveness of prefiguration in anarchist thinking see U. Gordon ‘Prefigurative Politics Between Ethical Practice and Absent promise’, *Political Studies* (2017) online version: 1–17.
66. M. Maecelbergh, ‘Doing is Believing: Prefiguration as Strategic Practice in the Alterglobalization Movement.’ *Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest* 10 (2011), 1–20.
67. L. Yates, ‘Rethinking Prefiguration: Alternatives, Micropolitics and Goals in Social Movements.’ *Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest* 14 (2015), 1–21.
68. See, for instance, Curious George Brigade, ‘The End of Arrogance: Decentralization and Anarchist Organizing’, *Anarchist Library* (2002), <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/curious-george-brigade-the-end-of-arrogance-decentralization-and-anarchist-organizing>; Class War ‘Labour and UKIP join forces to No-Platform Class war’, *Class War* 23 April 2015 <http://www.class-warparty.org.uk/labour-and-ukip-join-forces-to-no-platform-class-war/>; Paul Goodman, ‘The Black Flag of Anarchism’ (1968).
69. See, for instance, Mark R. ‘I Couldn’t Paint Golden Angels by Albert Meltzer [Review]’ *Bulletin of the Kate Sharpley Library* 36 (2003) <https://www.kate-sharpleylibrary.net/vq84dr>; Ian Bone, “Tariq Ali – You’re a Cunt” 31st January 2008, *Ian Bone* blog <https://ianbone.wordpress.com/2008/01/31/tariq-ali-youre-a-cunt/>; Bristol Anarchist Federation ‘Bristol Joins Actions Against Byron’, *Bristol Anarchist Federation* August 7, 2016 <https://bristolaf.wordpress.com/tag/solidarity-federation/>.
70. For instance, Emma Goldman, *My Disillusionment with Russia* (1923), *The Anarchist Library*, 47, 60 available at <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/emma-goldman-my-disillusionment-in-russia.pdf>.
71. H. Read, *The Philosophy of Anarchism* (London: Freedom Press, 1942).
72. B. Black, ‘Theses on Anarchism After Post-Modernism’, *Anarchist Library* (2009).
73. B. Black, *Anarchy After Leftism* (Columbia: C.A.L. Press, 1997), 25–26.
74. *Ibid.*, 35, 39, 67, 83.
75. See Black, ‘Theses on Anarchism’.
76. See, for instance, S. Newman, *Bakunin to Lacan*.
77. *Ibid.*, 20–24, 144–145.
78. S. Newman, *Postanarchism* (London: Polity, 2016): 41–44, 79, 144–145.
79. Black, *Anarchy*, 14.
80. *Ibid.*, 12n2, 39.
81. *Ibid.*, 133.
82. See, for instance, B. Black ‘Chomsky on the nod’ *Anarchist Library* (2014) <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/bob-black-chomsky-nod>.
83. M. Stirner, *The Ego and Its Own* (1845) *Anarchist Library* <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/max-stirner-the-ego-and-his-own#toc24>.
84. Black, ‘Theses on Anarchism’, 5.
85. Black, *Anarchy*, 36.

86. Newman, *Postanarchism*, xii, 35–36.
87. *Ibid.*, xii, 1, 15–16, 29, 51.
88. *Ibid.*, 64–65.
89. *Ibid.*, 76.
90. M. Wilson, 'Freedom Pressed: Anarchism, Liberty and Conflict' in B. Franks and M. Wilson, (Eds) *Anarchism and Moral Philosophy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), 116–117, 123–124.
91. M. Wilson, *Rules without Rulers: The possibilities and limits of anarchism* (Alresford: Zero, 2014).
92. *Ibid.*, 105.



Literature and Anarchism

James Gifford

Anarchism has extensively contributed conceptual, thematic, and topical contents to literary works. Likewise, literary figures have made major contributions to anarchism as a political philosophy and practice. For example, anarchism is important to works such as Thomas Pynchon's *Seize the Day* and primarily literary figures like Herbert Read have meaningfully contributed to anarchist philosophy. This chapter covers Romantic through modernist and contemporary literature in relation to anarchism with an emphasis on English-language literary traditions in Europe and North America since the 1790s. It covers literary writers who contributed to anarchist thought, such as William Godwin through to George Woodcock, as well as authors who integrated anarchist thought into their literary works, such as Percy Bysshe Shelley, Oscar Wilde, James Joyce, John Cowper Powys, Henry Miller, Robert Duncan, Jackson Mac Low, Kathy Acker, and Phyllis Webb. Anarchist literary movements are included as distinct from their individual participants, such as the New Apocalypse and the San Francisco Renaissance, as well as selected works from non-Anglophone and international literary traditions, such as novels by Albert Cossery and Arundhati Roy.

The chapter also covers authors whose depictions of or topical engagements with anarchism helped to shape popular consciousness or mainstream images of anarchism. While emphasising both literary poetry and prose, the chapter also covers popular literature and genre writing engaged with anarchism, including works by Ursula K. Le Guin, Michael Moorcock, Starhawk, and Alan Moore. Particular attention is given to the ways and moments in which these authors, movements, and works diverge from other Marxist and liberal literary traditions, including the commensurate conflicts in literary criticism and literary theory to respond to such works. In addition to the historical relationships

J. Gifford (✉)
Fairleigh Dickinson University, Vancouver, BC, Canada
e-mail: gifford@fdu.edu

among anarchism and literature, the chapter also considers how thematic, formal, structural, and stylistic innovations in literature have related to anarchist and antiauthoritarian paradigms, both intentionally and indirectly. A closing consideration is given to authors whose political interests turn distinctly away from anarchism but whose works are more fully understood through reference to anarchist concepts or histories.

The bonds between literature and anarchism are deep and old. This is equally true in English and other national literary traditions. Before Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's invocation of the word 'anarchism', the antiauthoritarian philosophy of William Godwin found expression in his treatises such as *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and Happiness*¹ and his novel *Things as They Are; or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams*.² His son-in-law Percy Bysshe Shelley would pursue an akin formulation of antiauthoritarian ideas in both prose and poetry,³ most notably *The Masque of Anarchy*⁴ and *The Philosophical View of Reform*,⁵ both in response to the Peterloo Massacre. However, while these historical links are readily invoked, they are potentially facile. A more striking reflection of the relations among literature and anarchism is not merely instances when anarchists are invested in literary expression or writers are interested in anarchism but rather when the two are mutually influential at the level of praxis, form, and style. In the examples above, the more striking relationship is not merely that Godwin and Shelley had antiauthoritarian interests that found literary expression but instead that the contours and forms of literary expression they favoured were adapted or shaped in relation to their proto-anarchist praxis and perspectives. This is especially so with the nature of subjectivity in the *Bildungsroman* form, which is important to Godwin's *Caleb Williams* and to Romantic notions of subjectivity in general, as are the more overtly pedagogical elements of both writers' works. It is this entanglement of literary form and innovation with the development of various forms of anarchist thought that this chapter considers.

Historically, most studies of anarchism grant it a capacious past by gesturing to Taoist philosophy, the Levellers' and the Diggers' faith, and Romantics' radicalism before the first articulation of anarchism as a political philosophy as such following with Proudhon.⁶ This dividing line is important since invocations of the 'anarchist' as a literary figure are only possible after the coherent articulation of anarchism as a philosophy and movement. In this sense, literary expressions of anarchism need not mention the movement nor name the concept while literary depictions of anarchism may also be profoundly opposed to liberatory politics.

The Enlightenment roots of anarchist philosophy appear in literary works by Godwin, Shelley, and Mary Wollstonecraft to varying degrees. All three also wrote critical works on liberatory politics, and the grounding of the novel of growth in the exercise of reason is as much an influence on their literary as their philosophical work. Wollstonecraft's *Maria: or, The Wrongs of Woman*⁷ is not, in this sense, distinct from her *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*.⁸ Later writers increasingly looked to form and style rather than theme or topics for

expressing anarchism as literary praxis, such as Joyce's stream of consciousness, Duncan's projective verse, or Read's sense of open form.

ANARCHIST AUTHORS

While authors prior to the late nineteenth century are often linked with anarchism, such as Godwin and Shelley above, it is difficult to identify several major English-language writers prior to the 1890s objectively as anarchists, even where there is good reason to associate their aesthetics or politics with prototypical forms of anarchism. Woodcock⁹ identifies Peter Kropotkin's anarchist work as the major influence behind Oscar Wilde's essay *The Soul of Man under Socialism* and links it further to Wilde's novel *The Picture of Dorian Gray*.¹⁰ While Wilde is often read in relation to the Symbolist movement, his articulation of the social role of art and his aestheticism are also readily understood through his ties to anarchism, but with the effect of giving a different interpretation. For instance, the seminal phrase 'All art is quite useless'¹¹ that concludes Wilde's Preface to the 1891 revision of his novel *The Picture of Dorian Gray* offers distinct readings. It may be taken as sincere and an indication of the Art for Art's Sake paradigm, meaning that art serves its own purposes aesthetically rather than a social function. Nevertheless, Kropotkin's influence on Wilde's essay is of the same moment as Wilde's 1890 first version of the novel, and the Preface was a later addition written in response to critiques he received—the Preface was also published prior to the revised 1891 standard version of the novel, which both cuts and expands contentious parts of the novel. In this second interpretive context, the uselessness of art signals its resistance to utility and commercial value. Art does not require a 'use value' in order to be art, or as Carolyn Lesjak¹² argues, 'the notion of pleasure in [Wilde's] texts dovetails with notions of use versus exchange value, commodification and commodity logic, the utopian and the everyday'.¹³ The artwork itself, as well as the artist, are in this sense 'quite useless' not because they are without purpose or influence but rather because they do not serve another's aims or capitalist production. Art may transform individuals, but for Wilde it resists 'value' as a commodity. This shifts emphasis from a single function of art to the 'Diversity of opinion' Wilde privileges, and this diversity implies the production of meaning localised in the individual reader as distinct from other readers or even the artist. *The Soul of Man under Socialism* adapts phrasing from Kropotkin and Proudhon, and Kropotkin described the essay to Robert Ross¹⁴ (Wilde's close friend) as 'that article that O. Wilde wrote on Anarchism'.¹⁵ Woodcock¹⁶ also writes of Wilde's essay that it was 'The most ambitious contribution to literary anarchism during the 1890s'.¹⁷ Hence, to look to Wilde's satire of upper-class manners and his privileging of individual responses to the artwork is to find an expression of the anarchist ethos at work in the style and praxis of the text: a critique of forms of rule based on the inherent value of the individual.

Ruth Kinna¹⁸ and David Goodway¹⁹ both identify significant anarchist influences in William Morris's literary and critical works of the same period as

Wilde. They again do so largely through Morris's relationship with the anarchist Kropotkin. Kinna recognises in Morris's anti-statist socialism a paradigm more closely aligned with contemporary anarchist thought today than it would be with Marxist analysis, particularly in relation to the cultivation of the individual as a necessity of positive social relations. As Goodway argues, Morris's more widely recognised and repeated refutation of anarchism and Kropotkin, despite remaining on friendly terms with him personally, reflects his belief that an egoistic understanding of anarchism (most likely his personal misunderstanding of Kropotkin's theory of mutual aid) would limit the natural growth of the individual rather than nurture it. Hence, for Morris, the forms of subjectivity at the heart of his socialism are far more anarchistic and given to mutual aid than they are Marxist in our sense of these bodies of theory today. However, in English literature, the major development of anarchist or anarchist-inspired authors began in the twentieth century.

The early expressions of literary modernism in English are also caught up with anarchist thought.²⁰ David Kadlec²¹ and Allan Antliff²² detail how Ezra Pound's early vorticist works are entangled with anarchism and his relationship with the anarchist Gaudier-Brzeska²³ as well as his connections with various anarchists. While Pound would soon turn to progressively fascist beliefs leading to his support for Mussolini and arrest in Italy at the end of the Second World War, anarchism remains important for reading his early career. Joyce read extensively in anarchist materials at the same time, and antiauthoritarian threads are seen in his fiction. Kadlec²⁴ emphasises how this relates the sexual content of his writings to the stream of consciousness technique, both of which deeply characterise his novels *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*²⁵ and *Ulysses*.²⁶ Jean-Michel Rabaté²⁷ has also extensively studied Joyce's ties to the distinct through related philosophy of egoism. As distinct from psychological realism, the other function of stream of consciousness is to privilege the individual in society and to draw attention to the transformative possibilities of inner life, thereby politicising the modernist inward turn in ways distinct from its use by Fabian and feminist modernists such as Virginia Woolf or Dorothy Richardson. As Kadlec argues, in late 1914, Joyce 'began thinking of narrative technique as a tool for combating the ravages of bourgeois morality'²⁸ and via Dora Marsden accessed Max Stirner's egoism, both of which link his approach to the willing subject, sexuality, and obscenity, in particular the demands of desire as the predicate for subjectivity's sense of agency.²⁹ In this sense, the self or 'I' of Joyce's stream of consciousness significantly differs, 'not as the nominally insular subject to "think" but rather as the "vital" unitary stream into which thoughts are drawn'.³⁰

The Welsh writer Powys advocated for socialism and, after encountering Emma Goldman, gradually turned toward anarchist views, most concretely so in 1937 through his correspondence with Goldman about the Spanish Civil War. Powys's very long productive writing life meant that he was among the generation preceding the high modernists but wrote most of his modernist works after its development. Goodway³¹ details through extensive archival

study the development of Powys's anarchism, ultimately expressed in his endorsement of anarchism in his most widely recognised novel *A Glastonbury Romance*.³² Powys's anarchism is most nuanced in his later novel *Porius: A Romance of the Dark Ages*³³ in which the conflict between encroaching authoritarian forms of rule and the self-care of the individual drives the plot and is articulated through the character Myrddin Wyllt. The stream of consciousness technique common across much modernist literature and often aligned with psychological realism is, hence, amenable to a different reading in Powys that extends back to its function in Joyce. Powys worked extensively on the topic in critical works about Joyce and Richardson in particular, and he held a long correspondence with Richardson.

Powys's later correspondent Miller was already an anarchist by the time of Powys's *A Glastonbury Romance*. After the publication of his own novel *Tropic of Cancer*,³⁴ Miller entered into a correspondence with the British poet and editor Read centred on refuting the communist politics of Surrealism following the London International Surrealist Exhibition.³⁵ Miller avoided explicitly self-identifying as an anarchist but frequently engaged in elliptical descriptions of 'anarchic' views.³⁶ Anarchism finds expression in his prose style and ostensibly autobiographical mode of fiction that, like stream of consciousness (which he also employed extensively), shift attention to the individual and spontaneity held in tension with imposed forms of order or artificial constructions of authority. Although Miller rejected Joyce as an influence, he incorporated a passage of Joyce's then 'Work in Progress' (*Finnegans Wake*) into his *Tropic of Cancer* and employs stream of consciousness with a similar pressure toward the 'vitality' of Joyce's sense of desire driving the stream into which thoughts are drawn rather than the authoritarian imposition of a stable ego-producing thought. This led Miller to a form of post-Surrealism that was anarchist in its outlook with consciously revised automatism and widespread influence. Amy Nimr and Lawrence Durrell, who both connected with the Art et Liberté group in Egypt, were in Miller's network around the Villa Seurat in Paris, from which he began his correspondence with Read, who subsequently made his public move to embrace anarchism.³⁷ Miller associated with the artist Jean Varda in Paris, and Varda relocated to Big Sur in California, where Miller again joined him after the Second World War. From Big Sur Miller again was in contact with the San Francisco Renaissance and the Beats, having an influence on both groups. He also helped to secure publication of the translation of Albert Cossery's novel *Men God Forgot*³⁸ through the anarchist Circle Editions run by George Leite.

Read embraced anarchism publicly in the autumn of 1937 after supporting and speaking at the 1936 London International Surrealist Exhibition and extolling socialism.³⁹ While Read's poetry and prose are less overtly anarchist in form and style, his writing on art history emphasises the relationship between open form and anarchist thought.⁴⁰ While his own poetry often remained faithful to traditional forms, he drew on anarchist themes and topics, particularly following the Spanish Civil War. Read's position in the British art world allowed

him to bring anarchist understandings of form and style to a much wider audience. Likewise, his editorial position at the publisher Routledge & Kegan Paul saw him support and lend his voice to many anarchist writers of a younger generation, particularly those connected to the New Apocalypse movement, such as Henry Treece. Treece published several essays identifying the driving intellectual energy of the New Apocalypse as anarchist in nature. His poetry, while now overlooked, was widely published and praised by the leading critics of his age, including T. S. Eliot, with whom he corresponded (Eliot published Treece's poetry and a verse drama through Faber & Faber). The expression of anarchism in Treece's poetry appears less through formal innovation than through subject matter, frequently gesturing to an ecological world beyond urban centres and to an unconscious repository of myth accessible to the individual, and hence an emphasis on Celtic themes. After the war years and time in service, Treece turned to genre fiction and a teaching career, although his books for children, his fantasy novels, and historical fictions are frequently anti-statist and attend to rural landscapes and spontaneous intimate relations among individuals outside of formalised or state-oriented structures.

In America, anarchist poetics tended more strongly toward formal experimentation. The poet Duncan identified Miller's anarchism early on in his journal *Experimental Review* from Woodstock, New York, and sought to publish Miller and Durrell during the war years. Duncan's anarchism was both explicit and expressed stylistically in his sense of projective verse and composition by field as well as in his attachment to personal relationships within a circle of authors,⁴¹ as manifests in his *Ground Work* collections.⁴² When he returned to San Francisco, he interacted extensively with the other anarchist poets Kenneth Rexroth and Kenneth Patchen and formed an anarchist reading circle that also connected to the anarchists in Big Sur. All three poets insisted on the political importance of the personal and everyday life, or as Andrew Cornell⁴³ explains, 'Because people were increasingly alienated from themselves in industrial society [...] they were losing their ability to connect with and care for others'.⁴⁴ Rexroth and Patchen were also published and promoted by Treece through the New Apocalypse in Britain, specifically their political works *The Phoenix and the Tortoise* and excerpts and analysis of *The Journal of Albion Moonlight*, respectively. All three also faced conflict with Marxist colleagues, Duncan most famously in the breakdown in his friendship with the poet Denise Levertov.⁴⁵

Subsequent American poets who emphasised anarchist practices include Jackson Mac Low, who met Duncan in New York in the early 1940s, but Mac Low's later approaches to anarchism connected through John Cage with chance and indeterminacy as restrictions on the ego. As with Joyce's and Miller's approach to stream of consciousness setting desire as the predicate to thought falsely associated with a stabilised (or even authoritarian) notion of the ego, Mac Low employed chance and 'diastic' procedural methods in *The Stein Poems*.⁴⁶ Like Miller's inspiration for the post-Surrealists of the New Apocalypse, Mac Low retained the conscious shaping of chance and unconscious materials as a ways of retaining the individual's taste and agency.

Acker employed similar procedural strategies to contain the authority of the ego through cut up and pastiche with similar anarchist-inspired critical positioning of the subject and sexuality.⁴⁸ Acker also saw her writing as work against the authoritarian forces of capitalism and patriarchy, at the heart of which is an understanding of art as praxis with meaningful action on the world grown from the opening discussion here of Wilde's sense of art's utility and uselessness. While distinct, her leveraging of anarchist praxis as resistance to patriarchy also relates to Duncan's insistence on the spell-like function of a poem and his disruption of heteronormativity. The Canadian poet Webb has also embedded anarchist ideals in her sense of formal and stylistic innovations, and hence an anarchist praxis of writing.⁴⁹ The novelist Thomas Pynchon also employs anarchism for thematic issues that drive his narrative and plot as well as for experimentation with the novel form. This appears in the 'anarchist miracle' of *The Crying of Lot 49*⁵⁰ and perhaps most pervasively⁵¹ in *Gravity's Rainbow*⁵² and *Against the Day*,⁵³ the latter of which demonstrates his profound knowledge of anarchist and syndicalist history. The Indian novelist Roy also incorporates several of the formal and stylistic traits discussed in relation with anarchism for her novel *The God of Small Things*.⁵⁴

ANARCHIST LITERARY MOVEMENTS

Several of the authors above were also involved with anarchist or antiauthoritarian literary movements. While the antiauthoritarian impulse is widespread in Romanticism, it would be incorrect to conflate anarchism with Romanticism or to characterise Romanticism as a movement with anarchism. However, the New Apocalypse and New Romanticism movements in British literature of the 1930s through 1950s share a deep concern with anarchism and through explicitly anarchist aesthetics and social critiques.⁵⁵ Post-surrealist techniques decoupled from Marxism by the New Apocalypse grew from the group's interests in the Villa Seurat group around Miller in Paris in the 1930s. It emphasised a personalist philosophy that placed significant attention on the individual and regarded subjectivity as more than a manifestation of a material mode of production. This placed it in conflict with contemporary socialist work in connection with literature, such as the Auden group's associations with Christopher Caudwell.⁵⁶ The New Apocalypse was productive after the defeat of the anarchists in the Spanish Civil War and was disinclined to formal organisation or agitation, such as the Freedom Defense Committee that supported Freedom Press, and the New Apocalypse regarded itself as primarily a literary movement. It reorganised after the Second World War as the New Romanticism with much of the same conceptual motivations, including the same personalist emphasis. It grew increasingly tied to Read as an anarchist mentor, and Read had also been motivated by his correspondence with Miller during the mid-1930s and his crucial turn from socialist to anarchist advocacy. At this point, the New Romanticism connected more widely with fiction writers as its chief proponent, Treece, turned increasingly to genre fiction, including fantasy, and Mervyn

Peake identified his first Gormenghast book, *Titus Groan*,⁵⁷ as part of this New Romantic movement⁵⁸ while writing the second volume, *Gormenghast*.⁵⁹

Miller returned to the United States of America during the outbreak of the Second World War, eventually settling on the West Coast in California. There, he also became involved with literary movements in America that had a significant anarchist component, including the San Francisco Renaissance and to a lesser degree the Beats. Rexroth, Duncan, and Patchen were the most prominent anarchist voices in the San Francisco Renaissance, but affiliated figures such as Leite moved between San Francisco and the anarchist group in Big Sur. Rexroth's collection *The New British Poets*⁶⁰ includes and emphasises the New Apocalypse poets, and Leite's periodical *Circle* published work by both Rexroth and Duncan. The Canadian writer Elizabeth Smart moved between the same groups with the British poet George Barker, who was also affiliated loosely with the New Apocalypse group in Britain. Leite also published work by the Egyptian anarchist novelist Cossery in *Circle* and the translation of *The Men God Forgot*. The connections among these disparate groups is important, and Cossery's activity in the Egyptian Art et Liberté group also connects back to Miller: Durrell was part of Miller's Villa Seurat Group in the 1930s, and Amy Smart (née Nimr) had resided in the Villa Seurat and met Miller before returning to Egypt where she was part of Art et Liberté and hosted its exhibitions in her salon. The amenability of the Art et Liberté artists to a rapprochement between anarchism and Marxism came partly from their independence from colonial narratives of centre and periphery,⁶¹ and the critique of Marxism to value the individual in their manifestos is remarkable given its coinciding with the Trotsky-Breton 'Manifesto for an Independent Revolutionary Art'.⁶²

DEPICTIONS OF ANARCHISM AND ANARCHISTS

Depictions of anarchism and anarchists have significantly shaped both public opinion and literary consciousness. Three works are dominant in this respect: Joseph Conrad's *The Secret Agent*,⁶³ Henry James's *The Princess Cassamassima*,⁶⁴ and G. K. Chesterton's *The Man Who Was Thursday*.⁶⁵ Conrad's novel was especially important in popularising the notion of the anarchist and anarchism through the bomb-throwing misfit divorced from reason or social consciousness. As Jesse Cohn⁶⁶ argues, these works 'cement the public perception of anarchists as pathologically violent miscreants.... [and i]ndelibly associated with lunacy and criminal violence, turned into fodder for thrilling novels, the anarchist movement was in danger of becoming permanently estranged from the working classes whose cause it championed'.⁶⁷ From Conrad's irredeemable figure of the anarchist as a bomb-maker and the manslaughter of Stevie in the novel as a figure of sentimental pathos, other kindred depictions of anarchism have spread in popular media, although some critics have sought to reconcile agency with the novel's problematic depiction of anarchism.⁶⁸ These stereotypes of the anarchist are reinforced by popular media linking Leon Czolgosz's assassination of President William McKinley and Gavrilo Princip's

assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria as anarchist acts, although Czolgosz was not associated with nor accepted by any anarchist groups and Princip's assassination was coordinated through the nationalist Black Hand. Despite this, both are ubiquitously presented as anarchist assassins much in line with Conrad's literary figure.

Later depictions of anarchism and anarchists differ in some respects and shift popular consciousness in a new direction. Chuck Palahniuk's novel *Fight Club*⁶⁹ presented anarchism in a potentially sympathetic light as anti-corporate and anti-capitalist, thereby restoring part of its social aims to popular awareness. However, the trend is toward silencing or euphemising anarchism in mainstream media or otherwise generalising it in a modern sense akin to Conrad, James, and Chesterton. The film adaptation of *Fight Club* and *V for Vendetta* largely elide anarchism.

POPULAR WRITING

While anarchism may manifest in the praxis, style, or form of literature, it has also shaped the concerns of popular writers, some of whom move between the ostensibly mainstream and 'art' readerships. As was already noted, Peake identified his popular *Gormenghast* novels with the anarchist New Romanticism movement. The novels contrast stratified social classes in conflict but establish the reader's sympathies with the hereditary ruler of the castle Gormenghast, Titus Groan, while presenting his antagonist Steerpike, from the lower classes, as a fascistic villain. The tendency across the novels is to present ritual and tradition as ossifying forces of arbitrary authority inimical to the more flexible rhythms of the natural world outside the built environment. The characters come to experience selfhood by resistance against these arbitrary systems of domination, for Titus by refuting his birthright and fleeing the castle, while others become mere operations of the caste or ritual by pursuing domination over others or power.⁷⁰ The novels rival J. R. R. Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings* in establishing the fantasy genre and hold a strong position in the popular readership, with politically engaged authors such as Miéville and Moorcock identifying and preferring Peake as a predecessor in the genre.⁷¹

Treece, who championed the New Apocalypse movement in poetry and wrote extensively on anarchism in poetry and literary study, moved increasingly to popular fiction genres after the Second World War, most likely for financial reasons but also as an adjunct to his teaching post. Treece popularised historical fiction and prehistoric fiction, frequently pairing a novel for children with a novel for adults, as in his *Legions of the Eagle*⁷² with *The Dark Island*⁷³ or *The Golden Strangers*⁷⁴ with *Men of the Hills*⁷⁵—both the adult and juvenile forms of each narrative contain anarchist themes without identification as such, which differs from his earlier poetry and critical writings. A persistent theme in Treece is the murder or foul death of kings who do little to improve the lives of their subjects (almost always hindering or harming their natural lives), or occasionally the abandonment of authority by a ruler to seek out a rural and spontaneous

life without imposed forms of authority. Treece is often more insistent on anti-authoritarian themes in his versions of books for children than he is in his adult fantasy and historical fiction, suggesting that as with several other authors in this chapter, he saw praxis and form in the Cold War context as more convincing and influential locations for anarchism than in overtly pedagogical or critical discussions.

The most recognised anarchist popular fiction is Le Guin's *The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia*,⁷⁶ which presents an anarchist protagonist negotiating cultural tensions between the planet Urras (with capitalist and communist nations in a state of perpetual conflict) and the moon Anarres (with an anarchist community that continually renegotiates the nature of anarchism in power relations against the tendency to perpetuate arbitrarily or to naturalise relations). Le Guin's sense of anarchism is also implicit, and perhaps more pervasive, in her Earthsea fantasy novels, which do not name anarchism but extensively engage with problems of authority, naming, domination, identity, desire, and spontaneity that are productively understood through anarchism. Le Guin's *The Dispossessed* is in her Hainish Cycle of novels and stories, which have provoked significant scholarly commentary-based matters of gender, sexuality, and utopianism.⁷⁷ The libertarian novelist Robert A. Heinlein, one of the Big Three science fiction novelists of the Golden Age of Science Fiction (meaning one of the three most influential and profitable authors in the genre), dedicated his late novel *Friday*⁷⁸ in part to Le Guin and wrote a potentially anarchist parable in his short story and later serialised novel published in book form as *The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress*.⁷⁹ While libertarianism and anarchism have similarities, their respective emphases on individualism and/or egoism differ significantly. Heinlein's quasi-anarchist popular narrative in *The Moon is a Harsh Mistress* had a significant impact on the genre and readership, but his subsequent works present problematic differences, such as the leadership role attained by dominant or dominating personalities and a naturalisation of capitalist systems of exchange in which superior attributes are granted to those with greater fiscal domination over others.⁸⁰

Moorcock openly recounts his influence from and friendships with Treece and Peake or the New Apocalypse writers in general,⁸¹ depicting these as formative relationships fostering his popular writing in the fantasy genre. Moorcock went on to write prefaces to republications of Treece's novels⁸² and actively supported (or even championed) the republication and popular return to Peake and Treece. While he acknowledges the tension between writing primarily in a genre (fantasy) with kings and queens while being an anarchist opposed to arbitrary and unnatural relations of power, Moorcock also integrates anarchist themes into his popular writings. This is most overt in his novel *Gloriana; or the Unfulfill'd Queen*,⁸³ which he revised to alter significantly its ending. The crux of the novel, conceptually, is that the ruler Gloriana is dominated by her arbitrary role as ruler as much as she dominates others, and she seeks to free herself from this constraint. The central conceit of the novel is that insofar as Gloriana is the Nation, she is anorgasmic. This drives a falsification of

identity and an arbitrary notion of rulership that is only overcome in the novel through the refutation of systems of rule and an embracing of the libidinal role of desire in organising concepts of subjectivity. This is to say, Gloriana only becomes self-possessed through embracing the drive of desire and refusing the demands of 'Others', with the fact of desire subverting the authoritarian imposition of normative social values. The kinship between this notional sense of anarchism and Joyce, Powys, Millers, and Acker is significant and also direct, with Moorcock relating his own works back to Powys, Joyce, and Miller, as influences and forward toward the concerns central to Acker and Duncan.

The author Starhawk (Miriam Simos) presses anarchist concerns against ecological and New Age paradigms, stressing a spontaneous set of relations. Her popular novels and New Age books emphasise a relationship with nature or wilderness that accentuates the 'wild' as not random but rather as a connectedness, implying a relational ontology between the world itself and the linguistically endowed peoples who will rely on an asymmetrical organisation of power placing themselves above (and in domination over) nature or their received environments. Alan pursues a more overtly anarchist project in his comics and novels. Moore's belief in anarchism is most overt in his early comics series, *V for Vendetta*,⁸⁴ where anarchism as a political philosophy is discussed extensively and drives the tension between the anti-fascist terrorist V. and the antiauthoritarian Evey. Moore eventually presents a form of antiauthoritarian anarchism in Evey that eschews violence, by paralleling the terrorist V. with the fascistic leader Adam Susan. However, Moore later moves anarchism from a thematic and topical discussion in his texts to a formal operation, such as in his novel *Jerusalem*⁸⁵ that gestures back to an anarchist Romanticism connected with William Blake. David Weir⁸⁶ sees this move to anarchist aesthetics and form in relation to modernism as typifying a depoliticisation of anarchism. In Weir's paradigm, anarchism succeeds as a formal innovation rather than as a political philosophy, but this critique is limited by the anarchist understanding and privileging of praxis, which would present Moore far more as a populariser of the ethos of anarchist sensibilities than as a voice of reactionary consolation. Kim Stanley Robinson's *Mars Trilogy*⁸⁷ also attained a canonical status in Science Fiction Studies while engaging in anarchist themes. While Robinson has predominantly aligned himself with Marxist social critiques, he has remained open to anarchist paradigms, and he addresses antiauthoritarian values extensively in his *Mars Trilogy*.

ANARCHISM AND OTHER WRITERS

Distinct from the issues covered so far, there are also authors whose works are more adeptly read with a familiarity with anarchism despite their own distinct political orientation. As has already been argued, William Morris's novels at the end of the nineteenth century express anarchistic views even while his critical writings voice reservations or refutations of anarchist politics based on his socialist conceptualisation of the individual and his or her self-development as

an essential part of the functioning of society. Kinna summarises Morris's fraught relationship with anarchism: 'Morris seemed to know that he was not an anarchist, without realizing why'.⁸⁸ Hence, Morris presents a critical view of society that rejects the state and concentrations of power that express domination as authority. Morris would have regarded statist power as a cause for the capitalist concentration of wealth, while he at the same time envisioned the creative individual in an antiauthoritarian series of social relations that minimise selfishness. The crux, however, is that Morris may be more beneficially read with an understanding of anarchism in mind, regardless of Morris's own affiliations at the time of writing the given work.

George Orwell is often misrepresented in popular consciousness as opposing socialism, though scholarly work ubiquitously recognises his support for democratic socialism. Orwell was linked to the anarchists when he served in the Spanish Civil War and was later good friends with the anarchists Woodcock and Alex Comfort, though he criticised their pacifism during the Second World War. His essay *Inside the Whale*⁸⁹ is often read as a dispute with Auden's support of the communists in the Spanish Civil War, but the largest portion of the work is concerned with Miller's anarchism (euphemistically referred to as 'defeatism' and 'quietism', both of which were common gestures to anarchism at the time) with Auden only adjunct. While Orwell was a democratic socialist, several of his works are beneficially read with an awareness of his familiarity with anarchist thought.

It is difficult to read Muriel Spark's novels without taking into consideration her connections to anarchist thought through Derek Stanford, detailed in his *The Freedom of Poetry*⁹⁰ and *Inside the Forties*.⁹¹ While Spark may have been troubled by the former title, which shares details of their personal life, she developed her views in conflict with Stanford's anarchism, and their respective differences on the conceptualisation of subjectivity and the meaningfulness of the sole individual's protest remained divergent, yet this anarchist frame expands the nature of several of her caustic critiques, particularly *The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie*⁹² and *The Girls of Slender Means*.⁹³ Approaching a text such as Elizabeth Smart's *By Grand Central Station I Sat Down and Wept*⁹⁴ is also improved by familiarity with her time spent with Jean Varda in Paris and later in Varda's commune in California with Miller, where she also met Rexroth and engaged with his anarchism circle. Durrell, who introduced Smart to her lover Barker (ostensibly the lover in the novel), is also productively read through his connections to several anarchists, particularly his use of ambiguity to privilege the reader's antiauthoritarian construction of meaning and his critique of capitalism and contractual obligation in his novels *Tunc*⁹⁵ and *Nunquam*.⁹⁶

INTERPRETING ANARCHISM AND LITERARY THEORY

Reading anarchist authors, anarchist aesthetics or praxis, and depictions of anarchists and anarchism are often complicated by the dominant or habitual methodologies in mainstream literary scholarship. The New Criticism, insofar

as it has been critiqued as a depoliticised and even conservative tendency in literary criticism, presents a major obstacle in that anarchist aesthetics will be read through this paradigm without recourse to their political context. This entails not only a depoliticised reading of the textual content in relation to literary tradition and form but also an excision of the ways anarchism often shapes attitudes toward subjectivity, identity, the construction of meaning, and challenges to inherited rather than negotiated traditions. The antiauthoritarian nature of anarchist work directly eschews the imposed reading methodology of the New Criticism, which intrinsically values an inherited (and therefore imposed, arbitrarily) literary tradition (authority) without recognising the potential for spontaneous and evanescent traditions or relations among texts. The prominence and ubiquity of New Critical reading methodologies thus tends to elide anarchism from literary texts in which it plays an important topical, formal, or allusive role.

The most significant challenge to reading anarchism in literature comes from the second most prevalent methodology in literary studies, critical theory. As a materialist paradigm rooted in Marxist methods that orient attention to social conflicts predicated on class conflict, the potential to recognise the social element of anarchist and related literature is significant. Yet, many of the most widely adopted streams of critical theory and Marxist literary study are hostile to anarchist perspectives on subjectivity and political action. This can lead to oversights or potential misrepresentations of anarchist materials in criticism. Examples in relation to the authors discussed in this chapter include Fredric Jameson's responses to Le Guin⁹⁷ and his categorisation of pre-capitalist utopianism for Tolstoy as 'regressive'.⁹⁸ This specific stream of Marxist analysis argues for anarchist politics as reactionary and conservative. It can also lead to Santesso's⁹⁹ misunderstanding of anarchism's antiauthoritarian philosophy as fundamentally fascist and authoritarian¹⁰⁰ or provoke critical disputes that represent anarchist subjectivities and antiauthoritarian values as inherently outdated and deriving from a historical past episteme, as in Samuel Delany's rebuttal of Le Guin's anarchist science fiction novel *The Dispossessed* in his own novel *Trouble on Triton*¹⁰¹ and again as a critical argument in his essay 'To Read *The Dispossessed*'.¹⁰² In relation to the popular literature discussed above, and especially its analyses of genre, the prevalence and near ubiquity of Marxist criticism in Science Fiction Studies has deeply shaped the field in its definitional critical projects,¹⁰³ and the limitations this approach places on genre and specific authors is recognised by the critic-novelist China Miéville.¹⁰⁴ Psychoanalytic methodologies also have a complex relationship with anarchism, with post-anarchist thought adopting poststructuralist concepts from Jacques Lacan¹⁰⁵ in ways that may be read as related to Joyce's, Miller's, and Powys's uses of stream of consciousness in relation with desire. However, Jameson's Marxist revision of Lacan in *The Political Unconscious*¹⁰⁶ runs contrary to these psychoanalytic methods, stressing the materialist origins of subjectivity and hence the origin of such methodologies or notions themselves in a bourgeois mode of production, only the transformation of which could alter modes of consciousness.

CONCLUSION

Anarchism and literature have a long, richly entangled history. While authors for whom anarchist ideas help to approach their works and non-anarchist authors who represent anarchism are important for literary study, the relations among anarchism and literature are most productive when literature expands anarchist understanding or when anarchism prompts literary development. The exploration of anarchist themes through plot or narration was predominantly before the twentieth century, but with the rise of modernism, an anarchist sense of literary form, technique, and style became increasingly important. A distinct anarchist poetics follows, particularly in American poetry. Likewise, the distribution of anarchism in popular literature shapes many critical discussions around genre and makes anarchist attitudes and forms of thought available to readerships that might otherwise be averse to the name of anarchism. Anarchism also runs contrary to some of the most widely adopted and promulgated forms of literary scholarship and reading, hence it is vulnerable to misrepresentation or antagonistic interpretations.

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Anarchism and Art

Mark Mattern

INTRODUCTION

As recently as 2007, Josh MacPhee and Erik Reuland noted that there is ‘hardly any discussion about art within anarchist and anti-authoritarian circles’, and that there has been ‘oddly little writing readily available in English on the subject of visual art and anarchism’.¹ With some qualification, they are not wrong. I wrote in 2016 that most of the discussion among contemporary anarchists of strategies for progressive change focus on civil society and the economy while largely ignoring the arts and popular culture.² The exceptions have generally focused on so-called high art and on specific earlier periods of avant-garde art in Russia, Europe, and the United States.³

Nevertheless, some anarchists past and present have viewed art as both a constituent element of a good life and as an instrumental means of attaining that good life. In this chapter I will refer to these as the constitutive and instrumental dimensions of art. In practice, the two often merge. Both entail a rejection of ‘art for art’s sake’, which purges art of its social significance.⁴

What is art? What is specifically anarchist art? For art to be anarchist, must it be created by an avowed anarchist who intentionally creates art that expresses specifically anarchist values and commitments? Or can it be any art created by any artist that expresses—either in content or in form—anarchist values and commitments? And who counts as an artist? Someone with specialised expertise and skills? Or anyone who splashes paint on a canvas or wall, dances with enthusiasm and abandon, or sings a favourite song? Each of these questions deserves an extended answer, but space constraints preclude it. I have addressed some of

M. Mattern (✉)
Department of Politics and Global Citizenship,
Baldwin Wallace University, Berea, OH, USA

these issues and debates elsewhere.⁵ Here, I will only make several claims that hopefully clarify my position. First, art can and should be broadly defined—elsewhere I define it broadly as ‘any attempt to express ideas and emotions through a medium that includes aesthetic and affective dimensions, as well as potentially analytical and intellectual dimensions. Artists employ imagination and skill to create objects, experiences, or environments that typically include an aesthetic dimension’.⁶ By implication, an artist is anyone who does this. Additionally, any attempt to separate so-called ‘high’ and ‘low’ art says more about power and interest than it does about actual substantive differences among art forms. Here, I will use the term ‘art’ to include both so-called high art forms such as opera and paintings that hang on museum walls and so-called low art forms such as graffiti and punk music.⁷ I will include in this discussion those art works that express anarchist values and commitments either in content or in form, or both. And, finally, I include artistic expressions whose anarchist values and commitments are there intentionally, that is, the artist intended to create a specifically anarchist work of art—or unintentionally—that is, the artist did not intend to create a specifically anarchist work of art but whose artistic work nevertheless expresses anarchist values and commitments.⁸

If anarchist art expresses anarchist values and commitments, what are those values and commitments? Given the diversity of anarchists past and present, a full accounting is impossible here. For the purposes of this chapter, they include ending domination in any form; autonomy; equality; horizontal, decentralised power; voluntarist, non-hierarchical forms of social organisation; and direct action. Other contributors to this volume address these and others at length.

ART AS A WAY OF LIFE

For some anarchists, a good life is an artful life. This means that art is integrated into the ideal life, and any life worth living will include art. More profoundly, for some anarchists a fully realised anarchism is itself the lived reality of art, understood to mean a life of creativity, free and full expression, unalienated labour, and the joy and spontaneity associated with many forms of art. In other words, art is a model of a fully realised anarchist way of life.

This perspective can be found perhaps most famously in the response by Emma Goldman (1869–1940) to criticisms from a fellow anarchist that her dancing was frivolous, unbecoming a serious revolutionary. She responded that precisely in the spirit of dance could be found the rationale and motivation for anarchism:

I did not believe that a Cause which stood for a beautiful ideal, for anarchism, for release and freedom from convention and prejudice, should demand the denial of life and joy. I insisted that our Cause could not expect me to become a nun and that the movement would not be turned into a cloister. If it meant that, I did not want it. I want freedom, the right to self-expression, everybody’s right to beautiful, radiant things. Anarchism meant that to me, and I would live it in spite of the whole world—prisons, persecution, everything.⁹

Here we see a clear, powerful statement of art as an essential constitutive element of any life—which Goldman associated with anarchism—worth living. She also found these experiences of beauty and joy in other forms of art such as poetry and drama. According to Timothy Robbins, Walt Whitman's *Leaves of Grass* showed her that beauty and joy were as important as freedom and justice to anarchism'.¹⁰

Jill Dolan's concept of utopian performatives vividly captures anarchists' ideal of an artful life. Utopian performatives are artful performances that transport us out of our current lives to imaginative emotional, psychological, and physical spaces that promise richer, more beautiful lives. They describe 'small but profound moments in which performance calls the attention of the audience in a way that lifts everyone slightly above the present, into a hopeful feeling of what the world might be like if every moment of our lives were as emotionally voluminous, generous, aesthetically striking, and intersubjectively intense' as that created by the performances. They 'make palpable an affective vision of how the world might be better'.¹¹ To illustrate, Dolan references musicians' experience of 'finding a groove' or 'getting tight': 'There are these rare moments when musicians together touch something sweeter than they've ever found before in rehearsals or performance, beyond the merely collaborative or technically proficient, when their expression becomes as easy and graceful as friendship or love. This is when they give us a glimpse of what we might be, of our best selves, and of an impossible world in which you give everything you have to others, but lose nothing of yourself'.¹²

One of the most persistent articulations of anarchists' commitment to artful living can be found in their rejection of work in a capitalist political economy. Contemporary anarchist David Graeber asked 'Why is it that artists have so often been drawn to revolutionary politics?' and argued that it 'must have something to do with alienation'.¹³ As most workers can testify, capitalist work tends to be unsatisfying, dreary, boring, dehumanising, and often dangerous. Anarchists seek a different world in which work sheds its alienating character and engages workers' whole selves from conception to creation. The link to art is an obvious and natural one. Artists imagine, they create, they do work that engages them in engrossing, satisfying, immersive activity in which their full humanity is acknowledged and expressed. Anarchists past and present have made this connection between unalienated work and art. Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), sometimes interpreted as a proto-anarchist thinker in his defence of a minarchist state, wrote that in a condition of freedom, 'all peasants and craftsmen might be elevated into artists; that is, men who love their own labor for its own sake, improve it by their own plastic genius and inventive skill, and thereby cultivate their intellect, ennoble their character, and exalt and refine their pleasures'.¹⁴

In her utopian anarchist science fiction novel *The Dispossessed*, Ursula Le Guin makes this connection between unalienated work and artful life conceptually as embedded in language. Set on the planet Anarres, its people speak a Pravic language that pointedly does not employ separate words for work and play; they are the same, suggesting the merging of work and play in practice.

Laurence Davis focuses on the connection between the idea of every person as an artist and ‘pleasurable labour’, by addressing the work of three anarchist writers: William Morris, Oscar Wilde, and Ursula Le Guin. According to Davis, their work functions as ‘a counter-cultural challenge to the currently dominant, capitalist form of anarchist ideology and practice’ in contrast to ‘an anarchist or libertarian socialist utopian alternative distinguished by the qualities of self-direction, free expression, and creativity associated with artistic, non zero-sum, and nature-friendly labour’.¹⁵ In a similar interpretation of William Morris, John Clark argues that Morris ‘envisioned a social order in which the creative capacities of all would be allowed free expression. Human productive activity would be valued as a good in itself, rather than as a means toward accumulation of property and power. The goal of labour would be the collective creation of a community in which beauty, joy, and freedom would be realized’.¹⁶

While some leading anarchist thinkers have been advocates of art, many artists have identified as anarchists or expressed an affinity with anarchism. This is especially true of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century avant-garde artists, many of whom in one way or another sought to undermine the separation between art and life.¹⁷ Many of these artists explored new, less alienated ways of life. Some of their efforts congealed into avant-garde movements of Dadaists, Futurists, Surrealists, and Situationists, seeking to break boundaries between art and life.¹⁸

Many contemporary artists similarly express a commitment to an artful life. Musician Patty Griffin’s ‘Go Wherever You Wanna Go’ works beautifully and powerfully as a critique of life in a neoliberal capitalist world, including the ubiquity of alienated, exploited labour. It achingly expresses a utopian future age when ‘You can go wherever you want to go’, when war has been abolished, when people can get up in the morning and ‘run a hundred miles just for fun’, where ‘heartaches and yesterdays don’t weigh a ton’, and where there are no more bills to pay or ‘worried floors’ to walk. In a line that likely resonates with most working people, Griffin sings that ‘working like a dog ain’t what you’re for now’.¹⁹ Similarly, street artist Dan Witz creates art that one encounters randomly in public spaces in New York City. During two separate periods, he painted a series of strikingly beautiful, life-size hummingbirds on buildings, light poles, and other public structures. They functioned as an intervention in the everyday life of New York City, perhaps the epitome of a work-obsessed, fast-paced, alienated world. Each offered passers-by a temporal and spatial break in the social fabric of the city, a passing experience of a different, more beautiful, sane, delightful world. Each gave passers-by a brief experience comparable to Emma Goldman’s dancing, or Jill Dolan’s utopian performative.²⁰

By implication, if art is a way of life, then everyone is potentially an artist. Anarchist Herbert Read argued that art as a separate profession is simply a consequence of culture that exists in separation from the daily lives of common people. In the artful life he envisioned, the category of professional artist would simply be eliminated: ‘there will be no precious or privileged being called artists: there will be only workers ... The artist is not a special kind of man, but every

man is special kind of artist'.²¹ According to Read, an evolving, egalitarian, art-based society 'does not fit human beings for the mindless and mechanical actions of modern industry'.²² Artists would offer 'a powerful antidote to social alienation', by creating new, more artful ways of life in the process of creating new art forms.²³ Leo Tolstoy similarly defined the artist broadly to encompass art created by non-professionals. He argued that 'art is that human activity which consists in one man's consciously conveying to others, by certain external signs, the feelings he has experienced, and in others being infected by those feelings and also experiencing them'.²⁴ This broad definition of art encompasses many forms of artistic expression dismissed or belittled by arts professionals, and opens new, accessible routes to artistic expression for common people. Tolstoy prioritised 'the expression of feeling and response to it over taste or form ... Making art or becoming art ... is for Tolstoy also much more important than the material, technical side of it that deals with norms, rules, genres, or certain styles that regulate the creation of aesthetic objects, or works of art'.²⁵ Anyone can create art and therefore anyone can live an artful life.

ART TO CHANGE THE WORLD

How do anarchists propose to achieve an artful life? I turn now to the use of art for instrumental purposes. Anarchists have long viewed art as a tool for political advocacy and political action, of at least three different kinds: social critique, expanding vision, and direct action. These may overlap considerably in practice.

First, to even conceive of a better world than the one we currently occupy requires breaking through layers of dominant ideologies, myths, and lies that legitimise the status quo. Criticism of the current social order is a necessary step.

William Godwin (1756–1836), one of the earliest proponents of anarchism, had little to say directly about the role of art. However, he wrote eight novels, in addition to a wealth of nonfiction, which suggests more than a passing interest in the value of fiction and literature. His first, *Things As They Are; or The Adventures of Caleb Williams*, was both a mystery thriller and a critique of aristocratic privilege.²⁶ Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) advocated a 'social role' for art and assigned to artists the lofty role of 'the physical and moral perfection of our species'. Art, he argued, is a 'representation of nature and of ourselves' whose task is 'to warn us, to praise us, to teach us, to make us blush by confronting us with a mirror of our own conscience'.²⁷ In other words, like Godwin, Proudhon viewed art as a means of social criticism but also of self-reflection and self-criticism. Art could help perfect the self and society through recognition and criticism of its shortcomings.

Similarly, the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin in a pamphlet entitled *Appeal to the Young* included artists (along with doctors, scientists, engineers, teachers, and lawyers) as important figures in advancing a social revolution. He called the youth 'true poets' who 'will come and take the side of the oppressed

because [they] know that the beautiful, the sublime, the spirit of life itself are on the side of those who fight for light, for humanity, for justice!’²⁸ He emphasised their instrumental role in advancing social revolution by exposing conditions of oppression.

In addition to her view of art as a way of life, Emma Goldman enthusiastically advocated art as a powerful means of revolutionary change, a vehicle for revolutionary ideas that would advance the cause of anarchism. In her analysis of popular drama, she argued that ‘any mode of creative work which with true perception portrays social wrongs earnestly and boldly is a greater menace [...] and a more powerful inspiration than the wildest harangue of the soapbox orator’.²⁹ Goldman referred to modern dramatic art as ‘dynamite’ that ‘undermines superstition, shakes the social pillars, and prepares men and women for the reconstruction’ of society.³⁰

Many of the paintings and other artistic expressions included in Patricia Leighton’s work on French modernist and anarchist avant-garde artists presented ‘realist scenes of hard labor and harder poverty’ that circulated as a form of social critique.³¹ For example, Jules Adler’s painting ‘Les las’ (‘The weary’, 1897) portrays a mixed crowd of stooped working people, their haunted faces etched with weariness and hardship. Adler’s *Les hâleurs* (‘The haulers’, 1904) depicts six workers straining at ropes, apparently pulling something along a dock, their figures bent at a forty-five-degree angle suggesting the extreme physical exertion needed to complete their work. Other examples are more metaphorical, their political critique found in the title. Édouard-Bernard Debat-Ponsan’s *Humanité pleurant ses enfants* (‘Humanity crying for her children’, 1905) depicts a woman hugging two prostrate children who appear asleep or dead. The title expands the meaning beyond the experience of a single woman and two children to the level of social critique. More bluntly, Kees van Dongen’s *J’suis ni musicien, ni chanteur ... Je suis crève-faim* (‘I’m not a musician or a singer ... I’m starving!’), 1901) depicts a man, possibly a busker, playing a violin. The title suggests the impossibility of being anything or anyone, much less a musician or artist, while starving.³² As Leighton notes, many of these works of art functioned as ‘purposely provocative acts’ of social critique.³³

Of course, many more examples drawn from past and present could be described, including paintings that vividly portray suffering and pain experienced by working people, song lyrics and poetry that evoke marginalised people’s everyday lives of hardship, and performance art that draws attention to unjust human conditions. Each is a form of social ‘dynamite’ that may explode in mainstream consciousness, puncture complacency, break through dominant myths and lies to provoke thoughtful reflection about injustice and its sources, and potentially summon empathy and sympathy for others’ suffering. At a minimum, each helps prevent wilful ignorance of others’ lived experiences of pain and suffering.

Second, if social criticism exposes the injustices in the current social context, imaginative vision brings alternative worlds into focus. Some anarchists have emphasised a special role for art to play in expanding horizons and offering

new possibilities for human experience. Some of this work emphasises the value of utopian works of art.³⁴ As noted by anarchist historian Peter Marshall, ‘Without the utopian imagination it would be impossible to imagine a different world from the one in which we live. We would be stuck in the cloying mud of abject deference, endless toil and grinding poverty of body and spirit. Without the generous vision of a better society, there would be little hope and less change’.³⁵

Many different artistic expressions play this visionary role, sometimes in content and sometimes in form. In a public world dominated by commerce, graffiti and street artists help us imagine a world where public visual space is not for sale to the highest bidder. The renowned street artist Banksy asks us to ‘Imagine a city where graffiti wasn’t illegal [...] A city that felt like a living breathing thing which belonged to everybody, not just the real estate agents and the barons of big business. Imagine a city like that and stop leaning against the wall—it’s wet’.³⁶ The content of Banksy’s street art often imaginatively creates alternative worlds where, for example, little girls disarm soldiers and float effortlessly over imposing political barriers such as the Israeli West Bank wall. The form he employs—primarily stencils—also offers a vision of a democratised, easily duplicable art accessible to all, not just affluent art museum patrons. Graffiti and street artists prod us to imagine a world less dominated by commercial images and gross invitations to consume, and less deferential to private property in the service of domination. Fictional utopias use words to paint this picture of a better, more just world. Visual art typically offers its vision more metaphorically. Using paint on canvas, for example, pointillist painters metaphorically rendered a world where thousands of diverse people find unity in a harmonious and beautiful whole.

As artists experiment with different forms of art, they press on the boundaries of convention and perceived reality, and the assumptions, beliefs, and ideologies that legitimate that version of reality. Their art expands those boundaries by presenting wider and broader horizons, different experiences of reality, more expansive vistas of possibility. By creating ‘new languages of form’, they stimulate imagination and open new worlds of social possibility.³⁷

Third, art is a vehicle for direct action to change the world. Some anarchists use art to express political ideas, to advocate for social change, to organise communities of survival and resistance, to open spaces where their values and commitments can take root, and to advance social movement. Art can often draw attention, and motivate action, in a way that the spoken word alone may not. It taps into emotional reservoirs that, coupled with rational thought, engage our full humanity. Art draws on the whole human, rational and affective. It draws us into a fully engrossing and memorable experience capable of building empathy and motivating action against injustice. Popular forms of art also have the advantage of being accessible, including and especially to marginalised people, enabling widespread participation.³⁸

The forms that direct action take are multiple and varied, encompassing a wide range of visual and performance art. Some of these are memorably

documented in MacPhee and Reuland: the Drawing Resistance travelling art show featuring a touring band of radical printmakers, postermakers, painters, muralists, designers, and other artists doing political action in public spaces; protest and community-building puppetry in Minneapolis; the Department of Space and Land Reclamation, a Chicago-based performance art group doing ‘street interventions’ such as rolling a giant ball of trash down Michigan Avenue, and ‘liberating’ advertising kiosks for political free speech; and many more.³⁹ Most large-scale demonstrations and other social movement events now routinely include various forms of political art, much of it directly or indirectly anarchist.

PREFIGURATIVE ART

Many anarchists have recently adopted a strategy of prefiguration that brings together the constitutive and instrumental roles of art. Anarchist prefiguration has two related meanings. First, it means *descriptively* that current social forms offer hints of future possibilities. For example, the content and form of specific artistic expressions can be interpreted in terms of how they model future social relations, including potentially an artful life. Second, it means *prescriptively* that the ways we organise our lives in the present should model the characteristics of the world we want to create in the future. Our means should be consistent with the ends we seek. A prefigurative strategy directs us to stop waiting for a better world to arrive and simply begin living it now, as best you can within constraints imposed by dominant neoliberal structures and institutions.

The strategy of prefiguration is rooted in a rejection of frontal assaults on the state, including the Marxist strategy of seizing the state, albeit temporarily, because of the suspicion that ‘temporarily’ will become permanent and the state is simply too powerful and the support for a direct assault too limited. It also recognises the limited value of working within the current neoliberal system, where centrist muddling becomes a way of life, and where any progressive step forward seemingly provokes a blowback resulting in two steps backward. Prefiguration offers a third alternative: creating interstitial spaces where anarchist values can be lived on a daily basis.⁴⁰ It directs us to find or create spaces within dominant structures and institutions, and on their margins, where anarchist values and commitments can take root and grow. Anarchists have theorised these as Temporary Autonomous Zones (TAZs), Permanent Autonomous Zones (PAZs), and Semi-Permanent Autonomous Zones (SPAZs).⁴¹

Some artistic expressions hint at specifically anarchist futures. Some art forms also offer a vehicle for living *now* the values we hold, rather than awaiting the establishment of an anarchist world in the future. They are comparable to other prefigurative forms described at length by other anarchist thinkers and activists: popular assemblies, autonomous social centres, small-scale decentralised agriculture, mutual banking, health clinics, squatting, neighbourhood collectives, co-ops, co-housing, community gardens, and many more examples, mostly rooted in civil society, cited and described by anarchists.⁴² Although the arts

have largely been ignored in these discussions, art has a special role and potential in prefiguration because of its emphasis on creativity and imaginative rendering of social life. Innovation of new artistic forms supports the innovation of new social forms, including anarchist social forms and the artful life overall.

Artistic expressions that prefigure anarchist values and commitments offer options for strategic political action. They are tools for social critique, stimulation of imaginative vision, and direct action. In practice, they allow participants to critique, educate, create, and organise while living an artful life in the present: a meaningful, satisfying, creative life on one's own terms, albeit in most cases within temporal and spatial constraints imposed by the state, capitalism, and other structures of domination.

Graffiti and street art provide vivid illustrations. Whether intentionally or not, and whether in the form of simple tags, complex 'pieces', stencils, or the beautifully rendered hummingbirds of Dan Witz, graffiti and street artists live many of the values and commitments embraced by anarchists. They often include a potent social critique that helps make us more aware of the domination, injustices, and ugliness woven into everyday life. Witz again merits mention. Responding to gentrification in his Brooklyn neighbourhood, Witz installed various art pieces as part of his 'Ugly New Buildings' project in 2008. He attached or painted grates on the lower portion of various buildings. Behind some grates, he painted a human striving to see out or escape. Behind others, he painted a prone body, apparently dead. These installations evoked the human spirit trapped inside soulless buildings thrown up or 'renewed' as part of gentrification. Similarly, a yarn bomb grabs the attention of pedestrians who randomly encounter it, opening them to the possibilities of social critique. Yarn bombers have notoriously 'decorated' masculinist memorials such as military heroes or boxing icons with knitted petticoats, pink ties, sunbonnets, and even a giant tea cosy covering a military tank. Each of these installations at least potentially awakens pedestrians to the dominant masculine values captured in most traditional memorials while subverting them.

Graffiti and street art also help us imagine a different public visual world than the current one dominated by ubiquitous, ugly corporate messaging and state directives. They envision a world that contains more random beauty, creativity, spontaneity, and diversity, one that is more vividly colourful and surprising, and less Disneyfied. It is a world of striking beauty in unlikely public spaces, where access to art is open to all. Graffiti and street artists paint—literally and figuratively—a picture of a world where public visual space is more democratically controlled and adorned, torn from the grasp of corporate and state authorities, where the right of free expression adheres less to corporate and state power.

Finally, graffiti and street artists help common citizen artists reclaim public spaces that have been corporatised in commercial messaging and repellent glass towers and tightly regimented and controlled by state authorities telling us what we can do, when, and where in public spaces. Despite abatement efforts costing billions of dollars, graffiti and street artists persist and thrive. They

undermine the state's legitimacy by mocking its inability to protect the private property upon which neoliberalism is founded. Similarly, both challenge the commodification of art within a capitalist political economy. Once installed, no one owns graffiti and street art. With few exceptions, ownership is impossible. The art remains public until authorities or owners buff it out (leaving yet another blank canvas for decoration).

Graffiti and street artists prefigure a world in which people defer less to authority, submit less to control by dominant forces, and refuse to conform to social expectations derived from neoliberal domination. They suggest a world in which free expression by more people is the norm. In the world prefigured by graffiti and street artists, private property rights confer less power and authority over social resources and public space, and the state yields to common people's assertions of autonomy. In this world, common people reclaim public space that has been sold to the highest commercial bidders in the neoliberal social order, and the state that protects that social order.⁴³

CHALLENGES

I turn now briefly to three of the tensions that I have glossed over or ignored earlier in this chapter. First, the infamous critique by Murray Bookchin of so-called lifestyle anarchism has an analogous counterpart in the world of art. Bookchin accused contemporary anarchists who are pursuing interstitial, prefigurative strategies of focusing too narrowly on their own 'lifestyles' and not enough on larger social movements and solidarities.⁴⁴ In the world of art, this takes shape as a tension between free individual artistic expression and larger social linkages and responsibilities. Do artists have a responsibility to produce works of art—including so-called realist art—that recognisably and directly address social injustices and potential (anarchist) remedies? And whatever the answer to that question, should the artist attempt to link to larger social movements? Without attempting a definitive answer here, I will only note that the tension is inaptly posed as a strict duality. In practice, whether intentionally or not, prefigurative art often functions politically in ways that reverberate socially beyond the artistic or practical intent of the individual artist. For example, whatever their intentions, graffiti and street artists attack the state and capitalism, while building a culture of anarchism at street level. Moreover, the Do It Yourself (DIY) dictum that permeates prefigurative anarchist communities is actually misleading, in that most anarchists do 'It' within communities of solidarity and mutualism. So DIY might more accurately be called Do It Together (DIT) or Do It Ourselves (DIO).⁴⁵ All that said, large-scale social movement is difficult, and perhaps impossible, without intentional collective effort. Bookchin's critique at least alerts us to potential pitfalls of individual expression untethered to larger movements for social change.

Second, many artists with anarchist sympathies face a difficult choice between making a living as an artist and rejecting the commodification of art within a capitalist political economy. How can you create art and derive mate-

rial sustenance from it without participating in the very markets that commodify art and define a capitalist political economy? There is no easy answer to this conundrum, and I offer only two qualified illustrations of anarchists' efforts to resolve this tension. One is the artist cooperatives recommended by Camille Pissarro that would allow artists to sell directly to buyers. However, as pointed out by John Hutton, these cooperatives would not directly challenge the market system per se; they would just allow artists to eliminate part of the market by circumventing the middle dealers.⁴⁶ Another is the willingness of many DIY punk musicians to live essentially in poverty in order to avoid participating in a capitalist political economy, foregoing recording contracts and corporate advertising that would compromise their values. However, most of these musicians manage this only for relatively brief periods. When faced with mortgages and growing family obligations, most eventually either make necessary compromises or leave the DIY punk scene entirely.

Third, is the artful life in its more profound sense really possible? Can a world be created where the characteristics of art define the character of life itself? For example, can the distinction between work and play really be eliminated and, with it, alienation? Or is a certain amount of drudgery necessary to produce the goods and services needed to meet all basic human material and psychological needs? Again, I can only here suggest two brief, tentative responses. One is the simple observation that many artists already merge art and life, wholly or partly. I have already mentioned DIY punk musicians' efforts to resist commodification. These same musicians live by the DIY principle applied to art: do it yourself, and do more of it, while avoiding or eliminating mindless work and consumption. As I write elsewhere, 'For them, this is more than a hollow exhortation or utopian vision. It is a way of life'.⁴⁷ As a second response, if we are to lead a more artful life, our material 'needs' will likely have to be scaled back, and careful distinctions made between needs and wants. We must be willing to produce more art and fewer consumer goods, transforming a current economy of excess into one of frugality and sufficiency.⁴⁸ Our lives would be richer—and more artful—for it.

NOTES

1. Josh MacPhee and Erik Reuland, "Introduction: Towards Anarchist Art Theories," in Josh MacPhee and Erik Reuland (Eds), *Realizing the Impossible: Art Against Authority* (Oakland, CA, 2007), 3–5, 3, 4.
2. Mark Mattern, *Anarchism and Art: Democracy in the Cracks and on the Margins* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2016), 7.
3. See, for example, Patricia Leighton, *Re-Ordering the Universe: Picasso and Anarchism, 1897–1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Allan Antliff, *Anarchy and Art: From the Paris Commune to the Fall of the Berlin Wall* (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 2007); Nina Gurianova, *The Aesthetics of Anarchy: Art and Ideology in the Early Russian Avant-Garde* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012); John G. Hutton, *Neo-Impressionism and*

- the Search for Solid Ground: Art, Science, and Anarchism in Fin-de-Siecle France* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1994; and Mark Antliff, "Cubism, Futurism, Anarchism: The 'Aestheticism' of the *Action d'art* Group," 1906–1920," *Oxford Art Journal* 21.2 (1998)), 22–120.
4. On the distinction between art for art's sake and art in the service of social revolution, see for example Emma Goldman, *The Social Significance of Modern Drama* (New York: Applause Theater Book Publishers, 1987 [1914]), 3; and David Graeber, "Anarchism, academia, and the avant-garde," in Randall Amster, Abraham DeLeon, Luis A. Fernandez, Anthony J. Nocella, II, and Deric Shannon (Eds), *Contemporary Anarchist Studies: An introductory anthology of anarchy in the academy* (London: Routledge, 2009), 103–112, 109.
 5. Mark Mattern, "John Dewey, art and public life," *Journal of Politics* 61:1 (February 1999), 54–75; and Mattern, *Anarchism and Art*. See also Nancy Love and Mark Mattern, "Introduction: Art, Culture, Democracy," in Love and Mattern (Eds), *Doing Democracy: Activist Art and Cultural Politics* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2013).
 6. Mattern, *Anarchism and Art*, 8.
 7. I tend to agree with the pragmatist and participatory democrat, John Dewey, who called distinctions between high and low art as 'out of place and stupid'. Dewey, *Art As Experience*, in *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925–1953*, volume 10: 1934, edited by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989 [1934]), 231.
 8. As a very partial defence of this position, I only note that it is doubtful that the musicians creating the dance music that Emma Goldman defended (see below, in text) were anarchists, and doubtful that most of her fellow dancers identified as anarchists. For Goldman, that was beside the point. The point was the expressiveness and joy captured in dancing, and how that affective experience enlivened and enriched her life.
 9. Emma Goldman, *Living My Life*, volume I (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1931) and volume II (Hempstead, NY: Garden City Publishing Company, 1934); volume I, 56. Her defence of dancing has subsequently been rendered succinctly, if somewhat inaccurately, as 'If I can't dance, I don't want to be part of your revolution'.
 10. Timothy Robbins, "Emma Goldman Reading Walt Whitman: Aesthetics, Agitation, and the Anarchist Ideal," *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, 57:1 (Spring 2015), 80–105, 83.
 11. Jill Dolan, *Utopia in Performance: Finding Hope at the Theater* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), 5–6.
 12. Ian McEwan, quoted in Dolan, *Ibid.*, title pages.
 13. Graeber, 'Anarchism, academia', 110–111.
 14. Humboldt, quoted in Noam Chomsky, "Introduction," in Daniel Guérin, *Anarchism: From Theory to Practice* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), vii–xx, xi.
 15. Laurence Davis, "Morris, Wilde, and Le Guin on Art, Work, and Utopia," *Utopian Studies* 20.2 (2009), 213–248, 213.
 16. John P. Clark, "Anarchy and the dialectic of utopia," in Laurence Davis and Ruth Kinna (Eds), *Anarchism and utopianism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 9–29, 18.

17. A short list would include, for example, Leo Tolstoy, Oscar Wilde, most neoimpressionists, most early twentieth-century artists who became Communists, Kazimir Malevich, Pablo Picasso, Camille Pissarro, Georges Seurat, Man Ray, Robert Henri, Wassily Kandinsky, Rockwell Kent, Frans Masereel, and Mark Rothko.
18. See Graeber, 'Anarchism, academia', 109–110 on this point. See also Julian Eagles, "Marxism, Anarchism, and the Situationists' Theory of Revolution," *Critical Sociology* 43:1 (2017), 13–36 for artists' attempts within these movements to merge art and life.
19. To listen to Griffin's song, go to <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VPeIrp-aIOY>.
20. Witz's website URL is http://danwitz.com/index.php?article_id=11. His two hummingbird projects are at http://danwitz.com/index.php?article_id=56 and http://danwitz.com/index.php?article_id=88.
21. Herbert Read, 'To Hell With Culture', in *To Hell With Culture* (London: Routledge, 2002 [1941]), 23.
22. Herbert Read, *Art and Alienation: the Role of the Artist in Society* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967), 26.
23. Catherine M. Nutting, "Art and Organicism: Sensuous Awareness and Subjective Imagination in Herbert Read's Anarchist Aesthetics," *Studies in the Literary Imagination* 45.2 (Fall 2012), 81–94, 91.
24. Leo Tolstoy, *What Is Art?* Trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonosky (London: Penguin Books), 1995, 40.
25. Gurianova, *Aesthetics of Anarchy*, 45.
26. For a discussion of Godwin's fiction, see Jared McGeough, "Unlimited Questioning: The Literary Anarchism of William Godwin," in *Studies in the Literary Imagination* 45.2 (Fall 2012), 1–25.
27. Pierre Proudhon, *Du principe de l'art et de sa destination social* (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1865), 43, 84.
28. Peter Kropotkin, "Appeal to the Young," in *Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets*, Roger N. Baldwin, (Ed), (New York: Dover Press, 1970 [1880]), 273.
29. Goldman, *Social Significance of Modern Drama*, 1–2.
30. *Ibid.*, 3.
31. Patricia Leighton, *The Liberation of Painting: Modernism and Anarchism in Avant-Guerre Paris* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 20.
32. These paintings are reprinted in Leighton, *Ibid.*, 21, 19, and 43, respectively. The book contains many other examples.
33. *Ibid.*, 177.
34. See, for example Clark, 'Anarchy and the dialectic'; and Laurence Davis, "Everyone an artist: art, labour, anarchy, and utopia," in Davis and Kinna, *Anarchism and Utopianism*, 73–98.
35. Peter Marshall, *Preface to Anarchism and utopianism*, in Davis and Kinna, *Ibid.*, xii–xvi, xiv.
36. Quoted in Cindy Milstein, "Reappropriate the Imagination!," in MacPhee and Reuland, (Eds), *Realizing the Impossible*, 296–307, 305.
37. Patricia Leighton, "Reveil Anarchiste: Salon Painting, Political Satire, Modernist Art," in MacPhee and Reuland (Eds), *Realizing the Impossible*, 26–41, p. 27. Leighton singles out Picasso and other Cubists for special consideration. On the role of art in stimulating and expanding imagination, see also MacPhee and Reuland, "Introduction".

38. I have argued these points at length elsewhere. See Mattern, *Acting in Concert: Music, Community, and Political Action* (Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998); Mattern, "John Dewey, art, and public life"; Mattern, *Anarchism and Art*; and Love and Mattern, *Doing Democracy*. On the affective power of art, see for example Jill Gregory, April Lewton, Mark Mattern, Stephanie Schmidt, and Diane Smith, "Body Politics With Feeling: The Power of the Clothesline Project," *New Political Science* 24:3 (September, 2002), 433–448. On the capacity of art for building empathy, see Mattern, "Steve Earle and the Politics of Empathy," in Mark Pedelty and Kristine Weglarz (Eds), *Rock Politics: Rock Musicians Who Changed the World* (London: Ashgate, 2013), 131–148.
39. MacPhee and Reuland (Eds), *Realizing the Impossible*. See Mattern, *Anarchism and Art*, for many examples of direct action in the worlds of DIY punk music, poetry slam, graffiti and street art, and flash mobs.
40. Sociologist Erik Olin Wright called these ruptural, symbiotic, and interstitial strategies respectively. Wright, *Envisioning Real Utopias* (London and New York: Verso, 2010). See also John Holloway's defence of an interstitial strategy in *Crack Capitalism* (London and New York: Pluto Press, 2010).
41. See, for example, Hakim Bey, *T.A.Z.: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism* (Brooklyn, NY: Automeia, 1991); and Richard Day, *Gramsci Is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements* (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 126.
42. See Mattern, *Anarchism and Art*, 7 for a relatively long list of these prefigurative forms, drawn from various academic and activist anarchist sources.
43. For an extended analysis of the prefigurative work of graffiti and street art, see "Graffiti and Street Art," Chap. 5 in Mattern, *Anarchism and Art*, 81–104. Other chapters address case studies on the prefigurative capacity of DIY punk music, poetry slams, and flash mobs.
44. Bookchin's charge was met with a chorus of criticism. See Bookchin, *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 1995). For responses to Bookchin, see for example the debate in *Anarchist Studies* 4:2 (1996) and 6:1 (1998) among L. Susan Brown, Janet Biehl, and Thomas Martin; and Bob Black, *Anarchy after Leftism* (Columbia, MO: C.A.L. Press, 1997). See also Bookchin's "Whither Anarchism: A Reply to Recent Anarchist Critics," in Bookchin, *Anarchism, Marxism, and the Future of the Left: Interviews and Essays, 1993–1998* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 1999). Laura Portwood-Stacer's *Lifestyle Politics and Radical Activism* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013) can be read as a defence against Bookchin's charge.
45. See Mattern, *Anarchism and Art*, 56–57. For an earlier, largely undeveloped discussion of DIT, see Evan Landon Wendel, "New Potentials for 'Independent' Music: Social Networks, Old and New, and the Ongoing Struggles to Reshape the Music Industry," Master Thesis (Comparative Media Studies), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 2008," 57. On DIO, see George McKay, *DIY Culture: Party & Protest in Nineties Britain* (London: Verso, 1998), 27.
46. Hutton, *Neo-Impressionism*, 90. For more on this tension, see, for example, Christine Flores-Cozza, "Life, Labor, Art: A Discussion with Carlos Koyokuikatl Cortez," in MacPhee and Reuland (Eds), *Realizing the Impossible*, 8–19.
47. Mattern, *Anarchism and Art*, 59.
48. On an economy of frugality and sufficiency, see especially Wolfgang Sachs, *Planet Dialectics* (Zed Books, 1999).



Gender and Sexuality

Lucy Nicholas

PERVASIVE AND OPPRESSIVE: GENDER AND SEXUALITY AS COERCIVE ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY

Gender and sexuality are categories that are both socially and institutionally defined and maintained, regulate and are regulated and restrict autonomy. Conceptually, therefore, anarchism's anti-authoritarian and autonomous ethos ought to, and often has, extended to gender hierarchy and domination and sexual normativity, considering how freedom is restricted by these phenomena. Anarchists have made unique contributions to analysis of these phenomena and resistance to them that will be explored in this chapter, both applying anarchist principles to gender and sexuality in wider society and applying feminist and queer perspectives to anarchism. These include critique and analysis of the hierarchical components of gender including the public/private hierarchy; greater emphasis on the 'personal' terrain of politics; focus on how identity can be part of coercion and control; gendered analysis of the state¹; prefiguration of alternative modes of living and relating including freedom from gender hierarchy and sexual freedom; and approaches to organising that do not collapse back into the hierarchies of gender. However, the diversity of perspectives and approaches to anarchism have often shaped how this has been conceptualised, and the extent to which gender and sexuality have been a focus in anarchism.

I write this as a colonial settler living on stolen land never ceded by the custodians, the Wurundjeri people of the Kulin nation, claimed by a nation that continues to refuse sovereignty. I pay my respects to elders past, present and future.

L. Nicholas (✉)
Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn, VIC, Australia
e-mail: Lnicholas@swin.edu.au

This chapter considers how anarchism has been and can be applied to the social categories of both gender and sexuality, which are often conflated or placed side by side. Gender refers to the assigned or (increasingly) chosen category of male, female or increasingly alternative options.² Traditionally, and still predominantly attributed by assigning a congruent sex at birth by identification of genitals, it remains a binary concept, with associated social ‘rules’.³ In the contemporary gender scholarship, there is near consensus that gender is ‘a socially constructed stratification system’⁴ and that it is still a *compulsory* category for making a person intelligible within current cultures.⁵ Within this scholarship, there may be different emphases or foci on the institutional, interactive or individual levels, but most thinkers take as a given that gender plays out across these levels. Anarchist thought was a forerunner in this way of analysing gender, situating it in wider analysis of power and domination.

Sexuality is an identity constructed around ‘sexual or erotic desires, behaviours and relationships’.⁶ Sexuality scholars have likewise long been concerned with analysing how sexuality has been regulated by the law and social norms, because ‘sexuality is constructed into hierarchies and is interconnected with other forms of social divisions including gender, sexual orientation, class and ethnicity’.⁷ Like gender, sexuality is understood as socially constructed but also stratified in terms of more and less sanctioned identities and practices, often based on arbitrary attribution.⁸ (Hetero)sexual norms have long been interrogated in anarchist thought and practice, with a parallel prefigurative element that considers how hierarchical power can be minimised in the sexual and relational domain. This includes interrogation of the coercive and compulsory nature of heterosexuality, the institutional and legal restrictions on sexuality and intimate relationships and the ways that domination can play out within sexual relationships and interactions. On the whole, it is unproblematic and ‘ideologically consistent for anarchists to take up queers’ resistance of the established hierarchical valuation of sexual identities and practices’⁹ and, I would add, genders.

As theorists have long been pointing out, while they are separate and different, as social and political concepts, gender and sexuality often inform each other. Queer theory forerunner Judith Butler is instructive here, positing as she does that each makes the other ‘intelligible’ because ‘gender hierarchy serve[s] a more or less compulsory heterosexuality’,¹⁰ and notably Butler has recently been more explicit about her conceptual alliances with anarchism.¹¹ As Heckert points out, “‘sexual orientation’ exist[s] as a hierarchy of gendered desire, but, as a nexus of gender and sexuality it also serves to support (and at the same time it is supported by) both the gender order and the hierarchical organisation of sexuality’.¹²

This chapter will outline how applications of anarchist ideas to gender and sexuality are informed by broader patterns in anarchist theory and activism. These terrains of authority have been ignored or sidelined, as well as being reified by some anarchist thought and activism, especially in ‘classical’ anarchism which often appealed to essential binary gender characteristics, the nuclear

family and heterosexuality. However, there was a shift to explicit focus on gender politics shortly thereafter and the last century and a half has seen a diversity of perspectives, wherein these stratifications have been understood using a variety of frameworks, from structural, state-oriented perspectives, to institutional, through to a focus on the cultural and interpersonal. This has been informed by divergent ontological assumptions about the nature of sexuality and gender, as well as ethical and political perspectives regarding how best to approach gender and sexuality politics.

These anarchist approaches reflect debates around gender and sexualities more broadly including that of their nature (put simply, the extent to which they are or are not social and thus malleable), that of the terrain of their enforcement (structural, institutional, interpersonal, personal) and strategic ethical and political questions around the corollaries of this (should it be challenged, eradicated, etc.?). These play out in particular ways in anarchist thought and practice on the topic. After considering the presence of gender hierarchy *within* anarchist theory and anarchism, the chapter will address anarchist approaches to gender and sexualities chronologically, touching on these conceptual concerns throughout.

MANARCHISM THEN AND NOW: GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN ANARCHISM

In addition to being a key stratification in wider societies, gender and sexual hierarchies have existed and persisted *within* historical and contemporary anarchism. Gemie emphasises how, in the nineteenth century, ‘the anarchists, so proud of their anti-authoritarianism, of their sceptical analysis of power structures, of their real ability to challenge the dominant political cultures ... were yet so blind to the existence of gender-based tyrannies’.¹³ There was support for decentralisation of state power, but reification of essential, that is naturalised and therefore inevitable, gendered power within the family structure, reifying the public/private divide that so many feminist thinkers have identified as a key mode through which women’s experience has been depoliticised and non-public domination ignored.¹⁴ It is thus possible to say that, despite ostensible anti-authoritarian politics, this often did not extend to women, and gender roles and hierarchy were naturalised: “Anarcho-sexism” was a real and powerful thing; it was a strong influence on many anarchist theorists and organizations, and it stunted much anarchist thought’.¹⁵

Likewise, in the contemporary context, many activists decry the incapacity of many male anarchist activists to reflect on the more interpersonal gendered power dynamics at play in attempts to decentralise decision making and in activism. While gender equality and anti-homophobia may be paid lip service in most anarchist contexts now, some queer anarchists have pointed out that often this does not extend to anarchists who do not consider themselves directly affected by these issues focusing on them as key elements of anarchism, or changing their own practices.¹⁶ Indeed, it has been argued that the more mas-

culinised and traditionally ‘political’ practices in anarchist activism such as conflict with police are valued more highly than the more feminised and prefigurative work of community building and the interpersonal domain: ‘some Black Bloc participants deploy a hollow political and moral discourse to account for what they derive from the use of force: a feeling of elation, a rather macho sensation of power’.¹⁷

Broader feminist scholarship and activist writing has produced a great deal of empirical work demonstrating the prevalence of domination of space by men, as in the systemic gendered phenomenon of ‘mainsplaining’.¹⁸ These same informal gendered dynamics can persist in anarchist activism, reifying on a micro level some of the issues that anarchists critique on a macro scale. Even among anarchists who explicitly embrace an anarchist analysis of gender and sexuality, more informal and implicit hierarchical gender and sexuality practices can persist. Indeed, the term ‘manarchist’ has become commonplace and is defined as follows on *Urban Dictionary*:

Manarchists are macho “anarchists” who talk too much at meetings, adhere to the cult of the great [male] thinkers (drop Kropotkin, Bakunin, Proudhon, Chomsky, etc.... all the time), negate others’ experiences, take up space, [and] exert their privileges.¹⁹

Such behaviours have been identified in anarchist communities even for those who make claim to feminist or queer labels or critiques but do not interrogate these in their own interactions. In a recent study of self-identified North American anarchists, some participants ‘used the term “manarchist” to describe self-identified anarchists who claim to be critical of hegemonic gender relations, but who consistently (if unconsciously) invoke and benefit from their heterosexual male privilege’.²⁰

In addition to providing exciting and radical critiques of the coercive aspects of gender and sexuality, then, as in wider ‘malestream’ discourses, anarchism has also perpetuated the downplaying of gender as a category with material effects, sidelining it as less oppressive because it is cultural.²¹ This thus reifies the public/private divide that has universalised men as default and made women less than subjects, invisibilised women’s existences and the social and informal ways that power plays out, a theme that will be returned to at the end of this chapter.

FEMINISM IN ‘THE [ANGLO] ANARCHIST CENTURY’: CLASSICAL APPROACHES TO GENDER AND SEXUALITY

Early anarchist approaches to feminism were distinctive for their divergence from the reformist politics of social purity campaigners and suffragists and socialist approaches to feminism that sought to integrate women into current structures, including the state. Unsurprisingly, early anarchist feminist focus was on the rejection of state-sanctioned marriage but also on the imagination

and prefiguration of alternative, non-dominative gender and sexual relations such as ideals of free love. These anarchist approaches of prefiguration of non-dominative relations in the personal realm persist in the contemporary context. Conceptually, anarchist feminists of this time were groundbreaking in their analysis of gender as a social construct, and the process of the ‘othering’ of women as less than human in the gender order and the division of the public and private that maintained the hierarchies. Additionally, thinkers such as Lucy Parsons were forerunners of intersectionality in dealing with multiple terrains of subordination. A greater exposition of some of these ‘classical’ anarcha-feminists can be found in Chap. 14.

The key divergence among thinkers in ‘classical’ anarchist thought was around the essentialness or not of gendered roles and of the desirability of challenging them, that is, whether they were properly a part of anarchist analysis. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, for example, was famously socially conservative and romanticised the private sphere of the family as an ideal microcosm of anarchist-socialist relation, leaving the structures, social relations and sexual and social reproduction within this patriarchal sphere completely naturalised.²² Owing to his essentialist conception of men’s greater strength over women, and the ‘natural’ complementarity of men and women’s discrete characteristics, for Proudhon the family is ‘the primordial unit of society and the father is, for him, the natural leader’ and ‘marriage is the lynchpin of the social fabric’.²³

However, for those anarchist thinkers who did engage in anarchist critique of gender and gendered institutions and practices such as sexuality and the family, these early perspectives have not been dated in terms of their analysis of gender norms and hierarchies as unnatural and socially constituted in a context of power. Of the well-known ‘classical’ ‘malestream’ anarchist thinkers, Bakunin was perhaps most progressive in his analysis of patriarchy in the public and private spheres as part of his anarchist thought, followed later by Emma Goldman and Voltairine de Cleyre. All of these thinkers applied anarchist analysis through opposition to the institution of marriage and advocating a sexuality without coercion. Bakunin’s perspective on gender was that women were different but not inferior, describing the ‘patriarchal principle’, in *Statism and Anarchy* (1873), as ‘an odious tyranny, a cowardly submission, and the absolute negation of all individual and family rights’,²⁴ distinguishing himself from socialists of the time by refusing to reduce all oppression to the one axis of class, and refusing to romanticise the working-class private sphere, within which he identified other hierarchies. Other anarchists of the period likewise extended the analysis of hierarchy to gender, with nuanced understandings of gender as a hierarchical social category that is historically and socially constructed but has huge material impact. For example, demonstrating a perspective that would not look out of place in twenty-first-century gender literature, Paris Commune member Louise Michel argued in 1886 that ‘man is master and women are intermediate beings ... it is painful for me to admit that we are a separate caste, made one across the ages’.²⁵ She made an explicitly anarchist argument that women do not seek the positions of governance or titles of men

under the current order, do not wish to take a place at the tables of power but, rather, seek ‘knowledge, education and liberty’.²⁶ Likewise, prefiguring Simone de Beauvoir’s key twentieth-century analysis of woman’s position as ‘other’ to men,²⁷ and later feminist analyses such as those of Luce Irigaray,²⁸ Emma Goldman sought to highlight the extent to which women were othered under the current gender order: ‘We have not yet outgrown the theologic myth that woman has no soul, that she is a mere appendix to man’.²⁹ For Michel, the argument of sex inequality was made to demonstrate that women were as capable as men of being revolutionaries and warriors, using the idea that women’s subordination is taught rather than innate. However, many of these thinkers also hinted that the patriarchal world of men may conversely have something to learn from more feminine values, an argument explicated and extended more by mid-twentieth-century feminism and feminist ethics.

In terms of opposition to marriage, Bakunin called for an end to state-sanctioned marriage but in its place imagined ‘free marriage’ and ‘natural family’.³⁰ He advocated for non-authoritarian relationships and family relations by decrying ‘invasion by one of the liberty of the other’,³¹ demonstrating his extension of the analysis of authority in to interpersonal relationships. For Emma Goldman, the analysis of marriage pertained to the mode through which the institution undermined love but also reified the public/private divide that impacted more heavily on women’s subordination: ‘The marriage insurance condemns [women] to lifelong dependency, to parasitism, to complete uselessness, individual as well as social. Man, too, pays his toll, but as his sphere is wider, marriage does not limit him as much as woman’.³² Voltairine de Cleyre perhaps summarised an anarchist analysis of the gendered nature of marriage, (hetero)sexuality and the family when, in 1895, she described the oppression at their core in:

this ill-got thing you call morality, sealed with the seal of marriage ... in it the consummation of immorality, impurity, and injustice ... [behold] every married woman what she is, a bonded slave, who takes her master’s name, her master’s bread, her master’s commands, and serves her master’s passion; who passes through the ordeal of pregnancy and the throes of travail at his dictation, not at her desire; who can control no property, not even her own body, without his consent, and from whose straining arms the children she bears may be torn at his pleasure, or willed away while they are yet unborn ... Yes, our masters! The earth is a prison, the marriage-bed is a cell, women are the prisoners, and you are the keepers!³³

In their pursuit of greater freedom, in this period, for many thinkers, anarchism also entailed sexual emancipation. Goldman, for example, considered sexuality to be a key aspect of human experience and expression, although this was usually framed in a heterosexual context. Exemplary of this is that, in contrast to the social purity campaigners, ‘as sexual expression, in Goldman’s view, was the core of each human personality, to reject male sexual partnership ...

was to reject “life’s greatest treasure, love for a man”.³⁴ This demonstrates that, while Goldman spoke about prejudice against ‘homosexuality’ as part of her anarchism,³⁵ there was a reluctance to link her anarchy-feminism with same-sex sex for women. Arguably, this was a strategic decision in response to the social purity campaigners’ essentialist demonising of men generally and sex with them more specifically, such that Goldman prioritised a vision of heterosexuality that could be based on something other than only men’s pleasure.³⁶

These applications of anarchist principles such as the deconstruction of the institution of marriage and refiguration of it with an anarchist ideal of positive free love demonstrate an anarchist politics taking place both through opposition to the state and at the interpersonal level of making the personal political.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY (ANGLO) ANARCHA-FEMINISM

[...] as far as I’m concerned, when I say that I’m an anarchist you should know that means women’s liberation is going to be a primary concern. (1977 interview with anarchist ‘Emma’)³⁷

According to Judy Greenway, 1970s anarchy-feminism was active both in challenging male domination within the anarchist movement and in applying anarchist approaches to feminism more broadly.³⁸ In terms of this second focus, during the second wave of feminism (usually considered to be from the 1960s), anarchist approaches to feminism offered an alternative to liberal and reformist feminism, and the women’s liberation movement offered to anarchism a model of politics and organising that was truly decentralised, horizontal and collective anarchist in nature. Carol Ehrlich,³⁹ for example, argued that what she called ‘social anarchism’ or communist anarchism was inherently compatible with radical feminism because, in her view, both are concerned with challenging all hierarchies in both theory and practice. The feminist principle that the ‘personal is political’ was cited by every respondent in Greenway and Alderson’s interviews with anarchy-feminists in the 1970s as shaping their perspective on the anti-authoritarianism of anarchism. In this way, Ehrlich’s list of what she perceives as the common concerns of both radical feminists and social anarchist feminists, spanning all levels of formal and informal institution, is instructive and echoes de Cleyre’s list above:

control over one’s body; alternatives to the nuclear family and heterosexuality; new methods of childcare that will liberate parents and children; economic self-determination; ending sex stereotyping in education, in the media, and in the workplace; the abolition of repressive laws; an end to male authority, ownership, and control over women; providing women with the means to develop skills and positive self-attitudes; an end to oppressive emotional relationships.⁴⁰

This, then, demonstrates an approach critical of top-down and overtly domineering power, and the ideal of fostering positive and enabling ‘power-to’ in

order to maximise autonomy. Many feminist thinkers of this time linked anarchism to feminist ideas that valued ethos and practices that had traditionally been regarded as feminine, rather than seeking the entry of women into traditionally masculine realms. The realms of domination, capitalism and the public sphere can be understood as masculinist, and their alternative feminist.⁴¹ This means that many feminists who were imagining different ways of interacting and organising had much to offer anarchists thinking through the same issues, and vice versa. Indeed 1970s anarcho-feminist ‘Emma’ said at the time, ‘I think it’s very important for men to work more like women’,⁴² demonstrating a key distinction from institutionalised liberal feminism that sought for women to enter the masculinist public sphere. Sci-fi writer and anarchist feminist thinker Ursula le Guin made these links between gender hierarchy and other forms of dominance. For example, discussing a novel in which she imagined a world without sexual difference and thus without gender, she argued in 1976 that without sex/gender:

our central problem would not be the one it is now: the problem of exploitation—exploitation of the woman, of the weak, of the Earth. Our problem is ... a struggle for dominance. Divisions are insisted upon, interdependence is denied. The dualism of value that destroys us, the dualism of superior/inferior, ruler/ruled, owner/owned, user/used, might give way to what seems to me, from here, a much healthier, sounder, more promising modality of integration and integrity.⁴³

This ‘feminine’ value of interdependence (essentially mutual aid) is revalued and rendered central by many anarcho-feminists, to replace the masculine values of atomisation, selfishness and competition. A British feminist activist interviewed in 1977 articulated this, stating, ‘I really believe in a basic anarchism in all women, because of their experiences. Women being more at home, more in small groups ... I think that’s something that excludes hierarchical structure’.⁴⁴ While approaches such as these, and the second wave of feminism in general, have been charged with a crude essentialism that attributes anarchist ethics to women’s ‘nature’, the words of women organising at this time demonstrate rather the prevalence of an understanding that the feminisation of the informal sphere is historical and social.⁴⁵ This reflects the work of feminist ethicists such as Carol Gilligan⁴⁶ who likewise argue that a better way to evaluate moral worth is through relationality rather than individualism. Subsequently, a theory of care ethics or care feminism has developed that continues to influence contemporary anarchism, feminism and queer theory.⁴⁷

Activist accounts from the 1970s demonstrate that for many anarcho-feminists at the time, gay liberation and non-monogamy figured as part of their broader analysis of restrictive and oppressive norms. Making the personal political often meant for them, for example, an enabling ethos of allowing children to consider being gay as an equally valid option and a focus on changing perspectives on ‘homosexuality’.⁴⁸ Likewise, the critique of monogamy common

to ‘classical’ anarchism continued, with a gendered understanding of monogamy as ‘closely related to the way that men oppress women in society, it implies possession’.⁴⁹ As Gayle Rubin, theorist of sex oft cited by anarchists,⁵⁰ outlined in 1984, ‘A radical theory of sex must identify, describe, explain, and denounce erotic injustice and sexual oppression’.⁵¹ Anarchist activists perhaps came closest to noticing the ‘subtle legal codification of more stringent controls over adult sexual behaviour [that] has gone largely unnoticed outside of the gay press’.⁵²

In terms of practice, then, given this focus on analysing dominative power and prefiguring more cooperative ways of relating, both anarchist feminism and radical feminism were concerned with building grassroots institutions according to non-hierarchical ethos and bottom-up approaches to politics rather than reform of existing institutions. Having said this, Ehrlich argues that radical feminists would have benefitted from a knowledge of anarchist theory and practices early on.⁵³ Influential feminist essay *The Tyranny of Structurelessness* offers to anarchism or radical politics more broadly an excellent feminist critique of simplistic and solipsistic approaches to anarchism that neglect the informal and everyday terrains of power that second-wave feminists drew attention to. In this essay, Freeman prefigured analyses of privilege, noting that:

A “laissez faire” group is about as realistic as a “laissez faire” society; the idea becomes a smokescreen for the strong or the lucky to establish unquestioned hegemony over others. This hegemony can be so easily established because the idea of “structurelessness” does not prevent the formation of informal structures, only formal ones ... Thus structurelessness becomes a way of masking power.⁵⁴

This essay offers organisational strategies that are premised in feminist activism but demonstrate an anarchist ethos that was a key part of radical feminism and are strategies that are still useful for all anarchist organisers seeking to avoid the congealment of hierarchy in their own groups and communities. As I will elaborate below, many of these second-wave anarcho-feminist perspectives paved the way for subsequent feminism, subsequent approaches to anarchism that implicitly include analysis of all terrains of power and domination and subsequent late twentieth- and twenty-first-century development of queer theory and queer politics.

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE QUEER, RELATIONAL TURN

While ‘manarchism’ (which is inherently heteropatriarchal) occasionally still rears its head, especially in US-style libertarian perspectives, in the twenty-first century, an analysis of the oppressive elements of gender relations, sexual relations and sexual identity is almost a default in most social anarchism, even if only by lip service. There is near consensus that gender needs to be attended to, compulsory heterosexuality is clearly tyrannical, and non-monogamy has almost congealed into a new anarchist norm. As an illustration of this perva-

siveness, there was a time in the early 2000s when it seemed every anarchist share house in the Global North had ‘the Crimethinc. Gender poster’.⁵⁵ Using Nancy R. Smith’s poem about the restrictions of gender norms, and a cartoon of a person split in two with a feminine and masculine side, this widely distributed poster zine from the USA anarchist collective encapsulated an anarchist perspective on gender norms as restricting autonomy for women, trans folk and men and a vision of a freedom from this gender tyranny. DIY anarcho-punk communities in the early 2000s have been identified as holding ‘a politics that seeks to deconstruct gender as a site of authority and reconstruct it on autonomous non-hierarchical terms’,⁵⁶ a vehemently anti-essentialist position that sees human nature as potentiality not determining. This was clear in practices such as men’s gender discussion groups and women- and queer-centred practices. Indeed, Grubacic and Graeber emphasise how, in the twenty-first century, anarchists are:

constantly expanding the focus of anti-authoritarianism, moving away from class reductionism by trying to grasp the “totality of domination”, that is, to highlight not only the state but also gender relations, and not only the economy but also cultural relations and ecology, sexuality, and freedom in every form it can be sought.⁵⁷

This shift or expansion in focus in anarchist communities is paralleled by a turn to poststructuralist analyses of power in anarchist scholarship at the same time. Early twenty-first-century anarchists tended to approach anarchism relationally, as an ethics that minimises interpersonal power hierarchies. Poststructuralism ‘offers a full account of the way that subjectivity and intersubjectivity is a site of power and dominance by narrating the way that they are produced according to dominant hierarchical ethics and assumptions’.⁵⁸ This means that often contemporary anarchism entails relational critiques of gender, sexuality and relationships, from a poststructuralist-influenced understanding of power as playing out in interpersonal relationships, perpetuated by individuals within wider discourses. There has certainly been an explicit shift to relationality and considering ‘new ways of relating to one another’.⁵⁹ This perspective is clear in the subtitle of a germinal twenty-first-century queer anarchist book collection entitled *Anarchism and Sexuality: Ethics, Relationships and Power*. This collection is surely influenced by earlier ‘waves’ of feminism and owes much to the notion that the personal is political, and the introduction and endorsement is from Judy Greenway who was a key thinker in the 1970s anarcho-feminism and considers this queer approach an extension of this project. The collection is explicit in its expansive definition of the political and sees itself as part of a project of ‘putting anarchistic ethics in to practice’.⁶⁰ In scholarship, the oeuvre of Jamie Heckert, in particular, has been instrumental in developing a perspective of anarchism as an ‘ethics of relationships’, taking a poststructuralist perspective that allows for interrogation of all of the ways that domination plays out.

This means that poststructuralist-influenced queer theory has found a fairly uncontested and harmonious relationship with anarchism. Both approaches can be understood as ethical frameworks rather than ideologies with blueprints for ideal societies and relations. Through these ethos, both queer theory and poststructuralist anarchism are critical of the binary modes through which the social and relational worlds are interpreted in dominant discourses, and how these lead to hierarchy and othering across multiple terrains. This makes the extension of this critique to other axes of difference useful. Contemporaneously, this focus on deconstructing hierarchy and othering means there is fruitful analysis and activism at the intersections of gender, sexuality, 'race', ethnicity, religion, anti-fascism, ability and so on. For example, current Texas, US-based group *Black Women's Defense League* describe themselves as 'fighting that battle on every single front',⁶¹ uniting anarchist, feminist, anti-racist and queer ethos in their opposition to oppression. From the premise that 'the state is the problem but its helped create interpersonal problems', they focus on all levels of activism, in particular fostering critical reflection in individuals on how gender restricts people, encouraging black and brown men to reflect on gender privilege and linking all of this to white privilege. This means 'understanding white supremacy and its patriarchal, paternalistic role'.⁶² Likewise, contemporary opposition to the rise of the fundamentally white and male supremacist alt-right⁶³ means that groups of 'women and non-men'⁶⁴ are uniting with and working across Black Lives Matter, Antifa and anarchist groups to oppose the alt-right in recognition of the intersectionality of 'race', gender and sexuality.⁶⁵ Likewise, those challenging ableism find affinities with queer anarchism, and crip politics, or 'cripping' has a similar impulse to 'queering', that is, interrogating the norm from the perspective of the 'other' in order to imagine what a more enabling world would look like. Indeed, 'ableism and heteronormativity are both oppressive ideologies and cultural constructs that hinder the full potential of realising the scope of human sexuality and modes of being in the world'.⁶⁶ In this way, all of these perspectives and approaches to activism have in common a deconstruction of the normal and a reconstructive vision of a more inclusive mode of ordering society and relating to one another.

Perhaps the one uniting feature of queer theory is its critique of 'heteronormativity', defined as the way that 'society implicitly assumes heterosexuality to be a stable, essential "thing," and to be the norm and, more than this, implicitly maintains and promotes it through both formal social institutions and more informal social norms and culture'.⁶⁷ The concept of heteronormativity is particularly useful because it draws out the connections between the normativity in gender, sexual identity and sexual practices. Queer, then, is a verb not a noun⁶⁸ in that it is concerned with a 'queering' or making the normal strange and is a perspective that is beyond the positive advocacy of pre-determined minority identities. Instead, this interrogation of normal and non-normal, this 'queering', comes from an ethos of self-determination, marking an important shift from feminist or gay identity politics to a queer ethic of gender and sexuality that advocates for self-determination of identity, presentation, behaviour

and sexual acts. This is a process of politicising the norm not the exceptions because ‘Maintaining the illusion of heterosexuality as apolitical ... inhibits the questioning of normative heterosexual practice and traditional masculinity and femininity’.⁶⁹ Queer analysis of sexuality is influenced by Michel Foucault’s historicising of sexuality, his demonstration of how differently what we now call ‘sexuality’ has been understood historically and cross-culturally, and how the concept of it as a core part of identity was first coined in the nineteenth century, and has served a disciplinary function.⁷⁰ Queer theory is interested in how certain sexual acts are sanctioned or not, and what power interests this serves. Heckert summarises this perspective that is respectfully critical of gay liberation approaches:

Politicising coming out seems to me to have effects other than those intended by its proponents. Making the (queer) personal political may inhibit discussion of the underlying issues (e.g., gender and sexuality) as well as maintaining the division between LGBT (problematic/political) and straight (unproblematic/apolitical). Of course, politicising homosexuality is not the source of the problem; rather, to do so is to be uncritical of the roots of the problem. This is the social division called ‘sexual orientation’, within which normative heterosexuality is dominant.⁷¹

Given this inclusion of challenging heteronormativity in anarchism, Portwood-Stacer⁷² has illustrated that in the Global North twenty-first-century anarchist community, it is almost pervasive that the ‘repressive conformity of heteronormativity’ be challenged, or at least be seen to be challenged. For example, it is common in anarchist communities to practice polyamory, and a swathe of political publications were produced and circulated among anarchists in the early twenty-first century to elucidate ethical anarchist approaches to non-monogamy.⁷³ For Portwood-Stacer’s North American anarchist participants, non-monogamy was part of expanding the ‘non-state’ approach to anarchism to ‘all forms of hierarchy’.⁷⁴ This is reflected in the literature, where privileging one romantic or sexual relationship is seen to subordinate other relationships in a hierarchy.⁷⁵ Ironically, however, this commitment to challenging the coerciveness of monogamy has often congealed into a new norm of polyamory in both anarchist and queer anarchist communities which can ‘privilege certain practices’ leading to ‘anarchonormativity’.⁷⁶ As with relationship norms, however, from an anarchist and queer perspective, it is important to be critical of the possibility of new norms forming, a critique that has been levelled at LGBT politics that rely on fixed identities and assimilation to the mainstream.

In terms of non-heterosexual sexualities, and non-normative genders, ‘this antagonistic relationship with the normal has ... led to an anti-assimilationist ethic that often sets queer politics apart from mainstream “G(lbt)” politics’,⁷⁷ and queer politics tends to be critical of the state. Exemplary of this is Lisa Duggan’s theory of ‘homonormativity’ and her critique of gendered, monogamous heterosexual models of family and sexuality that can be idealised in LGBT politics. In contrast to this, Duggan presents a prefigurative vision of alternative

modes of kinship and being sexual that are less sanctioned by the state and that many queer people already live, demonstrating a clear parallel with anarchist approaches.⁷⁸ Indeed, Judith Butler, whose critique of identity politics in *Gender Trouble* was so influential for subsequent queer theorists, has explicated that, for her, ‘queer anarchism poses an important alternative to the rising movement of gay libertarianism’.⁷⁹ For Butler, anarchism represents an important alternative because it does not isolate one axis of domination and othering from another, noting that ‘gay libertarians defend the state, are even recruited by them, and help to sustain violence against other minorities’.⁸⁰ As outlined above, an anarchist analysis ideally does not allow for this. Indeed, Heckert argues that ‘anarchism should move beyond the social division of “sexual orientation” upon which LGBT politics depends’.⁸¹

It is important to emphasise, then, that as with Duggan’s alternative ethics of kinship, for anarchism, this queer deconstructive or critical approach is also always oriented towards greater freedom, or self-expression, whatever language is used to articulate this. As a 2012 collection of queer anarchist essays explains:

...understanding sexuality and gender in terms of rigid, easily identifiable, and heavily policed identities effectively invisibilizes and robs people who do not fit neatly into our available identity categories of a viable social existence—not just for sexuality, but also (and of course, relatedly) for gender and sex.⁸²

In addition to a critique of gender hierarchy and normative sexuality, both anarchist and queer theories allow for exciting and radical frameworks with which to challenge compulsory binary gender normativity and compulsory binary sex. Gender anarchy is perhaps the most ‘queer’ and terrifying prospect for mainstream society, just becoming comfortable with LGBT tolerance, for whom the dissolution of binary gender seems to be one step too far.⁸³ This poststructuralist perspective can in theory, then, mean feminist arguments only for altering the hierarchical *contents* of gender, or for a more queer transfeminism, that can propose either rejecting the binaries all together or eradicating gender as an intelligible social category towards the freedom of a plurality of identities and expressions. This is apparent in my arguments for a poststructuralist anarchist-influenced ‘queer post-gender ethics’ of self-determination.⁸⁴

Like previous anarchists, contemporary anarchoqueers are dedicated to congruence between means and ends which entails refiguration of freer relations and communities. A potential criticism here is one of ‘life-stylism’ as strongly warned against by Bookchin⁸⁵ that I will address briefly below. However, in my view, anarchist approaches to gender and sexuality have always necessarily been cognisant of the co-constitutive relationship of the individual and the structural, with a nuanced usage of the idea of the personal being political. Some critics of queer theory have suggested that it entails an unproductive politics of negativity, but many contemporary anarchist thinkers consider this to be a productive way to enact a politics and ethics that is non-essentialist, not based on assumptions of fixed foundations and also open-ended, thus preventing the congealment of new tyrannical norms.⁸⁶ Grassi calls this ‘anti-utopian utopianism’ and

Nicholas, influenced by the utopian ‘logic of futurity’⁸⁷ of queer theorists such as Munoz, demonstrates the positive ethic of both queer and anarchism by proposing the key to be ‘critical modes of thought and non- closure, and proliferation’.⁸⁸ Giffney demonstrates the anarchist ethos at queer theory’s core, when she states that:

We as queer theorists must continue to chip away at, what Michel Foucault refers to as, the ‘net- like organization’ of the norm, and expose all norms for the way they define, solidify and defend their shaky self- identities by excluding those (dis- sident others) who fail or refuse to conform.⁸⁹

This does not mean an ‘anything goes’ chaos. As the authors of *Queering Anarchism* emphasise, as well as the critical element of anarchist thought, the necessary ‘negative’ project of ‘struggle against the state and capitalism ... white supremacy, heteropatriarchy and all forms of oppression and exploitation’,⁹⁰ there is the reconstructive side.⁹¹ Heckert describes these positive values as ‘respect, empathy, informed consent and shared pleasure [...] to sustain non- hierarchical relationships, organisations and societies’.⁹² This queer anarchist politics, or anarchic queer politics often, then, entails prefigurative approaches to addressing this in practice. Activist groups or communities have grown around an anarchist focus on deconstructing gender and sexuality norms from a queer perspective, and a concomitant ethic of mutual respect and self- determination in terms of gender and sexuality. Examples of this include *Queeruption* and *Queer Mutiny* collectives, camps and festivals and queer barrios at major protests. Evidence of this surge can be seen through the Queer Zine Archive⁹³ with its characteristic pink and black colour scheme. These cultures represent experiments in putting anarchist principles and ethics into practice, especially in terms of gender, sexuality and relationships. These communities allow for spaces of self- determination, where a pronoun is asked, and issues of consent and power in relationships are explicated and debated. The positive ethics that such deconstructions of gender and sexual identity are premised on and aim for are illustrated through queer sex parties with collectively developed codes of conduct, restorative justice approaches to sexual violence in anarchist communities and ethical approaches to polyamory or conscious monogamy. These are to be understood as collective enactments of values and freedom, however, as opposed to the imagined liberal and libertarian endpoints of ‘individual freedom’. This is elucidated by Butler, who asserts that an anarchist political agency ‘is an operation of freedom and agency which is not the same as that which is stipulated as the personal liberty of the individual under liberal democratic regimes’.⁹⁴

ADDRESSING CRITIQUES OF A FOCUS ON GENDER/SEXUALITY AND CLOSING REMARKS

The minor exception to the near consensus that gender and sexual norms are tyrannical aspects of life that require interrogation by anarchists is perhaps the opposition from some commentators who equate any attention to these axes of

power as ‘identity politics’, extending the arguments from more structurally focused anarchist theorists (e.g. Bookchin⁹⁵). These commentators decry the ‘individualism’ they conceptualise at the root of identity focus and extend this to gender or LGBT politics, as well as decrying the lack of focus on class. However, to equate poststructuralist or queer approaches with ‘identity politics’ is, I would argue, to miss the point.

For example, Dragonowl’s critique of ‘identity politicians’ charges that this approach which draws attention to gender and sexual norms ‘actually reinforces binary thinking and relations of domination’.⁹⁶ This is similar to critiques of the notion of privilege for overly individualising power and for ‘tinkering with the social order rather than recognising that it is the current social order itself that maintains the inequalities’.⁹⁷ However, in my reading these critiques are purposefully and wilfully reductive of the strategic nature of identity politics, and the extent to which, as Butler would say, we are actually unintelligible without identity and, if we do not address identities, they are attributed to us regardless with real material implications. These critiques can evoke a defensiveness at being construed as a member of an ‘oppressor’ or privileged group, and often propose ‘post-identity’ standpoints that, given the current social order, would merely replicate liberal attempts at gender or ‘race’ blindness that in fact just re-naturalise the hierarchy. As most feminist, queer and ‘race’ scholars would argue, this naive call for a ‘standpoint outside the field of available identities’⁹⁸ is mythological and reductively liberal in its understanding of agency and collectivity. Moreover it may be dangerous, by downplaying the material effects of these imposed identities and failing to draw attention to them in haste to get to a point of deconstructing them. Indeed, queer theorists have already addressed this contradiction that subject positions of identity both enable and restrict us but are still compulsory. Ultimately this attempt to transcend identity can, in a male and white supremacist and heteronormative world, only lead to a re-invisibilising of these axes of subordination. They charge ‘IPs’ with essentialism but in turn may well be charged with the kinds of ideas of free-floating individual agency that leads to appropriative ideas such as trans-racialism. There can be solidarity, affinity and a longing to transcend coercive social categories without a flippant libertarianism.

The solution to this tautology or ‘false antithesis’ seems obvious: ‘whereas anarchists and anarchist theory need to look at struggle on the conceptual level that queer theory provides, queer theory needs to be coupled with anarchism’s critique of structural domination, such as the state and capitalism’.⁹⁹

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Post-Industrial and Digital Society

Sky Croeser

The Internet has had massive and complex social, political, and economic effects, and there is, unsurprisingly, no single anarchist position on how to understand these effects, or on finding potential for resistance in the interstices of existing power structures. Claims that we live in a post-industrial economy, a digital society, or an information society must come with caveats. We are living in a world which is being profoundly changed by a range of information technologies, including microprocessors, the Internet, mobile phones, and complex software. These technologies are imbricated with shifts in the global form of capitalism; Manuel Castells argues that the information technology revolution was instrumental in the reshaping of capitalism from the 1980s onwards, and at the same time these technological changes were shaped ‘by the logic and interests of advanced capitalism, without being reducible to the expression of such interests’.¹ Castells argues that the revolution in networking technologies:

originated and diffused, not by accident, in an historical period of the global restructuring of capitalism [...] the new society emerging from this process of change is both capitalist and informational, while presenting considerable historical variation in different countries.²

In addition to the profound and varied social changes that have accompanied these shifts, there are also a range of changes to the production, distribution, and consumption of material goods. While we are clearly not ‘post-industrial’ in the sense of the industrial production of material goods having ended, even this

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S. Croeser (✉)

MCASI, Discipline of Internet Studies, Curtin University, Perth, WA, Australia
e-mail: S.Croeser@curtin.edu.au

production has itself been radically changed by networking technologies, which facilitate just-in-time production and increased surveillance of workers.

Overlapping with Castells' expansive discussions of the information society, some analysis has referred more specifically to the emergence of a digital economy.³ Tiziana Terranova notes that this 'seems to describe a formation that intersects on the one hand with the postmodern cultural economy (the media, the university, and the arts) and on the other hand with the information industry (the information and communication complex)'.⁴ Terranova argues that the digital economy is:

an important area of experimentation with value and free cultural/affective labor. It is about specific forms of production (web design, multimedia production, digital services, and so on), but it is also about forms of labor that we do not immediately recognize as such: chat, real-life stories, mailing lists, amateur newsletters, and so on.⁵

Overlapping concepts such as the information society, digital economy, and digital society cover a broad swathe of changes which are of interest to anarchist scholars (among others).

There is a substantial body of work on the use of the Internet in activism, including for anarchist and autonomist movements.⁶ Rather than rehashing this work, this chapter explores some of the changes associated with networking technologies particularly as they relate to changes in work, consumption, and alternative economic models. As many anarchist thinkers have argued, including many of the contributors to this volume, work is an important space for anarchist contention: the hierarchy of work under a capitalist system fundamentally undermines our autonomy, capitalism limits the potential for meaningful participation in the decisions that shape our lives, and therefore any anarchist political vision must reconceptualise both production and the social allocation of resources.

In looking at these developments, I take a broad perspective on what constitutes an anarchist approach. Maia Ramnath draws a distinction between what she calls the Circle-A brand of anarchism, and anarchism as a concept, arguing that 'we could locate the Western anarchist tradition as one contextually specific manifestation among a larger—indeed global—tradition of antiauthoritarian, egalitarian thought/praxis, of a universal human urge (if I dare say such a thing) toward emancipation, which also occurs in many other forms in many other contexts'.⁷ She argues that,

With a small a, the word anarchism implies a set of assumptions and principles, a recurrent tendency or orientation—with the stress on movement in a direction, not a perfection condition—toward more dispersed and less concentrated power; less top-down hierarchy and more self-determination through bottom-up participation; liberty and equality seen as directly rather than inversely proportional; the nurturance of individuality and diversity within a matrix of interconnectivity,

mutuality, and accountability; and an expansive recognition of the various forms that power relations can take, and correspondingly, when it becomes conscious, motivates people to oppose or subvert the structures that generate and sustain inequity, unfreedom, and injustice, and to promote or prefigure the structures that generate and sustain equity, freedom, and justice.⁸

Similarly, James C. Scott argues that ‘anarchist principles are active in the aspirations and political action of people who have never heard of anarchism or anarchist philosophy’.⁹

Much of this collection explores the Circle-A brand of anarchism: a specific theoretical and historical tradition with its roots in largely (but not exclusively) Western movements, its own canon, and its own loosely bounded academic sub-discipline. This chapter takes a different approach because rather than being deeply embedded in anarchist studies as a field, I am an anarchist who has found her way to a particular privileged niche of academia. I am using this niche to explore the tendencies that Ramnath describes above: imperfect movements towards dispersal of power, towards notions of liberty that see it as part of a web of community, and towards attempts to resist and subvert injustice and inequality. My goal in this chapter is not to claim that an anarchist perspective must understand post-industrial and digital society in a certain way, or to interpret networking technologies with reference to the anarchist canon, but rather to explore the current possibilities for movement towards the values that underlie anarchism (whether or not they are explicitly identified as such). For this reason, I consider the contributions of anarchist thinkers to include not only those who are published in peer-reviewed journals or news sources, or those recognised as leaders within social movements, but also a multitude of people whose voices find limited audiences, and who are acting within their own webs of community to create networks of mutual aid and visions of alternative political and economic systems.

As Uri Gordon notes, much of the anarchist analysis of technology falls into two broad categories: a ‘Promethean’ view of technology as inherently progressive and liberating, but currently twisted by capitalism into harmful and degrading forms, and a primitivist approach which tends to valorise hunter-gatherer and horticulturalist societies.¹⁰ Gordon draws on Langdon Winner’s work in proposing a more nuanced approach which acknowledges the tendency of certain technologies to facilitate particular uses, as well as recognising the ways in which existing power structures shape the development and success of some technologies over others. Gordon calls for ‘a disillusioned approach to the Internet—employing it as a tool for subversion while remaining aware of its being a temporary anomaly’.¹¹ Most work in Internet studies, my current nominal discipline which I draw on extensively for this chapter, arguably takes this nuanced approach as a starting point (though most Internet studies scholars would argue that the Internet is far from a temporary anomaly), and explores how the Internet is shaped by, and shapes, economic, social, and political power across a variety of areas.

HOPES AND DREAMS FOR THE INTERNET AS A TOOL FOR CHANGE

In the early days of the Internet, there were significant hopes that it would support radical political, economic, and social change. In part, this was linked to the expectation that the decentralised system of the Internet would encourage dispersal of other forms of power. John Duda, for example, suggests that global electronic networks were seen as the basis for new forms of collective intelligence, and the potential for technologically supported models of self-organised societies, as well as allowing networked, democratic production models.¹² Duda argues that several anarchist thinkers, including Colin Ward, were strongly influenced by perspectives that saw cybernetic networks as facilitating decentralised, non-hierarchical organisational forms on a new scale. Other commentators, particularly those involved in early Internet communities, argued that these decentralised, non-hierarchical spaces were already starting to emerge.

Many of these hopes rested on the idea that the decentralised network created a virtual realm that was beyond the power of the state. John Perry Barlow's 'Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace', perhaps the most widely cited and hyperbolic example of this, claims that 'Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel [...] You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather'.¹³ Subsequent developments, including substantial online censorship and surveillance, mean that few people continue to see the Internet as entirely immune to the coercive power of the state. Even Barlow has since conceded that governments can and do exercise power over the Internet and those who use it, although he maintains that 'there is a kind of inexorable direction of the Internet's political influence toward individual liberty'.¹⁴

Perhaps less fully explored than the claims to political autonomy embedded in 'The Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace' were vaguely articulated sketches of different economic forms. The declaration claims that governments did not 'create the wealth of our marketplaces' and that '[w]e are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice accorded by [...] economic power'.¹⁵ Of a similar era, 'The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto' also refers to the economic potential of a space free from government regulation:

Just as the technology of printing altered [and reduced] the power of medieval guilds and the social power structure, so too will cryptologic methods fundamentally alter the nature of corporations and of government interference in economic transactions. Combined with emerging information markets, crypto anarchy will create a liquid market for any and all material which can be put into words and pictures.¹⁶

These libertarian visions of a market free from taxation and state regulation, but in which monetary exchange still plays a significant role, fail to fully acknowledge or grapple with the relationship between the coercive power of the state, private property, and economic inequality.¹⁷

Other hopes for the Internet's potential to radically change economic relations have explored gift economies or other similar forms. In a 1998 special edition of 'journal on the Internet', *First Monday*, several contributions explored non-monetary economies online. Rishab Aier Ghosh argued that 'There is no question that there are differences between the economic logic—the application of basic economic principles—on and off the Net' and that 'there must be a definite possibility of the on-line economic logic spreading beyond the confines of the Net'.¹⁸ Ghosh went on to describe the economy of the Internet as a 'cooking pot market', in which the digital cooking pot is 'a vast cloning machine, dishing out not single morsels but clones of the entire pot', and which people are happy to contribute what they can 'as a more-than-fair payment for other goods—"ideas"—that they receive from the cooking-pot'. Richard Barbrook wrote about the emergence of a 'hi-tech gift economy', 'a really existing form of anarcho-communism is being constructed within the Net' both in conflict and in symbiosis with money/commodity relations.¹⁹ Similarly, Kylie J. Veale argued that voluntary payment schemes are a form of tangible reciprocity that support the continued existence of the online gift economy.²⁰ Optimism about the Internet's ability to facilitate non-capitalist economic forms continue: Dave Elder-Vass, for example, argues that the digital economy can facilitate economic forms that 'at their purest [...] deliver economic benefits as gifts and depend on cooperation without authority'.²¹ These contributions see the Internet as a space where non-capitalist economic relations might be revived and reinvented, and where people might have everyday experiences that can bolster non-capitalist economic relations offline.

As a corollary to this, there was tremendous optimism in some circles about the potential for the Internet to change working life. Clay Shirky argued that the Internet and other new networking tools, by lowering the costs of collaboration, opened the possibilities for 'organising without organisations', including reducing (or removing) the need for management, flattening hierarchies, and facilitating the amateurisation of production (particularly cultural production).²² Another related line of argument was that production and consumption were being blurred, with the 'prosumer' playing an increasingly large role in the online economy. Ritzer and Jurgenson argued that this could create a new form of capitalism based on abundance rather than scarcity.²³ While not anarchist in their approaches, these predictions about the Internet's ability to change our working lives demonstrate at least the hope of work that is more meaningful and self-directed, and working environments that are less hierarchical. As John Duda notes, there have also been more explicitly anarchist claims that new technologies will allow the development of:

self-organised networks of producers communicating directly over the new communicative networks ... to do what they do now, better and more efficiently, free of the interference of the irrational establishment that holds back these forces of networked, democratic production.²⁴

Unsurprisingly, it seems that many of these hopes for the potential of the Internet to radically change our working lives for the better have failed to come to fruition.

THE INTERNET, WORK, AND CAPITALISM

There is a wide range of literature exploring the negative impacts of post-industrial society on the economy and the structure of work. Tiziana Terranova cautions against seeing these impacts as the result of capitalism's incorporation of, or commodification of, a previously authentic space outside of capitalism, arguing that '[e]specially since 1994, the Internet has been always and simultaneously a gift economy *and* an advanced capitalist economy'.²⁵ Terranova argues that 'the digital economy is the fastest and most visible zone of production within late capitalist societies'.²⁶ While acknowledging the radical potential of the Internet, critical Marxist theorists have been particularly useful in analysing its embeddedness in capitalist relations of production, which means that networking technology exists within the wider context of a contested terrain between powerful corporate interests (aided by the state) and system-critical forces.²⁷ Fuchs argues that we must continue to remain aware of the role of class in analysis of the Internet's effects, although it has become more variegated and now includes

unpaid interns, online freelancers, unremunerated users of Facebook and Google who create economic value, different forms of knowledge workers, a new young precariat who is attracted to work in the culture industry, Foxconn workers in China who assemble mobile phones and laptops, miners in Africa who extract minerals that form the physical foundation of digital media technologies and who work under slave-like conditions, software engineers who are highly paid and work very long overtime hours and so on.²⁸

The Internet, developing in tandem with capitalism, has had wide-reaching and often negative effects on the environment, and has facilitated workers' (including relatively privileged workers') exploitation under capitalism.

Fuchs argues that critical analysts 'have to see capitalism's manifold dimensions that mutually encroach each other' and incorporate the relationships between information technology and financialisation in their analyses.²⁹ Fuchs argues that Marxist dialectics 'allows us to understand the contradictions of the media in capitalism' and proceeds to identify several such contradictions regarding Internet usage, including contradictions between: users who prefer to access free content online and corporate interests that try to profit from online content by imposing intellectual property rights; users and content creators who depend on their income from this content to make a living; and contending corporate class factions represented by 'the content industry' which profits from commodifying content and 'the openness industry' represented by corporations such as YouTube and Facebook that generate their profit from targeted advertising.³⁰

Fuchs concludes that '[t]he contradiction between the openness industry and the content industry shows that the online economy is dialectical: It is full of contradictions'.³¹ In his overview of critical theories of 'the intellectual commons', Broumas summarises arguments around the overriding contradiction that 'informational capitalism' represents: it 'has created the preconditions, on the one hand, for the penetration by the capitalist mode of production of facets of social activity previously untouched by capital'.³² Anarchists may come to different conclusions about the potentials for and methods of resistance, but critical Marxism does provide a useful perspective on the impacts of, and connections between, capitalism and networking technologies.

ANARCHIST POTENTIALS

Despite the undeniably bleak landscape that we overlook here, viewing the world through an anarchist lens, we might search for the radical potential and practices enabled by networking technologies. Yochai Benkler's work on 'practical anarchies' offers one such approach.³³ Benkler argues that while practical anarchies facilitated by the Internet are necessarily partial and imperfect, they can be useful in several ways:

First, they offer their participants a chunk of life lived in effective, voluntary cooperation with others. Second, they can provide for everyone a degree of freedom in a system otherwise occupied by state- and property-based capabilities [...]. Third, they provide a context for the development of virtue; or the development of a cooperative human practice, for ourselves and with each other. And fourth, they provide a new way of imagining who we are, and who we can be [...].³⁴

From this perspective, we might look at specific ways in which the Internet is facilitating experiences of non-hierarchical (or less hierarchical) production and non-capitalist exchange.

Before doing so, it is useful to briefly sketch the politics that underlie many of the projects which Benkler discusses. The Internet hosts an incredibly diverse range of communities and applications, and there is no single 'politics of the Internet'. Nevertheless, many of the platforms, organisations, and institutions which have shaped the development of the Internet have their root in a shared culture. The Internet is not, after all, placeless but rather has been heavily influenced by its development within a particular time and place: Barbrook and Cameron call this 'the Californian Ideology', which they see as based on the US West Coast and 'promiscuously combines the freewheeling spirit of the hippies and the entrepreneurial zeal of the yuppies'.³⁵ Tim Jordan argues that this 'cyberculture' has been strongly influenced by both libertarianism (in the US sense of the term, which argues for limited state power but an ongoing role for the free market) and anarchism.³⁶ Key arbiters of Internet culture (such as the long-running and influential publication *Wired*) have been shaped by libertarian principles³⁷; many of the activists involved in shaping networking

technologies are libertarian³⁸; and those involved in developing large corporate platforms like Facebook have frequently valued the libertarian promise of the First Amendment³⁹ while failing to recognise the ways in which structural inequalities undermine this ‘freedom’.

Bearing this in mind, we can look briefly at some of the practical anarchies that Benkler discusses, some of which are frequently noted for their anarchist (or at least anti-hierarchical and anti-capitalist) potential. Free and open source software (FOSS)—software which allows anyone to view and change the source code—is, perhaps, the ‘practical anarchy’ which has received the most discussion. Perceptions of where FOSS fits on the political spectrum vary. Advocates of FOSS differ not only in their own political persuasions but also in whether they see FOSS as having a political, rather than a purely technical, component.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, many participants and commentators join Benkler in the perception of FOSS as an anarchist project. Eben Moglen has referred to FOSS as ‘anarchism triumphant’, claiming that its success has demonstrated that ‘in the network society, anarchism (or more properly, anti-possessive individualism) is a viable political philosophy’.⁴¹ From a more theoretical perspective, Michael Truscello argues that even Eric Raymond’s avowedly apolitical approach to open source software possesses ‘a subversive political philosophy’ which he labels ‘tactical poststructuralist anarchism’.⁴² FOSS creates a space for practical anarchy in multiple respects. It provides collaborators with experiences of non-hierarchical (or less hierarchical) production, makes resources (software) freely available, and, in doing so, potentially stimulates our belief in production without the need for capital or management, and of the possibility of providing for our needs outside of the capitalist economy.

The other examples which Benkler explores—Internet governance, Wikipedia, and Wikileaks—are arguably even more imperfect and partial as practical anarchies than FOSS, particularly when it comes to the possibilities for new ways of collaborating and structuring organisations. The overlapping mechanisms of Internet governance include elements of self-organisation and organisation beyond the state, but even overtly consensus-based decision-making processes are often held at inaccessible locations, are beholden to state or corporate interests,⁴³ or operate through ‘hidden levers’.⁴⁴ Wikipedia not only relies on Jimmy Wales playing the role of ‘benevolent monarch’⁴⁵ but has also been criticised for the ways in which its structures tend to discourage contributions by, and about, women and other marginalised groups.⁴⁶ Wikileaks may have played an important role in leaking information about US war crimes, but it has also been criticised for the hierarchical internal structure of the organisation.⁴⁷ Arguably, these suffer from the disregard for attention to structural oppression which characterises the libertarianism underlying US tech culture.

This inattention to structural inequalities will arguably also limit the radical potential of projects which aim to use the Internet to evade state and corporate control of markets. Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum are often lauded for their potential to free users from state control, and even to offer the possibility of new forms of decentralised, non-hierarchical organisation. These

currencies, as the name suggests, use cryptography and distributed computing (blockchain technology) in order to facilitate secure transactions. There are also projects which aim to use blockchains to create more open and transparent organisational forms. Colony, for example, claims it is ‘infrastructure for the future of work’, allowing workers to self-organise, choose their own projects, earn fair rewards, and make transparent, non-hierarchical decisions.⁴⁸ Huckle and White, while acknowledging that cryptocurrencies are seen as a libertarian technology, argue that they should also be considered useful for Marxists and anarchists.⁴⁹ Blockchain technology might allow for more distributed forms of governance and for fairer distributions of resources (they also consider more centralised uses of the technology to plan resource distribution along Marxist lines).⁵⁰ However, as even Huckle and White acknowledge, blockchain technology uses tremendous resources, particularly once it becomes popular: one recent estimate is that ‘at a minimum, worldwide Bitcoin mining could power the daily needs of 821,940 average American homes’.⁵¹ This is a significant barrier to seeing this technology as in keeping with a viable anarchist alternative.

The dark web, ‘an amorphous collection of Internet sites that run on dark-nets, or overlay networks that employ non-standard communication protocols in order to encrypt and anonymize information’,⁵² and particularly the Silk Road marketplace, provides an instructive example of what libertarian dreams of a capitalist market beyond the reach of the state might look like. The founder of the Silk Road, Ross William Ulbricht, envisioned it as ‘a principled libertarian sphere of exchange’.⁵³ Ulbricht aimed to use the design of the site and reference to libertarian ideals (including through his ‘book club’) to ensure accountability and build a community consonant with ‘anarcho-capitalist’ (or rather, libertarian) ideals.⁵⁴ Influenced by these ideals, Ulbricht thought that without the coercive power of the state, actors would ‘come together to form mutually beneficial economic relationships’, creating an economic simulation of a libertarian society.⁵⁵ Jonathan Pace argues that this project ultimately failed both because state power was not actually absent (allowing vendors of illegal materials to blackmail buyers by threatening to reveal identifying details to law enforcement) and because it facilitated ‘the most aggressive elements of capitalist exchange: blackmail, scam, coercion, and monopoly’.⁵⁶ This debacle—which included Ulbricht himself being repeatedly blackmailed, and attempting to have vendors killed by a hitman who turned out to be an undercover agent—demonstrates the limitations of questioning state, but not economic, power.

Of course, many of the problems inherent in these ‘practical anarchies’ are also features of offline anarchist spaces and explicitly anarchist projects, including misogyny, abuse, racism, and invisible power structures in supposedly open or non-hierarchical groups. Morris’ article, ‘Why misogynists make great informants’, traces some of the ways in which the persistent failure of radical movements to deal with internal gender violence, misogyny, and homophobia have facilitated state surveillance and destabilisation.⁵⁷ Movements towards anarchism will necessarily always be partial and iterative; just as we cannot ignore the radical potential of explicitly anarchist projects because they do not fully

undo sexism, racism, and other forms of oppression, we should remain open to the anarchist potential embodied in online platforms and tools developed for corporate purposes and/or with libertarian aims. Galis and Neumayer argue that radical activists are engaging in effective *détournement* of corporate social media: other tools are similarly open to processes of *détournement*, reclamation, and subversion.⁵⁸

Of course, there are also a range of networked projects that have been developed more explicitly in line with anarchist principles. Perhaps the most prominent of these is Indymedia, which has received extensive academic attention.⁵⁹ Much of the writing on Indymedia has, understandably, focused on the ways in which it might provide an alternative to corporate mass media. However, Indymedia also serves as a space where activists can engage in open, consensus-based, organising and production, in which each Indymedia centre remains autonomous. While tensions and problems exist in the manifestation of this model, Pickerill argues that Indymedia collectives nevertheless demonstrate a workable alternative, a tangible space in which the challenges of self-organising can be negotiated and (hopefully) overcome.⁶⁰ There are a range of other projects that similarly aim to both provide online infrastructures for resistance and embody anarchist principles. Riseup, for example, organises ‘on the basis of autonomy, mutual aid, resource sharing, participatory knowledge, social advocacy, anti-oppression work, community creation’, while working to provide secure email for organisations and individuals involved in struggles for liberation.⁶¹ While Riseup and Indymedia are long-running and relatively autonomous projects, many others are much more short-lived and/or intertwined with existing economic systems.

This is not to diminish the value of such projects as a space for anarchist experimentation. The Rolling Jubilee, an outcome of Occupy Wall Street, attempted to jam the US system of on-selling loans to abolish loans, and in doing so to critique and provide an alternative to the existing predatory debt system. In order to do so, it legally incorporated as a US non-profit organisation.⁶² While this project only ran briefly, it not only abolished a significant amount of debt but also envisaged a different economic system, drawing on and highlighting the tradition of jubilee that exists in many religious systems. Turkoption, a project which has run for around a decade, has been specifically described as a project allowing crowd-labour workers to engage in mutual aid. It is not intended to be a solution to the problems of crowdsourced labour, but it nevertheless combines the provision of a meaningful resource for precarious workers with a continual ‘a thorn in the side of crowd-labor celebrants’.⁶³ Whether or not they wholly succeed in their goals, projects such as these use the Internet to facilitate interventions and alternatives to our current economic system, not only providing resources to activists but also embodying less hierarchical models of organising and production. They have the potential to ameliorate workers’ exploitation, build networks of solidarity and mutual aid, and help people to imagine and experience alternatives to capitalism.

LOOKING TO THE MARGINS

In considering the anarchist potentials of networking technologies, we should also look beyond projects and practices which have already received significant attention. Just as bell hooks argues that we should resist the hegemonic strands of white feminist thought and instead look to the ways in which black women's marginality allows them a vantage point from which to critique dominant hierarchies and engage in liberatory theory and praxis,⁶⁴ anarchist scholars would benefit from continually looking to the margins for liberatory practices. Mujeres Creando, an anarcho-feminist group, have said that they are anarchists, 'by our grandmothers', and I agree with them: 'that's a beautiful school of anarchism'.⁶⁵ I came to anarchism not by reading Bakunin or Kropotkin or attending meetings but rather by experiencing the ways in which people, and particularly women, around me (and, as I grew older, online) made power inequalities visible, provided support for each other, and dreamed of alternative political systems. There are difficulties in citing the multitude of practices, conversations, and visions involved here, not least the ethical challenges of subjecting conversations intended for a smaller audience to the context collapse of appearing in an academic book. Research in this area must, despite the demands of neoliberal academia, be willing to be slower,⁶⁶ participatory, and engaged with the complexities of online research.⁶⁷ One starting point for such research might be the recognition of the white, male-dominated nature of hegemonic political culture of the Internet.

As in many other areas, women's engagement in subversive practices online are frequently overlooked or undervalued. Kylie Jarrett, for example, discusses the failure of most analysis to conceptualise, or even acknowledge, the centrality of women's affective and immaterial labour online.⁶⁸ Black, Afro Indigenous and NDN women in particular noted that their analysis and labour are frequently appropriated and largely uncredited.⁶⁹ Those who are excluded or marginalised even from anti-hegemonic projects online engage in their own practices of resistance. Anarchists should attempt to learn from, and act in solidarity with, these struggles, even when they are not explicitly associated with anarchism.

Many of these efforts involve the use of networking technology to build networks of mutual aid in the face of the threats posed by capitalism and corporate power as they intersect with other forms of oppression, including homophobia, misogyny, racism, and ableism. For example, Randi Harper created the Good Game Auto Blocker, a tool which helps to protect targets of mob harassment on Twitter, who are disproportionately women, trans people, and other marginalised people.⁷⁰ Tools like these have limitations, but they do provide protections that Twitter and other corporate social media have proved unwilling to implement. To facilitate this work, Harper relies on voluntary mutual aid from others: her Patreon account allows hundreds of small donations to fund servers, pay essential bills, and (a sadly unrealised funding goal) pay for health insurance.⁷¹ We might also look at the ways in which teenage

girls (whose political agency is frequently trivialised) are using the Internet to engage in resistance and peer education. Keller, for example, discusses teenage girls' blogging as a space for building community and redefining feminism, and I would argue that while girls' use of the Internet tends to be the subject of frequent moral panics, girls are at the forefront in terms of the remarkable use of social media like Twitter, Tumblr, and Instagram to develop and spread a more radical, horizontal, and intersectional politics.⁷²

At the same time, many practices of resistance online are ephemeral and crisis-driven: there are frequent appeals shared across social media for those facing unexpected medical bills, eviction, or deportation. While many crowdfunding appeals are positioned as charity, they also often make reference to ideals of solidarity and mutual aid.⁷³ As I write, activists in Australia are attempting to crowdfund practical assistance for asylum seekers who are under attack by the Papua New Guinea Government while being indefinitely detained on Manus Island after attempting to apply for asylum in Australia.⁷⁴ These appeals, of course, can do little to undermine the structures of oppression which create crises: they cannot erase borders, decriminalise sex work, provide free and open healthcare, or end domestic violence. However, in addition to alleviating immediate crises, they can provide experiences of solidarity that help people to believe in other ways of being, and they can at least temporarily resource projects of resistance.

NURTURING ALTERNATIVES

This chapter should make it clear that, despite early proclamations to the contrary, the Internet is not a separate space. It does not exist outside of state or corporate power, and offline structural oppressions do not magically disappear online. The flip side of this is that the tools and practices facilitated by networking technologies have material impacts, including providing resources, facilitating organising, and creating experiences of mutual aid, solidarity, and less hierarchical organising in action. Networking technologies are now deeply integrated into our political, social, and economic systems, and are important sites of both domination and resistance.

The Internet we have today has been shaped by capitalism and state power, but it is not entirely controlled by state and corporate interests, nor does it fully serve them. People with alternative visions of how the world might work are using the Internet to create their own tools and infrastructures and are repurposing corporate social media for their own purposes. Activists continue to contest the structure and governance of networking technologies, including the role of large corporations like Facebook and Twitter in shaping our experience of the Internet. The outcome of this is far from certain: while the Internet appears to favour decentralisation of power, it would be difficult to look at the world as it is today and argue that the Internet necessarily brings us closer to the 'matrix of interconnectivity, mutuality, and accountability' which Ramnath has suggested characterises anarchist orientations.

Unsurprisingly, there are few sweeping pronouncements to be made about the role of networking technologies in supporting or undermining anarchist struggles. Just as in the past, attempts to build alternatives that are less hierarchical, more sustainable, and more inclusive must exist in the interstices between existing systems, repurposing tools built for other uses and working to create alternatives and protect them against both external threats and the emergence of internal hierarchies and oppressions. Networking technologies have facilitated some tremendously harmful shifts in the global economy, and in our working lives. They are also being used to find spaces for less hierarchical production, gifting, solidarity, and mutual aid. Anarchists (within and outside of academia) should be looking for these potentials and practices, including those that exist at the margins, and finding ways to nurture and expand them.

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Farming and Food

Erika Cudworth

This chapter situates anarchist's concern around human relations with non-human animals, and with the raising of animals for food, in the context of the history of anarchist thought and practical political engagement. The most common relationship we have with domesticated non-human animals¹ is that we eat them, and this requires the routine breeding and raising of enormous populations. The farming of animals has long been the most significant social formation of human-animal relations and does not happen discreetly within national boundaries, but is a process that has been international in scope and is industrial in its scale of operation.

The openness of anarchism to considering multiple forms of domination means that it is well-suited to develop powerful critiques of the human domination of other animals, including the range of exploitative processes through which food is produced in modern farming systems.

The chapter begins with a consideration of important anarchist contributions to debates on human relations with other animals. These include those of Peter Kropotkin and Murray Bookchin, both of whom see humanity as co-constituted in 'federations' of life with non-humans. Particular attention is paid to Élisée Reclus' arguments in *On Vegetarianism*, which emphasise our emotional connections to other creatures and the dominating power and violence implied in the production and consumption of meat. The chapter proceeds to examine anarchist work which foregrounds the intersectionalised oppression of humans and other animals in the food and farming industries, looking in particular at the contributions of Bob Torres and my own, examining the mass breeding and raising of animals for meat and other 'animal products' (eggs, 'dairy'). It will suggest that while intersectionality and social domination are

E. Cudworth (✉)
University of East London, London, UK

increasingly engaged with by both anarchism and animal liberation discourse, there is a significant way to go.

The chapter evaluates such contributions within human-animal studies as a whole, arguing that anarchism has been a dominant influence in the development of more radical approaches, such as the sub-field of critical animal studies (CAS), and in the theorising and practical politics of animal (and ‘total’) liberation. There are tensions however within both human-animal studies and anarchism. Some see animal liberation as a tertiary concern for anarchism, while for others, it is the cutting edge of contemporary political action. In animal studies, those advocating radical futures and direct action for political change may also endorse reformist strategies relatively uncritically. Various anarchist critiques call for an end to industrial animal food production, but while some advocate a vegan future, others wish for post-industrial man to enjoy the liberation of pre-industrial or pre-agricultural ways of producing and consuming food. The chapter ends on a conciliatory note, with a discussion of the shifting position of Brian Dominic and his notion of ‘veganarchy’.

Globally, ninety-nine per cent of all domesticated animals are commodities in animal agriculture² and are caught in relations of human dominion that involve their exploitation and oppression. This chapter takes as its premise that the systemic exploitation of other creatures, land and waterways in the production of human food is something that anarchism should oppose. What is recommended is an anarchist food politics which endorses more compassionate ways of being in the world and resists the intersected forms of violence implicated in the global networks of making other creatures into food.

THE TROUBLE WITH ANIMAL FARM

With respect to the farming of non-human animals for ‘meat’, there are some who argue that we have seen some positive changes, in the UK or the European Union, for example, in terms of ‘improvements’ in farmed animal welfare and the mainstreaming of ideas about ‘happy’ and ‘humane’ farming associated with ‘free-range’ or ‘ethically’ produced animal-based food.³ However, in terms of the global spread of intensive and industrial models of animal agriculture, the situation for farmed animals was worse (regarding the numbers raised and killed) in 2002 than in 1972, and the number of animals to be killed for food is predicted to double in the next fifty years, overwhelmingly through the spread of Western intensive methods.⁴ The current scale of animal farming is both extensive and intense, and it has been growing rapidly since the 1950s. As a result, there has been a dramatic increase in the populations of farmed animals. In 2003, for example, the United States became the first country to raise over one billion farmed animals in a single year, and this was more than twice the number of animals raised for food in 1980 and ten times the number raised in 1940.⁵ Since 1980, global meat production has more than doubled, but in the global south (where levels of meat and dairy consumption are rising year on year), it has tripled. Sixty billion animals are currently used each year to

provide meat and dairy products. On current trends, this figure could reach 120 billion by 2050.⁶ The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization predicts a dramatic rise in human population to 8.9 billion by 2050, and the rise in the food animal population is promoted partly by this increase and also by heightened demand in both richer and poorer regions of the globe.⁷

The seeds of this contemporary globalised animal food system are to be found in the centuries prior to the industrialisation of agricultural production in the nineteenth century. The process of colonisation involved the development of an internationalised food system, which co-existed with a localised model in European regions based on mixed farming and local specialism. Extensive cattle ranching and sheep grazing was the farming system introduced by European colonisation of the Americas, Australasia and Africa from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. This system involved particular forms of exploitative social relations such as the use of slave labour, displaced indigenous peoples and unwanted or exploited rural peasantries.⁸ As colonised territories became increasingly independent, and many drew in burgeoning immigrant populations, the ranching system—exploitative of both land and labour—became the model for an independent national system of production. In the seventeenth century, the Spanish and Portuguese imported their native cattle into South and Central America.⁹ This model was adopted in much of the Southern United States from the late eighteenth to late nineteenth centuries, as ranchers were seeking to increase profits by serving the expanding markets in Europe.

Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the breeding methods pioneered in Britain were adopted elsewhere.¹⁰ Animals were bred to gargantuan sizes, and the consumption of fat-rich beef was considered to be a quintessential sign of status. This demand, and the profits to be made from serving it, resulted in what Rifkin calls the ‘cattelisation’ of countries such as Argentina and Brazil, and the replacement of species type in the United States. The ‘Great Bovine Switch’ saw the replacement of buffalo with cattle through sponsoring the hunting of buffalo which led to their virtual and almost instantaneous elimination from the Western range lands after thousands of years of successful habitation.¹¹

The colonial model of meat production was further enabled by the development of refrigerated shipping which made it possible to ship meat to Europe from the United States, South America and Australasia.¹² In order to make best use of the potential market, the price had to be minimised by intensifying production and saving labour costs through increased mechanisation. By the 1920s, the United States was leading the way, and millions of diversified small family farms had been replaced by specialist, large, corporate enterprises.¹³ From the 1950s, one of the most important technological developments was the confinement of chickens for both eggs and meat production. Such farming maximises land use through intensive housing and minimises labour time as animals are in situ and fed automatically. In the United States, one person may manage up to 150,000 laying hens,¹⁴ and the time taken to fatten a bird to

slaughter weight declined from sixty to thirty-nine days between 1966 and 1991, while the amount of feed needed fell from 9 lb to 7.75 lb.¹⁵ While the bodies and minds of chickens endured intensely overcrowded, barren and polluted conditions, the post-war boom in the chicken business attracted the attention and investment of large pharmaceutical companies which developed treatments for diseases and ‘unwanted’ chicken behaviour.

Following the successful intensification of chicken-meat and chicken-egg production, the 1960s saw the development of intensified and highly automated systems for growing other birds, pigs, cattle and sheep. Key to success were automated feeding and watering systems, and for indoor raised animals, the elimination of bedding and litter through development of different kinds of food conveyance systems, cages, stalls, pens, forms of restraint and slatted floors over gutters or holding pits. Intensification has been applied to animals raised outdoors, and the cattle ‘feedlot’ of the United States is the strongest example of this. Feedlots are fenced in areas with a concrete feed trough along one side and were developed in the context of depleting soil through overgrazing and surplus corn production, from the early years of the twentieth century. With nothing else to do, and stimulated by growth-promoting hormones, contemporary feedlot cattle eat corn and soya, which may be ‘enhanced’ with the addition of growth-promoting additives such as cardboard, chicken manure, industrial sewage, cement or plastic feed pellets.¹⁶ Slightly less barren and automated are the cattle ‘stations’ predominant in Australia and Central and South America.¹⁷ Increased demand for cheap meat (primarily for consumption by social elites) has also led to the establishment of indoor production systems in poorer countries. Battery systems for laying hens and the growing of chickens in broiler units are now widespread throughout the Indian sub-continent, for example.¹⁸

In the aftermath of the Second World War, European countries and the United States set out to reduce malnutrition and hunger amongst their human populations with the promotion of cheap ‘animal products’. Rising levels of ‘meat’ and ‘dairy’ consumption became associated with social progress. This was promoted internationally by the United Nations, which, in the 1960s and 1970s, emphasised the necessity of increasing animal protein production and making such food increasingly available in poor countries.¹⁹ It is difficult not to conclude that such initiatives were strongly influenced by Western governments driven by the corporate interests of the multinational corporations based in their territories. In the 1980s and much of the 1990s, the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community/European Union also encouraged intensive animal farming through systems of grants and subsidies which explicitly favoured equipment and buildings.²⁰

More recently however, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization report, *Livestock's Long Shadow*, concluded that animal agriculture is a greater contributor to global warming than the combined effects of all forms of transportation.²¹ The deployment of Western agricultural models and the spread of Western food practices have had significant implications for the environment

in terms of undermining biodiversity, localised pollution, soil damage and rainforest depletion and contributing eighteen per cent of all greenhouse gases. International organisations are apparently concerned about climate change and with incontrovertible evidence of the role of animal farming in contributing to environmental hazard, national and international policy proclivities will shift. Recently in Germany, one government ministry has taken the apparently controversial decision to ban meat and fish from the menu at official functions, for example.²² We have also seen increased public awareness across the European region about issues of farm animal welfare.

Thus the breeding and raising of non-human animals for food has been an historical development exploitative of land and of both non-human animal and human labour and has been embedded in patterns of global inequality. The exploitative treatment of non-human animals farmed for food has been a backdrop to this tale of global networks and practices. Such exploitation of non-human creatures and the natural world, alongside its relations to structural and systemic inequity has been the spur to anarchism's engagement with food politics, its radical analyses and scepticism of reformist political measures by national and international organisations. In the next section, we turn to focus on the engagement of anarchism with both the non-human lifeworld and with multiple forms of domination.

PROBLEMATISING SPECIES RELATIONS AND THE EATING OF ANIMALS

The history of anarchist thought and practical political engagement demonstrates a concern with an eclectic range of dominations; or what we might call intersectionality.²³ Multiple forms of social domination have been at least as significant in anarchism as the focus on the state and governance; for some scholars and activists, more so. As Richard White and Colin Williams note, 'anarchist thought has mobilised not only around opposition to the state and capitalism, but in opposition to all forms of external authority and thus all forms of domination'.²⁴ Anarchism has been preoccupied with a range of dominations—around race, ethnicity and nation; caste, class and wealth; formations of sex, sexuality and gender; and colonialism, imperialism and warfare. Analyses of domination have also been used to understand our relationships to other species and to the planet, but rarely in explicitly anarchist ways. This section examines some examples of engagement with the more-than-human within the anarchist tradition, while the following section considers more contemporary work connecting anarchism to the domination of the non-human world, particularly non-human animals which are farmed. In problematising our relations with non-human beings and things, such perspectives inform what we might call an anarchist food politics.

In his most celebrated work, *Mutual Aid*, Kropotkin²⁵ noted how few animal species exist by directly competing with each other compared to the numbers who practise 'mutual aid' and suggested that those who do are likely to

experience the best evolutionary prospects. Mutual aid has been, Kropotkin argues, a feature of human existence that has widened its reach, ultimately potentially to the whole human species and beyond its boundaries.²⁶ The story of evolution in Kropotkin is not one of a path towards fixed things, but a process of relationships and linked becoming. Species is not a fixed taxonomy but about the recognition of what Darwin calls ‘differentiations’. *Mutual Aid* stressed the process of evolution as one where successful adaptation and exploitation of evolutionary niches is secured by species’ propensity for co-operation and solidarity. This order can be spontaneous and progressive. Mutual aid is an organising force across a range of species, as a ‘factor of evolution’ that enables species, including humans, to flourish.

While Kropotkin’s key insight is the notion of humans as embedded in relationships with other species, and as animals amongst many others, Reclus provides a more explicit challenge in terms of the need to confront the treatment of non-human animals as objects for human use as intrinsic to anarchist projects. In this and in countless other ways, Reclus clashed directly with the conservative and deeply speciesist moral codes of the society in which he lived.²⁷ What is particularly interesting is the way in which Reclus encourages personal, subjective and emotional (empathetic) connections to be made by his reader. In *On Vegetarianism*, for example, Reclus suggests the exploitation of non-human animals by appealing first to his reader’s emotional registers, rather than developing an argument based on Enlightenment humanism (as theories of animal rights do). The central argument is founded on personal and intimate reflections, which strike the heart of the reader far more intensely than appealing to the more abstract, mass killing of non-human animals. For example, Reclus offers this reflection:

I can see the sow belonging to some peasants, amateur butchers, and therefore all the more cruel. I remember one of them bleeding the animal slowly, so that the blood fell drop by drop; for, in order to make really good black puddings, it appears essential that the victim should have suffered proportionately. She cried without ceasing, now and then uttering groans and sounds of despair almost human; it seemed like listening to a child. And in fact the domesticated pig is for a year or so a child of the house; pampered that he may grow fat, and returning a sincere affection for all the care lavished on him, which has but one aim—so many inches of bacon. But when the affection is reciprocated by the good woman who takes care of the pig, fondling him and speaking in terms of endearment to him, is she not considered ridiculous—as if it were absurd, even degrading, to love an animal that loves us?²⁸

Undoubtedly, Reclus’ distressing childhood experiences and encounters of violent human/non-human animal encounters encourage the reader to see the violence against other creatures embedded in our daily lives and practices.²⁹ In *On Vegetarianism*, Reclus entreats us towards a future in which we and our surroundings ‘become beautiful’ in a world without animal abuse.

While Kropotkin's entreaties for the embedding of all creatures in 'federations' of life is based on apparently dispassionate observation, Reclus draws on personal experience to engage an empathetic response from the reader. Such an understanding of our close relations with some other species and the entangled lives we live is a feature of current feminist work.³⁰ Importantly, these notions of entanglement and shared empathy—of the kind demonstrated in Reclus and often marginalised in political thought—suggest the importance of our attachments to other creatures.

Many of Kropotkin's ideas are elaborated in the work of Murray Bookchin, who has been instrumental in linking anarchism to green social and political thought in the development of 'social ecology'. The notion of overlapping and intersected forms of social domination which are systemic and co-constituting is clearly compatible with an intersectionalised analysis of social domination. However, although Bookchin is to be applauded for his conception of humans as in and of nature, he holds to a problematic human exclusivity when it comes to considering relations between human and other species.

A mechanism by which he does this is the distinction between 'first' and 'second' nature. For Bookchin, humans as a species have developed to an exceptional degree such that they have produced a 'second nature', that is, a 'uniquely human culture, a wide variety of institutionalised human communities, an effective human technics, a richly symbolic language, and a carefully managed source of nutriment'.³¹ However, Bookchin's narrative sits within the Enlightenment paradigm where the human subject has pre-eminence. When it comes to the human domination of 'first nature' however, there is a reductionist argument made that the end of intra-human domination will simply result in the demise of the exploitation and oppression of non-human beings. Despite this, Bookchin and Kropotkin provide us with a useful legacy. For example, the insight that many species have overlapping forms of 'species life' with humans, with certain needs, forms of sociality and ecological and cross-species dependency. Differentiations of species, in particular social, economic and ecological contexts, give rise to different kinds of human-animal relationship that socio-political animal studies have been concerned with, such as the use of certain non-human animals as labourers of various kinds, as food and resources, as 'companions', as human entertainment and so on. We might best understand these socially constituted categorisations as carrying relations of human power, and that power, as Reclus passionately tried to demonstrate, is very often not benign.

ANARCHISM AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE

More recently, anarchist scholarship has specifically focused on the relationship between humans and other animals, and considers species difference as a form of social domination. Of particular note is the work of Bob Torres (2007), who applies David Nibert's³² analysis of animal oppression to the case of highly industrialised capital-intensive agriculture in the global north, in particular the

large-scale industrial farming of animals for meat. In doing so, Torres explicitly links the production of meat to anarchist politics. In addition, there is the important pamphlet by Brian Dominick—*Animal Liberation and Social Revolution*—which outlined the similarities in perspective between anarchism and veganism, broadly defined in terms of living a life which is as compassionate as possible towards animals, including, of course, human beings.³³ In the sections below, we consider different issues raised by anarchist applications on the subject of animal agriculture: the critique of species oppression and exploitation and advocacy of a diet free of animal-derived foods, the relation of feminism to such approaches and the gendering of good production, critiques of domestication and differences between primitivism, ‘total liberation’ and ‘veganarchy’.

EXPLOITATION AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE

Now, comrades, what is the nature of this life of ours? Let us face it: our lives are miserable, laborious and short. We are born, we are given so much food as will keep the breath in our bodies, and those of us who are capable of it are forced to work to the last atom of our strength; and the very instant that our usefulness has come to an end we are slaughtered with hideous cruelty ... Why do we then continue in our miserable condition? Because nearly the whole of the produce of our labour is stolen from us by human beings.³⁴

David Nibert explicitly uses the concept of oppression in relation to the historical development of human relations with non-human animals.³⁵ He argues that social institutions such as those of animal agriculture are foundational for the oppression of animals. Nibert isolates three elements in his model of non-human animal oppression. First, we have economic exploitation where animals are exploited for human interests; second, power inequalities coded in law leave animals open to exploitation; and third, this is legitimated by an ideology—‘speciesism’—that naturalises the oppression of animals in its many forms. Contemporary cultural processes and institutional arenas through which animals are exploited and oppressed—such as farming and food production—are explained in terms of profit creation, corporate interest and the generation and sustaining of false commodity needs.

Bob Torres applies Nibert’s model to the case of industrialised capital-intensive agriculture in the global north. Animals are largely understood by Torres as labourers, who labour by eating and breeding in producing commodities such as milk and eggs in dull, barren and stressful conditions. Animals are also property which enables their transformation into embodied commodities such as meat and leather.³⁶ Torres allows that the oppression of animals can exist before and beyond capitalism,³⁷ but capitalism has ‘deepened, extended and worsened our domination over animals and the natural world’.³⁸ While human and non-human animals are exploited under capitalism, the forms of exploitation differ. The bodies of non-human animals are not only exploited by working for us in order to produce animal food products, their bodies are

themselves ‘superexploited living commodities’.³⁹ Animal lives and bodies are a means to profit creation within capitalism. In addition, animals are property, and this means that, in the case of animal agriculture, animals are ‘sensate living machines’ for the production of commodities.⁴⁰ While human and non-human animals are exploited under capitalism, the forms of exploitation differ. For Torres, as for Nibert, capitalism remains the key explanatory framework, and the analysis of human relations with non-human domesticated animals is conceptually underpinned by notions of property relations and commoditisation.

Torres sees a critique of domination and a contentious politics of non-domination as key to anarchist politics.⁴¹ For Torres, the domination of the non-human animal world is an instance of highly normalised and everyday oppression in which most Western humans are much invested. It is also crucial to understand our relations with non-human animals as integrated into intra-human exploitative and oppressive structures. The analyses of linked dominations and of the politics of non-domination could have played a greater role in Torres’ analysis however. While he allows that the histories of exploitative systems are different and differentiated and that the oppression of animals can exist before and beyond capitalism, his analysis of the oppression of animals, however, is focused on one systemic cause: ‘If we’re to be successful in fighting oppression—whether based on race, class, species or gender identity—we’re going to need to fight the heart of the economic order that drives these oppressions. We’re going to have to fight capitalism’.⁴² This is ultimately, a reductionist position and a more fully intersectionalised analysis requires the broader notion of multiple domination, such as is found in Bookchin.

This broader perspective comes through strongly in the pamphlet by Brian Dominick which argues that contesting domination is key to both vegan politics and to anarchism. Dominick calls for anarchists to recognise the imposition of social categories on animals. Non-human species are not ‘less’ than humans, rather, this hierarchy is constantly reproduced by the active dehumanisation of animals and the reinforcement of separation. This hierarchy is political, and anarchists sensitive to the naturalisation of categories of oppression (in terms of gender or race or ability and so on) should be attuned to those generated by the politics of species domination. In addition to an objection to hierarchy, anarchists are called to oppose the exploitation, violence and alienation experienced by non-human animals as well as the alienation of many human labourers in such industries, and avoid as far as possible, the consumption of products based on the exploitation and suffering of animals. The intersectionalised nature of the domination of animals means that veganism becomes part of the multi-faceted resistance to the dominant social paradigm that is anarchism: ‘Only a perspective and lifestyle based on true compassion can destroy the oppressive constructs of present society ... This to me is the essence of anarchy. No one who fails to embrace all struggles against oppression as his or her own fits my definition of an anarchist.’⁴³

In an afterword to the third edition of *Animal Liberation and Social Revolution*, Dominick softens this line and suggests that while social revolution

is needed in all spheres of domination, including our relations towards non-human animals, we must see compassionate living as a process rather than an end state. It is an ideal which few if any of us will realise, but a struggle to be engaged with. Indeed, the struggles in countering multiple dominations and oppressions in daily life mean that our political choices are always compromised and complicated. Dominick wisely eschews the term ‘liberation’ for animals in favour of terms such as freedom from exploitation and violence, which he sees as essential to the anarchist project of freedom for all.

In reflecting on the publication of *Animal Liberation and Social Revolution* more than twenty years ago, Dominick contextualises his intervention in terms of the need for ‘a truly humble, empathic, animal-respecting stance [which] was conspicuously lacking in anarchism—even the “green” varieties, namely social ecology, anarcho-primitivism, and deep ecology. Despite the fact that these intellectual tendencies focus on the environment, they were fundamentally humanistic or mystic in orientation’.⁴⁴ Dominick now rejects what he sees as a fundamentalist culture that has, on many levels, sought to appropriate the term *veganarchy* over the last twenty years. He critically addresses the limits of a militant or dogmatic interpretation and makes a persuasive case for development of a more nuanced understanding of veganism and anarchism, one composed of constellations of values and principles—a more intersectionalised understanding, perhaps.

GENDERED EXPLOITATION IN ANIMAL AGRICULTURE

My own research into the farming of animals has been particularly concerned with the ways forms of gender-based violence can be evidenced in terms of the treatment of chickens, pigs, sheep and cattle. In the egg industry, for example, laying hens, particularly in intensive conditions, are worth so little that any problems associated with laying (such as prolapsing of the uterus) are ignored and hens are simply left to die painfully and slowly from blood loss, infection or attacks from cage mates.⁴⁵ Some species are also bred for characteristics which conform to patriarchal discourses of domesticated femininity. Cattle are selected via trade exhibitions or through breed catalogues for weight gain, mothering instinct, reproductive ease and meat value, and breeders map family trees of certain herds and determine the heritability of each desirable trait. The gendered evaluation of cattle as potential meat is reflected at agricultural shows, where ‘best of breeds’ are groomed, paraded around a ring and judged on their appearance.⁴⁶

Pork is one of the cheapest meats due to the ‘efficiency’ of an industry in which reproduction is incredibly intensive and controlled. In intensive systems, breeding sows are kept in stalls in which they are unable to turn round or exercise throughout their sixteen-and-a-half-week pregnancies and often lapse into stereotyped behaviour, trying repeatedly to build a nest from nothing. They give birth in farrowing crates (with a concrete, plastic or perforated metal floor and no bedding).⁴⁷ Once piglets are born, the mother cannot see them properly,

and this often results in sows becoming frightened of their young or aggressive due to their biting. Piglets would properly be weaned at two months, but are taken away at two weeks, so good mothering is not an overwhelming breed requirement. When pigs are raised outdoors, the gendering of breed selection is stronger, as piglets need to be more 'durable', boars more highly sexed and gilts (young sows) docile and motherly, as unlike the factory farm, mothering on a free-range system is not fully deconstructed.⁴⁸ Gendering can further be seen in the human manipulation of female animals' fertility and reproduction, wherein animals are forced into constant reproduction. In some cases, the gendering of abuse is very clearly expressed. Reproductive violence includes forced intercourse between non-human animals (where farm workers, for example, may force boars to mount sows, insert their penises by hand) or by inserting human hands, arms or instruments of various kinds to inseminate artificially. Some feminist anarchist scholarship has understood this as the rape of animals by humans.⁴⁹

The institutions of animal agriculture are constituted through forms of violence that are regularised and for the most part, legally sanctioned. In intensive industrial systems in particular, there is much evidence of cruelty—of animals being beaten, killed (e.g. 'unviable' piglets) or mutilated (e.g. by tail docking or castration). Even in less intensive production systems, there may be periods of forced confinement, the separation of social groups and separation of mothers from young. There are also more ambiguous treatments such as the inability to express species-life behaviours, which can be understood as forms of violence.⁵⁰ All farmed animal lives are drastically foreshortened and, overwhelmingly, are barren and stressful. While there is much cruelty, this is not 'extreme' practice, rather it is inbuilt into the everyday operations of reproducing and growing animals for food.⁵¹

My own analyses of farmed animals draw feminist analysis into conversation with those such as Nibert and Torres in terms of the idea of intersectionalised oppressions.⁵² This means I would look at the abuse of farmed animals in terms of various kinds of relational systems of power in addition to capitalism, gender, 'race' and so on as well as looking at the ways social hierarchies of species which privileged human beings are sustained and reproduced over time. I use the term 'anthroparchy' to describe and explain a social system, a complex and relatively stable set of hierarchical relationships, in which the incredible diversity of non-human species are homogenised as 'animals', identified as part of 'nature' and dominated through formations of social organisation which privilege the human. I have also suggested that five sets of social institutions and their related processes network to form the social system of relations I call anthroparchy. The first set of anthroparchal relations is production, wherein the breeding and raising of animals for food can be seen in the interlinked institutions and processes of breeding and growing which operate in a complex network of local, regional and global relations. The second relational arena is domestication which has characterised human engagements with other species for millennia through the selective breeding of certain kinds of plants and animals. The last two centuries have seen intensification

of such processes, for example, in terms of reproductive interventions in animal food production. The third arena is political. States and international organisations can act as direct or indirect agents of anthroparchy, for example, by subsidising animal farming, or contest and change forms of abuse by making certain practices unlawful (such as the use of battery cages). Fourth, we have systemic violence, which as we have seen in the previous section, is embedded in the production systems of ‘animal food’. Finally, anthroparchal social relations are characterised by cultures of exclusive humanism which may, for example, encourage certain practices such as animal food consumption.

The farming of non-human animals for food illustrates a specific site in which anthroparchal institutions, processes and practices may be evidenced. The case for the material intersections of relations of capitalism and colonialism has been well made by those such as Nibert⁵³ and Torres.⁵⁴ However, these material practices can also be understood as co-constituted through gendered relations. The breeding and growth of non-human animals for ‘meat’ reflects the complex intersections of a range of relations of social power.

FROM VEGANARCHY TO TOTAL LIBERATION AND BACK AGAIN

There is tension as to what such a critique of domination—intersectionalised or otherwise—might mean for anarchist futures, including the politics of food and eating. For some, including controversial primitivist John Zerzan, a future free from domination is both vegetarian and primitive, that is, endorses pre-agricultural methods of food gathering. Zerzan’s *Future Primitive* (1994) asserts the superiority of hunter-gatherer lifeways, arguing that the cultural practices and technologies of modernity are carefully constructed means of enslaving people.⁵⁵ Zerzan uses anthropological studies from ‘original’ and ‘primitive’ societies as the basis for a wide-ranging critique of aspects of modern life and to suggest these are a political ideal or model, for future development, or rather, de-development and de-domestication. This critique of Western civilisation has been subjected to a range of incisive critiques from within anarchism and without, yet has some influence in contemporary anarchist developments at the intersection of anarchism, political ecogism and animal liberation, both theoretically and practically. In a recent essay, Mara Pfeffer and Sean Parson argue that enormous numbers of human animals are killed, mutilated, poisoned or abused by industrial capitalist systems, alongside countless billions of non-human animals. Thus:

there can be no total liberation: no end to colonization, genocide, or animal exploitation, without addressing the root problem of our era—industrial civilization. We argue that animal liberationists, anarchists, and all people concerned with exploitation and suffering need to reject the dreams of techno-utopias, worker-run industrial factories, and post-scarcity eco-communism. If we wish to live and see life flourish on this planet, there is only one alternative: we must envision a politics centered around burning down the factories, dismantling the energy grid, and liberating all animals, human and nonhuman.⁵⁶

This resonates in some ways with the more recent intervention by Nibert who has made the case that the process of domestication is violent and abusive in and of itself; a position with which Zerzan would concur. It involves the enslavement of species via their 'domeseccration'.⁵⁷ Comparing practices of animal exploitation for food and resources in different societies over time, Nibert focuses on nomadic pastoralism and the development of commercial ranching, a practice that has been largely controlled by elite groups and expanded with the rise of capitalism. Beginning with the pastoral societies of the Eurasian steppe and continuing through to the contemporary exportation of Western, meat-centred eating habits, Nibert connects the domeseccration of animals to the interests of powerful social elites and to mass violence, invasion, displacement and enslavement. Conquest and subjugation were the results of the need to appropriate land and water to maintain large groups of animals, and the amassing of military power has its roots in the economic benefits of the exploitation, exchange and sale of animals. Nibert argues that the domeseccration of animals was a precondition for the oppression of human populations, particularly indigenous peoples.⁵⁸ Historically, the material interests of social, political and economic elites are inextricably linked to the exploitation of animals, and this has been spread and deepened with the development of capitalism.

While such critique of the process of domestication/domeseccration might be persuasive, it does not necessarily lead us to primitivist-style conclusions. Ultimately, feral and primitivist politics is deeply contradictory when it comes to the politics of food, and an analysis of intersected domination. For anarcho-primitivism we become more authentically human in autonomous lives without the trappings of domesticity. Yet mass farming of plants would be crucial in any transition to a veg(etari)an lifestyle unless cataclysmic reductions in world human populations are envisaged! In addition, this particular story of domestication as some kind of prehistoric 'fall' is called into question by those whose work suggests elements of a co-evolutionary process and reciprocity in the domestication of both human beings and certain non-human animals.⁵⁹

Many critical animal studies scholars, particularly those drawn to anarchist politics, deploy the notion of 'total liberation' which considers that human liberation requires animal and earth liberation as well.⁶⁰ For Steven Best, 'liberation' in the form of one manifestation of oppression/domination, such as 'race', may not be secured in isolation from other varieties which co-constitute them. Thus humans cannot be 'free' while continuing to exploit the labour and bodies of non-human animals. Total liberation, because of this, requires a move away from the ideas of 'progress' which have been bound up with colonial and capitalist forms of development.⁶¹ It is here that Pfeffer and Parson link their critical form of primitivist politics with the notion of 'total liberation' means that primitivism needs to be far more critical in its analysis.⁶² The primitivism they advocate is a 'feral politics' of compassion and solidarity where the goal is to dismantle the social and economic systems that are killing the planet. In addition, they assert that we need a politics to create real and lasting communities, not only between humans but also between humans and the more-than-human world.

This, however, does not appear to be the kind of ‘return to the woods’ and discovering our ‘inner animal’ that Zerzan and others envisage, particularly those in favour of eating animals as a way to reconnect with our human animality⁶³ and those of other creatures.⁶⁴

Recent publications in CAS contain a range of interesting contributions all of which skirt round the question of what it might mean from a green, anarchist and critical animal perspective to speak of a future for farmed animals.⁶⁵ Some suggest a politics of ‘groundless solidarity’ in which we must...struggle to help non-humans create spaces where they can flourish and develop their own organic relations and communities.⁶⁶ Colling et al. go on to explain that this means fighting against institutions that imprison, abuse and kill non-human animals (like those of farming), supporting those animals who ‘resist their human oppressors’ (such, perhaps, as those escaping from farms or slaughterhouses), and stopping the geographic marginalisation of wild animals. This does not imply a world of de-domestication and a return to gathering (and for some, hunting too). Rather, it seems closer to Dominick’s plea for veganism to be understood as part of a process of human liberation which enables us to ‘free’ animals from exploitation and oppression.

TOWARDS AN ANARCHIST POLITICS OF FOOD

The less oppressive future is complicated for, as we have seen in this chapter, the growing of both animals for food and plants for animal feed is mired in blood, death, impoverishment and insecurity. Very little of what we consume is innocent—from coffee and tea, chocolate and sugar, meat and milk, our food is produced, traded and sold through intricate national, international and global systems which exploit. All manner of domination needs to be tackled when we think about what we might eat. Fruit, vegetable and grain production is bound up in gendered, colonial and capitalist structuring also of course, so that rising Western demand for the staple foods of others, such as quinoa, means poor Bolivians go hungry⁶⁷ and avocados become beyond the reach of many Mexicans.⁶⁸ An anarchist food politics needs to be developed from an intersectional perspective that foregrounds the production and consumption of food as necessarily transformed in our struggles to secure a less oppressive world. In the footsteps of Reclus, contemporary anarchism has been very much focused on in terms of scholarship and activism surrounding animal agriculture as a key element in the search for a less violent and more compassionate future for all beings.

In a recent book, Steve Hobden and I have argued that radical politics need rethink the notion of liberation as ‘freedom’, a positive emancipation, and think more about how we develop an emancipation based on a lessening or absence of forms of domination and oppression.⁶⁹ This what Amy Allen calls ‘negative emancipation’ wherein our task is to critique and contest domination while finding ways to live in which we exploit less.⁷⁰ The process of domestication probably was mired in the violence and social injustices that those such as

Nibert suggest. But Nibert also makes clear there is no returning to a golden age of Zerzan's hunter gatherers. Rather the task is to engage in the production of a less oppressive present through the promotion of plant-based diet and transitions away from animal agriculture, particularly in the immediate and urgent present, industrial animal farming.

NOTES

1. The term 'non-human animals' is used to make clear that the author knows that humans are animals! Where the term 'animal(s)' is used, it should be read as 'non-human animals' but has been shortened for ease of reading only.
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17. D. Nibert, *Animal Oppression and Human Violence: Domesecration, Capitalism and Global Conflict* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2013).
18. MacDonald, 'Eat'
19. Rifkin, *Beyond Beef*, 131.
20. A. Johnson, *Factory Farming* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

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35. Nibert, *Animal Oppression*, 7.
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37. *Ibid.*, 156.
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Anarchism and the Newest Social Movements

Marina Sitrin

There is not much of a global anarchist movement today. At the same time, since the 1990s, many popular movements around the world have been animated by something that I am going to call an anarchist spirit—a way of organising and relating that opposes hierarchy and embraces direct democracy. These forms have many things in common with ideas developed by people like Emma Goldman, Murray Bookchin and the libertarian left in Spain during the 1930s. However, being animated by, and having the spirit of, anarchism is not the same as being ideologically anarchist. Many contemporary movements are touched by this spirit, sometimes without even knowing the similar roots that their forms of organising share with those of historical anarchists, and most do not identify with the tradition of anarchism, or if they do, for many it is for brief moments, not as an overarching political guide to organising.

Anarchism is not a unified ideology or theory, but it does emphasise a few core beliefs: opposition to both capitalism and the state, emphasis on face-to-face relationships and prefigurative ways of organising society. Some anarchists look to the working class as the main agent of change; for others, it is ecology, and still others view feminism as the starting point for transforming society. All anarchists oppose institutional forms of hierarchy and the idea of power as something to wield over others. That does not, however, mean that anarchists oppose organisation, structure, rules, accountability or forms of governance.

Contemporary movements, meaning those that are flourishing at the writing of this chapter, such as the *Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca* (PAH), the housing defence movement in Spain; the autonomous Social Solidarity Clinics in Greece; many if not most of the land defence movements in Latin

M. Sitrin (✉)

State University of New York, Binghamton, Binghamton, NY, USA

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America; and the recuperated workplaces in Southern Europe and the post-2016 election solidarity groups in the US, have emerged from communities and neighbourhoods with their gaze at the horizon, not the state. They are not mobilised or organised by a union, specific group or political party. They organise horizontally, generally using forms of direct democracy. They employ direct action as the first step instead of petitioning, lobbying or putting forward demands to institutions of power. Often, they try and embody the future they wish to see in their day-to-day relationships, rejecting hierarchy and grounding their organising in affect and trust. Most are majority women, and led, in the day-to-day organising, by women.

This chapter discusses an increasingly expansive and diverse phenomenon in social movement organising and societies in movement, and while perhaps not the majority experience per se, they represent the experiences of millions of people over the past two decades. These are movements grounded in forms of organisation that are not ‘new’ in and of themselves, but are new in the sheer numbers and diversity of people participating in organising in these ways. These movements tend towards a more horizontal gaze, striving for new social relationships of participation and care, with goals of self-organisation, and with a focus on these goals and less on demands on institutions of power. Many have called the movements anarchist—as a celebration or a curse. This chapter describes the phenomenon, using a few specific examples, and relates this phenomenon to anarchist concepts, to see if there is a way to think about both without one dominating the other.

In this chapter I focus predominantly on the common forms of organisation in the post-2001 crisis in Argentina and the Movements of the Squares, looking at places of commonality with anarchist practices and ideas. In particular, *horizontalidad*, *autogestion*, defined as self-organisation with direct horizontal forms, perspectives on the state and institutional power and refiguration.

While the focus of this chapter is Argentina and the Movements of the Squares, any discussion of the emergence of contemporary horizontal forms of organising, on a mass level, not looking to the state for solutions, must begin with the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico. Emerging publicly in 1994, declaring a resounding ‘*Ya Basta!*’ (Enough is Enough!) and quickly reorganising themselves in response to their reception, they began to create dozens of autonomous communities, rather than place demands on the state or organise for state power. And next, in Argentina, in 2001 the popular rebellion sang ‘*Que Se Vayan Todos! Que No Quede Ni Uno Solo!*’ (Everyone Must Go! Not Even One Should Remain!). As with the Zapatistas, the movements focused on creating horizontal assemblies, not asking power to change things, but creating that alternative in the present with their new social relationships: taking over and running workplaces by the hundreds without bosses; retaking land; creating new collectives and cooperatives, from media to art; redefining work and breaking from past hierarchical ways of relating—forming a new dignity.

Then, in 2011, the world witnessed the beginning of a similar form of massive rejection, with declarations of ‘You Don’t Represent Us!’ and ‘Enough!’ and in that space of the ‘no’, as with the Zapatista ‘*Ya Basta!*’ and Argentinian

‘They All Must Go!’, alternatives have been manifested—often prefiguring a desired future. In various towns, villages and cities, in countries across the globe, people created (and some continue to create) new social relationships and ways of being. In some places this continues to take the form of directly democratic neighbourhood assemblies, in others the movements take on alternative forms of production, agriculture, defence of the land, housing, health care, child care and education.

THE BREAK IN ARGENTINA: *QUE SE VAYAN TODOS!*

Millions of people singing ‘que se vayan todos, que no quedan, ni uno solo’ (they all must go, not even one should remain), public art/graffiti reading: *Ni Dios, Ni Patria* (neither god nor homeland), *La Solución Autogestion*, *Nuestro Suenos no Caben en Sus Urnas* (Our Dreams Do Not Fit in Your Ballot Boxes), *La Verdadera Democracia Esta En Las Calles* (True Democracy is in the Streets), *Nunca Mas, No Te Metas* (Never Again, Don’t Get Involved) and *Ocupar, Resistir, Producir* (Occupy, Resist, Produce). Hundreds of thousands of middle class, and recently declassed urban dwellers organising in neighbourhood assemblies, rejecting hierarchy and instead using forms of direct democracy and *horizontalidad*, hundreds of work places, from clinics and supermarkets, to print shops and daily papers being taken over and run by workers, again, using forms of direct democracy and *horizontalidad*. Indigenous communities retaking their land and doing so with the support and solidarity of people in other movements. Unemployed workers not only shutting down roads and bridges to demand unemployment subsidies (which were won), but *autogestionando* in their neighbourhoods, creating communal bakeries and kitchens, popular education and schools, alternative medicine, sometimes including optometry and acupuncture, taking over land to create organic gardens to try and feed the community, building housing on the occupied land, creating fish hatcheries and raising other livestock for protein. In some cases creating things ranging from beauty parlours and cinemas to massage workshops. And then, many of these movements, relating to one another as a movement of movements. Movements that were not trying to take state power, but creating—prefiguring—the alternatives they desired to see in their day-to-day relationships.

This is just a glimpse of the inspiring creation that took place, and in some areas continues to take place, in Argentina particularly since 19 and 20 December 2001, when a total economic collapse precipitated millions of people taking to the streets, *cacerolando*,¹ and within two weeks expelling five consecutive governments, while simultaneously creating horizontal assemblies to try and meet their needs.

FROM *KEEAYA!* TO *DEMOCRACIA REAL YA!*

Between 2011 and 2012, millions of people gathered in plazas and squares declaring ‘*No Nos Representan!*’ (They Don’t Represent Us!) in Spain, ‘*Ya Basta!*’ (in reference to the Zapatistas) in Greece, ‘*vynas dazhe ne predstavlyayete!*’

(You can't represent us—and you cannot even imagine us!) in Russia and '*Kefaya!*' (Enough!) in Egypt.

Each movement was sparked at different times by different specific causes, but with powerful similarities in forms of organisation, and under the same general rubric: no to representation, and yes to horizontal social relationships. Each of the movements used space similarly to create these new relationships, first in the occupation and recuperation of large parks and plazas, and then to the neighbourhoods and smaller towns. None are traditional social movements that have 'claims' and 'demands' that once met will placate the movement. These are movements about reclaiming relationships, reclaiming space and reinventing ways of being.

People came together in the 'no', the refusal, and looking to one another began to talk about alternatives. Turning their backs on the state and institutions that brought them to this moment, they turned to one another, forming assemblies and over time, networks and groups for self-organisation. The media were incredulous, constantly asking, what do they want? The traditional left was equally so and was angry when the movements did not accept their leadership.

A number of years have passed since the plaza occupations, yet the reverberations continue. As the Spanish 15-M movement participants reflect, the movement was *una clima*, a sensation. This echoes societies in movement in Latin America over the past decade, where, for example, people in Argentina when referring to their continued use of *horizontalidad* and autonomy speak of being children of the popular rebellion of 2001.

The experiences in Argentina and the Movements of the Squares are part of many other experiences over the past two decades in particular, where a rupture takes place, and within that space people look to one another, begin to see themselves and one another differently, and create alternatives to the forms of relating bequeathed to us. Instead people created horizontal relationships, attempting to facilitate the development of new subjectivities, and found ways to take care of one another, using what anarchists might call mutual aid, grounding all of it in a form of autonomy, whether using that language explicitly, as the Argentines did, or implicitly as with the Movements of the Squares. The overarching language used for this phenomenon is often prefiguration. Over the past twenty years, the world has been witnessing an upsurge in prefigurative movements, movements that create the future in the present. These new movements are not creating party platforms or programmes. They do not look to one leader, but make space for all to be leaders. They place more importance on asking the right questions than on providing the correct answers. They resolutely reject dogma and hierarchy in favour of direct democracy and consensus.

IN ARGENTINA THE REBELLION BEGAN WITH A SOUND... AND A SONG

On the night of the 19th, while the news was on television and the middle class was at home watching, seeing people from the most humble sectors crying, women crying in front of supermarkets, begging for or taking food, and the State of Siege was declared, then and there began the sound of the *cacerola* (the banging of pots and pans). In one window, and then another window, in one house and then another house, and soon, there was the noise of the *cacerola*.

The first person began to bang a pot and saw her neighbour across the street banging a pot, and the one downstairs too, and soon there were four, five, fifteen, twenty, and people moved to their doorways and saw other people banging pots in their doorways and saw on television that this was happening in another neighbourhood, and another neighborhood... and hundreds of people gathered banging pots until at a certain moment the people banging pots began to walk...

That's how it was. The movement of the 19th and 20th began with a sound—the sound of someone banging on a pot. That sound grew, and then bodies began to move from their houses to the corner, and then to the center of the city, and finally to the Plaza de Mayo. Bodies moved and pots banged, and finally that new phrase was spoken—not speeches, not explanations, not political party placards. There were housewives, young people—everyone was there—and they said with a common voice ‘que se vayan todos!’ (they all must go!).²

This description by Pablo of the neighbourhood assembly of Colegiales could have been described by any number of thousands of people throughout Argentina, who sang, chanted and created everything anew. Out of the popular rebellion, hundreds of neighbourhood assemblies emerged, workplaces were taken over and run by workers without bosses or hierarchy, and unemployed workers' movements grew by the thousands, taking over land and creating projects to aid survival in these difficult times. People not only said no, but were creating their many yeses, all at the same time.³

The idea of social creation without hierarchy, and the rejection of centralised power or political parties is something that is a key part of the anarchist tradition. Noam Chomsky, who sometimes refers to himself as an anarchist fellow traveller, explained the concept of the rejection of centralised authority in an interview:

I think it only makes sense to seek out and identify structures of authority, hierarchy, and domination in every aspect of life, and to challenge them; unless a justification for them can be given, they are illegitimate, and should be dismantled, to increase the scope of human freedom. That includes political power, ownership and management, relations among men and women, parents and children, our control over the fate of future generations (the basic moral imperative behind the environmental movement, in my view), and much else. Naturally this means a challenge to the huge institutions of coercion and control: the state, the unaccountable private tyrannies that control most of the domestic and international economy, and so on.

But not only these. That is what I have always understood to be the essence of anarchism: the conviction that the burden of proof has to be placed on authority, and that it should be dismantled if that burden cannot be met.⁴

The *Que se vayan todos* was joined by social creation; creation that was horizontal. In the years I spent in Argentina after the rebellion, whenever I would ask someone what does it mean when you say you are horizontal, people would say, ‘well we are not this’, and show a vertical line with their hands, moving them back and forth as an indication of the rejection of hierarchy. Emilio, 17 at the time of our first conversation in 2002, explained this phenomenon:

Yes, the politics of reaction were first. First was the shout/scream. First was ‘*Que se vayan todos*’ (they all must go). First was the shout, a reaction to an unsustainable situation, and then the creation—almost at the same time. That’s to say, and it’s almost obvious, to break with something first you have to say ‘no’ to it, and from there start building something new. That’s how we begin to construct differently. *Horizontalidad* starts there. I believe that *horizontalidad*, like autonomy and *autogestion*, are momentary constructions and they are in themselves opening space for something more in Argentina. Today we are horizontal, first because we broke with representatives, with the old, with concepts of delegation. But I don’t believe that if things continue the way they are that the objective will be *horizontalidad* in itself, but it is, rather, a process that constructs and brings us to something more. It is dynamic.⁵

In Seán Sheehan’s book *Anarchism*, he says almost exactly what Emilio and so many others say in describing *horizontalidad*, though he is describing anarchism. He writes:

Anarchism as a process, a means of existing, happens when people collaborate with others out of a felt need for justice, on a voluntary basis, and without degrees of rank or hierarchy. Such moments are often personal or small group affairs but they can be public and they can point the way forward for libertarian socialism⁶

The influence of the post-2001 autonomous movements in Argentina on those around the globe striving for horizontal self-organisation is not measurable—at the same time, the knowledge of the massive directly democratic assemblies, recuperation of workplaces and taking over of land by the unemployed is known and has spread into the imagination of people organising all over the globe. While not trying to directly imitate what people have heard took place, the experience in Argentina has opened people’s imaginations as to what could be possible.

HORIZONTALIDAD

Horizontalidad is a word that came to embody the new social arrangements and principles of organisation of the post-2001 movements in Argentina. As its name suggests, it implies a flat plane upon which to communicate. It entails the use of direct democracy and involves, or at least intentionally strives towards, non-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian creation rather than reaction. It is a break with vertical ways of organising and relating. *Horizontalidad* is a living word, reflecting an ever-changing experience. Months after the popular rebellion, many movement participants began to speak of their relationships as horizontal as a way of describing the new forms of decision-making. Years after the rebellion, those continuing to build new movements speak of *horizontalidad* as a goal as well as a tool.

Our relationships are still deeply affected by capitalism and hierarchy, and thus by the sort of power dynamics it promotes, especially how we relate to one another in terms of economic resources, gender, race, access to information and experience. As a result, until these fundamental social dynamics are overcome, the goal of *horizontalidad* cannot be achieved. Time has taught that, in the face of this, simply desiring a relationship does not make it so. But the process of *horizontalidad* is a tool for the achievement of this goal. Thus *horizontalidad* is desired, and is a goal, but it is also the means, a tool, to help achieve this end.

Similar to what was witnessed with millions of people assembling in plazas and parks around the world—from Puerta del Sol in Madrid, Syntagma Square in Athens and Zuccotti Park in New York—in Argentina hundreds of thousands of people went into the streets, without political parties or unions leading them, and formed assemblies, on street corners, in workplaces and in rural and post-industrial spaces, transforming them into laboratories of new social relationships. *Horizontalidad* became one of the main ways people described what they were doing.

As Ayelen, a participant in the 15-M in Madrid and child of South American exiles, discussed:

We are reflecting all the time about how to improve our techniques, because an assembly in which everyone has the right to talk doesn't guarantee that everybody will feel free to talk. For example, affirmation is very influential, so it is the responsibility of the collective to give confidence to everyone, so that they feel encouraged to talk. It is important to notice how the collective reacts, and that has a direct influence on building true freedom of expression, freedom to speak. There are also group dynamics where implicit leaderships are generated. It's OK if the person that knows most about certain things can talk and say what they have to say, but it's also necessary that the rest can also speak too, in order to break the delegation of power that generates vertical structures. When we practice the horizontal power structure, we are all using our power, but internally there are still mechanisms of delegation—the idea that other people must know more than us, or that we are afraid of making some mistake, and that means I'm uncertain to talk about certain things. I'm in love with horizontality, but am also thinking

about goals for improving it. What we saw in horizontality was that, if assembly meetings are fifteen hours long, one gets exhausted, decisions end up being taken by fatigue, and are taken by the ones that resisted until the end, and it becomes vertical again.⁷

This horizontal relationship is at the heart of the creation of prefigurative spaces, particularly seen in the plazas and the neighbourhoods of the Movements of the Squares. As Ernest from the PAH and 15-M in Barcelona, Spain, described of the early days of Plaça de Catalunya:

It was like—the way you can imagine another possible world—everyone discussing issues that the media and politicians never talk about—it was awesome. If you took a walk around, maybe even at midnight, you would say: ‘these people are crazy’. There were groups of 5 or 6 people who didn’t know each other, talking about the energy crisis, nuclear treaties, or discussing labor issues. People who had never met before were there, having discussions, more and more people adding themselves to the discussions, something like mini-forums. It came out of a need to express, to communicate, and to imagine other worlds that never existed in the reality before 15-M.⁸

The Movements of the Squares, not only related in horizontal ways, focusing on the participation of all, but used the specific language of democracy in relation to what they were and are creating, rejecting outright the concept of representation and representative democracy. One can infer this from the Argentine autonomous movements, but, for example, the Spaniards took this to the point where their organising groups before 2011 used the frame of ‘Real Democracy!’. As Ana explains:

This idea of ‘Real Democracy Now!’ and that of ‘You Don’t Represent Us’ is the foundation of the 15-M movement. This is the most common feeling. It is authentic discomfort because decisions are made over which we have no control at all; and how can we begin to win that control over our own lives through something that we call democracy?⁹

Movement participants are clear in their rejection of representation, but the specific forms of democracy that they put forward are open.

HORIZONTAL SELF-ORGANISATION

Continuing, and trying to expand on a more effective practice of horizontal social relationships, many of the Movements of the Squares intentionally shifted locations of the points of organising from central plazas and parks to neighbourhoods, workplaces and schools. Spain and Greece were the most explicit in the articulation of this shift, with the assembly in Madrid deciding to dissolve itself after a twenty-four-hour assembly, so as to deepen the experience of the movements in locations where people lived and worked. The movements in

the US, Canada and other sites had similar conversations, and while they did not have the time to make the decision to move to the neighbourhoods in mass assemblies due to violent police evictions of the plazas, the conversation continued in various ways and in various more decentralised locations.

The pre-existing movement that grew most as a consequence of the 15-M in Spain is the movement against foreclosures, the *Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca* (PAH). It is organised in chapters all over the country and coordinates concrete resistance to prevent foreclosures, a thread concerning hundreds of thousands of people since the crisis started in 2008. Since 2013, the PAH, together with neighbourhood groups, has taken over empty homes and entire buildings to house hundreds of homeless families. This is all done through the assemblies of each local group. The PAH has stopped at least 2045 evictions and rehoused 2500 people. There are now over 251 PAH nodes across Spain.¹⁰ Ernest, one of the participants in the PAH before the 15-M, explained the anti-foreclosure work:

The *Plataforma* is a pre-15-M movement, but it was given impetus by the 15-M. Before the 15-M there was an assembly of the Barcelona *Plataforma* and another in Terraza, and after the 15-M in just a short period of time there were 44 *Plataformas*, plus other neighborhood assemblies, that have the same action guidelines as protecting families from evictions, they give them some kind of counseling or they bring them to the *Plataforma*, but above all when there are announcements of foreclosures like this next Monday in their neighborhood, they get active and call the neighborhood together so that they can all go to prevent it, knocking on doors to mobilize people to prevent the foreclosure from occurring.¹¹

Each assembly chooses how to organise and what to act on, though they all organise without hierarchy. When asked about the forms of organisation the PAH takes, Cristina from Lanzarote PAH explained:

There are no hierarchies. They don't exist. But it is not that they don't exist because someone suggested it, but because it is a space where each person becomes the owner of their life and everyone has every opportunity. If we are all in control of our lives and we have all the opportunities there is no desire for someone to come and tell you what to do. The objective is that you have all the tools, all the capacity and opportunity to seek freedom and the freedom of all—so of course, hierarchy does not fit, and we don't feel it, want it ever.¹²

Not only does PAH continue to grow throughout Spain, but it is also now an example to other movements throughout Europe and the US. In urban areas of Germany, such as the Kreuzberg neighbourhood where I lived for a few years, neighbours not only organise to prevent evictions, but if they are unsuccessful, then they make sure through direct action that the homes affected are not rented out to others. Tactics have included preventing the showing of houses to prospective tenants and putting glue into locks on the doors. If that

still does not work and a home is rented out, then activists apply social and political pressure, such as explaining to potential renters that the neighbourhood is opposed to their moving in.

In the US, dozens of groups have been organising around housing in these ways. Some, like Occupy Homes, are direct spin-offs from Occupy. They are organising neighbours to physically defend homes that are at risk of foreclosure. Often the result is that the banks involved do not go forward with the eviction, and the groups can then help the affected families to renegotiate their mortgages. Others, like the community-based groups in poverty-stricken neighbourhoods of Chicago, take over abandoned homes but state that they are going to do so publicly in advance, in order to build more publicity and gain support. There are also numerous groups that disrupt the auctions of homes that are about to be foreclosed. Actions range from singing in courtrooms in the boroughs of New York City to the San Francisco Bay area, where activists have disrupted auctions that take place on the steps of City Hall.

The actions of all these groups go much further than protecting the housing rights of vulnerable people; as movement participants reflect, they build new relationships and a different sense of self and of community, rooted in the strength and assembly-based direct action and horizontalism.

POWER AND THE STATE

'*Ni Dios Ni Patria Autogestion*' was written again and again on the statue in front of the government house (Casa Rosada) in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires. On the top of the statue was written '*Gracias Madres*', recognising this place as the one where the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo began publicly and heroically declaring their children missing during the dictatorship. The graffiti written below is similar to graffiti found all over towns in the years after the rebellion of 19 and 20 December 2001. Other similar graffiti read '*La Solución Autogestion*', publicly reflecting not only a sentiment but a practice that was, and is, taking place throughout the country.

Crucial in understanding the autonomous movements in Argentina today is an understanding of their different approach to power. Taking over the state through military force or otherwise is not the goal; they are creating what many have called '*otra poder*' or '*contra poder*'.¹³ This does not mean that they ignore the state or do not want to see something in its place, only that what they are doing, and their conception of revolution, is not the seizing of the government house or parliament.

Paula, a participant in queer and feminist groups at the time of the rebellion, describes the moments when it seemed possible to actually take over the government house, observing that people refused and instead turned to their neighbours and co-workers:

I have an idea of power, but it is a critical one. The concept of power, at least in the leftist tradition, has always meant that to transform society it's necessary to

take power. That means to take political power, to take over the means of production, which is the classic vision. I had to laugh because after December 20th, when there were still many *cacerolazos*, which my friends and I always participate in, there was one that was particularly violent, with a lot of police repression. To escape this, we ran and jumped the fence to the Pink House [government building] and went inside. I was on television. They said that I was encroaching on the Pink House, that I was taking over the Pink House. I had to laugh. It's especially funny because at the time, my friend said, 'We can go in there, but we're not taking power. 'To us, power didn't exist anymore. The concept of taking power is archaic. What does it mean to take power? Power over what?'¹⁴

Neka, a participant in the Unemployed Workers Movement of Solano, a neighbourhood on the outskirts of Buenos Aires, describes how what they are doing is such a change from previous ways of acting and imagining possibilities:

The issue isn't just the physical confrontation with the system. Every day, we're forced to confront a system that's completely repressive. The system tries to impose on us how and when we struggle. The question for us is how to think outside of this framework. How to manage our own time and space. It's easier for them to overthrow us when we buy into concepts of power, based on looking for the most powerful-based in something like weapons or the need to arm the people. We're going to build according to our own tempo, our own conditions, and our own reality, and not let them invade it. I think this idea of power as capability and potential-not a control-is a very radical change from previous struggles.¹⁵

And Sergio, in conversation with Neka, responds affirmatively, 'The difference is thinking about power as a noun: to arrive at power, to obtain power-as if it was a thing, when power is a verb'.¹⁶

Linked to the anarchist principle of rejecting hierarchy is a different vision of power, one based on people's potential and in our relationships with one another. Anarchists reject the state and see it as a tool of oppression. That is not to say that anarchists reject governance or collective decision-making, but the state, as the armed wing of a class, is rejected. The idea is that people make decisions together and do not have them made for themselves.

In Argentina the government came back to formal power and even regained a great deal of legitimacy over the years, but that does not undermine the shift that took place in so many people in their conceptual and sometimes practical relationship to formal power. A participant in the neighbourhood assembly of Colegiales, Martin, describes:

This struggle is revolutionary, but not the way people meant revolutionary in the 1970s. It's something else, and we still haven't named it, because it's not a revolution in the sense of bringing down the state. We have to create another world, build another world-think of how to organize this other world, using a different logic. The logic of the state and the politics of representation are so entrenched in the market that, together, they have taken away our tools for social change.

We're creating new ways of relating to one another. No one knows exactly how to do it. It's a collective process. No one's going to come and tell us how to do it, and it's exactly this process that is so beautiful.¹⁷

These new movements do not look to others to solve their problems, but together are finding ways to achieve—recuperate—what they consider to be a right. In Greece, for example, some neighbourhood assemblies are organising the blocking of cash registers so that people do not have to pay the newly imposed cost of health care. Sometimes the result of this is that laws are changed or rules modified, as has occurred in a few municipalities in Spain, where the local governments have ordered the police not to carry out evictions, or in neighbourhoods in Athens, where local governments have placed a hold on the collection of new taxes in response to neighbourhood assemblies' mass refusal to pay. Recuperation is a manifestation of this new way in which the movements are looking at power and autonomy: taking back what is ours. Instead of articulating demands and expecting institutional power to react, people are constructing popular power—much as the Landless Workers' Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra—MST) in Brazil did beginning in the 1980s when they took over land to create new societies with their own schools and clinics and growing their own crops. In 2001, Argentinian workers came together, recuperating their workplaces, using the slogan of the MST ('Occupy, Resist, Produce') and putting their workplaces back to work using horizontal forms of organisation. The fact that they do not wait for governments or institutions to respond to them does not mean that no demands are ever made; in fact, many of the movements demand back from the state what they consider to be theirs anyway from their years of labour.

In Greece, the assembly of Syntagma even made a statement on the issue of power and need to self-organise. As Anestis from the Peristeri Neighborhood Assembly in Athens reflected:

A lot of people were influenced by what happened in Syntagma last summer. There was a certain political tradition of self-organizing in Greece, mostly by anarchists. But in the Syntagma mobilization a lot of people saw that, organizing this way, you can at least have your opinions heard—you can express your view clearly and express yourself more openly to others.¹⁸

Anestis then showed me the below text, one of the resolutions decided upon by those in the Square:

#603. Resolution by the Popular Assembly of Syntagma Square [...] an assembly attended by 3,000 people.

For a long time now, decisions are taken for us, without us.

We are workers, unemployed, pensioners, youth who came to Syntagma to struggle for our lives and our futures.

We are here because we know that the solution to our problems can only come from us.

We invite all Athenians, the workers, the unemployed and the youth to Syntagma, and the entire society to fill up the squares and to take life into its hands.

Here, in the squares, we shall co-shape all our demands.¹⁹

In New York, Matt, one of the first participants in the New York City General Assembly, the grouping that met throughout the summer of 2011 and organised the first day of Occupy Wall Street on 17 September and the subsequent occupation of Zuccotti Park, reflected:

I guess, for me, I am a firm believer in the power of direct action and basically creating conditions where one would force the state to come to the negotiating table—and consequently making these changes, rather than the framework of demands, which is perhaps a slightly less passive form of begging or petitioning, which I think only relegitimizes the power of the state. It is obviously a very difficult question of how you address some of the very immediate suffering without giving power to the state. And for me, I think, at least part of that answer is in the direction of direct action. ... The question [we get asked] constantly: ‘What do [you] want?’ And our answer is that you have nothing that we want. What we want is from one another as people.²⁰

And in the Bay Area of San Francisco, California, Gopal, one of the initiators of Occupy Farms, discussed:

We could have been fighting to get the University of California to put an urban agriculture farm and center there. But we are not fighting to change what the University of California does on that land—we are fighting to take the land away from the University of California, and put it in a commons [...] There’s a very big difference between a campaign to change practice and a campaign to change power dynamics.

So with the Take Back the Land housing fights, right now housing is understood as ‘There’s private property, and there’s public housing. There’s private land, and there’s public land.’ And the idea is to construct that third space of the people’s. And that’s where we’re trying to create, common-centered housing. How do we leverage the land trust model in a way that de-speculates the soil, that takes land off the market? That’s where it becomes about contesting for power. And there are lots of ways to do land trusts that don’t contest for power—like buying the land and then putting it into a land trust. So then it’s a one-time purchase, now it’s de-speculated ideally, but it doesn’t actually change power relationships and power dynamics, and how property is held.

So Occupy for us—just getting back to that—for us it’s this very exciting moment of, Wow! Goals without demands.²¹

PREFIGURATIVE

The movements today are prefigurative movements; they focus on the social relationships in the present as the future. They are distinguished from past movements, such as those in the 1960s and 1970s, which were generally about either demanding reforms from the state or taking state power and replacing it with something better. As the interviews reflect, most in the autonomous movements are placing their energies in how and what they organise, using *horizontalidad* and *autogestion*. Most of the movements are anti-capitalist, and some anti-state, and their strategy for the creation of a new society is not grounded in either state dependency or the taking of power to create another state. Their intention is to change the world without taking power.

This is a politics that has sometimes been referred to as prefigurative. Prefigurative politics, as it sounds, is the behaving in the day to day, as much as possible, the way that you envision new social and economic relationships, the way you would want to be.²² This means, with the example of Argentina, creating horizontal relationships now, organising actively against oppression and respecting diversities. It also means creating alternative forms of exchange, education, culture, art and medicine in the here and now. To be clear, this is not a politics about dropping out of society and creating the perfect microcosm outside of society. It is about creating more space within society, more openings, and through this process creating other ways of organising and transforming society. The means are the ends as long as they are going in the direction of social transformation. It is a moving politics, one that does not have a programme. These are not new practices. Prefigurative politics, as with autonomy, organising outside the state, and *autogestion*, can be seen throughout history from the autonomous Zapatista communities in Chiapas, Mexico, to the Regantes in Bolivia, to the Paris Commune and the Spanish revolution, as well as dozens of moments of worker and community control, from the worker Soviets in Russia to the Shora in Iran to worker and community in Argentine and Chilean history. The list is inspiringly long. At the crux however is the combination of prefigurative politics, rupture as a timeless opening, with the formation of other powers, not aimed at the state or institutional power.

Raul Zibechi summarises this way of being in conclusion to his book *Genealogía de la Revuelta*: ‘What really changes the world is to learn to live in another way, in a communitarian way, even if we do not live in communities. Brother/sisterhood is the key in social change, not war, not even class war’.²³ This concept of creating the new society now and not waiting for some time in the future to take power to then change relationships, but to create new social relationships as a part of the transformation of society, as the transformation, is an idea also rooted in the anarchist tradition. Proudhon described this phenomenon:

Beneath the governmental machinery, in the shadow of political institutions, out of the sight of statesmen and priests, society is producing its own organism, slowly and silently; and constructing a new order, the expression of its vitality and autonomy.²⁴

In New York our movement began first by meeting in public assemblies in a park in the Lower East Side, and then by taking over the streets and Zuccotti Park in the afternoon and evening of 17 September. We held dozens of horizontal assemblies in the afternoon and a two-thousand-person assembly in the evening, and from there the occupation began. The intention was always to meet in and use space and, of course, hopefully occupy and keep it. As with our predecessors, from whom we drew and draw imagination and inspiration, from Egypt, Greece, Israel and Spain—among countless historical examples—we wanted to not only protest something bad, not only to refuse, but to open up a new space for the experimentation with and creation of alternatives. Doing this by using or occupying public space—meaning space open for all people to come in and out of—was central to our desires.

Rather than reproducing the logic of the traditional ‘sit-in’, these occupations quickly turned to the construction of miniature models of the society that the movement wanted to create. The territory occupied was geographic, but only so as to open other ways of doing and being together. It is not the specific place that is the issue, but what happens in it. Solutions began to be implemented to urgent problems like loneliness, humiliating competition, the absence of truly representative politics and the lack of basic necessities, such as housing, education, food and health care. In Spain, Greece and the US, the first part of the occupations saw the creation of two problem-solving institutions: the general assemblies and the working groups. The occupations, in each case, rapidly became full encampments, with sleeping facilities, food, sanitation, health care, and security.

After two to three months in each case, the occupations shifted from places of encampment to places of gathering. In Greece, New York and a number of other US cities, this was due to police repression and eviction. In the case of Spain, the movement decided to focus its energy more on the assemblies and the working groups than on maintaining the encampments themselves. To maintain the miniature models of a society that the movement wished to create did not necessarily contribute to the actual changes that were needed in the populations that needed them the most. Which is why, in Spain, the decision to move away from the encampments was another impulse in the constructive aims of the movement: the real encampment that has to be reconstructed is the world. In the US and Greece, we were forced to end the encampment as a place for sleeping and housing, but also in both places the movement is getting stronger bases in new territories, re-territorialising in other neighbourhoods, schools, workplaces and communities.

In Spain and Greece, movement participants describe how much more profound they find the organising. Creating assemblies in public space, using space to create territory and where new relationships develop and prefigurative politics can flourish, based now more in the concrete day-to-day needs of people in the neighbourhoods.

CONCLUDING WITH ANOTHER SORT OF POLITICAL

The autonomous social movements in Argentina, since 2001 in particular, have begun to articulate a new and revolutionary politics. This politics is seen in various new practices and in the expressions they use to describe these practices. Some say that they are not political or that they are anti-political. Often this is related to their experiences in ‘old ways of doing politics, with the use of hierarchy and political parties to make decisions for people, taking away their agency. They are engaged in the politics of everyday life. Remarkably similar are the conversations I had with people across the US during and after the Occupy movement, as well as in Spain, Greece, Italy and later France with *Nuit Debout*. People did not want to identify politically and often said what they were doing was not politics—or not political.

People are seeing themselves creating the future in their present, through new, directly democratic relationships. They reject hierarchy, bosses, managers, party representation and often traditional unions. Simply put, they reject people attempting to have power over others. They organise themselves in every setting, and do so relying on themselves and each other, *autogestionandose*, in communities, neighbourhoods, work places, schools and universities. What is the name of this revolutionary process: *horizontalidad*? *autogestion*? socialism? anarchism? autonomy? none of these? all of them? It is a process that does not have one name. It is a process of continuous creation, constant growth and development of new relations, with ideas flowing from these changing practices.

The question then is: is it useful to place these new movements in a theoretical and historical framework so as to better understand them and add to our understandings of social change as socialists, anarchists or autonomists? I do not think so. I do not think we should place any of the movements in a single framework. That said, I do think that certain concepts of anarchism or non-authoritarian socialism can help in understanding some of the practices and principles of these movements. These movements also lend examples and experiences to the non-authoritarian tradition. I do not intend to play with words or be ambiguous here. I do not think it is the role of an anarchist, for example, to tell other people they are anarchists, especially when they choose explicitly to not identify as such. The same is true of autonomists or socialists. What I do think one can do however is look at the similarities, listen carefully to the new practices and articulations and draw parallels so that each can learn from one another. As long as it is in the process of creating a more liberated world, and learning from one another in the process, does it really matter what it is called?

While there is no one definition of anarchism, which is some of its beauty, Emma Goldman’s ‘Anarchism: What it Really Stands For’ provides a conceptual place holder in which the newer movements can either enter into, move through, pass along side of, or continue onward from:

Anarchism is not, as some may suppose, a theory of the future to be realized through divine inspiration. It is a living force in the affairs of our life, constantly creating new conditions. The methods of Anarchism therefore do not comprise an iron-clad program to be carried out under all circumstances [...] Anarchism, then, really stands for the liberation of the human mind from the dominion of religion; the liberation of the human body from the dominion of property; liberation from the shackles and restraint of government. Anarchism stands for a social order based on the free grouping of individuals for the purpose of producing real social wealth; an order that will guarantee to every human being free access to the earth and full enjoyment of the necessities of life, according to individual desires, tastes, and inclinations.²⁵

NOTES

1. Cacerolas are the phenomenon of banging on pots and pans, usually as a form of protest.
2. Pablo, quoted in Marina Sitrin, *Horizontalism: Voices of Popular Power in Argentina* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2006), 22.
3. The Zapatistas of Chiapas, Mexico, are credited with the phrase, one no and many yeses, which was to become popular during the late 1990s Global Justice Movement.
4. Noam Chomsky on ‘Anarchism, Marxism and Hope for the Future’. First published in *Red & Black Revolution* (No 2) 1996 (<http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/interviews/9505-anarchism.html>) (Accessed 29 September 2017).
5. Emilio quoted in Sitrin, *Horizontalism*, 39.
6. Seán Seehan, *Anarchism* (London: Reaktion Books, 2003), 158.
7. Ayelen quoted in Marina Sitrin & Dario Azzellini, *They Can’t Represent Us!: Reinventing Democracy from Greece to Occupy* (New York: Verso Books, 2014), 135–136.
8. Ernest quoted in Sitrin & Azzellini, *They Can’t Represent Us!*, 144–145.
9. Ana quoted in Sitrin & Azzellini, *They Can’t Represent Us!*, 131.
10. <http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com/> (Accessed 29.11.2017).
11. Ernest quoted in Sitrin & Azzellini, *They Can’t Represent Us!*, 144–145.
12. Cristina quoted in Marina Sitrin, ‘Being Poor is not a crime’: transforming the struggle for housing rights worldwide’, *Transformation: Where Love Meets Social Justice* (24 January 2014) (<https://www.opendemocracy.net/transformation/marina-sitrin/%E2%80%9Cbeing-poor-is-not-crime%E2%80%9D-transforming-struggle-for-housing-rights-world>) (Accessed 29.11.2017).
13. Colectivo Situaciones, *Apuntes para el Nuevo Protagonismo Social* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: De Mano en Mano, 2002).
14. Paula quoted in Sitrin, *Horizontalism*, 161–162.
15. Neka quoted in *Ibid.*, 163.
16. Sergio quoted in *Ibid.*
17. Martin K quoted in *Ibid.*, 217–218.
18. Anestis, quoted Sitrin & Azzellini, *They Can’t Represent Us!*, 93.
19. Resolution Syntagma in *Ibid.*
20. Matt quoted in *Ibid.*, 177, 178.

21. Gopal quoted in *Ibid.*, 180.
22. To my knowledge the first to develop the use of this the term was Wini Breines in her writing on the politics of the 1960s and what she saw as a different way of thinking and organising in part as a rejection of the centrism and vanguardism of the Communist Party. She writes: ‘The term *prefigurative politics* is used to designate an essentially anti-organizational politics characteristic of the movement, as well as parts of the new left leadership, and may be recognized in counter institutions, demonstrations and the attempt to embody personal and anti-hierarchical values in politics. Participatory democracy was central to prefigurative politics [...] The crux of prefigurative politics imposed substantial tasks, the central one being to create and sustain within the live practice of the movement, relationships and political forms that ‘prefigured’ and embodied the desired society.’ Wini Breines, *Community and Organization in the New Left, 1962–1968: The Great Refusal* (Rutgers: Rutgers University, 1989), 6.
23. Raul Zibechi, *Genealogia de la Revuelta: Argentina: la sociedad en movimiento* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Letra Libre, 2003), 18.
24. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century*. Translated by John Beverly Robinson (New York: Haskell House Publishers, Ltd., [1851] 1969), 243.
25. Emma Goldman, ‘Anarchism: What it Really Stands For’ http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_archives/goldman/aando/anarchism.html (Accessed 29.11.2017).



Non-Western Anarchisms and Postcolonialism

Maia Ramnath

NON-WESTERN? ANARCHISM? POSTCOLONIALISM?

Every term in this title is questionable. Each is self-negated by the very logic within which it assigns me to write about it.

Firstly, Non-Western

The very use of the binary terms ‘West’ and ‘Non-West’ (the notorious ‘Rest’, in reference to a dizzying multiplicity of complex cultures and histories) is the quintessence of colonial thinking. This West (or North) marks less a spatial cartography than a political category, a historical legacy, a cultural/racial taxonomy. Equating it to literal cartographic coordinates has precisely as much meaning as the papal meridians drawn in 1493 and 1529, awarding one half of the globe to Spanish conquest and the other to Portuguese. Thus ‘The West’ carries the discursive baggage of the cluster of dominant paradigms that have underwritten imperial expansion for half a millennium.

As an oppositional force to those paradigms, was anarchism ever truly Western? Russia and the Mediterranean rim have been central to the classical (and therefore the unmarked ‘Western’) anarchist tradition, yet these places were only ambivalently part of the industrial and technological core of the ‘West’. And given the centrality of such early pillars of the American anarchist canon as African-Mexican-indigenous Lucy Parsons and the Oaxacan Zapotec-mestizo Ricardo Flores Magón, for example, ‘Western’ anarchism may never actually have been so purely Western after all.

The story of ‘Western’ anarchism is intrinsically global, woven of the passages of labour migrants and exiles; transnational shipping as vector for syndicalism;

M. Ramnath (✉)

Writer, Organiser and Adjunct Professor of History, Fordham University, New York, USA

diasporas linking host countries and home countries in intellectual networks; and cosmopolitan cities as nodes of multi-ethnic interchange of tactics and ideas.¹ Structures of empire provide another important framework of globality—including that of anarchism—by enabling us to link together places remote from each other but yoked to the same colonial metropole.²

Does non-Western anarchism then mean the anarchism of the colonised? The anarchism of the global South, the Third World, the Tricontinental, the indigenous and African diasporic communities of the Americas' 'third worlds within'? This isn't quite right either, unless we choose to define (for example) Japan as Western, and Ireland not. Perhaps non-Western only means decentring Europe (including its settler offshoots), diversifying our awareness of anarchism, with or without explicit attention to colonialism.

Secondly, Anarchism

But what is it we're looking at, exactly, in these expanded non-European vistas? It is not enough to restore visibility to the 'non-Western' participation within the familiar models of first, second and third wave anarchism (the well-trodden 'classical' 1880s–1930s, the 1960s–1970s New Left and the turn of the millennium resurgence).³

A further step beyond greater inclusivity within familiar paradigms is to consider that anarchism throughout the world may actually not be limited to these familiar paradigms. Yet that question applies to the unmarked or Western anarchism as well. Does anarchism encompass anti-authoritarianism overall, anti-authoritarian communism, libertarian socialism? How are we situating revolutionary syndicalism? Individualism? Insurrectionism? Revolutionary romanticism? Some who assign anarchism a fixed and narrow definition have felt the need to posit 'post-anarchism' or post-structuralist anarchism as an alternative, whereas others who define it more capaciously, as an evolving discourse comprising a spectrum of thought and praxis addressing key dialectical questions, perhaps don't feel it's so restrictive as to require going outside it to find those alternatives.

If its particular organisational lineages and intellectual genealogies are located specifically in the context of the European Enlightenment, is it a thesis or antithesis to that context? Part of the secular (anti-clerical if not atheistic) Enlightenment, alongside other branches of socialism, liberalism and radical democracy—or congruent with the lumpen 'primitive' revolutionary impulse that preceded it, and persisted in an ongoing counterpoint? Or does it hint at a synthesis? This double helix is our bridge between questions of anarchism and questions of postcolonialism.

Finally, Postcolonialism

Postcolonial history, chronologically speaking, in a specific country often refers to the period after the formal transfer of power from a colonial to a national government. But to my mind, the term postcolonial refers to a time after not

the elimination but the onset of coloniality. A postcolonial world then is one indelibly marked by the ongoing processes and effects of colonisation.

Postcolonial theory refers to a body of academic thought situated since the 1980s as a counter-hegemonic intervention in certain disciplines and areas of knowledge production such as cultural theory, literary and linguistic analysis, historiography, sociology/anthropology, and epistemology. As such it also addressed the real experiences and structural positioning of scholars and students who bore identities marginalised in relation to the academy.

This body of critical scholarship draws upon, overlaps with and comments upon but is distinct from a history of actual anti- and decolonial movements, thought and praxis. And despite its significant challenges to academic institutional contexts, postcolonial theory is also quite recuperable within them. Academic discourse in isolation can coexist with the political, military and economic mechanisms of coloniality (such as the entrenchment of settler regimes, neoliberal capitalist world-systems, dispossession/extraction/exploitation of resources, and disenfranchisement of racialised communities).

Although the cultural, epistemological, pedagogical and psychological dimensions of colonisation are indeed connected to its material processes in complex ways (given that force alone can only accomplish so much; sustained control requires legitimating certain narratives while subjugating others), linguistic and philosophical deconstruction is not cognate to an activist critical theory of race, gender or intersectionality. If we take intellectual work and knowledge production outside the academy, though, shifting from abstraction to experience, concepts are much clarified.

A language of postcolonial anarchism emerged from the same context that has produced several waves of mobilising since the 1990s among North American self-identified anarchist people of colour, who challenged anarchist milieux to acknowledge the implicit racism of countercultural spaces that remained predominantly white, insensitive to the experiences of racialised and colonised communities and therefore out of touch with their priorities. Anarchist people of colour foregrounded anti-imperialism, and linked anti-racism to a larger anticolonial analysis, rebuking white Western anarchist assumptions that anticolonial liberation struggle was nationalist and therefore ideologically incorrect for anarchists to support.⁴

At the same time, anarchists who identified with communities of colour (including Indigenous, African and other diasporas framed as part of a global anti-imperialist struggle), felt that an intervention in the other direction was equally important: namely to critique national liberation struggles by introducing anarchist principles and organisational models in place of state-based ends and authoritarian means.

As I've noted elsewhere, some strands of anarchism do have clear affinities with some elements of postcolonial theory.⁵ However, although academic postcolonialism is assumed to be analogous with postmodernism and post-structuralism, this does not mean that the anarchism of the colonised matches up with that sort of postcolonialism; nor does it mean that non-Western

anarchisms necessarily resemble post-anarchism. Rather, non-Western anarchist histories coexist within the same world-historical periodisation as the West and share many points of synchronous connection. They were subject to the same global-systemic processes (of industrialisation, technological acceleration, capital expansion, imperial warfare, and so forth) but with the key differential of *location* within an unevenly constructed system, and therefore a different experience of how oppression and exploitation manifest, and which agents of power are most salient at those coordinates. Location also determines when one can recognise the start and end points of a cycle of phenomena (the West often sees things last and loses sight of them first). The incorporation of such perspectives is crucial for generating postcolonial knowledge.

So I do not know how to speak of non-Western anarchism and postcolonialism. All I can do is offer a very brief sampling of a few specific manifestations of anti-authoritarian movements and tendencies outside of 'the West', especially as they pertain to anticolonial struggle and/or postcoloniality. Perhaps in doing so, even more usefully, I can propose a rubric of analysis for further collaborative illumination of such things.⁶

THE TERRAIN, AND THE TOOLS

If you look at any place with anarchist eyes, what do you see? To analyse anarchism anywhere in the world, its priorities and practices, it's necessary to map power and counter-power.

Firstly, the Terrain

What are the structures and relations of power, hierarchy, oppression and exploitation, which are most operative at any given location? What specific forms do they take? What patterns of coercion and control are present and who is responsible for them? Where is this place situated within global political and economic systems, which are tied to histories of empire?

In most non-Western contexts, by definition, colonialism will cast a long shadow. It mediated their incorporation into global capitalism (cementing a dependent and peripheral position) and their encounter with the modern state with its disciplines, punishments and carceral and surveillance regimes. Furthermore, in many colonial situations, the external forces also collude opportunistically with local reactionary elements. This is why any anarchistic movements against colonial regimes require also an overhaul of internal oppressions alongside the elimination of external ones.

Secondly, the Tools to Navigate the Terrain

What repertoires of emancipatory practice are available? What stored memories and movement histories can be drawn upon? What cultural materials, heroes, narratives and legends influence both resistance tactics and radical aspirations?

What intellectual/philosophical traditions inform the contents of the utopian imagination? (Whether apocryphal or verifiably documented, inspiration can be a powerful resource for subsequent action.)

Where culture is a tool of resistance (or cultural nationalism), rooted authenticity is at a premium. However authenticity need not mean normativity, as policed by conservative elites, or deployed by chauvinistic reactionaries. Anticolonial struggle is simultaneously a struggle for the direction and cultural identity of the decolonising society and, therefore, for which (dominant or subjugated) strands of its own traditions to embrace or reject, emphasise or downplay. Chances are the relevant imaginaries/aspirations may be submerged or heterodox within their own contexts too, yet no less authentic or autochthonous for that. It seems reasonable to suppose that places with previous cultural materials to draw on that resonate with anarchistic principles are more likely to manifest those forms later. So, where European anarchists might conjure Diggers or Anabaptists as retroactively interpellated predecessors, Asian anarchists might look to Taoist sages or bhakti poet-mystics for traditions of radical egalitarianism, subversion of hierarchy and authority, practices of collective society, unmediated agency and horizontal cosmology.

So now, let us consider some far from exhaustive examples from the following highly imperfect subcategories of the vast Rest.

EAST ASIAN ANARCHISM AND POSTCOLONIALISM

The story of East Asian anarchism usually begins with the 'glorious period' of the 1890s–1920s, during which Chinese, Japanese and Korean journalist-activists were avidly translating (and in some cases corresponding with) classical anarchists of the Western canon, such as Kropotkin, Bakunin, Goldman, Berkman, Malatesta and Reclus. Asian anarchists participated in dense nexuses of intellectual/political interchange in Tokyo and Paris.

These two respective clusters were associated with two different schools of thought which they developed within several influential journals, publishing their own writings as well as translations. Though not mutually exclusive, one emphasised progressive modernity, while the other looked to pre-industrial and pre-colonial agrarian collectivist practices with local philosophical roots. In Tokyo, anarchist feminist He Zhen and her husband Liu Shipai wrote and edited *Natural Justice*, looking to Taoist philosophy as a source of moral principle for anarchist revolution. In Paris, Li Shizeng and Wu Zhihui's *New Era* was dedicated above all to scientific progress and rationalism. These debates around modernity (Western?) and tradition (Asian?) anticipated by almost a century themes recognisable in internal (postmodernist?) and external (postcolonialist?) critiques of hegemonic Enlightenment values, categories and teleology.

Liu Shifu read both. Formerly a member of an anti-Manchu pro-assassination group similar to the Russian People's Will, he then became a peasant movement organiser. Under his watch, *The People's Voice* emerged as China's most influential organ of anarcho-communism, in whose pages there was no contradiction

between embracing the latest science and embracing Buddhist and Taoist ideals. His Society of Anarchist-Communist Comrades (est. 1914), succeeding the Society for Cocks Crowing in the Dark (est. 1912), focused on education toward creation of a new society, in which there would be common ownership and access to the means and fruits of production, land and wealth; free labour and association; and no class, laws, police, marriage or religion. He called this ‘pure socialism’—in other words, an anarchist alternative to the state-building model of self-strengthening then being pursued in China to avoid the fate of India, the cautionary tale next door. This would also equip China for participation in a predicted world revolution, wherein, in Liu’s words,

The governments of Europe will be toppled one after another. In North and South America and in Asia, our party will join in and rise up. The speed of our success will be unimaginable. In China today nothing is more important than to catch up, devoting our utmost effort to propaganda in order to prevent the possibility that a day would come when that incident would occur in Europe but propaganda in the East would not be ripe; that would hold back the world’s progress.⁷

In East Asia the dynamics of anticolonialism did not necessarily coincide with anti-Westernism. Japanese anarchists of this period who opposed their own government’s colonialism, militarism and imperial conquest were accused of treason (and were more structurally comparable to French, Spanish or Israeli anti-authoritarians than to Algerian, Cuban or Palestinian ones). Korean, Chinese and Japanese anarchists all fought against Japanese imperialism, whether from within or from the receiving end.

Kotoku Shusui—editor of several newspapers and journals and an influence on the Chinese anarchists of the Tokyo circle—started as a Marxian socialist but announced himself as an anarchist in 1905 after being jailed for publishing subversive literature. Subsequently he felt much affinity with the IWW during the few years he spent in San Francisco. Advocating the tactics of direct action and general strike, he too invoked the philosophy of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu as a source code for anarchism, rooted in a ‘general tendency to fulfill our freedom and happiness, because that tendency is natural in human society, to be realized with mutual aid and communal life, united by morality and charity, without government compulsion as it is now’.⁸

As in Chinese circles, the Japanese debate fell between anarcho-syndicalism and anarcho-communism, or ‘pure anarchism’ as Hatta Shuzo named it. The former was more industrial, scientific and modernist; the latter more agrarian and interested in seeking authentic culture. Again, note that the battle was less between ‘foreign’ and ‘authentic’ than about how to define what was authentic and which of its possible versions to foreground: not Confucianism with its emphasis on micro- to macro-structural order through obedience and duty within a scaffolding of hierarchical relationships, but Taoism with its emphasis on horizontality and fluidity.

Kotoku Shusui was executed in 1911 in connection with the High Treason Incident, along with his comrade and partner, the pioneering anarcho-feminist

Kanno Sugako, and nine others, in connection with the High Treason Incident. This alleged plot by anarchists and socialists to assassinate the emperor was followed by a sweep of punitive arrests. Osugi Sakai and Noe Ito were the comparable anarchist power couple of the next generation: advocates of free love, early supporters but later critics of the Russian Revolution. Noe claimed that Japanese peasant society had been a 'functioning anarchist society based on mutual agreement and mutual aid': autonomous, self-organised, and participatory, sharing tasks of care and conflict resolution.⁹ Both were murdered by police in 1923, targeted as part of a purge following the chaos of the Great Kanto Earthquake, in which the two main scapegoats, significantly, were anarchists and Koreans.

Amidst a global explosion of anticolonial mobilisation in the aftermath of the First World War, the All-Japan Libertarian Federation of Labour Unions (Zenkoku Jiren, est. 1926) included both anarcho-syndicalist and anarcho-communist elements. Its tenets included class struggle for emancipation of workers and tenant farmers, direct and economic action over political participation and free decentralised industry-based federation. Consonant with the syndicalist slogan of no war but the class war, they 'oppose[d] imperialist invasion and advocate[d] the international solidarity of the workers'.¹⁰ In 1931 its paper published a piece highly critical of the Japanese capitalist class and military, denouncing the invasion of China and Manchuria. 'We must cease military production, refuse military service and disobey the officers. Complete international unity of the anarchists would signal our victory, not only economically but in the war against war:

Anarchist groups of all countries, unite!
Abolish Imperialist War!¹¹

Hence their logical solidarity with Korean counterparts on the other side of the line of coloniality.

Much of what English speakers know of Korean anarchist history has come from anti-imperialist anarchist-pacifist scholar-activist Ha Ki-Rak. Although some say much of this is unverifiable apocrypha, nevertheless a popular attachment to mythologised memory says something real about what people value, aspire to and fight for.

Kim Jwa-Jin, the legendary 'Korean Makhno' (or should we be calling Makhno the 'Ukrainian Kim?'), was a hero of the Korean independence movement and the utopian Shinmin Autonomous Region, or Korean People's Association in Manchuria. It was formed in 1929 jointly by the Korean Anarchist Federation and Korean Anarcho-Communist Federation as a self-governing network of cooperatives, prefiguring anarchist principles while resisting Japanese occupation. Kim was murdered while defending one of the cooperatively run rice mills on which the community's survival depended. Shinmin fell shortly thereafter in 1931, squeezed between Japanese and Chinese forces.

The Declaration of Korean Revolution had stated, 'To sustain the Korean people's survival, we need to wipe out Robber Japan'. This could only be accomplished through a popular revolution: destroying the Japanese forces

would require simultaneously eliminating ‘the rule of a foreign race’, ‘a privileged class’, a ‘system of economic exploitation’, ‘social inequality’, and ‘servile cultural thoughts’.¹² Breaking through those layered structures of oppression would result in an ‘authentic Korea’ with freedom for the masses.

After the war, Ha helped found the League of Free Social Constructors in 1945 and later a new KAF in Seoul in 1972. While the earlier declaration linked the struggle against Japanese imperialism to ‘internal lack of equality and freedom’ wrought by local feudal and capitalist collaborators, the new one addressed the postwar trusteeship of new foreign powers, patronising local dictatorships. Could these be replaced by a free and equal society?

The 1980 Kwangju Uprising drew inspiration from both Shinmin and the Paris Commune (as did the Chinese students in Tiananmen Square 1989, alluding to it in their communiqués).¹³ According to George Katsiaficas, the Kwangju revolutionaries had been studying and discussing the Commune, and through it, Kropotkin, viewed as the primary articulator of its logic as he expressed his faith in the people’s capacity and tendency for spontaneous cooperation, self-organisation and prefiguration of a free society through the independent commune. Katsiaficas emphasises the language of participatory democracy, horizontal empowerment, bottom-up, anti-hierarchical social relations and decentralised coordination of movement organisation as well as of new social forms, the unleashing of contagious radical eros,¹⁴ and the awakening and maturation of consciousness to be gained through the process of insurrection. ‘What people desire is not power, but freedom’—to ‘put down structures of oppression and expand the spaces of freedom’ in all its material and psychological dimensions.¹⁵

AFRICAN ANARCHISM AND POSTCOLONIALISM

In Africa too, the anarchist record tends to follow two tracks: one is dominated by revolutionary syndicalism and class struggle, with its two most well-documented sub-Saharan centres in Nigeria and South Africa, in whose liberation struggle anarchists formed a wing of the Social Democratic Federation (est. Cape Town, 1904) and the International Socialist League (est. Johannesburg, 1915) leading to the syndicalist Industrial Workers of Africa, Indian Workers Industrial Union and Industrial Socialists League (multi-racial formations which merged, split and remerged in new formations including the Communist Party of South Africa in 1921). An anarcho-syndicalist trade union federation in Portuguese Mozambique was allied to the Portuguese General Confederation of Labour (CGT), and in Guinea the Democratic Party of Guinea/Parti démocratique de Guinée (PDG) early on had close relations with the French CGT. In North Africa, syndicalism flourished in the early twentieth century along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, in cosmopolitan port cities like Alexandria, Tunis and Beirut, borne by the vectors of Italian, Spanish and Greek seamen and labourers, migrants and exiles. This wave crested in the mid-1920s, but fell apart within a few years with much of the continent subject to fascist powers via imperialist incursions and intensifications (Courtesy of Salazar, Franco, Mussolini and Vichy France.)

Secondly, we might see an African counterpart to Hatta's 'pure anarchism' or Shifu's 'pure socialism' in the ideas developed under the language of African socialism. In their seminal text on African anarchism, Sam Mbah and I.E. Igariwey claim that 'anarchistic elements' were pervasive in traditional indigenous African societies in which the relatively egalitarian social organisation wasn't based in class or hierarchy but in gendered age groups. Power was not concentrated in authorities, although councils of elders were accorded respect in adjudication and decision-making for their wisdom and experience. Each community's economics were collective, its politics participatory and deliberative. To Mbah and Igariwey,

What this means is that anarchism may not be so new in the African context. What is new is the concept of anarchism as a social movement or ideology. Anarchy as an abstraction may indeed be remote to Africans, but it is not at all unknown as a way of life. This is not fully appreciated because there is not as yet a systematic body of anarchist thought that is peculiarly African in origin.¹⁶

While acknowledging that those societies weren't perfect—some treated women poorly, and economically they were perhaps only feasible on a localised subsistence scale—Mbah and Igariwey claim that empire-states and social stratification began to emerge under the influence and distorting forces of colonial incursion. They make it clear that for the African continent, incorporation into the global capitalist system occurred through colonisation, which generated its racial regimes and internal class structures as well as its deleterious positioning in the global economy. Given this analysis, leftist revolutionary class struggle becomes inseparable from a colonial context; the trade union movement was 'a direct response to the colonial situation' of economic exploitation and developed even more strongly in settler areas where white supremacist social structures and the resultant racial tensions sharpened colonial contradictions.

After independence, some experiments were put into place to (re-)establish African socialism: in Nigeria, short-lived self-managing agricultural collectives were 'intended to recreate the traditional African communal way of living, complete with its features of equality and freedom'.¹⁷ In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere's ujamaa villages were intended to be the seed units of a socialist future consistent with free and egalitarian African traditional values. Translated as 'familyhood', whether by blood or choice, the ujamaa concept called for 'economic and social communities where people live and work together for the good of all' through cooperative agriculture and self-chosen community government. However the new state regimes largely hijacked these potentially emancipatory ideals, by coercive top-down implementation (see for example Senghor, Nkrumah, Qaddafi, and not least, Nyerere).

Given the failures and disappointments of the postcolonial national liberation states (whose authoritarianism, corruption and complicity with neoliberalism/neocolonialism made them into obstacles rather than facilitators of self-determination for the various ethnicities of the continent) and Marxist state socialism (which had been so influential upon anticolonial liberation

struggles from the 1920s to 1980s), many African countries would appear ripe for anarchism, which Mbah and Igariwey say more accurately reflects their cultural values in any case. They insist,

Anarchists demand the liberation of all existing colonies and support struggles for national independence in Africa and around the world, as long as they express the will of the people in the nations concerned. However, anarchists also insist that the usefulness of 'self-determination' will be very limited as long as the state system and capitalism—including marxist state capitalism—are retained.¹⁸

A new wave of anarchist organisations emerged in the 1990s, including the Awareness League in Nigeria, whose anarchist turn reflected its sharp critique of the failed state socialism of the post-independence regimes, and the Zabalaza Anarchist Communist Front in South Africa, where anarchists now portrayed the post-apartheid ANC government as 'the main sub-imperialist power' acting as proxy for the residual interests of the British empire and now of the agents of neoliberalism through privatisation, evictions and debt.

Given that the other important component of African colonisation—besides settlement and foreign exploitation of land and natural and mineral resources—was the mass abduction of the population for the slave trade, the African diaspora has logically seen its own liberation as an intrinsic part of African decolonisation efforts. New Afrikan anarchism in the US situated itself within the black revolutionary anticolonial tradition, participating in the militant liberation struggles of the 1960s–1970s, but also—as in the post-independence African continent—born out of disillusionment with the failures of those movements.

Black Panther and Black Liberation Army veteran Kuwasi Balagoon has been identified as 'a new Afrikan freedom fighter'¹⁹ and as 'an antiauthoritarian like Bakunin and Ricardo Flores Magón'.²⁰ The analysis he fleshed out in his court statements when on trial for the 1981 Brink's truck robbery laid out connections between capitalism, racism and imperialism. Identifying black people in the US as a third world community and an internal colony—the profitable exploitation of whose enslaved bodies and coerced labour were the basis for US imperial expansion²¹—while committing himself as a colonised person to militant liberation struggle (comparing the BLA to the IRA, PLO, FALN and ANC), he insisted upon the need for both anarchism and anti-imperialism:

Of all ideologies, anarchy is the one that addresses liberty and equalitarian relations in a realistic and ultimate fashion. It is consistent with each individual having an opportunity to live a complete and total life ... This is because the goals of anarchy don't include replacing one ruling class with another ... This is key because this is what separates anarchist revolutionaries from Maoist, socialist and nationalist revolutionaries who from the outset do not embrace complete revolution. They cannot envision a truly free and equalitarian society and must to some extent embrace the socialisation process that makes exploitation and oppression possible and prevalent in the first place.²²

Lorenzo Kom'boa Ervin, another Black Panther militant turned anarchist, systematically laid out his analysis of imperialism, capitalism and racism as the interlinked components of global oppression; his belief that anarchism combined with black revolution, among other anticolonial national liberation movements, was the best vehicle for counteracting that; and his dissatisfaction with white anarchists in their failure to come to terms with white supremacy, including what he saw as their ideologically purist dismissal of black and other third world nationalism.

His statement of belief sums it up:

I believe in Black liberation, so I am a Black revolutionary...

I believe in the destruction of the world Capitalist system, so I am an anti-imperialist...

I believe in racial justice, so I am an anti-racist...

I believe in social justice and economic equality, so I am a Libertarian Socialist ... I believe in workers [sic] control of society and industry, so I am an Anarcho-Syndicalist...

I do not believe in government, and so I am Anarchist ... Anarchism means that we will have more democracy, social equality, and economic prosperity. I oppose all forms of oppression found in modern society: patriarchy, white supremacy, Capitalism, State Communism, religious dictates, gay discrimination, etc.²³

We may infer from this his picture of a postcolonial anarchist society.

MENA ANARCHISM AND POSTCOLONIALISM²⁴

Postcolonial struggles in this region include simultaneously the direct primary resistance to a still extant settler colonialism pursuing a textbook agenda of land expropriations, ethnic cleansing to clear land, attempted cultural genocide, collective punishment, as in Palestine; and the resistance to dictatorships put in place and maintained as compradors or proxies by the US neo-empire, enforcing stringent internal security to guarantee the empire's economic and strategic interests, the profitability of free markets, and access to fossil fuel supplies, as in the regimes confronted by the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings.²⁵

Non-Western anarchism sometimes manifests as a complex linking radicals among colonised populations and dissidents within the colonising society—such as, in this region, France/Algeria and Israel/Palestine. David Porter delves into the relationship of French anarchism to the Algerian anticolonial struggle as well as anarchistic formations within Algeria. Although most of the self-identified anarchists there from the late nineteenth century until independence were of European origin (French or Spanish exiles), he says, there were some native Algerian anarcho-syndicalists, who had spent time organising and writing in Paris. Saïl Mohamed had been jailed during World War One for insubordination with the French Colonial Forces, then settled near Paris, joined the Union Anarchiste and Confédération Générale du Travail-Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire (CGT-SR), organising militant anarchist Algerians in France in

a separate section; he eventually volunteered to fight with the Durruti Column in Spain.²⁶ Like Nyerere, Gandhi, Kim or Zapata in their own contexts, Saïl argued that rural Algerian (Berber) society, prior to Western incursion (or Western anarchist terminology), was already decentralised and autonomous, functioning by cooperative mutual aid principles. Liberation from French control must not lead to another hierarchical nationalist or religious regime, he insisted, like that of the marabouts whose clerical influence he considered to be a distortion of Algerian culture. Porter reports that when the Mouvement Libertain Nord-African (MNLA) formed in 1950, its components included several anarchist groups in Algeria and Morocco with connections to the French Anarchist Federation newspaper *Le Libertain*; it affiliated with the 'Libertarian Communist International' in 1954.²⁷

After the liberation in 1962, there were attempts at *autogestion* or 'Algerian socialism' in the form of worker takeovers of farms, factories, land and services abandoned by colonial property owners. Assistance came from the Union Générale de Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA), whose members had studied cooperatives and worker-directed agricultural and industrial structures in China, Cuba, Yugoslavia and elsewhere. The UGTA journal called for collectivising previously European-owned land to use for *autogestion* farms. Still, these efforts at self-organisation were more 'spontaneous and pragmatic' than ideologically driven. During the Ben Bella regime, the 'scope and size of this radical decentralized socialist sector [was] unprecedented in a newly independent country', says Porter.²⁸ But after Boumedienne took over, the *autogestion* system was gradually broken down and consolidated into more state-controlled or privatised units.

Despite a lack of explicitly named anarchist formations in the post-independence period, some Algerians (at home and in France) did identify themselves as such; Porter claims to see a strong streak of consistent anarchistic sensibility in activism and writings viewing Berber cultural heritage as naturally anarchistic, whose local governing structures had 'centuries-deep roots in the mountainous communities of rural Kabylia, more autonomous by nature and fiercely suspicious of outside authorities than rural communities in the plains'.²⁹ Later insurrectionary moments like the Berber Spring (1980) and Black Spring (2001) based their challenges to the regime in a 'coordinated network of traditionalist-type local village and communal assemblies'. The *aarch* (assemblies) movement, a Berber cultural movement demanding greater regional autonomy from the national government, '[i]n its original 'horizontalist' structure and process ... had strong affinities with an anarchist model of social organization'.³⁰

Similar observations have been made about some portions of the ongoing Palestinian struggle against colonial occupation, in which anti-authoritarian patterns and principles have been present even without a specific vocabulary and optics of anarchism as understood in the west. Echoing Ervin decades later, young Palestinian activists—who report that anarchistic thinking is amply present among individuals active in the struggle, though not in organised form as such—have cited the disconnect between Western anarchists' assumptions and the on-the-ground experience of a community struggling under acute colonial

duress, including occasional Orientalist or Islamophobic blind spots.³¹ The first Intifada (1987–1991) was characterised by horizontalist and bottom-up self-organisation, but the movement of popular struggle later felt derailed after the Oslo accords by the top-down power of the Palestinian Authority. The PA has since been critiqued as a virtual agent of the occupying forces (policing resistance while concentrating wealth and privileges amongst a small elite). Wherever there are critiques of not only the occupation but also the governing authorities; and not only of the governing authorities but of patriarchy and other entrenched social hierarchies; wherever there is the impulse to move beyond thinking nationalistically in the narrow or particularistic sense toward thinking as part of a broader transnational liberation ideal, there is anarchistic vision.³² Much work remains to be done to spotlight, articulate and amplify these elements.³³

LATIN AMERICAN ANARCHISM AND POSTCOLONIALISM

As our attention roves over the great Non-West, certain patterns begin to emerge.

Recurring theme #1: in Latin America, as in Africa, formal independence from European empires fell almost immediately under the shadow of new forms of empire, in which the newly established states were often complicit. Whereas in Africa this came about in the late twentieth century, in Latin America the process began as early as the 1820s when Mexico and the Bolivarian countries won independence from the Spanish empire, only to face the US's assertion of hemispheric hegemony through the Monroe Doctrine, continuing through the seizure of half of Mexico's territory in 1848, Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1898, and on through a century of proxy-ruled banana republics, CIA-sponsored counter-insurgencies, neoliberal trade agreements, narco-wars and resource privatisations.

Recurring theme #2: anarcho-syndicalism and revolutionary trade unionism traveled virally along the pathways of European migration and shipping, most significantly in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.

Recurring theme #3: complementing the resultant urban industrial radicalism and its thriving intellectual and print culture was a rural revolutionary strain of left libertarianism, particularly acute where control of land, agriculture and mining were concerned, and which, given the ethnic make-up of the peasantry, drew strongly on indigenous traditions.³⁴

Manuel González Prada was credited as one of the first urban anarchists of European origin to engage with Latin American indigeneity in 1904. In Peru, heterodox socialist José Carlos Mariátegui noted an alliance of urban trade unions, usually anarchist, with rural peasant rebels, usually indigenous, whose respective revolutionary tasks would be to face industrial capitalists and feudal landowners. In Mexico, an analogous dynamic unfortunately broke down when President Carranza co-opted the urban anarcho-syndicalists to organise Red Brigades against rural rebels such as Spanish/Nahua Magón-influenced guerrilla leader and land-reform champion Emiliano Zapata, in 1917.

In Bolivia, where the latest cycle of resistance to neocolonialism might be traced to the Cochabamba water wars in 2000, Raúl Zibechi sees an alternative to the existing socio-politico-economic system in the Altiplano, where Aymara communities are building decentralised, bottom-up non-state power using the *ayllu* (the traditional Andean kin-based social form) as the main organisational unit, wherein power is emergent from community rather than separated from or above it.

‘If the state is the monopoly of physical coercion exercised by a body that separate from society (a civil and military bureaucracy)’, said Zibechi, ‘in the Aymara world this capacity is distributed and dispersed throughout the social body and ultimately subject to assemblies in the countryside and the city’.³⁵ The goal and aspiration is to build a ‘self-organised pluricultural society starting out from the Andean community paradigm’: an autonomous region beyond state, beyond capitalism.³⁶

CONCLUSION: STATELESS SOVEREIGNTIES (A POSTCOLONIAL ASPIRATION)

From an anarchist perspective, nation-states are not equipped to be the vehicles of either resistance or liberation. The acquisition of a state by a national liberation movement can never be postcolonial, since it will perpetuate coloniality.

Under colonial rule it is easy to recognise the state and all its avatars as hostile forces external to society, and industry and finance as obvious siphons of wealth away from local flourishing toward faraway concentration. But upon attaining independence from foreign rule, the ‘postcolonial’ state, with its affiliated economic and military elites, often simply takes over the structures, functions and behaviours of the colonial apparatus. An anarchist approach to anticolonial liberation must be as critical of nation-states’ power and the local hierarchies they reward as it is to colonial regimes. The implementation of more radical imaginaries includes definitions of self-determination and sovereignty that do not entail state-building, and might involve drawing upon pre-colonial social forms and ethical systems as precedents. (The caveat here is that not all pre-colonial forms may be inherently liberatory either, simply by virtue of their provenance.)

But are stateless people stateless by choice and principle, or by deprivation of that option against their will, because they have been dispossessed, or displaced, or exiled, or had their homelands dissected by newly drawn borders? Many of the peoples who fought for independence from colonial rule in the twentieth century wound up with states. The not-yet-‘enstated’—those who are still fighting, or stranded straddling state lines—perhaps have an opportunity to seek another form. Is it possible, in today’s world, to establish and defend a sovereign territory without a state? Some are trying.

The Kurds have been seeking independence ever since the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire gave way to the British and French Mandatory system and thence to the postwar political map whose lines left them scattered between four countries. Rojava (or West Kurdistan) is a region within the borders of

northern Syria comprising several autonomous cantons, according to an organisational model dubbed Democratic Confederalism by Abdullah Öcalan, a leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) originally established as a Marxist-Leninist national liberation party in 1978. While in prison in Turkey, Öcalan began studying the work of American anarchist theorist Murray Bookchin. Öcalan applied his interpretation of Bookchin's concepts of libertarian socialism, social ecology and municipalism as the basis for a decentralised social structure built upon autonomous municipalities, functioning through participatory democracy in local assemblies, and defended by people's militias. While another segment of the Kurdish population in northern Iraq does seek a more conventional route to statehood through a more conventional nationalism, oil-financed and strategically aligned with the interests of the main imperial forces in the region, Rojava's alternate model of Kurdish patriotism advocates ethnic diversity and religious pluralism, and foregrounds the ideals of *jineology* ('women's science'), committed to the principle that society cannot be free without eliminating patriarchy and misogyny; nor can it survive without establishing ecologically sustainable collective structures.³⁷

As a ray of hope and inspiration, Rojava's Kobani canton has come to occupy a similar place in the worldwide anarchist imagination of the 2010s as perhaps Barcelona did in the 1930s. But do we see only what we want to see? Some observers caution against utopian wishful thinking, warning that the PKK is not immune to authoritarianism, leader worship or pressured conformity. Furthermore, its survival is precarious, surrounded by hostile forces in a volatile and hazardous political environment, entangled in messy situational webs of conflicting tactical alignments, and its future remains to be seen. But perhaps it may take heart from the fact that another example has lasted now for over 20 years.

The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) announced itself on the world stage in 1994, in direct response to the initiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. The Mayan communities of the Lacandon jungle located themselves squarely in the context of opposition to neocolonialism in the form of neoliberal globalisation, namely, the hyper-expansion of global capitalism.

The Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon, issued in 1996 to announce a new phase of the struggle, framed the Mexican government as synonymous with criminality, and the federal forces as an army of occupation and new conquest of the indigenous communities; their 'struggle for democracy, liberty and justice is a struggle for national liberation' too.³⁸ Almost a decade later, the Sixth Declaration stated even more unequivocally (in the section 'How We See the World') that neoliberal global capitalism equals neo-imperial conquest, exploitation and plunder³⁹; and (in the section 'How We See Mexico') that the state, serving global capital and not the people, is hence an agent of imperialism.

Foreshadowing our now standard hyper-connectivity of communication networks, they played a large role in calling forth a global network of grassroots resistance to neoliberalism. Zapatismo captured the imaginations of social movements around the world, and the hearts of many northern anarchists, though some did gripe that it wasn't proper anarchism. But nor was it proper

nationalism: 'In the world we want everyone fits. In the world we want many worlds to fit. The Nation which we construct is one where all communities and languages fit'.⁴⁰ Henceforward, non-indigenous communities in effect were invited to participate in a nation-building project *on indigenous terms*.

Among the Zapatista autonomous municipalities, power flows upward from the base communities; according to the leadership model of 'leading by obeying', no major decision can be made from above without consultation and consent from throughout the confederation. Each community is organised through direct democracy in local assemblies, with cooperative economics. Here too, gender equality is prioritised in all formations.

In a surprising tactical turn, the Zapatistas have fielded a (female, indigenous) candidate for the 2018 Mexican presidential election, not for the purpose of taking over the state, but for the stated purpose of infiltrating the general consciousness and building the Indigenous Government Council as a presence mediating between the existing state and the alternate society they have nurtured. Beyond the establishment of a spatially separate territory, what happens if such a mode of society really does begin to reveal itself as a ubiquitous mesh, dispersing power throughout the shell of the old?

While it may or may not be accurate to call either Kurdish Democratic Confederation or Zapatismo a non-Western postcolonial anarchism, each is an embattled base for the prefigurative praxis of true postcoloniality while striving toward radical self-transformation. In essence, the Rojava experiment is an effort to establish a form of anarchistic society independent of the surrounding state jurisdictions, and as such, a deferred decolonisation project, namely the liberation of a territory and people disenfranchised by maps of colonial palimpsest. The Chiapas experiment, similarly, is the effort to establish a form of anarchistic society independent of the surrounding state jurisdiction, within a liberated territory established as a bastion against neocolonialism.

Postcolonial anarchism is by definition embedded in a context shaped by the colonial encounter, and, since anarchism opposes all forms of domination, has therefore been involved in resisting it and embodying alternatives to it.

In many of the non-Western anarchist histories we've considered, two strands coexist: one that is more industrial, scientific and modernist; another that is more agrarian, land-based, holistic and arcadian. As the fundamental building blocks of struggle and futurity, the revolutionary syndicate and the decentralised confederation of autonomous village collectives are equally widespread templates. We might also note the recurring co-presence of

- people and groups who self-identify with the genealogy of modern anarchist traditions, from syndicalist to insurrectionary, consequently challenging Western ownership of that tradition and
- people and groups who use different vocabularies rooted in a variety of philosophical traditions that demonstrate affinity with anarchism as defined above, consequently challenging anarchism's ownership of anarchistic praxis and thinking.

But we should not mistake this difference for one between stable categories of modernity and tradition or between progress and regression. Suppose we redefine ‘postmodern’ as the adjective locating a range of possible responses to conditions of modernity and ‘postcolonial’ a range of possible responses to conditions of coloniality (a historical component of modernity, as it has existed). This is at the crux of what postcolonialist discourse and its critics are addressing. It does not necessarily mean an attempt to recreate how things were prior to the initial colonial encounter, whether that means rewinding by five decades or five centuries; but rather for colonised peoples to be free to manifest modernity on their own terms, to revive tradition as evolving, not static, growing in accordance with desired values and aspirations; to resume movement upon an alternate route previously blocked off.

These non-Western anarchisms are all counter-modernities, proposing sophisticated and politically adept political and economic alternatives oriented toward a different set of values than the ones that have come to be associated with the dominant paradigms of modern Western colonialism. Indeed, many have argued that traditional forms of non-Western social organisation and economic relations (more free and egalitarian; less liable to bring about the destruction of the planet through war or ecological collapse) offer more just and sustainable models, which, if free to develop, would be capable of proceeding directly to a desired vision of anarcho-communism without passing through the universally set stages of a Hegelian or Whig teleology. Thus reclaiming these forms doesn’t mean restoring lost purity, but restoring lost possibility: imagine a world where non-Western anarchisms and postcolonialism are the unmarked hegemonic reality.

AUTHOR’S POSTSCRIPT

It is crucial to emphasise that I am in no sense the rightful spokesperson for any non-Western anarchism or decolonial struggle—neither the ones mentioned here nor those I failed to mention. This piece is offered so as to hold space and open a threshold, nothing more. It is my hope to use it as a stepping stone for the collective generation of further knowledge about non-Western anarchisms through the self-directed participation of many more people (<https://anarchiststudies.org/non-western-anarchisms-and-postcolonialism>).

NOTES

1. C. Bantman and B. Altana (Eds), *Reassessing the Transnational Turn* (Oakland: PM Press, 2017).
2. See Laursen in this volume.
3. This periodisation from J. Adams, *Non-Western Anarchisms: Rethinking the Global Context* (Johannesburg: Zabalaza Books, 2002).
4. See R. White, *Postcolonial Anarchism* (The Anarchist Library, Anticopyright 2004, theanarchistlibrary.org/library/roger-white-post-colonial-anarchism);

- APOC, *Our Culture Our Resistance* (www.libcom.org/forums/organise/anarchist-people-of-color-book) (Accessed 30 November 2017).
5. M. Ramnath, 'In dialogue: anarchism and postcolonialism', in C. Levy and S. Newman (Eds), *The Anarchist Imagination* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018); 'Decolonisation', in R. Kinna and U. Gordon (Eds), *Handbook of Radical Politics* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).
 6. [I am planning to set up an interactive on-line feature to collaboratively build this research].
 7. R. Graham (Ed), *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas, Vol. I* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2005), 351.
 8. *Ibid.*, 367.
 9. *Ibid.*, 371.
 10. *Ibid.*, 376. In 1928 the Zenkoku tilted toward pure anarchism and the syndicalists broke off to form the much smaller Libertarian Federation Council of Labour Unions of Japan (Jikyo).
 11. *Ibid.*, 389.
 12. *Ibid.*, 374–375.
 13. G. Katsiaficas, *Asia's Unknown Uprisings, Vol. 1* (Oakland: PM Press, 2012), 361–388.
 14. This term, which George Katsiaficas develops throughout all his work, refers to 'the sudden, intuitive awakening of solidarity and massive opposition to the established system' visible in times of widespread revolutionary upsurge, exceeding rational calculation and generating contagious energy from affect and desire. Katsiaficas, *The Subversion of Politics: European Autonomous Social Movements and the Decolonization of Everyday Life* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1997), 17n14.
 15. Graham, *Anarchism*.
 16. Mbah and I.E. Igariwey, *African Anarchism* (Tucson: See Sharp Press, 1997), 27–28.
 17. *Ibid.*, 47.
 18. *Ibid.*, 106.
 19. D. Gilbert in *Kuwasi Balagoon: A Soldier's Story* (Montreal: Kersplebedeb Publishing, 2003), 9.
 20. J. Sakai in *Ibid.*, 21.
 21. We should add here the other key component, namely the land seized from the prior inhabitants, which provided the land base for the plantation system's global commodity cash crops.
 22. K. Balagoon in *Kuwasi Balagoon*, 75.
 23. L.K. Ervin, 'Anarchism and the black revolution', in Black Rose Anarchist Federation, *Black Anarchism: A Reader* (www.blackrosefed.org/black-anarchism-a-reader), 70–71 (Accessed 30 November 17).
 24. For the purposes of this overview, the formulation 'Middle East and North Africa' indicates a region of cultural and historical continuity through shared experiences of Ottoman, British and French control.
 25. See Galian in this volume.
 26. D. Porter, *Eyes to the South: French Anarchists and Algeria* (Oakland: AK Press, 2011), 201.
 27. *Ibid.*
 28. *Ibid.*, 93.

29. Ibid., 321. This seems consistent with James Scott's or Eric Hobsbawm's proverbial free/lawless mountain folk.
30. Ibid., 322.
31. J. Stephens (quoting Beesan Ramadan), 'Palestinian anarchists in conversation: recalibrating anarchism in a colonized country', *The Outpost* (February 2013). www.anarchiststudies.org/2013/07/19/palestinian-anarchists-in-conversation (Accessed 30 November 17).
32. Stephens, *ibid.* According to Ramadan, this broader space was opened up by contacts between Palestinians and Syrian, Lebanese and Egyptian anarchists, a phenomenon catalysed by the Arab Spring uprisings. See also M. Bamyeh, 'Anarchist, liberal and authoritarian enlightenments: notes on the Arab Spring'. *Jadaliyya* (30 July 2011).
33. Independent activist/journalists J. Stephens and S. Campbell have each contributed to opening a portal by which western anarchists may glimpse and hear the voices of Palestinian anarchists, through work published on various websites including www.itsgoingdown.org and www.anarchiststudies.org (Accessed 30 November 2017).
34. P. Marshall's tiny chapter on Latin America in the (in many ways admirable) compendium *Demanding the Impossible* (HarperCollins, 1992) suggests the opposite: that the indigenous empires (Aztec, Inca) were authoritarian and hierarchical while proposing a direct correlation between anarchist presence and degree of European immigration. He seems not to understand the diversity of indigenous social structures, or acknowledge the indigeneity of the peasantry, nor to recognise the distinction between urban syndicalism and rural anarchism.
35. Raul Zibechi, *Dispersing Power: Social Movements as Anti-State Forces* (Oakland: AK Press, 2010), 7.
36. Ibid., 123.
37. See as an introduction among many sources, Strangers in a Tangled Wilderness (Ed), *A Small Key Can Open a Large Door* (Strangers in a Tangled Wilderness, 2015).
38. M. Leger and D. Tomas, *Zapantera Negra* (Brooklyn: Common Notions, 2017), 154–159.
39. Ibid., 179.
40. Ibid., 163.



Anarchism and Indigeneity

Kahala Johnson and Kathy E. Ferguson

In this chapter, we aim to make connections and stage encounters between anarchism and Indigenous thought. We are looking for resonances across these fields of thinking and acting, without insisting on correspondence or eschewing tensions. Judy Greenway's preface to *Anarchism and Sexuality* sets the needed tone: she provokes us to 'find ways of bringing together different perspectives, analyses, ways of doing things: not answers, but questions; not a single, smooth, impenetrable surface, but rough edges which can spark off one another, provides new points of access'.¹ Our goal is not to collapse the two rich trajectories into a single body of thinking/acting: we are not saying 'Indigenous people are really anarchists, after all' or 'anarchists are not really settlers, after all'.

Instead, we are looking to a few fertile sites of encounter between anarchy and Indigeneity, hoping that sparks will fly and, as Greenway suggests, 'new points of access' will emerge. Anarchism grows best when, as anarchist thinkers Ruth Kinna and Alex Prichard suggest in their essay 'Anarchism: Past, Present, and Utopia', it eschews 'an endless celebration of a few de-historicized and de-contextualized principles' and instead theorises its relation to specific problems and challenges.² As Joel Olson argues in his insightful essay, 'The Problem with Infoshops and Insurrection', a moral condemnation of all forms of hierarchy is not the same as, and does not substitute for, 'a *political and strategic* analysis of how power functions'.³ Olson stages an encounter between anarchism and critical race theory, using each to put pressure on the other. We invite a similar concurrence between anarchist and Indigenous thinking, focusing specifically on ideas about temporality, states, law, and sovereignty.

K. Johnson • K. E. Ferguson (✉)

Department of Political Science, University of Hawai'i Mānoa, Honolulu, HI, USA
e-mail: kahalaj@hawaii.edu; kferguso@hawaii.edu

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Before we go on, a note about co-authoring is in order. We read and talked together for several months before writing without finding pronouns troublesome. Yet when we began to write, differences in authorial voice emerged. For Ferguson, who comes to this work largely as a political theorist, *we* usually means the two writers at hand. For Johnson, who approaches the project more as a Kanaka Maoli activist and thinker, *we* primarily means Native Hawaiians. Occasionally *we* means anarchists and indigenists or issues an invitation to all potential fellow travellers. To preserve and honour Johnson's situatedness, the two of us have taken some liberties with academic conventions: each of the four main sections of the chapter is signed by their primary author, while the overall direction of the argument and this brief introduction are shared.

TEMPORALITY (FERGUSON)

Anarchism and Indigenous politics both seek ways of living that embody their goals and resist incorporation into hegemonic arrangements. Among those hegemonic arrangements enacting unwelcome incorporation is history or, more accurately, dominant historiographies of states and empires. State time and settler time bracket anarchism and indigeneity as untimely, albeit in different ways; both are marginal to the accepted historical narratives dictating the 'common sense' of the present. Indigenous thinkers are discounted in hegemonic time as hopelessly nostalgic for a pristine but lost past, while anarchists are dismissed as hopelessly optimistic for a perfect but impossible future. Indigenism is impractical for 'our' present—it can't come back. Native people might hope to be incorporated into dominant arrangements as a minority group or romanticised as a defeated people but not recognised as a different kind of nation. Anarchism, similarly, is impractical for 'our' future—it can't come at all. It might be a nice idea in theory, but it would never work in practice. The pervasive dualism of tradition vs. modernity skewers Indigeneity, while the 'common sense' dyad of realistic vs. unrealistic disqualifies anarchism.

Yet, for all the violent efforts at erasure, Indigenous people are still here, neither extinct nor frozen. Seneca scholar Mishuana Goeman (Tonawanda band) urges us to think of 'Native peoples as becoming and belonging in movement rather than as stable and unchanging identities'.⁴ Similarly, despite the state's best efforts to disappear or disdain anarchists, rendering them 'at best as utopian, at worst, as a dangerous chimera', anarchism has a stubborn presence, neither dangerously chaotic nor permanently postponed.⁵ This being the case, why doesn't simply pointing out the presence of living Indigenous people and functioning anarchists change the dominant way of thinking about them? The answer appears to be that Indigenous people and anarchists perform similar functions for states and empires: both are necessary Others to the hegemonic system, the constitutive outside confirming the orderly inside. Chickasaw scholar Jodi Byrd explains that Indigenous people are a 'necessary supplement that continually haunts the edges of any evocation of civilization or Western thought'.⁶ Anarchists similarly have been repeatedly recruited to confirm the

proper order by their exclusion from it.⁷ Bringing Indigenous people and anarchists into the working present as living possibilities requires us to unthink the frame in which radical options are either lost in the past or unavailable in the future.

It is a radical act to refuse to be temporal anomalies, for Indigenous people to insist, 'We're still here' and for anarchists to proclaim, 'We're already here'. The key to this insistence may lie in thinking radical times as interconnected with, but not reducible to, state/settler times. Alternative times are not entirely absent from prevailing histories, nor are they captive to it.⁸ Time is not an absolute, but is a reckoning of change and continuity that requires a 'frame of reference' to be coherent.⁹ Frames of reference are grounded in enduring, material, social arrangements of living. As Mark Rifkin explains, 'Such collective frames comprise the effects on one's perception and material experience of patterns of individual and collective memory, the legacies of historical events and dynamics, consistent or recursive forms of inhabitation, and the length and character of the timescales in which current events are situated'.¹⁰ Instead of thinking of time as a container holding events, we need to think of time as plural 'potentially divergent processes of becoming'.¹¹

How do Indigenous time and anarchist time work? They enact durations grounded in non-hegemonic life worlds, 'everyday forms of relationships and struggle'.¹² They do not develop primarily through inclusion in the temporal registers of settlement, states, and capital, patriarchy, and empire. Hegemonic time is mono-time, imagining a single 'now' preceded by a universally shared 'then'. The price of inclusion in hegemonic time is the erasure of specificity. While settlement violence is ubiquitous for Indigenous people, settler governance is not the primary umbrella frame within which Indigenous temporalities emerge. Many Indigenous thinkers are suspicious when settler institutions offer 'recognition' to native people; Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson, for example, advocates refusal instead, rejecting the option of being reduced to a 'different' participant within the overweening settler frame.¹³ Anarchist time also emerges in a counter-history, one marked by events, rituals and rebellions through which anarchist communities organise their activities and tell their stories. States may offer anarchists a kind of inclusion in the dominant temporality by inviting them to issue a set of demands to be taken up by the authorities. Anarchists generally reject or at least are suspicious of these opportunities, because it reduces them to bargaining for a better deal rather than making a better world.

Yet, radical temporalities must negotiate some relationships with hegemonic time because they affect it and are affected by it. Refusal of recognition does not mean that Indigenous people are unimplicated in settler arrangements, but it can mark, as Rifkin claims, 'an existence not a priori tethered to settler norms and frames'.¹⁴ Anarchists too build their politics on a subordinated knowledge, as British anarchist Colin Ward argues, on 'informal, transient, self-organizing networks of relationships that in fact make the human community possible'.¹⁵ Free and cooperative relations, for anarchists, operate 'side by side with, and in

spite of, the dominant authoritarian trends of our society'.¹⁶ Self-organising networks persist 'like a seed beneath the snow, buried under the weight of the state and its bureaucracy, capitalism and its waste, privilege and its injustices, nationalism and its suicidal loyalties, religious differences and their superstitious separatism'.¹⁷ Anarchist and Indigenous temporalities may differ over disparate notions of nation, sovereignty, and religion, but they share an insistence on confounding the dominant historical narrative about what has been and what is possible. 'Discrepant temporalities', in Rifkin's fine phrase, are 'all open to change, and yet [are] not equivalent or mergeable into a neutral common frame'.¹⁸ Anarchist time and Indigenous time, then, do not dissolve into a single fixed alternative to state and settler time, but inhabit a plurality of non-normative durations grounded in distinct life-worlds.

Radical times are expressed through markers of continuity and change that turn toward some events and away from others. These markers invite 'collective ways of inhabiting the present' that orient people to possible pasts, connect some events while bypassing others.¹⁹ Rifkin sketches some of the ways that Indigenous time may diverge from settler time, including:

modes of periodization; the felt presence of ancestors; affectively consequential memories of prior dispossessions; the ongoing material legacies of such dispossessions; knowledges arising from enduring occupancy in a particular homeland, including attunement to animal and climatic periodicities; knowledges arising from present or prior forms of mobility; the employment of generationally iterated stories as a basis for engaging with people, places, and nonhuman entities; the setting of the significance of events within a much longer timeframe (generations, centuries, or millennia); particular ceremonial periodicities; the influence and force of prophecy; and a palpable set of responsibilities to prior generations and future ones.²⁰

Kanaka Maoli (Native Hawaiian) scholar Noenoe Silva notes the centrality of Hawaiian language newspapers in expressing what she calls *mo'okū'auhau* consciousness, a genealogical orientation valuing the knowledge of ancestors and anticipating the needs of descendants.²¹ Speaking of nineteenth-century writer Joseph Kānepu'u's work to record knowledge endangered by the state-mandated shift from Hawaiian to English, Silva writes, 'It was as if Kānepu'u looked directly into the future, into the next century, anticipating my own and younger generations of Hawaiian scholars and our enduring interest in and need for both the literature produced by his generation and the orature from all the generations before him'.²² These ways of 'enter[ing] into each other's sensations and experiences of duration' produce a specific temporal sensorium.²³

Anarchist communities have different but also potent markers to achieve cohesion in their timescapes as well as their landscapes. Annual celebrations of births, deaths, and anniversaries of events mark recurrences with which anarchists engage: the execution of anarchist educator Francisco Ferrer on October 13, 1909; the release from prison of anarchist Alexander Berkman on May 18, 1906; and the execution of the Haymarket martyrs on November 11, 1887. Radical labour actions such as Homestead, Pennsylvania (1892); Ludlow,

Colorado (1914); and the Battle of Blair Mountain in West Virginia (1921) are markers not because the strikers were defeated but because such strikes could happen again. Anarchist communities create publications, free schools, unions, collective farms, workshops, theatres, picnics, and other repeating activities that create frames of reference in which time accrues and is expressed. These markers are recurrent but not static: they create rhythm and momentum while also changing in relation to current conditions.

The regular publication of anarchist journals, whether daily, weekly, or monthly, circulate anarchist texts to homes, workplaces, pubs, libraries, and community houses, where in earlier times they were often read aloud around kitchen tables or on breaks from work. Like Hawaiian language newspapers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, anarchist periodicals of that era serialised materials, with each instalment marking the recurrent engagement of readers with continuing texts. Readers of papers were encouraged to save and share the publications, and anarchists would have joined Native Hawaiians in honouring writers as ‘companion[s] of the pen’.²⁴ Like anarchists, Hawaiian writers often evinced extraordinary commitment to their newspapers; the papers were not simply places where writers reported on the happenings in their communities but were themselves political expressions of those communities. ‘I will not quit any Hawaiian-language newspaper until the day I die’, declared Kānepu’u.²⁵ Contemporary versions of these circulating texts include zines, blogs, websites, games, and social media postings, enmeshing readers in a world of shared information, feelings, and judgements.

Radical Indigenous time and radical anarchist time draw upon stories as technologies of life: stories, as Ojibwe scholar Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark remarks, ‘*do things*, like provoke action, embody sovereignty, or structure social and political institutions’.²⁶ The narrative and material markers in Indigenous and anarchist timescapes produce ‘multiple modes of production, diversities of belief, contending memories, and competing future visions’.²⁷ Mapping places converges with mapping times: Hawaiian geographies as collected by Kānepu’u included specific names for ‘capes, waterfalls, fishponds (the native system of aquaculture), streams, kaupapalo’i (wetland kalo gardens)’ and the names for winds and moon nights.²⁸ Radical timescapes create conditions of possibility authorising the pasts they need and the futures they desire.

STATES (JOHNSON)

Analyses of the nation-state and its hierarchies have been a central feature of anarchist writings from Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s *Theory of Property* to Emma Goldman’s ‘The Individual, Society, and the State’.²⁹ Contemporary anarchisms continue the commitment to anti-state critique started by their forebearers by tracing how state hierarchies enable ongoing intersectional oppressions across race, class, ability, gender, sexuality, religion, nationality, and indigeneity. In his article ‘The Savage Ontology of Insurrection’, Benjamin Noys describes why this approach remains so compelling to present political movements seeking futures beyond current modes of life:

The allure of anarchism lies, in part, in an assertion of autonomy from the state and capital, and from the usual forms of political organization. The suspension of the 'arche' licenses a new self-determination, a new autonomy, beyond what are regarded as the stagnant and ineffective political forms of the present.³⁰

In addition to anarchist concerns, the nation-state and the ideology of statism have also posed a challenge for Indigenous peoples facing the ongoing effects of settler colonialism. Nation-states are more often than not settler states that function to continue the removal of natives from our lands while also absorbing potential threats from decolonisation efforts, direct-action activism, and Indigenous nation-building. As Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred and Cherokee scholar Jeff Corntassel argue in *Being Indigenous: Resurgences Against Contemporary Colonialism*, the state is a settler structure that eliminates natives not only by 'attempting to eradicate the physical signs of Indigenous peoples as human bodies, but by trying to eradicate their existence as peoples through the erasure of the histories and geographies that provide the foundation for Indigenous cultural identities and sense of self'.³¹ As natives, we suffer the material, semiotic, and relational consequences of this elimination. At the same time, colonial institutions often use our disadvantaged conditions to conveniently offer handouts via reconciliation processes meant to secure our dependence on the settler state for sustenance. Quoting Maori educator Graham Hingangaroa Smith, Alfred and Corntassel call this 'politics of distraction' an impediment to native nation-building 'that diverts energies away from decolonizing and regenerating communities and frames relationships in state-centric terms'.³²

For contemporary Kanaka Maoli politics, a turn toward legalist and statist deoccupation strategies in the last decade provides a unique context from which to consider the role of the state in Hawaiian activism. For in contrast to both anarchist critiques and Indigenous resurgence movements, statism is fundamental to Kanaka Maoli arguments seeking to restore the Hawaiian Kingdom, an internationally recognised sovereign nation-state since 1843. Rejecting the myths of American annexation and statehood, deoccupation advocates turn to international law to assert that the Hawaiian Kingdom is a country illegally occupied by the United States from 1896 to the present.³³

The argument from Hawaiian deoccupation advocates is different from previous frameworks analysing Hawai'i as a colony of the United States. Past paradigms had used the coloniser/colonised binary to position Kanaka Maoli in relation to American Indians and other Indigenous peoples as native nations attempting to achieve independence, self-determination, and sovereignty through decolonisation processes. In a striking departure from the discourses of both decolonisation and indigeneity, David Keanu Sai describes the legal, statist framework of deoccupation in 'A Slippery Path Toward Hawaiian Indigeneity':

In the legal and political realm, the fundamental difference between the terms *colonization/decolonization* and *occupation/deoccupation* is that the colonized must negotiate with the colonizer in order to acquire state sovereignty (i.e. India from Great Britain, Rwanda from Belgium, and Indonesia from the Dutch).

Under the latter, State sovereignty is presumed and not dependent on the will of the occupier (e.g. Soviet occupation of the Baltic States, and the American occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq). *Colonization/decolonization* is a matter that concerns internal laws of the colonizing State and presumes the colony is not sovereign, while *occupation/deoccupation* is a matter of international law relating to already existing sovereign states.³⁴

Arguing that the political status of the Hawaiian Kingdom falls under the legal framework of occupation/deoccupation—and not colonisation/decolonisation—he continues:

Thus, when Hawaiian scholars and sovereignty activists, in particular, consistently employ the terms and theories associated with colonization and indigeneity, they are reinforcing the very control they seek to oppose. Hawaiian State sovereignty and the international laws of occupation, on the other hand, not only presume the continuity of Hawaiian sovereignty, but also provides the legal framework for regulating the occupier, despite a history of non-compliance.³⁵

Following Sai, deoccupation frameworks suggest that the Hawaiian Kingdom—a sovereign nation-state recognised through treaties made with Britain, France, and the United States—was created by Kanaka leaders and non-Kanaka counsel to withstand the invasion of Hawai'i by other imperialist states expanding into the Pacific. By asserting the unextinguished sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a nation-state, Kanaka Maoli are simultaneously remembering this legal and political history while refusing the ongoing American occupation of our lands and government. In other words, the presumed sovereignty of the American nation-state over Hawai'i is being rejected by Kanaka Maoli who assert the unextinguished sovereignty of our own nation-state, the Hawaiian Kingdom, as rationale for deoccupation.

An interesting set of differences, similarities, and tensions are thus created between anarchist, Indigenous, and Hawaiian deoccupation strategies. Anarchists critical of statism might dismiss state forms—settler or native-led—as hierarchical, violent, and imperialistic structures responsible for the oppression of Indigenous communities. Native American and First Nations might rebuff settler state authority over their people as part of a resurgent 'politics of refusal'.³⁶ Kanaka Maoli deoccupation advocates who assert that the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom nation-state has already been recognised under international law may, consequentially, reject American pretences to jurisdiction and governance over Hawai'i. The difference for each argument lies in the approach and relation to statism: the first is a refusal against the state, the second a resurgence from within settler states, the last a remembrance of a pre-existing state in contestation with an occupying one.

The problem becomes increasingly cacophonous as these tensions are brought to bear upon one another. Anarchist critiques of Hawaiian deoccupation's reliance on the nation-state can end up undermining Kanaka Maoli articulations of sovereignty as a counter-strategy against American imperialism in

the Pacific. Indigenous resurgences insensitive to Hawaiian Kingdom legal historiographies may fail to recognise the political agency of past Kanaka leadership who attempted to indigenise the nation-state as a means of protecting their people from foreign invasion. At the same time, Hawaiian deoccupation research can fail to recognise and problematise the historiography of statism, including the violence and intersectional oppressions created by state hierarchies organised around race, class, gender, sexuality, nationality, coloniality, and so on. Furthermore, a dogmatic fixation on issues of law, sovereignty, and the nation-state can diminish the capacity for deoccupation discourses to envision resurgent, Indigenous futures based on kinships beyond those violent relations offered by state forms.

So far, the tensions between anarchism, Indigenous resurgence, and Hawaiian deoccupation have continued to emphasise the authority of statism and statehood: resisted, recognised, refused, or remembered, the state remains a central feature of the conversation. While an answer to the debate is beyond any single encounter, we might want to (re)consider a political concept constantly overshadowed by state dominance: the nation. Furthermore, we may want to stage an encounter with the nation concept as a way to shift the discussion between anarchism, indigenism, and Hawaiian deoccupation from state-based discourses toward resurged ideas of nationalism and nationhood.

Drawing upon native feminist and queer Indigenous theorisations of kinship, I want to think about the concepts of the state and the nation from a relational standpoint. How might anarcha-Indigenous approaches to Hawaiian deoccupation theorise resurged concepts of the nation, nationalism, and nationhood? Although nations are often conjoined in nuptial union with a state counterpart, their hyphenated status is by no means permanent or even desirable, especially considering the violent and oppressive history of the partnered term. Thinking relationally, can a nation imagine futures divorced from statism as part of an ex-colonial resurgence? Is the prospect of a nation living promiscuously or in open relation with other nations a recognisable possibility? Do statisticians need to know the details of extra-legal international trusts? Is keeping them a secret a sovereign act of refusal?

LAW (JOHNSON)

Following the practice of prefigurative politics, I would like us to consider our engagement with these inquiries as part of a resurgence from within the discussion between anarchists, Indigenous resurgents, and Hawaiian deoccupation advocates. Such a conversation can begin to enrich the formation of anarcha-Indigenous liaisons by encouraging participants to think beyond the limitations of critique and analysis and toward affinities informed by place-based research and direct-action struggle. Nevertheless, we should also turn to institutional complements of the state—the discourses, practices, and frameworks of law—to broaden the range and scope of our approach to the train of inquiries. In the following section, I discuss the place of law in conversations between anarchism,

Indigenous resurgence, and Hawaiian deoccupation, pointing to the practice of treaty-making as a potential site for collaboration.

Supporting the predominance of statist ideologies in Hawaiian deoccupation movements are the concepts, practices, and frameworks of law and jurisdiction. Law and legal structures provide Kanaka deoccupation discourses with the tools, tactics, and strategies for recognising the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom, often referring to national constitutions, civil and penal codes, court proceedings, international treaties, and an archive of land titles for evidence. The grammar of law, together with the practice of legal documentation, has been an important means of substantiating the injustice of a historical and ongoing American occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

Thus, in addition to the nation-state model, the framework of law is essential to Hawaiian deoccupation efforts to recognise the sovereignty and continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom. In particular, the practice of treaty-making is considered a crucial marker of sovereign expression: the historiography described by Sai in his dissertation *The American Occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom* cites the myriad treaties between Kingdom diplomats and foreign governments as a legal record of sovereign recognition between nation-states. Furthermore, deoccupation discourse points to the lack of a legal treaty annexing the Hawaiian Kingdom to the United States as evidence of the former's continued existence under international law.³⁷

As with the nation-state, anarchists might be quick to problematise the reliance of Kanaka Maoli on the framework and discourse of law as a strategy to restore the Hawaiian Kingdom. After all, isn't law largely responsible for maintaining the violent hierarchies of patriarchy, statism, capitalism, racism, and settler colonialism that oppress Kanaka Maoli? Considering the co-articulation of legal structures with these systems of oppression, Hawaiian faith in law may appear naïve, especially given the contrasting experiences of other native nations facing the oppression of settler state legal regimes.

Likewise, Indigenous peoples from Turtle Island (North America) may also urge caution when observing the weight Kanaka Maoli place on treaty-making with the United States and other foreign countries as evidence of sovereign recognition. For Native Americans in particular, the practice of US treaty-breaking—itsself providing historical and ongoing evidence of settler colonialism and American occupation—might seem a more appropriate reason to question the entire enterprise of legal recognition as an assimilation process. Indeed, Glen Coulthard of Yellowknives Dene First Nation warns against such reliances on state forms in *Red Skin White Masks* when he says:

What our present condition does demand ... is that we begin to approach our engagements with the settler-state legal apparatus with a degree of critical self-reflection, skepticism, and caution that has to date been largely absent in our efforts. It also demands that we begin to shift our attention away from the largely rights-based/recognition orientation that has emerged as hegemonic over the

last four decades, to a resurgent politics of recognition that seeks to practice decolonial, gender emancipatory, and economically nonexploitative alternative structures of law and sovereign authority grounded on a critical refashioning of the best of Indigenous legal and political traditions.³⁸

Again, we should acknowledge the cacophony generated by our encounter with anarchism, Indigenous resurgence, and Hawaiian deoccupation. Anarchist distrust of legal processes and institutions is well-warranted given the hierarchies of power law creates which eliminate, assimilate, police, and incarcerate Indigenous peoples, including Kanaka Maoli. Native American experiences with United States treaty-breaking predates the recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom, enhancing the sense of hollowness that attends treaty-making with imperialistic, settler governments.

Yet, there is a possibility that Kanaka Maoli ancestors and leaders of the past who helped to establish the Hawaiian Kingdom as a nation-state may have been engaging in a resurgent politics of their own. As Kamana Beamer argues in *No Makou Ka Mana: Liberating the Nation*, the creation of the Hawaiian Kingdom did not necessitate the complete erasure and replacement of pre-existing Kanaka Maoli governance systems with the legal frameworks of Euro-American states; that scenario is too simplistic, too neglecting of Hawaiian agency and capacity for resistance. Instead, Beamer argues that Kanaka leadership found methods to adopt the introduced practices in ways that still managed to empower Hawaiian modes of governance based on kinship with land and people.³⁹ The result was a Hawaiian Kingdom that was neither fully Kanaka nor entirely non-Kanaka in body and form. Rather, Hawaiian leaders, together with non-Hawaiian counsel, ‘selectively appropriated Euro-American tools of governance while modifying existing Indigenous structures to create a hybrid nation-state as a means to resist colonialism and to protect Native Hawaiian and national interests’.⁴⁰

I want to seriously engage with Beamer’s argument which suggests that the Hawaiian Kingdom may have been more ‘nation’ than ‘state’, that is, Indigenous in foundation while selectively Euro-American in appearance. For what Beamer’s research permits is the partitioning of the hyphen joining the Hawaiian nation to the Hawaiian state, in essence, identifying two distinct but related political movements, each with their own set of obligations, accountabilities, responsibilities, and so on. Such a division and sharing of tools, tactics, and strategies could allow law-based deoccupation discourses to take their course without sacrificing the possibility for exploring what imaginaries and possibilities Kanaka Maoli scholar Noelani Goodyear-Kaopua says lie ‘beyond or perhaps beneath the surface of state sovereignty’ and law.⁴¹

Continuing with the trail of inquiries made previously with regard to resurgent concepts of nation, nationalism, and nationhood, I want to ask: how might an anarchy-Indigenous resurgent move from critiquing the dominance of the state and law in Hawaiian deoccupation discourses toward forming relations between native nations through resurged, sovereign acts of treaty-making?

Thinking relationally again, the pursuit of this question can allow Indigenous peoples to redefine nation-to-nation relations—a process currently used by the United States to hierarchically position Native Americans as domestic wards of the state—in ways that refuse the settler-occupier and the geopolitical boundaries which separate native nations from engaging with each other on our terms. Furthermore, the refusal could lead to a resurged politics of recognition where Indigenous concepts of sovereignty and kinship become the basis for imagining and prefiguring a decolonising alternative to the settler nation-state: the native nation-nation.

A nation-nation created across and between Indigenous communities could radically transform the way Kanaka Maoli approach futures of law and treaty-making. Treaties and treaty-making could become more than just documents or records symbolising agreements made between states: we would be able to bring our ancestors, our queered kinships, our unborn futures, indeed all of our human and more-than-human relations to the table...or the awa bowl...or the ceremonial pipe.... We would be able to compare our shared history of broken international treaties made and unmade with Euro-American states, we could weave, braid, bead, paint, pound, sing, dance, chant, and rap those failed documents into creative materials for our own treaty-making processes. Or, perhaps, we could just burn them. Nation-nation relations should remain dangerously outlawed.

SOVEREIGNTY (FERGUSON)

Reflecting on the temporalities of resistance expressed in anarchist and Indigenous politics has provided insight into the multiplicities of time: there is no stable entity called ‘time itself’. Similarly, our thinking about native nations suggests that nations can be uncoupled from states, pluralising possibilities for thinking nations and laws. Lastly, we suggest that there is no stable entity called ‘sovereignty itself’.

Anarchists are generally uninterested in the language of sovereignty, seeing it as irrevocably married to hierarchies and states. Indigenous thinkers and activists who claim sovereignty for their communities thus alarm anarchists, who fear yet another power grab in the name of yet another hierarchy. Yet, anarchists deal directly with questions of authority and identity, all of which are elements of sovereignty: Who should make decisions? How should decisions be made? What relationships most closely define us? To whom should we be loyal? Anarchists have generally seen sovereignty as a bad answer to those questions, one that enshrines authority in states, owners of property, and patriarchy, while embracing ‘suicidal loyalties’ in nationalism, and reserving watered-down forms of representation for everyone else.⁴² We suggest that encounters with Indigenous struggles for sovereignty could provoke anarchists to rethink sovereignty as a plural and contested set of possibilities rather than always and only an alibi for the state.

An old bromide about anarchism runs that anarchism is great in theory, but it would never work in practice. However, the history of anarchism suggests the opposite: anarchist theory has been somewhat underdeveloped, but anarchists are practiced at the organisation of self-governing, self-creating activities. Anarchist politics stresses the creation of spaces in which anarchist ways of living can take root: autonomous communities, integral living, and prefigurative politics are three central aspects of these spaces. Each resonates to some degree with Indigenous sovereignty practices. By sketching points of connection between anarchist and Indigenous practices, we are thinking toward a kind of immanent sovereignty, emergent out of histories and practices that build on living threads to pull us toward a better future. Our aim is not to reduce Indigenous sovereignty to anarchist communities, nor to ‘indigenise’ anarchism to defend it in decolonisation struggles. More modestly, we are exploring points of contact in which meaningful and contentious conversations could emerge through the development of resonant relationships.

Autonomous Communities

Autonomous communities in which individual freedom develops through relationships of self-determination and mutual aid are cornerstones of the alternative societies anarchists work to build.⁴³ Anarchists insist that people are capable of self-organisation through spontaneous action, trial-and-error, and on-going adjustments to one another. *Autogestión*, or workers’ self-management, is its economic expression as ‘a processual movement of self-creation, self-conception, and self-definition’.⁴⁴ Workers’ self-management is far more than participation in co-managing a capitalist enterprise; it is production based on direct democratic decision-making by those who do the work, in solidarity and with respect for each other. Autonomous communities, by their existence, can weaken state, capitalist, patriarchal and colonial structures: they foster, as Ward argues, ‘the strengthening of other loyalties, of alternative foci of power, of different modes of human behavior’.⁴⁵

Native Hawaiian thinkers include in these ‘other loyalties’ their ‘āina (land) and lāhui, understood as ‘a great number of people, sharing a common connection and a collective identity’.⁴⁶ As Adam Barker and Jenny Pickerill make clear, the Indigenous development of relational geographies is not an invitation to others to appropriate or replicate those practices; it could, however, be an opportunity for non-Indigenous anarchists to ‘find their own new way of looking at—and being in—place’.⁴⁷ Aloha ‘āina is not identical, as Goodyear-Ka’ōpua explains, to either nationalism or patriotism because it exalts neither a government nor a race but land and people as connected with ‘interrelated living systems’.⁴⁸ This form of sovereignty suggests Colin Ward’s encouragement toward other loyalties and other powers. In the Hawaiian charter school Goodyear-Ka’ōpua helped to build and run, she finds robust forms of self-determination, including ‘intergenerational efforts to strengthen Kanaka Maoli health and well-being, to increase literacy in Hawaiian language and history, and to regain recognition of Hawaiian political sovereignty’.⁴⁹

Goodyear-Ka'ōpua turns to the concept of 'kuleana, a Hawaiian notion intertwining authority and responsibility'.⁵⁰ Noenoe Silva further specifies that 'kuleana encompasses right, authority, and responsibility, and it suggests a familial relationship'.⁵¹ Goodyear-Ka'ōpua hears a resonance with Mikhail Bakunin's notion of mutual, shifting, temporary, and voluntary authority. She suggests that Kanaka Maoli 'might consider blending this voluntary and mutual authority with older Hawaiian practices of governance and decision-making about our natural resources and relations', so that those with the most 'intimate and in-depth knowledge of particular resources' would have greater kuleana in decision-making about those activities and resources.⁵² Suggested here is not the triumphant sovereignty of states but relational sovereignty with its own genealogies to ancestors, land, water, animals, and other peoples.

Integral Living

Writing in the late 1880s, anarchist geographer Peter Kropotkin identified specialisation, isolation, and stasis as oppressive conditions that interfere with people 'exercising all [their] capacities'.⁵³ Instead, he called for

integration ... a society of integrated combined labour. A society where each individual is a producer of both manual and intellectual work; where each able-bodied human being is a worker, and where each worker works both in the field and the industrial workshop; where every aggregation of individuals, large enough to dispose of a certain variety of natural resources—it may be a nation, or rather a region—produces and itself consumes most of its own agricultural and manufactured produce.⁵⁴

He further praised work that brings people into 'free intercourse with nature, make[s] of [them] a conscious part of the grand whole, a partner in the highest enjoyments of science and art, of free work and creation'.⁵⁵ Support for integral education is broadly shared by anarchists, including Charles Fourier, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Louise Michel. It provided the pedagogical basis of the Modern School movement initiated by Spanish educator Francisco Ferrer. As Kropotkin explains, integral living is built on links of 'head' and 'hands' in labour, intellectual and manual learning in education, and rural and urban links in housing and in 'the two sister arts of agriculture and industry'.⁵⁶ Writing to Ferrer, Kropotkin developed the sensory dimension of integral instruction: 'teaching which, by the practice of hand on wood, stone, metal, will speak to the brain and develop it'.⁵⁷

Indigenous thinking and living could expand the capacious concept of integral living to include linking place to identity through practices that, in Goodyear-Ka'ōpua's words, 'put the interdependence of land and people at the center'.⁵⁸ Silva explores Hawaiian connections to aloha 'āina as 'recognizing that we are an integral part of the 'āina and the 'āina is an integral part of us'.⁵⁹ Barker and Pickerill urge anarchists to 'alter their basic practices of solidarity

and affinity with respect to Indigenous communities' by 'pursuing deep understandings of place-based relationships'.⁶⁰ We agree with this advice, and add that it does little good to embrace a place-based philosophy in the abstract; by definition, such thinking builds on specific, located, intimacies. Place-based living could mean many things—it could mean historically felt connections with land, water, wind, plants, animals, rocks, and sky. It could also refer to other expressions of situatedness—in urban areas, or on the road, or in music, or in the digital universe. As Mohawk Scholar Dan Roronhiakewen reflects, 'imagination is a place'.⁶¹

Goodyear-Ka'ōpua finds pedagogical expression of aloha 'āina in land-based literacies cultivated by Hālau Kū Māna, a secondary school in Honolulu grounded in Native Hawaiian practices. She defines these pedagogies as 'critically engaged observational, interpretive, and expressive practices that put land and natural environment at the center', in which working with print is accompanied by 'reading patterns of winds or the balance of water in a stream' as well as study of 'historical and contemporary relations of power'.⁶² Hawaiian educators integrate reading stars for navigation, building and sailing voyaging canoes, drawing water to a lo'i kalo [taro patch] through an irrigation ditch and then taking it back to the stream, chanting, dancing, and many other practices to develop students' voices, minds, and bodies within sustainable, self-determining communities.⁶³ Students learn to cultivate kalo, but not because all students are expected to become full-time farmers, just as students at the Modern Schools learned to set type but not because they were all destined to be printers. Rather, students flourish in the creative expression, the merger of head and hands, and the meaningful connection to their communities through their respective histories of Hawaiian sustainable farmers and of anarchist printers.⁶⁴ Integral education enacted by anarchists in the Modern Schools is akin to the sovereign pedagogies in Native Hawaiian education, built, in Goodyear-Ka'ōpua's words, on 'ongoing collective struggle to support' *Ōimi* [native to that place] survivance and to end colonial relations of 'power and knowledge' by enacting a different relation to 'power and knowledge within the school itself'.⁶⁵

Prefigurative Politics

Prefigurative politics builds on organising strategies of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) to create a new society inside the shell of the old. Anarchists prefigure the future they seek by drawing out elements of anarchism in the society at hand and enacting it in the present. The resources to make anarchism happen are visible, Ward explains, 'in the interstices of the dominant power structure. If you want to build a free society, the parts are all at hand'.⁶⁶ Anthropologist Marianne Maeckelbergh characterises prefiguration as 'a direct theory ... that theorizes through action, through doing' by engaging, experimenting, and reflecting within networked structures.⁶⁷ Anarchist sociologist

Howard Ehrlich sees prefiguration in the process of building ‘transfer culture’—‘a set of institutions and intergroup and interpersonal processes that are consistent with our image of a good society, though it is not that society itself’.⁶⁸ Prefigurative politics incorporates the strong anarchist demand for consistency between the means of creating change and the desired ends. Anarchist philosopher Todd May notes, ‘How we struggle and resist reflects our vision of what a society should look like. We cannot resist now and create equality later’.⁶⁹

As with autonomous communities and integral living, we see resonance between anarchism’s prefigurative politics and Indigenous sovereignty struggles. Silva and Goodyear-Ka’ōpua both call on the work of Osage scholar Robert Warrior regarding native intellectual sovereignty, which he defines as a process that emerges through the building of it: ‘The path of sovereignty’, Warrior argues, in turn building on Vine Deloria’s earlier work, ‘is the path to freedom’.⁷⁰ Turning to the neglected and nearly lost writings of earlier Native Hawaiian writers, Silva explores claims to knowledge in their histories, stories, and literature and in the process makes her own contribution to Kanaka intellectual sovereignty.⁷¹ Goodyear-Ka’ōpua sees Indigenous sovereignty not as a plan that is first made, then put into action, but as ‘enact[ed] on the ground through political organizing’.⁷² She examines the organising practices of Native Hawaiian movements to occupy land stolen by colonial authorities and in the process to confront state power. Drawing on the stories of *kupuna* (respected elders) in the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, she finds a *lāhui* (people) ‘constituted through direct action for aloha ‘āina [love of the land] and collective decision-making’.⁷³ Engagements with the US Navy over land use and access by fishermen, farmers, and ‘welfare warriors’ enabled political emergence, ‘made them a *lāhui*’ grounded in decentralised decision-making and collective action.⁷⁴ Making change by building the capacity to live differently emerges through struggle, she concludes: ‘It is in the process of these mobilizations, rather than in the final positions enunciated, that revolutionary potential is located’.⁷⁵

* * *

Anarchy and Indigeneity share the exhilarating practice of emerging from within the very struggles for change they generate. Other political possibilities for this contact zone could bring in sexualities and spiritualities, which also invite pluralisation and trigger different lines of flight. Marcelo Vieta’s description of anarchism could be offered to Indigenous activists as well: ‘driven by the possibilities of another kind of life ... from *within their moments of struggle ... their hope grows from their responses to their difficulties*’ rather than from the directives of leaders or permission of authorities.⁷⁶ Their resonances invite us to take up Byrd’s invitation to ‘imagine cacophonously’ what could be done, what we could do, together.⁷⁷

NOTES

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3. J. Olson, 'The problem with infoshops and insurrection: US anarchism, movement building, and the racial order,' in Amster, DeLeon, Fernandez, Nocella II, and Shannon (Eds), 37.
4. Mishuana R. Goeman, 'Ongoing Storms and Struggles: Gendered Violence and Resource Exploitation', in Joanne Barker (Ed) *Critically Sovereign: Indigenous Gender, Sexuality, and Feminist Studies* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), 105.
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6. Jodi Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 9.
7. The sliding signifier of the constitutive Other can also make its appearance as female, homosexual, Muslim, Jew, and so on. See Kathy E. Ferguson, 'Is it an anarchist act to call oneself an anarchist? Judith Butler, John Turner, and insurrectionary speech', *Contemporary Political Theory* 13: 4 (2014), 339–357.
8. For a useful discussion of the captive/absent relation, see Teresa De Lauretis, *Alice Doesn't: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984).
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10. *Ibid.*, ix.
11. *Ibid.*, 2.
12. *Ibid.*, xiii.
13. Audra Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life across the Borders of Settler States* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 158.
14. Rifkin, *Beyond Settler Time*, 14.
15. Colin Ward, *Anarchy in Action* (London: Aldgate Press, 1973), 8.
16. *Ibid.*, 18.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Rifkin, *Beyond Settler Time*, 3.
19. *Ibid.*, 18.
20. *Ibid.*, 19.
21. Noenoe Silva, *The Power of the Steel-Tipped Pen: Reconstructing Native Hawaiian Intellectual History* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), 6.
22. *Ibid.*, 22.
23. Rifkin, *Beyond Settler Time*, 23.
24. Silva, *The Power*, 174, 127.
25. *Ibid.*, 23.
26. Heidi Stark, quoted in Rifkin, *Beyond Settler Time*, 46.
27. *Ibid.*, 15.
28. Silva, *The Power*, 88, 89, 25.

29. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 'The Theory of Property,' *Working Translations* <http://workingtranslations.blogspot.com/p/the-theory-of-property-noticethe-reader.html>; Emma Goldman, 'The Individual, Society, and the State,' in Alex Kates Shulman (Ed), *Red Emma Speaks* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), 86–100.
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32. Smith, quoted in *Ibid.*, 600.
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42. Ward, *Anarchy in Action*, 18.
43. Marcello Vieta, 'The stream of self-determination and *autogestión*: Prefiguring alternative economic realities,' *ephemera: theory and politics in organization* 14: 4 (2014), 781.
44. *Ibid.*, 783.
45. Ward, *Anarchy in Action*, 25.
46. Goodyear-Ka'ōpua, 'Kuleana Lahui', 139.
47. Adam J. Barker and Jenny Pickerill, 'Radicalizing Relationships To and Through Shared Geographies: Why Anarchists Need to Understand Indigenous Connections to Land and Place,' *Antipode* 44: 5 (2012), 15.
48. Noelani Goodyear-Ka'ōpua, *The Seeds We Planted: Portraits of a Native Hawaiian Charter School* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 32.
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50. Goodyear-Ka'ōpua, 'Kuleana Lahui', 147.
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66. Ward, *Anarchy in Action*, 20.
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72. Goodyear-Ka'ōpua, 'Kuleana Lahui', 133.
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Squares, Occupy Movements and the Arab Revolutions

Laura Galián

The glorious 18 days that toppled Mubarak as they have been seen by many commentators were not so glorious and were not only 18 days. The 25th January Revolution in 2011 started everywhere, in many towns and also in many streets in Cairo. It started everywhere and went to the centre, Tahrir square. The square was the focus of the movement, not the centre. All beams of light came down to the square, after clashes with the security forces, after the people took the square and they declared the sit-in and issued the first statement that ended with the slogan “The people want to topple the Regime”.¹

For Yasir Abdallah, an Egyptian self-declared anarchist, translator and one of the founders of the anarchist movement al-Haraka al-Ishtirakiyah al-Taharruriyah (the Libertarian Socialist Movement, LSM), the Egyptian revolution with Tahrir Square as its symbol was not just confined to eighteen days. Tahrir was also not the centre of it, but a place of convergence, of encounter, and an ‘anarchist experience’ in itself. Even if more than six years have passed since the spark of the Occupy movements around the world, 2011 was above all a turning point in the emergence of new social movements, some related to anarchist theory and practice, in the South of the Mediterranean. Since 2011, Arab revolutions have played a key part in maintaining, reclaiming and decolonising anarchism as a political philosophy.

The study of the anarchist experiences in the Arabic-speaking world since 2011 echoes a long history of libertarian and emancipatory thought and

Transliterations from Arabic are provided for the sake of non-Arabic speakers. Translations from Arabic and other languages are my own.

L. Galián (✉)
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

practice that has passed unnoticed in most books on anarchism. These experiences have also shed light on the theory and practice of anarchism in unprecedented ways in the last decades; however, they have not yet been inserted in what Uri Gordon describes as ‘[...] the full-blown revival of anarchism, as a global social movement and coherent set of political discourses, on a scale and to levels of unity and diversity unseen since 1930s’.²

The movements that emerged in the South of the Mediterranean are deeply diverse in terms of social composition, culture, government reaction and repression, and geopolitics. The kind of political systems in which they operate differ in the same way that their repertoires of contentious politics and their anarchist practices do. Notwithstanding these differences, it is precisely horizontal organisation, urban transformation and the radical re-appropriation of public space which allow us to draw a pattern of commonality among these new anarchist experiences in the South of the Mediterranean. All of them share a common response to the *status quo* that performs politics outside of traditional left-wing party politics, NGOs and institutionalised organisations. Furthermore, these movements are not defined by traditional narratives of socialism, Islamism or nationalism (even if in many ways they have had a national framework of action). At the same time, they are mostly leaderless, horizontal, decentralised and anti-hierarchical in their organisational strategies.

This chapter brings to light some of the ways in which anarchism has been lived and experienced in the South of the Mediterranean from 2011, in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria. Bringing these three contexts together allows us to have a general overview of the re-emergence of anarchism in this region since the Arab revolutions. My main argument is that what started out as new social movements with the occupation of squares and street politics in what its participants recognised as revolutions still continues in other forms and autonomous spaces that give sense to the revolutionaries’ motto: *al-thawra mustamirra* (‘the revolution continues’). This comparative structure does not allow us to discuss the case studies in detail. However, it allows us to divert the attention of the reader in order to think and rethink the ways in which contemporary anarchism expresses itself in non-Western contexts, namely the Arabic-speaking world of the South of the Mediterranean. For the purpose of this analysis, anarchism is understood as a form of doing politics rather than a European-based ideology. For that reason, most of the cases analysed in this study are not self-declared anarchist groups and collectives, but they do function in a way that help us to expand, re-conceptualise and decolonise our understanding of anarchism. These are mostly horizontal, decentralised and anti-hierarchical strategies, discourses, groups and repertoires of fighting against the capitalist and neoliberal construction of public/private spaces, urban architecture and established social dynamics and relations. Neither is it our intention to romanticise resistance nor the anarchist experiences of the people from the South. These experiences have been followed up by harsh state repression and counter-revolution through detention, forced disappearances, imprisonment, torture and even death. Our intention is to draw a line of commonality where

transnational solidarities can be drawn and where the South of the Mediterranean is included, recognising its local specificities in the global history of counter-hegemonic discourses and practices, and in particular, anarchism.

FROM OCCUPY THE SQUARES TO AUTONOMY: ON REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

Yasir's vision of the revolution is that of a long-lasting social revolution. For the young Egyptian anarchist, the revolution did not just happen at one moment, as it has been widely assumed in the media or academic circles, but it has continued in less visible diverse spaces and in novel ways within Southern Mediterranean contexts. The classic model around which the concept of revolution is built conjures up the idea of centralised power—the political power of the State. As is understood in Marxist accounts, this power is seized by a revolutionary vanguard.³ Revolutions do not succeed until there is a radical change in the pre-existing political systems and their internal structures. For that reason, when we are dealing with political and social events in Europe and North America, the academy displays a tendency to use terminology derived from European history.⁴ The popular uprisings that took place in the South of the Mediterranean at the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 and that are still ongoing (despite the great efforts of counter-revolutionary forces supporting authoritarian regimes in the Arabic-speaking world) were described by analysts, journalists and part of the Western academy as the 'Arab Spring'. The 'spring' metaphor is twofold. It implies, on the one hand, the universalisation of the hegemonic criteria of Western political science and, on the other, an orientalist worldview of those who articulate these criteria. According to Brownlee and Ghiabi the term minimises the intensity and bravery of those who have participated in these mobilisations.⁵ Moreover, the 'spring' metaphor carries with it the semantic legacies of an entire colonial history of the Southern Mediterranean societies, Arab or otherwise, who, after decades of historical and social lethargy during the Ottoman Empire, woke up with the arrival of European colonisation. This literary, cultural, social and political 'awakening' that is known in Arabic as *nahda*, re-emerges in 2011 as a potent trope that conceptualises the spontaneous uprisings against authoritarian regimes in the Arabic-speaking countries. In Arabic, the conceptual differences between a revolution (*thwra*), a revolt (*tamarrud*) and an uprising (*intifada*) have helped, as Brecht De Smet points out, the counter-revolutionary forces to sustain their argument that the Arab revolutions, once (for the most part) they led to the downfall of a dictator, the street movement and the political masses could retire from the scene and leave the situation in the hands of professional politicians and technocrats.⁶

But in fact, the uprisings that took place in Southern Mediterranean societies at the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 were not just insurrectional moments. They have been transformed into long-lasting social revolutions that still continue in different spaces and with new forms of contentious politics, some directly related with the politics of anarchism and some others in the

form of anarchist practices. These practices, theories and repertoires redefine and reconfigure the relationship of the people with the political and give sense to the motto *al-thawra mustamirra* that has been and still is chanted in protest movements. This process, labelled by its participants as a revolution, builds a narrative framework that enables those who lived and experienced it to become agents and subjects of history. Revolutionaries (as they call themselves) become aware of the revolution as a profound historical experience, more than a means to an end, according to Mohammed Bamyeh.⁷

It is in this moment, that the term *sha'b* (people) emanated in the Arab revolutions as a potent political actor in itself and helped the social mobilisation of the uprisings. For that reason, the slogan 'al-sha'b yuriid isqat al-nithaam' ('the people want to overthrow the regime') was the motto *and* the epitome of the revolutions. This is how the people separated themselves from the government and the state and '*al-sha'b* became material for revolution'.⁸ The Argentinian theorist Enrique Dussel in his *Twenty Theses on Politics* (2006) argues that 'the people' is transformed into a political actor in critical moments or in concrete political conjunctures:

The *people* appears in critical political conjunctures when it achieves explicit consciousness as the *analogical hegemon* of all demands, from which it defines strategy and tactics, thereby becoming an *actor* and constructing history on the basis of a new foundation. As many social movements note: 'Power is constructed from below!'⁹

In fact, constructing the power of the people from below is how revolutions, with squares as their symbols, were at the same time sites of convergence, of encounter and 'anarchist experiences' in themselves.¹⁰ As sites of convergence, protestors started in different parts of the country, in many cities, and after clashes, revolutionaries went to the squares to occupy them. This is how Tahrir Square as a symbol and epitome of the 25th January revolution emerged, as was the case of other squares in the MENA region. Indeed, occupying practices were not a new repertoire in the history of the contentious politics in the countries of the Southern Mediterranean. In 2011, public squares in the Arab world were, on the one hand, transformed by their citizens into becoming the centres of their political demands. On the other hand, the occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo, the Pearl Roundabout in Manama, the Green Square in Tripoli, the Change Square in Sana'a and the Kasbah Square in Tunis had a direct influence on the dynamic and organisation of other squares in the West, in Spain, Greece, and the United States, subverting the squares' primary goal of sustaining their regimes' power. As Luisa Martín Rojo writes:

Squares and urban places that were designed to project the regime's power and monumentality, and which also function as centres of economic activity, are now being occupied and used not only as new "agorae" for political debate, but also as alternative cities forming part of a large-scale protest.¹¹

Even if the occupation of these squares appeared spontaneous, the convergence of their participants in these urban spaces has its roots in their strategic location and historical symbolism. In the case of Tahrir Square, one can find the monuments and buildings of Egypt's political, economic and colonial power, such as the Parliament, the Mogamma (the symbol of Egypt's corrupt bureaucracy), the Mubarak's National Democratic Party headquarters, the Ministry of the Interior and the American University of Cairo. Beyond its strategic location, Tahrir Square has a long history of contentious politics. It was renamed *Midan al-Tahrir* (Liberation Square) after the military coup of 1952, when Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power and symbolised the liberation of Egypt from the colonial power. From that moment, Tahrir Square has been a space of contestation for many social movements during the second half of the twentieth century, including the student movement of the 1970s, the hunger strikes of 1977 and the protests against the Iraq War in 2003. As Gunning and Zvi Baron point out, 'a history of Egypt could be written from the perspective of the Square'.¹²

In the Tunisian case, the self-immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi sparked large protests against the Ben Ali regime. Protesters used the main avenue, Habib Bourguiba, to launch their demands and drawing on their repertoires of contentious anti-regime politics. Habib Bourguiba Street became progressively more important in the events of the Tunisian revolution. In fact, soon after, the 7th November Square, located at the end of this street, was renamed after the young street vendor, Mohammad Bouazizi Square. Another square, Kasbah Square, surrounded by Dar el Bey, the government palace, the centre of state and governmental power, was also the centre of the demonstrations when young activists rejected the recently formed interim government that included members of the former president's political circle and gathered in the square demanding 'the full dismantling of the old regime's security apparatus and a complete break from the old political system by electing a National Constituent Assemble to write a new constitution'.¹³ To occupy the square, therefore, meant to reclaim the right to the city, in Henri Lefebvre's terms, and to re-appropriate, re-semantise and collectivise the symbols of power.¹⁴

In Syria the squares were not the centre of the demonstrations. However, the people went to the streets reclaiming their right to the city, in the same manner as their Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts. In Syria calls for protests were made for the 4 and 5 February 2011 in what has been called the 'Days of Rage'; however, they were not followed up by street protests since the people wanted to see the reaction of the regime. The third 'Day of Rage' was called for the 15 March 2011, when thousands of Syrians gathered simultaneously across the country in the cities of Hama, Hasakah, Dair al-Zor and Deraa. After the (mass) detention of protesters, protests continued around the country in the following days and were followed by assaults and arrests.¹⁵ It was clear for Syrians since the beginning of the uprisings that the meaning of the revolution and the strategies needed were going to differ from that of their Egyptian or Tunisian counterparts. Soon after the start of the protests, mainly after the arrest of fifteen schoolboys, all under the age of fifteen, who disappeared after

being caught writing revolutionary slogans on walls in Deraa in March 2011, Syria has experienced a popular uprising that tried, at least at first, to institute the right to self-management and government through the establishment of Local Coordination Committees, alongside other forms of contentious politics, such as demonstrations, protests and civil resistance.

However, and most importantly, squares also symbolised the *tipping point* of decades of struggle by social movements in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria. These three countries, together with Libya, Yemen and Bahrain (to name a few) have had a long history of contentious politics and social movements that fuelled the initial mass protest. In fact, the emergence of new social movements in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria were at the centre of the formation of mass protests in 2011 and beyond. These new social movements, which mainly started at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, have been defined as ‘glocal’ movements. They are global since they are the product of globalisation, and they are local since they target local issues. In the global sphere, the events in Seattle in 1999 and the Zapatista movement were essential in determining the emergence and development of new social movements around the world, even in the Arabic-speaking world. In Egypt, since 2000, different protest waves marked the appearance of new social movements that symbolised the fall of leftist party politics and a new wave of social politicisation. Although influenced by transnational events, the Second Palestinian Intifada and the Iraq War signalled the creation of decentralised and horizontal movements and groups that served as umbrella organisations to denounce the corruption of the government and demand the democratisation of the country such as the *Kefaya* and April 6 Youth Movement. In Tunisia, the events in the Gafsa Mining Basin of 2008 sparked social mobilisation, which shook this area near the Algerian border, and represented the most important protest movement in Tunisia since the bread riots of 1984. Soon after, these mobilisations spread through various sections of society, including unemployed graduates and the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) (the main trade union). Using a large number of repertoires of actions including hunger strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations and occupations, these initial mobilisations catalysed and anticipated the explosion that broke out in the governorate of Sidi Bouzid in December 2010, and later led to the overthrow of Ben Ali in January 2011.

In Syria, there were precedents foreshadowing the events of 2011. In 2000, a forum for the intellectual middle class was established in Damascus in which reformist ideas could be debated, and which was, at that time, more liberal than anything found in Egypt or Tunisia. It was not, according to Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila al-Shami a ‘radical movement, and its demands were modest, but still it represented a significant change in a polity where for decades all criticism had been brutally suppressed’.¹⁶ In this ‘Damascus spring’, in 2001 a manifesto was signed but by 1000 people drawn from across Syrian civil society. This manifesto called for the review of the Baath’s position as the leading political party and it demanded social justice, a more equal society and redistribution of wealth. However, soon after the appearance of the manifesto, some of the key figures of the movement were arrested. The regime hardened its

position on freedom of expression and cracked down on civil society, even as protests and sit-ins continued. The opposition movement during Bashar al-Assad's first decade (2000–2010) 'though brave and in some ways groundbreaking, involved only a tiny section of the population. Plagued by infighting and boxed in by continual bouts of repression, the opposition failed to galvanize the street'.¹⁷

Neither al-Assad's authoritarian regime, nor his coetaneous dictatorial regimes in the South of the Mediterranean could stop the emergence of social revolutions. These revolutions were experienced by some participants as anarchist revolutions, as Yasir Abdallah and other self-identified anarchists in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria declared in the interviews I conducted in Cairo in 2013 and 2014 and in Tunis in 2015. The occupied public spaces were transformed into political arenas for debate and recognition. According to Luisa Martín Rojo, the participants generated different political practices that challenged the status quo through 'inclusiveness, horizontality, transparency and the absence of monopolies or appropriation of discursive practices by leaders or spokespersons'.¹⁸ In fact, the occupation of the squares contributed to the meaning of the protest, and it transformed the experience of their inhabitants throughout the construction of counter-practices to the prevailing neoliberal construction of the city. Mohamad Bamyeh, who also participated in Tahrir Square, considers that the Arab revolutions displayed anarchist methods:

In this sense that the current Arab revolutionary wave is closest to anarchist ideals, which highlight spontaneous order and posit the principle of un-imposed order as the highest form of a rational society and which like all revolutionary currents in nineteenth-century Europe, had clear roots in Enlightenment thought.¹⁹

According to Bamyeh, these revolutions had an anarchist method but a liberal intention. Bamyeh considers that other communal, self-governed and autonomous traditions outside Europe, such as those found in the Arab-speaking countries, should be placed within the anarchist tradition.²⁰ In fact, the anarchist tendencies, practices and theories witnessed in these Southern Mediterranean countries were adapted, reformulated and integrated in their local, linguistic and cultural contexts, thus decolonising the European roots of this political philosophy.

The indication of the intellectual impact of the Arab revolutions on anarchist models can be appreciated if we note the change in name of a study by Ahmed Zaki, an Egyptian translator deeply interested in anarchism although not a declared anarchist. Zaki changed the title of his book from *al-Anarkiyah: al-madrasa al-thawriyah allati lam ya'arifuha al-sharq* ('Anarchism: the revolutionary school that we did not live') published in 2007 to *al-Anarkiyya: al-madrasa al-thawriyah allati na'arifuha* ('Anarchism: the Revolutionary School that we know') republished in a second edition in 2011. This book was widely distributed in Tahrir Square and the streets of downtown Cairo. The author explains in the book why:

What was happening in Egypt at that time was the modern edition of some of the ideas of the revolutionary school of the 21st century: masses without ideology, from a wide range of social groups, participating without hierarchical leaders from professional politics taking advantage of the waves of protests, an achieved freedom to launch the creativity of every individual [overcoming] the amazing power of conformity and consensus, the creativity for the management of the forms of social protest through democratic ways without excluding anyone, even in the shared management of the lives of thousands of protesters inside the Square for more than two weeks etc.²¹

Undoubtedly, the organisation of Tahrir and other squares was also an example of the practice of this ‘revolutionary school’. At first, Tahrir was organised as if it was an imagined new society, in a collective and self-managed way. It practised direct democracy through assemblies, and it never had the intention to occupy state institutions, but to organise people’s power outside of the state. The projection of this imagined community was constituted through concrete infrastructures: a security apparatus, delimited borders, flags, a health-care system, a communication system, libraries, schools and its own participatory self-government and direct decision making. Through these strategies Tahrir became an autonomous space, the first of many autonomous spaces that were organised in Egypt as well as in Tunisia and Syria in the period 2011–2017. The Arab revolutions violently disrupted the existing personal and geographical spaces and perhaps started to build a new spatial order in a post-anarchist sense, as Saul Newman points out.²² For Newman, spaces are always political and therefore their contestation and reconfiguration are essential forms of radical politics relevant for anarchism:

Rather than seeking to take over state power, or to participate in state institutions at the level of parliamentary politics, many contemporary actors and movements endeavour to create autonomous spaces, social practices and relations, whether through the permanent or temporary occupation of physical spaces—squats, community centres and cooperatives, workplace occupations, mass demonstrations and convergences—or through the experimentation with practices such as decentralized decision-making, direct action or even alternative forms of economic exchange, which are not striated, conditioned or ‘captured’ by statist and capitalist modes of organization.²³

In this vein, a multiplicity of autonomous and insurrectional spaces and practices appeared and continued to exist and expand in the South of the Mediterranean, following these revolutions’ core idea: *al-thawra mustamirra* (the revolution continues). What started as new social movements or in the form of civil society organisations outside of the traditional paradigm of party politics in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria still continues in the form of autonomous spaces and practice, and these autonomous spaces change the practice of resistance and the revolutionary method. Their performances and their repertoires

are an important part of the configuration and decolonisation of the politics of anarchism. Among those new political actors that create radical social practices and relations while reclaiming their right to the city by creating autonomous spaces, we find many groups and collectives that either existed before the revolutions but radicalised their discourse after it or were created due to the creation of, and their encounter with, affinity groups. These affinity groups emerged during the sit-ins, street protests and the occupation of the squares.

BUILDING A LONG-LASTING SOCIAL REVOLUTION: AUTONOMOUS EXPERIENCES IN EGYPT, TUNISIA AND SYRIA

The square was also a place of encounter. ‘Glocalised’ social movements and civil society found each other during the sit-ins, camps and in the street protests and clashes with security forces in the streets of Egypt, Tunisia and Syria. Many subjectivities from heterogeneous ideological, economic and social backgrounds met and agreed on the ‘imagined community’ they were trying to create. This encounter was an essential part of the organisation and the continuation of the Arab revolutions in other spaces with new ways of understanding the political and with new repertoires of contentious politics. After the breakdown of the sit-ins and street politics through harsh repression and counter-revolutions, the creation of activists’ networks helped to configure affinity groups that later constituted autonomous spaces and practices that radically transformed and are still transforming public space.

The gathering of activists who self-identified as anarchists, or knew of the existence of an ideology called anarchism, in Tahrir and in Kasbah Square culminated with the foundation of the two more important self-declared anarchist groups in the South of the Mediterranean: the Libertarian Socialist Movement (LSM)²⁴ in Egypt, and ‘Asian (Disobedience)’²⁵ in Tunisia. Both were self-defined as anarcho-communist organisations. The emergence of these two anarchist movements,²⁶ both born in 2011, can be explained with reference to two forces. Firstly, due to a personal factor, mostly related to individual motivations and experiences, particularly the experience of the Square discovered and lived as an anarchist experience. Secondly, due to external factors related to the collectivity and the ‘political opportunity’ to create horizontal, decentralised and anti-hierarchical movements.

The main goal of the two organisations was to accelerate and radicalise the revolutionary process. The LSM is thus defined on their official webpage:

The Libertarian Socialist Movement is an organisation of anarcho-communists who believe in class struggle as the only way to overthrow Capitalism and the power of the oppressive State. It adopts the aspirations and demands of the working classes, the industrial workers, the small farmers, the peasants, the proletarians, and all of those who only have the power of their work to sell without the control over the production process.²⁷

‘Asian’, in its declaration of principles presents itself as ‘libertarian and anti-authoritarian. It fights against Capitalism and the authoritarian apparatus. Its goal is the self-organisation of the people, general and direct self-management of life and wealth and [...] struggles against the State and its central power that has to be replaced by direct self-management of the resources for life’.²⁸

For the LSM and ‘Asian’, the state promotes and helps the functioning of capital, with capital’s domination incarnated and represented by the financial elites and the local Arab regimes. However, ‘Asian’ goes further in underlining other forms of oppression and recognises that ethnic, racial and gender inequalities are also a form of discrimination. With a Marxist understanding of social inequalities, both groups are very close to their local labour movements and have acted with them in organising strikes, occupations and sit-ins in the work place. Furthermore, both organisations emphasise the role of culture as a means for spreading and radicalising the revolution. The LSM used to organise a weekly seminar to read and translate anarchist books. Such translations of anarchist books into Arabic have been an important repertoire of resistance for anarchists in the Arabic-speaking world for disseminating their political philosophy.²⁹ In the case of ‘Asian’, important figures from the rap music scene in Tunisia, such as e Armada Bizerta or Omar Herzi, were members of the organisation. In fact, in terms of the social make-up of their members, both groups can be inserted in what Uri Gordon has called a *local milieu* where ‘The closest affinities exist on the level of small groups and local milieus—the ‘bands’ and ‘extended families’ where there is the closest level of friendship and trust’.³⁰

In Tunisia, there are other horizontal, decentralised and self-managed collectives with a libertarian and anti-capitalist character. Among them is the music collective Blech 7es (in Tunisian dialect ‘Without noise’): ‘This is the counter-concept we have used since this project has the intention to motivate young people to express and share their ideas with the public’.³¹ As a musical project and collective, Blech 7es organises a weekly general assembly with all the members of the group to discuss and debate every aspect of the organisation. The general assembly is, as it is said on their web page: ‘the engine of the collective’ and self-organisation is ‘the safest method to allow the human being to exercise their potential and dignity’.³²

In Egypt, other horizontal, decentralised and self-managed collectives and groups appeared with the construction of concrete walls along downtown Cairo that had the intention of separating the ‘war zone’ from the ‘normal life of the citizens’ while mass protest was taking place. Activists painted them to reclaim their right to occupy the city. For Naguib, an Egyptian anarchist artist, the first days of the revolution motivated him to join The Revolutionary Union of Artists, a group of artists (painters, film makers, designers, musicians, photographers, singers etc.), whose main goal was to create a solidarity network and to work towards an artistic aspect of the revolution. They felt that to defend that art was another important weapon for the revolution. For Naguib, painting around the city was a way to narrate the ‘real revolutionary stories’ and to counteract the image that the state and private media were broadcasting

of it. On the other hand, doing graffiti was a collective method of direct action and was closely associated with anarchism: 'It was not the art itself, but the way the art was done and the goals that it has'.³³ By reclaiming their right to the city through graffiti and painting, graffiti artists negotiated with the state, through a dialogic process of making murals, erasing them and painting them again, that created an archive of the revolution.

Moreover, since 2011, many initiatives were born to gender the Square and the revolution. This is how *Ikhthiyar* ('Choice'), a feminist collective, was founded. A self-managed and self-funded group, *Ikhthiyar* is defined as:

[...] an open space where researchers and activists meet to exchange ideas and discuss gender as a cross-cutting topic to develop an indigenous knowledge around gender and sexuality trends and dynamics in Arabic. We seek to be the knowledge producer not just the subject of the study.³⁴

Situated in the popular Abbasiyya neighbourhood, the collective organises seminars on gender, disseminates information about sexuality and has a communal and open access library in its headquarters. Their main goal is to create an open space for researchers and activists. The collective has the intention of decolonising its epistemological foundations by changing the locus of enunciation from white-Western theorists to those from the South. They want to be the knowledge producer and not just the orientalist subject of study. In fact, their intellectual and feminist references are heterogeneous, and for that reason in the group one can find second and third wave feminists together with black and Islamic feminists.

In Egypt we also find theatre, open mic, community media and citizen journalism projects that can be inserted within the category of autonomous spaces such as *Moseeren*, *al-Fann Midan*, among others, that work in a decentralised and self-managed way and that are trying to keep alive the ideas of the revolution.

On the other hand, the Syrian case largely differs from the Egyptian and the Tunisian one. However, even with the difficulties faced by political dissidents, fiercely surveilled by the regime's secret police, anarchist thinking and practice were not stopped during the revolution. Mazen Kam al-Maz, a Syrian anarchist, narrates his journey through anarchism and the Syrian revolution as follows:

I started translating the works of Bakunin (who directly impacted me with his crazy devotion to freedom and revolution) and other known 'anarchists'. The theory of State Capitalism was very important to me and for some of my friends who were heading in the same direction. We used it to describe the Al-Assad regime and to promote a direct oppositional politics in the 2000s. However, it was the 'Arab Spring' that gave anarchism a true push. I left my job as a family doctor in the Gulf and I went to Egypt and after that to 'liberated Syria' in 2012. I saw how the movement was growing up in Egypt and in some parts of Syria as well.³⁵

As Mazen Kam al-Maz states, the Arab Spring gave anarchism ‘a true push’. In fact, the Egyptian and the Tunisian uprisings, that started a few weeks before the Syrian, gave Syrian society the political opportunity to take to the streets, even if it was under tight control and monitoring by the secret police and the state apparatus. The solidarity protests that followed them were the catalyst for a series of protests and a change in the demands and petitions of the protesters who gradually addressed national issues. During the heyday of the Syrian revolution, different types of self-managed projects emerged. One of the most important grassroots movements was the *tansiqiyyat* or Coordination Committees that sprang up in neighbourhoods, villages and towns across the country. They were the first forms of revolutionary organisation and the nucleus of the civil resistance. The *tansiqiyyat* were organised as networks where a few revolutionaries (5 to 7) were working in secrecy throughout the city organising resistance in their local communities with street actions, preparing slogans, banners, demonstrations and barricades to protect protestors and document the events.³⁶ With time, their actions and strategies changed according to the circumstances from direct repertoires of contentious politics to more mutual aid support organisation (field hospitals, collecting and distributing food and medical supplies etc.).

The work of the *tansiqiyyat* has been greatly influenced by the theory and work of the Syrian anarchist, intellectual and economist Omar ‘Aziz (1946–2013) whose theoretical work on Local Councils in Syria has received a great deal of attention from the media and eventually also in academic circles.³⁷ Omar ‘Aziz spent a great part of his life in exile in Saudi Arabia and the United States, and in the first days of the Syrian revolution, at the age of 62, he decided to return to Syria to enrol in the Free Syrian Army. He was not, according to the Palestinian activist Budur Hassan, a typical contemporary anarchist. In her tribute to ‘Aziz, she declares that Omar ‘Aziz did not wear a Vendetta mask, nor did he form black blocs. He was not obsessed with giving interviews to the press, nor did he make the headlines of mainstream media upon his arrest’.³⁸

In his initial conversations with young revolutionaries, Omar ‘Aziz concluded that the protests that were taking place were not going to finish with the end of the regime. For ‘Aziz it was necessary to carry on grassroots, long-lasting work, involving civil society as whole that would undermine the hierarchical and authoritarian structures imposed by the state. In order for the revolution to succeed it was necessary, according to Omar, to permeate all aspects of people’s lives through a radical change in social organisations as the basis of their relationships. That was going to be the only way to confront the very foundation of the system of domination and repression of the Syrian regime. In order to accomplish that task, Omar ‘Aziz designed a document which enunciated the theoretical principles of a new society based upon the organisation of the local councils. These local councils would be the basis for the cooperation among the members of the community and the collectivisation of the resources available to them. Inspired, as many anarchists of his generation, by Rosa Luxemburg, and above all, by the examples and experiences of

self-management of the *tansiqiyyat* in Syria, the local councils were for ‘Aziz the space where people from different ethnicities and economic backgrounds could work together with the same goal: manage their lives in an autonomous way outside the institutions of the state and give a safe space that would allow mutual collaboration among the individuals in order to activate and advance the social revolution at a local, regional and national level.³⁹

This theoretical approach to self-management comes from a very particular notion of history. For ‘Aziz history was divided into two periods: *thaman al-sulta* (the period of authority) and *thaman al-thawra* (the period of the revolution).⁴⁰ From his perspective, revolution would constitute a rupture with the space and time that makes humans live in these two consecutive and contradictory periods. Exemplifying his case with the first eight months of the Syrian revolution, when it was still peaceful, for ‘Aziz the *period of the authority* is the time where the regime still rules the people’s lives and the *period of the revolution* is the time in which activists work every day to overthrow the regime. However, according to ‘Aziz:

The risk lies not in the overlap of the two periods, for that is the nature of revolutions, but rather in the absence of correlation between the spheres of daily life and the revolution itself. So, what is feared of the movement during the coming period is one of two things: humans becoming bored due to the continuity of the revolution and its disruption of their daily lives, or humans resorting to the use of heavy weaponry, causing the revolution to become the rifle’s hostage.⁴¹

For ‘Aziz, in order to achieve the continuity of the *period of the revolution* it was necessary to work in a collective and self-managed way, guaranteeing, for example, decentralised medical and legal aid. The ‘imagined community’ for ‘Aziz was that of a society with flexible structures based on a merging of the revolution and the daily lives of the members of society through the Local Councils. The ultimate goal of the councils was that of working to:

1. Find safe housing for families coming new into the regime and provide them with needed supplies. The council located in that region must collaborate with its counterpart, the local council from the region that the families initially fled from.
2. Organise statements for the detainees and transfer the information to concerned authorities in the revolution. The council must arrange to contract legal authorities and must provide support to the families by issuing follow-ups on the conditions of loved ones in detention.
3. Manage the requests of effected families and work to ensure the expenses through financial aid for the public and ‘regional revolution funds’.⁴²

Omar ‘Aziz was aware that his vision of the self-managed society of the revolution was going to be a slow, progressive process, which needed to begin by building up people’s trust. For that reason it was necessary to create new

social relationships among human beings.⁴³ Local councils would constitute spaces for discussion so that citizens could exchange and seek solutions to their daily problems. In addition, they would serve to build horizontal networks between the local councils of a geographical area that in turn could be expanded to include relations between different councils of different regions.

However, local councils could not work just by themselves, and a non-hierarchical national structure, a National Council, would be necessary to coordinate the work of the local councils. The National Council would be in charge of the revolutionary funding of the councils, facilitate the coordination between the different local and regional councils in a flexible way and thus would guarantee structural flexibility and the quest for a common ground of action.

The work of Omar ‘Aziz had a great impact on the development of the *tansiqiyyat* in Syria and the self-managed projects that arose during the revolution. In November 2012 he was arrested and a few weeks after his detention, killed. However, his legacy is still experienced in the country, even if, as time went on, some of the revolutionary councils were replaced by Sharia-based and Islamist structures.

Even if it is not the purpose of this chapter to touch upon the Kurdish case due to its specificities and complexities, it is important to mention the debate around Rojava’s libertarian experience after the withdrawal of Assad’s forces in 2012. The PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) with initial Marxist-Leninist tendencies led by Abdullah Ocalan became influenced by the ‘libertarian municipalism’ or ‘democratic confederalism’ of Murray Bookchin. In his *Social Contract*,⁴⁴ Abdullah Ocalan envisioned an ‘imagined community’ based on communalism and transnational direct democracy. This social contract is supposed to be the antidote for sectarianism, militarism, authoritarianism, gender inequalities and discrimination and promotes coexistence, self-governance and a democratic autonomy within the state through local councils, workers cooperatives and so on. However, many dissident voices have raised criticisms. The Kurdish revolution seems to have been in some parts more top-down and party-led than a bottom-up social revolution. Although grassroots’ participation at the local level exists on day-to-day life issues, the militarily backed party hierarchy displays authoritarian characteristics and censors members or sympathisers of other parties as well as independent journalists. Furthermore, military and security decisions are taken by Democratic Union Party (PYD) staff.⁴⁵

Other self-managed projects and committees appeared during the first years of the revolution to advance a social revolution such as the Syrian Revolution Coordination Union (SRCU) that organised peaceful resistance and boycotted regime-backed businesses, or the Syrian Revolutionary Youth (SRY), a self-funded group of students that organised a more radical vision and actions in the streets and whose petitions included free education and health care and gender equality. Also, citizen journalism and community media was found in Syria, such as Radio Nassem. However, the militarisation

of the conflict gave way to more hierarchical structures and inner contradictions within the self-management projects and the local councils appeared, such as cases of corruption, misdistribution of resources and the lack of female representation.⁴⁶

CONCLUSION: DECOLONISING AND EXPANDING ANARCHIST THEORY AND PRACTICE

Yasir's narration of the revolution in Egypt underlies the close relationship between the anarchist theory and the Arab revolutionary practices. The squares as the symbols of the new social and occupy movements designed different 'imagined communities' with decentralisation, direct decision making and anti-hierarchical organisation at their core. These movements, their strategies and their narrations have given their participants the legitimation to carry on with their revolutionary and libertarian repertoires of contentious politics that transcend the hegemonic narrative of the Arab Spring. Participants still continue their work through what Saul Newman has defined as 'autonomous spaces', through the radical occupation and re-appropriation of urban public space in order to reclaim their right to the city and to work outside the state's parameters. However, these movements were not always devoid of conflict, power struggles, divisions, setbacks and faults, with most of these related to intergenerational and gender problems on the one hand and the lack of technical support on the other. These problems sometimes led to the fractionalisation of groups and hampered the continuity of their projects. Moreover, these movements faced and are still facing continuous repression and close surveillance from state authorities. Participants adapt and readapt to these conditions in order to maintain their autonomy and guarantee their own personal safety. The emergence of these movements re-writes the history of libertarian ideologies and practices in the South of the Mediterranean. Adapted to local contexts, such as that of the Arab-speaking world, the new repertoires of contentious emancipatory narrations and struggles decolonise European libertarian and anarchist ideologies and expand this primarily white political philosophy to non-Western contexts.

NOTES

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19. M. Bamyeh, 'Anarchist Method, Liberal Intention, Authoritarian Lesson', 331.
20. *Ibid.*, 322.
21. A. Zakī, *al-Anārkiyya: al-madrasa al-thawriyya allati na'rifuha* (al-Qahira: Dar al-Khamasin, 2012), 7.
22. S. Newman, 'Postanarchism and space: Revolutionary fantasies and autonomous zones'. *Planning Theory*, 10:4 (2011), 348.
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24. For a deeper insight into the LSM and the re-emergence of anarchism in Egypt see: L. Galian, 'New Modes of Collective Actions: The Re-emergence of Anarchism in Egypt', in F. Gerges, ed. *Contentious Politics in the Middle East. Popular Resistance and Marginalized Activism beyond the Arab Uprisings* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 351–372.
25. 'Asian changed its name after internal divisions to La Commun Libertaire—al-Mushtarak al-Taharruri.
26. It is important to say that there has not been any known self-declared anarchist groups or movements in the Arab world since the end of the IWW. For more information see: I. Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860–1914* (Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2010).
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29. The first book on anarchism translated into Arabic was Daniel Guerin's *Anarchism From Theory to Practice* (1970) by the Professor of Law from Lebanon George Saad. Four thousand copies were distributed, most of them in the Arab region.
30. U. Gordon, *Anarchy Alive! Anti-authoritarian Politics from Practice to Theory* (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 17.
31. Blech 7es (2012). Available at: <http://blech7es.org/> [Accessed April 12, 2015].
32. Ibid.
33. Interview with Naguib in 2016.
34. Ikhtyar, 'Ikhtyar'. *Facebook* (2013). Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/ikhtyarforgerstudies/> [Accessed May 20, 2015].
35. Interview with Mazin Kam al-Maz, 2013.
36. Yassin-Kassab, & Al-Shami, '*Burning Country. Syrians in Revolution and War*', 57.
37. In English: Budur Hassan, a Palestinian activist and Leila al-Shami, a Syrian activist, have extensively documented the life and work of Omar 'Aziz in the Syrian Revolution. See: B. Hassan, 2015. 'Radical Lives: Omar 'Aziz' (2015) *Novara Media*. Available at: <http://novaramedia.com/2015/02/23/radical-lives-omar-aziz/> [Accessed March 10, 2015], L. Al-Shami, 'The Life and Work of Anarchist Omar 'Aziz, and his impact on self-organisation in the Syrian Revolution' (2014) *Tahrir-ICN*. Available at: <https://tahriricn.wordpress.com/2013/08/23/syria-the-life-and-work-of-anarchist-omar-aziz-and-his-impact-on-self-organization-in-the-syrian-revolution/> [Accessed April 5, 2015]. In Arabic see: M.K. Al-Maz, 'Omar 'Aziz wa nihayat al-muzaqaf' (2014) *al-Hiwar al-Mutamadden*. Available at: <http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=417680> [Accessed March 4, 2015].
38. B. Hassan, 'Omar 'Aziz: Rest in Power' (2013). *Wordpress*. Available at: <https://budourhassan.wordpress.com/2013/02/20/omar-aziz/> [Accessed March 10, 2015].
39. L. Al-Shami, 'The Life and Work of Anarchist Omar 'Aziz, and his impact on self-organisation in the Syrian Revolution'. *Tahrir-ICN*, 2014. Available at: <https://tahriricn.wordpress.com/2013/08/23/syria-the-life-and-work-of-anarchist-omar-aziz-and-his-impact-on-self-organization-in-the-syrian-revolution/> [Accessed April 5, 2015].
40. O. 'Aziz, 'A Discussion Paper on Local Councils in Syria' by the Martyr and Anarchist Comrade, Omar 'Aziz' (2013). *Tahrir-ICN*. Available at: <https://tahriricn.wordpress.com/2013/09/22/syria-translated-a-discussion-paper-on-local-councils-in-syria-by-the-martyr-and-anarchist-comrade-omar-aziz/> [Accessed August 24, 2016].
41. 'Aziz, 'A Discussion Paper on Local Councils in Syria'.
42. Ibid.
43. It is necessary to notice that here 'Aziz does not use the word *sha'b* (people), but *bashar* (human being). Mohammad Sami al-Kayal a friend and comrade of 'Aziz points out that 'He did not believe in "The people", that jargon coined by authority to maintain its power. He saw human beings who live, thrive and spout their potential'. Hassan, 'Omar 'Aziz: Rest in power'.
44. 'Charter of the Social Contract. Self-rule in Rojava'. *Peace in Kurdistan. Campaign for a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question* (2014). Available at: <https://peaceinkurdistancampaign.com/charter-of-the-social-contract/> [Accessed September 25th, 2017].

45. M. Leezenberg. 'The ambiguities of democratic autonomy: the Kurdish movement in Turkey and Rojava'. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16(4) (2016), 682.
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